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7EDITORIAL FOREWORD
The Belarusian Yearbook is a longterm joint project of Belarus’ ex
pert community. This publication presents an integral analysis of the
state of affairs in essential domains of state and society on an annual
basis.
The presidential election campaign of 2010 predetermined the
developments in almost every segment of social and state life, while
the finale of the campaign – the brutal dispersion of the rally in the
Independence Square – has already had an impact on all aspects of
state life with no exception (including the sectors that have
traditionally stayed out of politics – sports, popculture, etc.)
Below are the key trends of the year 2010, based on a complex
contentanalysis of the Yearbook’s texts:
• Decisionmaking authority is concentrated within a progressive
ly narrowing group of people who bear no responsibility whatso
ever for implementation;
• The deteriorating state administration crisis manifested itself in a
misalignment of policies pursued by state institutions, primarily
due to the widening gap between those making decisions and
those responsible for implementation;
• The series of successful attempts to fit into the regional political
and economic context through modifications of the foreign polit
ical paradigm became a trend that was ruined by lateyear devel
opments;
• Less successful, but not less persistent attempts to overcome the
isolation of the state and society were made throughout the year
by both sides, but then again, the outcomes of the December 2010
events froze all the positive trends;
• Belarus has made a name in the global economic system, mostly
as a borrower, and completed the year as a debtor with vague re
payment prospects.
Contributing to this Yearbook were independent analysts and
experts, as well as specialists representing various think tanks,
including the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS), the
Institute for Political Studies “Political Sphere”, the Research Center
of the Institute for Privatization and Management, the Agency of
Humanitarian Technologies – Centre for Social Innovation, NOVAK
Axiometrical Research Laboratory, the Independent Institute of Socio
Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), the Belarusian Economic
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Research and Outreach Center (BEROC), the Centre for Eastern
Studies (Warsaw, Poland), the Polesski Fund of International and
Regional Studies (Chernigov, Ukraine), eBelarus Research Center.
As a joint effort, the Yearbook is designed to promote public
discussions about current transformations in Belarus and development
options the country has, and facilitate the work of state functionaries,
business managers, members of the diplomatic corps, journalists,
politicians and community leaders.
Valeria Kostyugova
Anatoly Pankovsky
Vitaly Silitsky
9STATE AUTHORITY
10 	



PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
AND SECURITY AGENCIES: BEFORE AND AFTER
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Pyotr Valuev
Summary
The process of transformation of Belarusian security agencies started after
Viktor Sheyman vacated the office of state secretary of the Security Council
that also entailed reauthorization and reallocation of duties in other security
agencies. As a result, special services and security agencies were actually
subordinated to the Presidential Administration, or, to be more exact, to
President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko, the eldest son of the
Belarusian president. Control over the strongest and most effective special
services is thus concentrated in “one hand.”
The changes above, and also the 19 December events and the crackdown on
the opposition that followed, interrupted the dialogue with the European Union,
which was one step away from recognition of Lukashenko’s Victory (on certain
terms) and aiding him financially. Given the substantial disagreements among
Belarus and Russia, Alexander Lukashenko faces not easily soluble problems,
first of all economic, caused by the lack of resources to keep the present model
functioning. Besides, there were other serious problems inside the country,
specifically the dropping popularity rating on the threshold of the election, the
opposition backed by the West, functionaries uncertain about their future, special
services balled in “one fist”, the lack of a consolidating ideological core, and
so on. In 2011, Alexander Lukashenko will keep trying to balance between
Russia, the West, and home policy vectors.
Tendencies:
• De jure and/or de facto, security agencies and special services found
themselves underfoot of the Presidential Administration, to be more exact,
President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko;
• Inconsistency of actions and misunderstanding throughout the past year
(including the pre8election period) within the “opposition8Europe8
Lukashenko” triangle resulted in the 19 December events and reprisals that
followed, against the background of the frozen dialogue with Europe.
Reform called “Viktor Lukashenko”
In contemporary Belarus, the hierarchy of governmental agencies is
less important than the person who controls it all. The Security Coun
cil used to supervise special services before 2008. The Presidential
11
Administration or, as a matter of fact, President’s National Security
Aide Viktor Lukashenko, took over control. As a result, the Security
Council turned into an advisory board. Although Viktor Lukashenko
is a member himself, it did not enable the Council to make any partic
ular decisions.
Realignment of human resources began in 2008 and gained
momentum in the autumn of the same year after Viktor Sheyman
resigned his office of secretary general of the Security Council.
Viktor Lukashenko controlled security agencies singlehandedly
in 2009 and 2010. He certainly made use of advice from more
experienced fellows, who had been building up political muscle for
years in top floor offices. However, the 2009 and 2010 personnel
reshuffles were initiated by Viktor Lukashenko personally. A few
scandals surfaced at that time, namely the criminal charges pressed
against officers of the State Control Committee’s Financial
Investigations Department and highranking KGB officers.
Essential changes occurred in 2010 in Viktor Lukashenko’s
backing agency – the Operating Analytical Centre (OAC) formed at
the Presidential Administration. Earlier, the Center had the status of
a complementary special service, which was not only engaged in
investigations, but also had agents in all government institutions from
the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Sports to regional tax offices. In
2010, it was finally assigned the status of the State Center for
Information Security, which was earlier subordinate to the Council of
Ministers. It was followed by staff changes in the OAC and dismissal
of Sheyman’s people.
Today, the OAC performs a lot more functions. In 2009, the Center
focused on the fight against corruption and, to a lesser extent, political
inquiries. After a year, it was commissioned to monitor streams of
information and actually to control the Internet. So, the OAC plays a
more important role now, although it has got a bit weaker. The OAC
lost fighters, but still has analysts, political technologists with a well
developed infrastructure for highgrade internal political
investigations, and information departments capable of controlling
the Internet, as well as determining the human resources policy.
Basically, the OAC’s “muscles” were brought out in the outside.
Sheyman supervised a simplified command system, which provided
for direct subordination of entities like the special rapid response unit
(SOBR) to the Security Council. After the reshuffle in security agencies
lobbied by Viktor Lukashenko, the whole system was retailored to
match his ambitions, specifically to bring him up to a higher level of
State authority
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the political pyramid in view of his more appropriate destination,
rather than just the position of a president’s assistant.
After all, a new agency emerged and it had the right to examine
any sector of economy, security agencies, human resources, etc.
It concentrates enough resources to pull strings at different levels.
However, it is not about the overall control since even Viktor
Lukashenko is not omnipotent.
Moving of the president’s son to the forefront complicated the
decisionmaking process in the Presidential Administration to a
certain degree. The Viktor Lukashenko team could influence
economic decisions heavily. It is enough to mention that his team
worked on the sale of Belaruskali, and not only the government, but
also the OAC provided its expert opinion.
The system of influence centers in both the government and
Presidential Administration downgraded to simple allocation of duties
in the Administration. Journalists are groping for striking metaphors
and keep writing about “hawks and pigeons”, while it is more
appropriate to talk about “hawks and hawks.” The only thing is that
some of them are white and the others are black.
Vladimir Makey’s group, which unites foreign policy
professionals, can be identified as the “white hawks.” The group was
more or less independent, because Viktor Lukashenko was actually
too far from foreign policy, although his agencies were involved in
2008, when the idea of a dialogue between the West and Belarus was
brought back to life once again, and Viktor Lukashenko prepared
several research notes, which helped the president to choose the
concept offered by Mr. Makey. It is not improbable that those notes
were at least as good as the reports coming from the Foreign Ministry.
However, Viktor Lukashenko’s influence has no feedback as he
lacks longterm contacts with foreign politicians. He did not promise
anything to anyone personally, except for Javier Solana. But nobody
knows what he promised.
Today (and earlier, of course), political weight in governmental
circles is determined by personal access to the Belarusian ruler. Viktor
Lukashenko has the greatest opportunities, as he meets with the
president at least twice a week.
Operating Analytical Centre vs. State Security Committee
Meanwhile, the relations between the OAC and KGB remain quite
intense. The latter is an institutional agency with extensive capacities
13
and resources for fullrange activities. Both agencies confront each
other now and again and it is usually called “little misunderstand
ings”, the impacts of which go up to the surface sometimes. But no
one sees a real fight between the special services.
The KGB is directly subordinated to the president. The chairman
is entitled to come to the president with weekly reports. During such
troubled times as now, the KGB chief can report almost every day.
Now he plays the biggest role ever. The OAC thus fell by the wayside,
as it cannot influence investigative procedures directly. The mutual
relations between the KGB and OAC are complicated not because
the “vertical” is erected in a wrong way, but because the OAC is not
always aware of what the KGB is up to and vice versa. And it is not a
fight between the two special services, but simply noncoordination.
As concerns the State Control Committee (SCC), it should not be
regarded as a special service. The SCC wields less power despite direct
subordination to the president. On the contrary, special services assess
all actions of the SCC to be sure that all inspections are conducted “in
an appropriate manner”. The SCC’s actions have not always been
legitimate and lawful. Special services clamped down on many anti
market attempts of state controllers as they were inconsistent with
the liberalization policy, like it happened with the tobacco market,
alcoholic beverages, and exports where the SCC overstepped
authority not only to replenish the state treasury, but also to satisfy its
own appetite.
With security agencies’ reattachment to Viktor Lukashenko,
President’s National Security Aide within the structure of the
Presidential Administration, the position of the Administration
consolidated even more. On the other hand, the struggle for power
between the Administration and other government institutions shifted
inside the Administration.
In 2010, the primary goal of special services – both the 4th
department of the KGB and OAC – was to prepare for the presidential
election. A special group was formed in the OAC to work on local,
parliamentary, and presidential elections. Preparation for the local
elections was started as early as spring 2009. The presidential pre
election campaign was launched at that time as well. The opposition
entered the presidential campaign much later.
The second field of concern of the special services in 20082010
was fostering relations between the West and Belarus. The OAC and
KGB were involved alongside the Foreign Ministry and Presidential
Administration. The fight against corruption was the third direction.
State authority
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President Lukashenko still wants to know who steals from him in a
wrong way.
Expert examination of investment projects in the economic sector
is one more direction. All targeted privatization projects on sales of
land plots and production facilities, for example the Belaruskali case,
passed through the OAC. The government offered an international
investor for Belaruskali (it was a Chinese trader), but following an
examination conducted by the OAC, the investor was replaced
because “a trader cannot be an investor”. Azot was also sold with the
participation of special services, which took a hand in corporatization
and stock sale.
Perhaps the only area where special services did not cut in was
the supervision over local administrations, community outreach, and
inspections directed by Makey as the management quality was what
really mattered then. Nevertheless, the fifth line of special services’
activity was personnel policy, and everyone knows that “cadres are
allimportant”. For this reason, security services are entitled to study
personnel files and make decisions on career assignments.
Information security should be mentioned here too. OAC officers
worked on the decree on the Internet. Its first draft was much better
than the final version, which provoked a burst of criticism on the part
of Internet users and Belarusian civil society institutions.
It is safe to assume however that the first half of the year 2011 will
pass under the influence of the KGB, which is in charge of all
investigatory actions in relation to the opposition. The State Security
Committee is assigned the political task to comb out the political field
to give way to other, saner and more organized opposition forces. The
second task the KGB is supposed to cope with is “to detect” a
conspiracy in order to frighten government officials. In fact, a
revolution can be successful provided that there are two basic
components, namely mass street protest actions and a conspiracy
inside the ruling elite. Therefore, these two components should be
preventively nipped in the bud.
Everything is under suspicion: mutual non.compliance
with obligations
December 19 events were a logical consequence of the excessively
increased role of security agencies integrated into the political pro
cess. They can ensure any result except for electoral support. After
the popularity rating report was put on Lukashenko’s desk (and it was
15
only about a half voters who came to the ballot boxes), the force sce
nario was used and special services came upon the stage.
The work on cordoning the Square (Kastrycnickaja
(Oktyabrskaya) Square of Minsk, the usual place for all sorts of rallies)
was started long before the election. Enforcers used the methods they
had been honing for such occasions. They were free to act as they
thought fit in case many people come to protest. Presidential campaign
consultant Viktor Sheyman, who actually managed the campaign, was
ready at hand. And so happened what had to happen, as special
services were preset for a counter play. The scale of actions and their
consequences were determined by Lukashenko’s decision and his fear
of a probable conspiracy.
All security agencies involved in maintaining of the dialogue
with the opposition closely monitored activities of the alternative
candidates. The information that they were extracting had not
aroused serious concern up to a certain moment. Minsk and the
EU initially agreed that European institutions would not supply
money for the opposition’s undertakings. If special services did not
obtain information that all were supposed to come to the Square at
the order of the “donors”, and that Andrey Sannikov and Nikolay
Statkevich’s headquarters were entertaining the utopian idea of a
“government of national confidence”, probably Alexander
Lukashenko would not have resorted to using brutal force against
the rioters.
In the TV and radio addresses to the nation, practically all
presidential candidates called on people to come to the Square as soon
as the polling stations close. It broke the agreements between
Radoslaw Sikorski, Guido Westerwelle and the Western Group1.
People were expected to come together in the Square, stand there for
a while, and go home. Nobody was supposed to go to Independence
Square. There was no common plan. But the police interference was
quite predictable. The only question was how the police would react.
Nothing sophisticated was needed to provoke mass riots. It was done
not only by provocateurs, but also members of the Belarusian Christian
Democracy and the Speak the Truth campaign. Young minds are easy
to get overexcited.
1 The Western Group is just a code name. They are the people who executed
the order of the president to work on the “multivector policy” in the western
direction. In case of a onevector policy, the group would be referred to ac
cordingly, say “the eastern”, “northern”, or “southeastern”.
State authority
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The Presidential Administration was doing all right coping with
the tasks up to 5 p.m. on December 19, the election day. What
happened next actually ruined all efforts and successes achieved in
negotiations between the Belarusian government and the West. It was
reasonable just to stay put doing nothing, because the force scenario
would neutralize all efforts of the Western Group in the Presidential
Administration. Like many other persons in history, Alexander
Lukashenko used security agencies to disperse the peaceful protest
rally on December 19.
During the previous election campaign, Lukashenko enjoyed the
support of 65% of voters and officials added 15% making up to the
boss. On December 19, he won the election not singlehandedly but
with the help of the entire vertical, which he constructed. Some
objective factors throw discredit upon his leadership capabilities. And
the officials are not that confident in their future anymore. In turn, it
casts doubts upon the officials’ loyalty. President Lukashenko has to
either buy them off or intimidate them.
Officials can be paid off by means of privatization, but it would
inevitably lead to redistribution of power. Therefore, Lukashenko will
most likely approve selective privatization and distribute the targets
personally with due gratitude to those who helped him in retaining
power. It is certainly not about strategic facilities, but only trade
outlets, warehouses, transportation companies and so on. It is even
easier to settle accounts with special services: it is enough to raise
salaries in their departments.
Policy for outward and in.house use
Over the six months following the election, Lukashenko will take steps
to find out terms for reloading the disrupted “dialogue”. The West
regards a declaration of political prisoners release to be a fundamen
tal issue. But no one – except (even) Lukashenko – knows how it
will occur technologically. Any mitigation of sentences or post con
viction pardon for political prisoners can be taken as a step forward. It
will serve as proof if some court hearings are postponed till May to
have more time to explore possibilities of dialogue with the West.
On the other hand, the opportunity to come to terms with Russia
once again playing the burned cards of rapprochement with EU
and diversification of raw material supplies still exists. The question
is whether the Kremlin rulers will let Lukashenko play this game
again.
17
The president believes he does not need domestic opposition,
although, objectively speaking, someone should control the 50
percent electoral field. Otherwise, a new opposition will take the lead
of malcontent voters. On the other hand, creation of a controllable
opposition is an answer for the West, but not for the Belarusian political
establishment. Officials would agree to formation of a pro
governmental party like Belaya Rus (‘White Rus (Ruthenia)’, a pro
presidential NGO). This option is however suitable for just a small
part of them, those who will occupy leading positions in the party. A
parliamentary opposition would be created with the use of the already
available oppositional resources. And such opposition is needed not
for inhouse, but for outward use.
President Lukashenko cannot tolerate sitting at the negotiating
table with the people who used to work for him. They said more than
once that no quarter would be given once they come to power. Besides,
the president is right indeed when speaking about an opportunity for
the opposition to have seats in the parliament provided that candidates
(or institutions) really command voters’ support. In fact, formation of
Belaya Rus was suspended among other things because it had no
ideology and lacked people’s support. None of the existing parties
enjoys support. And it is too hard to give these parties the mandates as
they always fail to poll at least the 7% required by the law. They will be
therefore promoted by local administration that can result in a conflict.
By the way, the incumbent president has a problem with ideology
too. Ideology always comes from wellorganized ideological groups,
i.e. parties. There will be no ideology unless Lukashenko eases control
over the political field and provides conditions for unrestricted
competition between parties. The ideology department has not
employed a single resourceful expert capable to build up ideology,
political technologists, or propagandists so far. As a matter of fact, it
is a weakness of the president, of which he makes no secret. Neither
Alexandr Radkov, nor other socalled governmental ideologists are
capable of putting forward an ideology, which would validate the
social structure model Lukashenko is seeking to implement. It should
not be a bunch of wellformed proclamations and slogans. It must
energize.
Today, Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy is to carry out tactical
tasks to retain power. For this purpose he used the Russian vector at
first, then suddenly started “to make advances” to the West. After
December 19, he has to keep hold of three directions – Russia, Europe
and, in addition, the situation inside the country.
State authority
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Forecast for 2011
A distinct opposition will hardly emerge in 2011. It can only happen if
Lukashenko returns to the dialogue with Europe at least at the level
of 2010. He has to repay European loans, for instance with some cos
metic changes in the autocratic model.
Alterations of the election system can be adopted depending on
how far Lukashenko will go in the western direction. The European
Union is presently stressing a few points: preservation of stability in
the state, which it neighbors, respect for human rights, and non
alignment with Russia. Special services will therefore play a smaller
role, while the OAC will engage in development of strategic targets,
goal setting, making contacts, etc. At the same time, in the first half of
the year, special services will be busy creating atmosphere of fear: the
political establishment will be scared of conspiracy, and society will
be scared of largescale reprisals and tortures. This work should be
done thoroughly, and no one knows when the backtonormal signal
will be given.
Belarus has no other choice but to constantly proclaim its multi
vector commitments. Lukashenko can appear face to face with Russia
and promise to sign the single currency agreement again. But it is not
an option for him because he would not be able to maintain the existing
economic model considering the restrictions established by the
documents on the Common Economic Space.
On the whole, the 2011 propaganda campaign priorities have been
already outlined. Firstly, it is repressive propaganda aimed at
intimidation. Secondly, it is propaganda of economic liberalization,
which has already proved to be faulty due to mutually exclusive
decrees and enactments, or pointless documents, such as Directive
No.4. If decisions on systemic reforms are made, their implementation
is impeded at the level of local authorities, which find it much more
convenient to regulate financial processes using the existing model.
Any liberties for business mean less money for functionaries. Thirdly,
there can be counterpropaganda in the EuropeBelarus vector. The
situation is far from being favorable here since revolutions in the
Middle East frighten the world community and distract attention from
the events in Belarus.
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FIVE HUNDRED.DOLLAR GOVERNMENT
Inna Romashevskaya
Summary
Last year, the Belarusian political and administrative authorities failed to take
strategic decisions that would have enabled them to overcome the negative
trends in the national economy and form a foundation for future sustainable
development. The Belarusian government had what probably was the last chance
to work out and implement efficient reforms, especially economic, based on
its own scenario, and it let that chance slip away. While pursuing short8term
political goals and lacking common views on the real place and prospects of
the country in the regional economy in conditions when energy is imported at
prices very close to market rates, the government settled for an imitation of
reforms designed to please internal and external stakeholders. The Sidorsky
government’s agenda therefore focused exclusively on four main objectives:
(1) to have Russia resume energy supplies at preferential prices; (2) to
demonstrate a successful performance of the social and economic development
targets in the final year of the five8year development program; (3) to continue
the “liberalization” campaign that allows the government to keep its control of
economic processes; (4) to ensure the re8election of the incumbent president
for another five8year term.
Tendencies:
• Complete domination of short8term tactical objectives aiming at maintaining
the status quo amid hopes that the country will reactivate the economic
model based on external subsidies;
• Imitation of long8term planning expressed in an indefinite postponement of
strategic decision8making (“pegged” to some specific development scenario);
• “Politicization” of the Belarusian state management system with a view to
fulfilling Lukashenko’s “sacred” election pledges, which called for a
mobilization of the entire state machine.
Energy supply terms, Customs Union and Common
Economic Space
The year of the presidential election began and ended with an “oil
war” – a headon confrontation between the Russian and Belarusian
governments over the terms of trade in oil and oil products – and
demonstrated yet again, this time even more vividly, that the Belaru
sian state policy depends entirely on the oil transport and processing
infrastructure located in its territory.
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The situations observed at the start and the end of the year 2010
are almost direct reflections – the government entered both 2010 and
2011 being positive that the matter of preferential supplies of energy
resources to the country had been resolved politically and only needed
to be formalized as a bilateral interstate agreement in the former case
and a contract for oil supplies in the latter. In both instances, this
country’s hopes for a continuation of the subsidybased existence of
the Belarusian state failed.
In a bid to grab the everevading cheap oil, the Belarusian
government in 2010 stepped up its efforts to work out and coordinate
the documents that constitute the regulatory framework of the two
interstate bodies – the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan
and the Common Economic Space (CES). The work on the 51 interstate
treaties to form the Customs Union and 17 framework agreements of
the future CES slowed down and accelerated depending on how
realistic the coveted oil preferences promised in exchange for
membership seemed to Belarus.
As early as January 4, Belarus was startled by the proposal of a
Russian government delegation to apply export duties to crude oil
deliveries to Belarus save for the supplies for domestic consumption
(agreed at 6.3 million metric tons), and “a representative of the state
administration”, quoted by BelTA statecontrolled news service,
threatened that Belarus might withdraw from the talks over the
Customs Union.1 Those discrepancies had climaxed by June, when it
became clear that the oil duty would not be abolished in the scope of
the Customs Union, and the Union deal was almost frustrated. Hardly
had the Belarusian government “digested” the consequences of
accession to the Customs Union when it engaged in a hasty
preparation of the CES deals (once Russia pledged that the oil duties
would be lifted as soon as the package of framework CES deals was
approved, and Belarus’ ratification alone sufficed).
The government therefore assumed very serious international
obligations without conducting a thorough analysis of possible
ramifications in a bid to enjoy concessional oil delivery terms as soon
as possible (Belarus was never granted the expected volume of
preferences, though). It was as early as February 2011 that the
country’s new Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich, who took over
1 Russia’s new approaches to oil trade with Belarus undermine the foundation
of the Customs Union // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
www.belta.by/ru/all_news/main2/i_470302.html.
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Sergey Sidorsky, slammed the export promotion program for the next
five years, drafted by the Foreign Ministry and Economy Ministry,
citing the absence of any specific Customs Union and CESrelated
mechanisms to facilitate exports. “I have to reiterate that the
government has taken a pause once the package of CES deals was
signed, as it believes that from now on everything will move forward
automatically… The program has not been fleshed out – there are no
initiatives coming from ministries and those who coordinate this
work”.2
For fairness’ sake, the same processes were going on in the Russian
“court”. Representatives in the Russian Economic Development
Ministry believe the political order for the soonest possible
development of the CES deals resulted in a failure to factor in many
unsettled issues, which will inevitable be brought into the spotlight
when the memberstates attempt to agree instruments to implement
the agreements.3
Some experts believe the governments of the CES memberstates
will have the most heated debate when discussing the mechanisms to
implement the deals on the unification of the legal framework for
subsidizing the manufacturing sector and agribusiness in the Common
Economic Space for the period to 2017.
Efforts to meet chief targets of the 2006–2010 social and
economic development plan
The election year naturally emphasized the importance of meeting the
parameters of the fiveyear social and economic development program
adopted at the Third AllBelarusian Assembly back in 2006. Through
out the year, there were quite bitter clashes between the Presidential
Administration and the Council of Ministers over drafting and further
implementation of the socalled “forecast for social and economic,
monetary and fiscal development” adopted for each year of the five
year period based on the indicators of the development program.
2 Myasnikovich insists on including CES opportunities when drafting export
expansion strategy // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
www.belta.by/ru/all_news/economics/Mjasnikovichpotrebovaluchityvat
vozmozhnostiEEPpripodgotovkeeksportnojstrategii_i_ 541972.html.
3 Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan friendship stumbles over documents // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2011/03/21/focus/
562949979897539
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The overview of the government’s work in last year’s Yearbook4
aptly calls this practice “rudimentary” amid global economic
processes, however, for political reasons, it became even more
significant in 2010. Anyway, the complexity of the government’s
endeavor may be attributed not only to the fact that it is mandatory in
Belarus to meet targets. The situation was further complicated by the
politicization of the very process of setting targets – the president
was supposed to report to delegates of the Fourth AllBelarusian
People’s Assembly on the performance of the previous fiveyear plan,
adopted by the previous Assembly, and the year 2010 had to
compensate for the underperformance of the previous year, hit by the
global recession, and push the aggregate result of the fiveyear period
(2006–2010) to the desired level. On the other hand, the government
did not have any room for maneuver when selecting economic
instruments to meet the targets.
Back in late 2009, Lukashenko slammed the forecast for 2010
prepared by the government and ordered National Bank of Belarus
Governor Pyotr Prokopovich and Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration Leonid Anfimov to revise it. It was at that early stage
that the first discrepancies between the Presidential Administration
and the Council of Ministers became apparent – the chief state
agencies differed as to which instruments should be used to tackle
the foreign trade deficit as the country’s top priority – either (a)
privatization of state property (which was part of Belarus’ deal with
the IMF) and streamlining of financing of state programs (again, via
the IMFrecommended National Development Agency, which is
supposed to be set up as part of the deal with the Fund), or (b) import
substitution, intensification of exports and attraction of foreign direct
investments.
At issue were some of the key parameters, primarily the GDP
growth target. Since the economy expanded only 0.4% in 2009,
affected by the global downturn, and amid the reviving markets of
the main trade partners, which inspired some optimism, the
government suggested a 2 to 3% GDP growth target for 2011. However,
under the Presidential Administration’s political pressure, the
government had to offer two scenarios in early 2010: the baseline
scenario envisaged a 2–3% GDP growth in 2010, whereas the target
scenario, a sort of the macroeconomic expansion ceiling for the year,
4 Sekhovich V. Government: a Crisis Test // Belarusian Yearbook 2009. Minsk.
2010. P. 27–34.
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included an 11–12% growth forecast. The latter, optimistic scenario
expectedly turned into the mandatory set of targets, and the 7.6%
economic growth reported at the end of the year was severely criticized
by the Presidential Administration.
The authorities were supposed to keep in mind their
commitments to the IMF (under the recent economic program
supported by a StandBy Arrangement) while debating the endeavor
to meet the macroeconomic targets. As hopes of replenishing state
budget revenues with receipts from oil product export faded and
pressure of the Presidential Administration (which led the crusade
for the “sacred” USD 500 monthly wage) got stronger, the IMF
started expressing additional concerns in its reviews on Belarus.
However, once the IMFbacked program was completed and the
authorities officially confirmed that there were no more plans to
borrow from the IMF, the opinions of the Fund’s review missions
and reminders about the commitments were arousing less interest
in the government.
The government was thus caught in a dilemma of having to meet
politicized (hence too high) economic targets while possessing a very
narrow range of instruments limited by the same political rhetoric.
The general economic performance was therefore quite poor in 2010,
as only five macroeconomic targets were met out of 19. Two of them –
the increase in industrial production by 11.3% and growth in import
by 20.9% indicate a lack of progress in resolving most crucial economic
problems (or rather an aggravation of the problems). Three major five
year indicators were not met – the growth in GDP, farm output, and,
worst of all, the reduction in foreign trade deficit.
Anyway, as the country got closer to December 19, the
presidential election day (announced in September), the key target
of attaining a USD 500 average monthly wage was brought to the
foreground. In a situation when increases in wages stemmed neither
from hikes in companies’ profits nor from an increase in labor
productivity, the artificial push of the average wage towards the
politicallymotivated target became the final straw that broke the
back of the Belarusian economy. The fact that the members of the
Council of Ministers and the National Bank of Belarus, being fully
aware of the consequences of that populist move, not only failed to
criticize it, but mobilized the entire state machine to reach the
coveted goal using purely administrative instruments, demonstrates
the complete “politicization” of the state management system in
Belarus.
State authority
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Economic liberalization
In 2010, the Belarusian government was faced with a challenge of keep
ing up economic liberalization while holding on to traditional admin
istrative economic levers without allowing privatization of major state
controlled property units.
High hopes for at least some progress in the country’s
liberalization endeavor were pinned on the socalled Directive No. 4,
which was first mentioned by Lukashenko in his April address to the
National Assembly and the nation. Experts believe the new economy
minister, Nikolay Snopkov, should take the credit for the active
promotion of the Directive, which, despite its doubtful status5, was
supposed to confirm the strategic commitments of the authorities to
the economic liberalization policy. The political weight of the
Directive, which was developed with a high (by Belarusian standards)
degree of engagement of the business community seemed so
substantial that some media claimed as early as the summer of 2010
that Mr. Snopkov would likely take over Sergey Sidorsky as the next
premier.
However, the draft Directive originally submitted to the
Presidential Administration in early June was sent back to the
government for revision a few times, which is why the signing of that
cornerstone document was chronically postponed (the president
finally signed it on December 31). During the second half of the year,
the head of state continually criticized both the draft Directive and
the hopes of the business community.
The government came under fierce criticism for the lack of a
systemic strategy for economic reforms. Watching its most
insignificant proposals on any substantial reform take months to have
a “go” or “no go” from the Presidential Administration, the
government opted for facelift transformations emphasizing “image
making” efforts. However, it relied primarily on its own resources
despite the large number of international reputation agencies ready
to step into Lord Bell’s shoes.
From this point of view, the government’s approach to the long
term target of getting into the World Bank’s top30 countries by the
overall ease of doing business is indicative. Inspired by the rapid
5 A peculiar way to express political will // [Electronic resource] Mode of ac
cess: http://www.belmarket.by/ru/103/190/8105/Особыйслучай
волеизъявления.html
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progress in the rankings in the previous three years (to position 58
from 115; the WB methodology was later revised and Belarus went
down to place 64), the president ordered his government back in 2009
to create a working group led by Deputy Prime Minister Andrey
Kobyakov to bring Belarus into the promised top30.
The action plan seemed solid enough, and Belarus hoped to
improve its rating to at least rank 48 in 2010. The government believed
the fast progress in the WB’s rankings would become a positive signal
to foreign investors. However, the session of the Council of Ministers
on June 13, 2010, where Mr. Kobyakov reported on the results of the
action plan, raised concerns of both independent experts and
representatives of the business community. The report presented by
the vicepremier indicated that on the one hand, the 27 draft regulatory
acts prepared by the working group mostly aimed at improving only
the pinpointed indicators assessed by the World Bank. On the other
hand, Kobyakov called for state officials to “reach out” to supervised
businesses that could be involved in WB’s sample interviews
conducted to evaluate businesses’ perception of the administrative
burden.6
Belarus moved down 4 notches to position 68 in the 2010 Doing
Business rankings (one reason for this was yet another change in the
methodology; furthermore, some documents that could have
improved the rating were adopted in the second half of the year, that
is, after the annual monitoring had been completed). However,
independent experts noted that FDI inflows in Belarus remained the
same in the previous years7 irrespective of the country’s Doing
Business efforts.
It is also noteworthy that the Presidential Administration brought
home to the government the idea that there were no systemic
objective obstacles to FDI inflows, and the lack of any significant
investment projects was attributed entirely to subjective qualities of
state officials8.
6 World Bank fails to embrace the scope of reform pursued in Belarus // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.belta.by/ru/person/opinions/
AndrejKobjakov_i_510884.html
7 FDI inflows in Belarus’ real sector exhausted // [Electronic resource] Mode
of access: http://belapan.by/archive/2010/10/07/416120/
8 http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/president/AdministratsijaPrezidenta
Belarusipredlagaetpostavitnabuduscheepjatiletiezadachupoudvoeni
juVVP_i_522760.html
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Conclusion
The year 2010 revealed the following marked tendencies that will de
termine the situation with the government of the state in 2011.
• The confrontation between the government and Presidential Ad
ministration became more pronounced. It cannot be ruled out that
when faced with the need to put in place hasty structural reforms
in 2011, the government will start paying less attention to politi
cal reasoning coming from the Presidential Administration, which
will only be responsible for the ideological content of the re
forms – a sort of “public relations” mission;
• The growing involvement in a situation, where to maintain the
status quo – the scenario than has dominated for the past de
cade – is not the real choice of elites, where further postpone
ment of reforms will not lead to conservation of the socioeconom
ic situation in the country, but on the contrary, will guarantee its
rapid deterioration.
The political and administrative authorities therefore need to come
to an understanding that as things now stand, any strategic decision –
the choice of any development pattern – will inevitably affect the
manageability of the state and living standards of the population in
the medium run.
The window of opportunity for reforming the country from within
was shut in late 2010. Any dramatic changes in the way the Belarusian
state functions and develops now will be introduced under an
unprecedented pressure of external forces and under scenarios that
have nothing in common with the Belarusian social and economic
development program for the coming five years.
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COOPERATION IN ARMS: BUILDING UP NEW
UPON OLD
Alexandr Alessin, Andrey Volodkin
Summary
Russia remained Belarus’ main partner in the military sector in 2010 despite a
whole bunch of controversies between the two. Military8political cooperation
was however complicated by the Minsk–Moscow conflict over the situation in
Kyrgyzstan and certain reluctance of the first during formation of the Collective
Rapid Response Forces (CRRF) of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), but the disputes paled into insignificance by the end of the year.
Military cooperation with China and the Near East was quite eventful as usual.
Belarus’ decision to send its military to contribute to the UN peace8making
efforts in Lebanon was something crucially new. As regards interaction with
NATO and European states, it was rather limited as always and no considerable
progress was made. Certain revitalization of contacts between the Defense
Ministries of Belarus and Lithuania is worth attention.
Mapping out of joint plans imply substantial funding for an upgrade of both
mutual relations and equipment of the armed forces and the system of troop
command and control, i. e. the matters of shared strong interest. The tiny
finances that Belarus can allocate to modernize its army make development of
rearmament approaches a priority.
Tendencies:
• The economic recession and scarcity of funds compelled to highlight key
points and determine particular army modernization targets that slowed down
ongoing military projects; efforts are mostly channeled towards upgrading
available weaponry rather than its replacement with new equipment;
• Belarusian8Russian relations in the politico8military sector were
unprecedentedly energetic yet very unstable with a series of ups and downs
in one year connected with political collisions between Minsk and Moscow
and ambitions of the Belarusian leaders who wanted to manifest greater
independence from Russia in the international arena;
• Military cooperation with Asia and the West basically followed the traditional
tendencies of the past few years.
Economic crisis and state arms program
High ranking officers say the Belarusian army is at the stage of imple
mentation of the State Arms Program scheduled for the years 2006
2015, which primarily focuses on keeping the available arms and mil
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itary equipment missionready1. Defense Ministry officials believe
actions taken under the new program have enhanced operational ef
ficiency of command and control of the air force and air defense and
considerably increased serviceability of arms and materiel of air de
fense missile units and radioradar troops.
The military also take the credit for reequipment of the special
operations forces with new kinds of special small arms, optical
surveillance and targeting devices, special communication facilities
and individual protective gears. The land forces were provided with
simulation training systems substantially.
However, the actual situation in the Belarusian army is not that
cloudless as the military use to report, which first of all concerns upto
date arms and equipment supplies. Defense Minister of Belarus Yury
Zhadobin had to admit once that the government could not afford a lot of
things the army would like to have. The Belarusian armed forces experience
shortage of modern simulation systems and cannot even use the ones they
already have to the fullest extent. The army is still unable to provide the
required amounts of vehicles, ammunition, and fuel for combat training.
It may be a conjecture on our part but the scantiness of financial
resources probably explains why the Defense Ministry does not plan
on purchasing of new arms and military equipment for the land forces
in large quantities for the period of up to 2020. Efforts are mostly
channeled towards upgrade of the available weaponry engineered
during the Soviettime. As far as we can judge by the available
information, emphasis is put on extra protection of land forces’
vehicles and their maneuvering characteristics, weaponcontrol
systems, extending of the range, higher accuracy, and fire power of
weapons used by motorrifle and armorheavy units.2
Meanwhile, the air defense troops have been supplied much more
extensively than the land forces in line with the air defense
1 Optimization of the numerical strength of the armed forces and transition to
new organization and establishment were carried out at the previous stage of
reorganization. However, a number of experts believe that the current num
ber of the Belarusian military is still excessive. In their opinion, the number is
determined not by the strategic practicability but the bargaining with Russia
for economic preferences, which have an adverse effect on upgrade of the armed
forces. See: Alessin A. Army: Reorganization Instead Modernization // Year3
book Belarus 2008 [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://nmnby.eu/
pages/6.html.
2 Alessin A. What do Belarusians Have to Protect the Motherland? // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://news.open.by/country/47817.
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strengthening program3. These troops form the basis of the joint
regional air defense system of Belarus and Russia and they are
therefore used as a weighty argument in the neverending bargaining
for privileges and preferences.
The Belarusian army had seen better days in terms of financial
provision. The global economic recession hit the entire economy of
the country. Since the budgetary performance is far from being perfect,
the Defense Ministry had to curtail the defense budget planned for
2010 down to the minimum.
Considering what military officials say now and then, the year 2011
does not give much hope either. The military will keep trying to save
as much funds as possible focusing on salary fund payments,
satisfaction of accounts payable, transportation and communication
charges, food and medical supplies. For this reason, all other plans,
including purchase of new weapons and equipment have to be
recalibrated at this point (towards reduction of course). President
Alexander Lukashenko mentioned this himself in a meeting on
financing of the second phase of the State Arms Program held on
November 22, 2010.
Relations with Russia and the CSTO
Despite the rapprochement with the West observed throughout 2010,
Russia remains the major defense partner of Belarus. This coopera
tion was developing in two formats: bilateral relations and interaction
within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Although
the organization unites quite a number of CIS states, Russia is its ab
solute leader when it comes to both politics and defense. Therefore,
Belarus’ attitude to the CSTO and its initiatives depended directly on
the relations between Minsk and Moscow, which were rather compli
cated last year.
In early 2010, Belarus did not assume the CSTO presidency as it
was supposed to do on a rotation basis as far back as June 14, 2009 at
the summit of the organization hosted by Moscow. The Belarusian
delegation headed by the president declined participation in the heat
of the “milk war” against Russia. Nevertheless, Belarus signed the
agreement on formation of the CSTO Collective Rapid Response
Forces October 15, 2009 but was not in a hurry to ratify it. The House
3 Alessin A. What do Belarusians Have to Protect the Motherland? // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://news.open.by/country/47817.
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of Representatives finally did so at the 26 May session. Last year, the
CRRFrelated topics were a theme song of the whole militarypolitical
component of the BelarusianRussian relations, the second essential
ingredient after formation of the Customs Union.
Buildup and functioning of the joint BelarusianRussian air
defense system was another major point of the negotiations. Minsk
and Moscow ratified agreements on creation of the regional air defense
system almost simultaneously in 2009, but the scheduled actions
grounded to a halt actually. For instance, as of May 2010, the parties
had not appointed the steering bodies and joint air defense group
commander, although they planned it for March4.
The situation in Kyrgyzstan and Lukashenko’s hostile opinion on
CSTO’s nonintervention during the April revolution in the country
was a bone of contention in political relations between Belarus and
Russia in spring 2010. Official Minsk granted political asylum to
ousted President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev after Russia
refused to shelter the refugee, thus displaying its position on the
events. It was more like an explicit act of defiance towards Moscow’s
policy. The political conflict certainly affected military cooperation.
Russia postponed ratification of the signed agreement on development
of militarytechnical cooperation with Belarus. The session of the joint
board of the two Defense Ministries was postponed twice in April and
May.
Nevertheless, the tension caused by the attitude to the events in
Kyrgyzstan was alleviated by the end of May and the parties got
back to militarypolitical questions as a matter of routine. As it was
mentioned before, Belarus ratified the agreement on formation of
the CSTO CRRF on May 26. In June, the defense minister specified
the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Belarusian forces
to be delegated to the CRRF.5  Belarus also adopted an action plan
aimed at arrangement of the conflict in Kyrgyzstan worked out by
the secretaries of the CSTO Security Councils on June 14. Belarus
was the last member state to approve the plan one week after the
others.6 The package of documents on formation of the CSTO
4 Mukhin V. Unarmed Sky of the Union State // [Electronic resource] Mode of
access: http://www.ng.ru/nvo/20100525/1_sky.html.
5 Belarusian Parliament Completes Ratification on CSTO CRRF // [Electronic
resource] Mode of access: http://afn.by/news/i/137035.
6 А. Lukashenko Agrees to CSTO Plan on Resolution of the Conflict in Kyr3
gyzstan // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://afn.by/news/i/
137439.
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Collective Forces signed by Lukashenko was sent to the organi
zation’s secretariat in August.7 A tactical training exercise of the
Belarusian air force and air defense was held the same month at
Ashuluk range in Russia.
Autumn saw another cooldown in BelarusianRussian military
cooperation, apparently resulting from the presidential election
campaign in Belarus and Lukashenko’s attempt to show both
domestic and foreign viewers his independence from Moscow and
his intention to build bridges to the West. For instance, the president
of Belarus considered it irrelevant to interrupt his working trip to
the Brest region to meet with CSTO Secretary General Nikolai
Bordyuzha who arrived in Minsk in early September to discuss
Belarus’ forthcoming presidency in the organization8. In October,
the mass media informed referring to “a source in Minsk” that
Lukashenko allegedly threatened to withdraw Belarus from all post
Soviet integration institutions unless Russian leaders recognize his
future election victory.9  On top of this, Belarus refused to send its
units to the Interaction2010 exercise of the CSTO CRRF.10  The joint
board of the Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries did not hold
a single session in 2010.11
Some positive trends were observed by the end of the year. A
Russian military delegation came to the Belarusian Joint Staff in
November to coordinate the schedule of the forthcoming Belarusian
Russian joint operational exercise planned for 2011.12  On December
8, the State Duma of Russia ratified the agreement on development of
7 А. Lukashenko Signs All Documents on the CRRF // [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2009/10/20/
ic_news_112_319761/
8 N. Bordyuzha Discusses Belarus’ Presidency in CSTO // [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://novostnoj.ru/post/pol_113.html.
9 Lukashenko Threatens to Withdraw Belarus from Integration Processes //
[Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://ru.delfi.lt/abroad/belorussia/
lukashenkoprigrozilvyhodomizvsehintegracionnyhprocessovs
rossiej.d?id=37252981.
10 Belarus Refuses to Send Airborne Troops to CSTO Exercise // [Electronic re
source] Mode of access: http://rus.ruvr.ru/2010/10/06/24452804.html.
11 Belarus and Russia’s Defense Ministries Hold Joint Sessions No More // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2010/11/
01/ic_news_112_354641/
12 Belarus and Russia Coordinate Concept of Joint Military Exercise // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.postwismar.de/topic
16470106_23537585.
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militarytechnical cooperation with Belarus13, which among other
things envisages licensefree import and export of weapons, military
equipment, and technology at domestic prices14.
Military cooperation with other states
Contacts with Asian countries remained quite intensive. Belarus has
regarded expansion of military exports and training of military per
sonnel in Third World countries one of its priorities. The format of
the “Asian vector” became a little wider last year. Alongside the ef
forts made to upscale bilateral relations, Belarus pursued establish
ing ties with multilateral politicomilitary institutions of Asia and
obtained partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
in April 2010.
China has been Belarus’ leading partner in Asia in all sectors
including defense for years. However, the past year was not
outstanding for both. The parties mainly concentrated on the joint
venture engaged in manufacture of hydromechanical transmissions
and chassis assembled from Belarusian parts. The venture was
established by the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant and Belarusian
Chinese VolatXingjian enterprise. A Chinese delegation headed by
the director general of the Chinese Aerospace Corporation with
respect to science and industry (which included representatives of
Xingjian) visited Belarus in March 2010 that testifies importance of
the project.15
The Belarusian defense minister went to China in May once again,
which has already become a yearly tradition. The two ministries signed
an agreement on military cooperation.16  Belarusian ranking officers
conducted negotiations with the Chinese throughout the year.
Belarusian media outlets did not provide any valuable information
about the results achieved, though.
13 Russian State Duma Ratifies Agreement on Military and Technical Coopera3
tion With Belarus // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
www.naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/12/08/ic_news_116_356805/
14 Privileged Arms Supplies // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
nmnby.eu/news/express/2659.html.
15 Chinese Business Delegation in Belarus // [Electronic resource] Mode of
access: http://www.vpk.gov.by/news.php.
16 Assessment of Belarusian Defense Minister’s Visit to China // [Electronic re
source] Mode of access: http://www.vsr.mil.by/index/89_1_1.html? publi
cation=89.
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Militarytechnical aspects were assigned the leading role in
military cooperation with the Near East. The BelarusianSyrian
commission for militarytechnical cooperation held the 9th session in
April 2010. The joint militarytechnical cooperation committee of
Belarus and the United Arab Emirates convened the first session in
October. The UAE agreed to participate in MILEX2011 international
exhibition of arms and military machinery to be arranged in late May
2011 in Minsk.
Military cooperation with Qatar was somewhat an exception.
Alongside the routine questions, the two countries conducted joint
maneuvers in July 2010 at the range of the 5th detached special
operations brigade of Belarus observed by Qatari Armed Forces Chief
of Staff Hamad Bin Ali Al Attiyah, who was visiting Minsk at that time
to meet with his Belarusian counterpart. By all appearances, the joint
exercise was a reciprocal gesture after the Belarusian military took
part in Ferocious Falcon general exercise in October 2008 and March
2010 in Qatar.17
Belarus’s intention to send a contingent outside the country on a
peacemaking mission accords with the government’s policy in the
Near East. In line with the law of 200318, Belarusian citizens can only
perform nonmilitary tasks in UN and OSCE peacemaking operations.
Nonetheless, the deputy chief of Joint Staff informed in May 2010
that Belarus was going to send troopers to Lebanon on an UNled
peacemaking mission. On August 2, the president signed Decree No.
400 on “deployment of servicemen of the armed forces of Belarus in
the Republic of Lebanon for participation in activities aimed at
maintenance of international peace and security”. Although the
decree only concerned nine people19, i. e. even fewer than those
delegated by the Baltic States, the very fact that the government
crossed out the fundamental principle of nonparticipation in combat
17 Belarus and Qatar Conduct Joint Special Tactical Military Exercise // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://5obrspn.ru/news/20100729170.
18 Law of the Republic of Belarus № 254З of 29.11.2003 on the procedure of
delegation of military servicemen, commanders and privates of the law en
forcement agencies, financial investigation institutions of the State Control
Committee of the Republic of Belarus, emergency situations bodies and units,
workers of prosecutor offices, and civilian personnel outside the Republic of
Belarus for participation in activities aimed at maintenance of international
peace and security
19 Comments to Decree № 400 of August 2, 2010 // [Electronic resource] Mode
of access: http://www.president.gov.by/press94096.html.
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actions outside the country was staggering. It is means a lot that
Belarus chose not a local conflict in the CIS or the Balkan Peninsula,
but the Near East.
As regards collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the year witnessed no breakthroughs. Contacts were
basically maintained under the NATO Partnership for Peace program
(actions specified by the individual BelarusNATO partnership program
2010–2011) and within the framework of international arms control
agreements. According to the program, a delegation of the Belarusian
Defense Ministry headed by Chief of Joint Staff Tikhonovsky
participated in a session of the EuroAtlantic Partnership Military
Committee in January 2010. A delegation of the NATO Headquarters
visited Minsk in March to discuss Belarus’ participation in the
Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process and to evaluate
progress in implementation of the objectives set for 2008 and 2010.20
As part of the second component, in AugustSeptember 2010, Belarus
arranged a training course at the Defense Ministry’s National Agency
for Verification and Inspections intended for officers of verification
missions of the OSCE and NATO who came to share expertise and brush
up their knowledge of the Russian language. A French military delegation
visited Minsk in September to address arms control matters.
Among the NATO members, military cooperation with Lithuania
was the most extensive. The Foreign Ministry of Lithuania said the
country was interested in cooperation with Belarus in the field of
transportation to load the Klaipeda port used for NATO supplies to
Afghanistan21  in line with the BelarusNATO agreement on transit of
military cargoes. Defense Minister of Belarus Zhadobin was invited
to Vilnius in autumn where the parties signed a defense agreement
and a cooperation plan for 2011.22  Considering that interaction
between the two defense agencies was actually at a zero level in late
2009, as Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene said23, the
countries made a breakthrough in 2010.
20 Delegation of NATO Headquarters Visit Belarus // [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/politics/i_344973.html.
21 Latvia to Share NATO Cargoes with Lithuania and Estonia // [Electronic re
source] Mode of access: http://ru.delfi.lt/news/politics/latviyapodelitsya
gruzaminatoslitvojiestoniej.d?id=28327481.
22 Minister of Defense Visits Lithuania // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:
http://www.vsr.mil.by/index?publication=204.
23 Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene: Am I an enemy to Belarus? //
News tut.by. Politics. 23.12.2009: http://news.tut.by/155786.html.
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Military contacts with another neighboring NATO member,
Poland, are hardly worth noting. Chief of Joint Staff Tikhonovsky went
to Warsaw twice and nothing is known about any agreements. The
land and air force commanders of Belarus and Poland held two
working meetings in the second half of the year. According to the
available information, they focused on airspace use control and
reporting of flights in the common border area.24
There were some sporadic meetings between Defense Ministry
officers with military delegations of Germany, Italy, and France.
Conclusion
Some actions aimed at upgrade of the armed forces of Belarus speci
fied by the state program were taken in the previous few years owing
to the appreciable economic growth in the precrisis period. The glo
bal recession slowed the process down. Moreover, a whole series of
actions of paramount importance are likely to be frustrated.
In spite of all political contradictions, Russia remains Belarus’
major defense partner in the bilateral format and in the CSTO, which
is troublesome for the most part. Over the past year, the bilateral
relations in the military sector passed through several stages from
stagnation early in the year caused by dragged out ratification of CSTO
CRRF protocols and implementation of the joint air defense system
arrangements to the spring conflict over the situation in Kyrgyzstan.
Then came reconciliation (in early May and August) together with
the Belarusian military exercise at the Russian range and support for
Russian initiatives addressed to the CSTO. Then it all cooled down
again in SeptemberOctober most likely due to the international
anxiety about the future presidential election in Belarus. And finally
the temperature went up again at the year end with scheduling of the
joint exercise planned for 2011 and ratification of the agreement on
development of BelarusianRussian militarytechnical cooperation.
It is safe to assume that the military cooperation line will still go
up and down in future. In fact, issues remain unresolved. They are
just put on the back burner in the situation aggravated by the notorious
presidential election in Belarus. At the same time, both countries are
motivated to maintain cooperation for objective reasons. Belarus
24 Belarusian and Polish Military Address Regional Security Matters // [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/
75339.
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depends on Russian military supplies needed to reequip the army,
and Russia depends on supplies of Belarusian component parts for
some enterprises of the militaryindustrial complex. Also, the territory
of Belarus is used for strategic purposes in case of a confrontation
with the West.
Given the recent developments in what concerns attitude of the
West towards the 19 December events in Belarus, cooperation with
NATO will most probably stall for a while. This does not seem to be a
huge problem for Belarus, as, in fact, interaction with Europe was
limited anyway and largely does not affect the defense potential of
Belarus or its neighbors. That is why it is much less dependent on
political fluctuations, than on future military relations with Russia.
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PARLIAMENT: AN ORNAMENTAL ELEMENT
OF “LAW.MAKING”
Andrey Kazakevich
Summary
During 2010, some prominent staff changes were made in the parliament,
though initiated by executive bodies rather than by the representative organ
itself. In 2010, the parliament had two regular sessions and one
extraordinary one. Eventually, more than 180 normative acts were adopted
in first and second readings. No bill was rejected by the House of
Representatives.
The parliament has no direct influence on Belarus’ foreign policy; it does not
take strategic decisions in this sphere. Nevertheless, the parliament and the
deputies do represent Belarus in the international arena to some extent. In
2010, parliamentary procedures were used in foreign8policy games (recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is most typical in this aspect).
Tendencies:
• The parliament is losing its political functions;
• The number of deputies representing the national level has dropped
significantly, while the amount of local administrations’ functionaries in the
parliament is growing;
• Tendencies in the legislation are stable: the parliament considers and amends
normative acts passed down by the government or the President.
There is a significant discrepancy between the de jure and de facto
political roles of the Belarusian parliament. There is truly a power
imbalance written into the Constitution and normative acts, but real
parliamentary activity is far from using even these constitutional po
wers.
It being difficult to define deputies’ functions and powers, we
cannot easily assess their decisions, initiatives, public statements
and other forms of political and civil activities. There are even more
difficulties with the status and role of the upper chamber – the
Council of the Republic. It can be regarded as a functionless body.
Its existence is stipulated by the Constitution but its role in the
state system is formal – it is a forum for informal communication
of the ruling elite. That is why we will analyze mainly the lower
chamber.
38 	



Parliament’s main features
According to the majority of analysts and researchers, the parliament
is steadily losing its political functions. In recent years the number of
deputies representing the national level has dropped from 24% in HR I1
to 10% in HR IV. While the number of administration functionaries
from the local level is growing.2 The age structure of the deputy corps
is changing drastically. Over the past 20 years the number of depu
ties aged 31–40 and 41–50 dropped respectively from 19.1 to 4.55%
and from 47.3 to 25.5%. At the same time, the number of preretire
ment deputies (51–60) has risen significantly: it doubled since 2000 –
from 27.3 to 61.8%. Young people below 31 have a stable representa
tion – 1 deputy (0.91%). The same is true about people over 60 (5.45–
6.36%) (Table 1).3
Table 1
Therefore, the deputy corps has grown older with preretirement
deputies dominating. The tables show that a deputy mandate is a kind
of honorable retirement for regional ruling elites, while its role in the
vertical political mobility is gradually reducing (see Table 1). This
tendency reflects the logics of parliament formation rather than the
1 Here and further the House of Representatives of the 1st convocation is ab
breviated as HR I, of the 2nd – HR II, etc.
2 See the results of the respective study: Belarusian Elite. Structure and Ten3
dencies // Research results. 2010. № 1. p. 15–16; http://palityka.org/wp
content/uploads/2010/04/elites.pdf.
3 Here and further see: Kazakevich A. Belarusian parliament during indepen
dence: evolution of deputy corps, 1990–2010 // Political sphere. № 15(2).
P. 44–71.
4 Age is given at the election period.
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fact that deputies are getting older. The succession between HR II
and HR IV is only 3 deputies.
The level of political selforganization and initiative of deputies is
also reducing: there are fewer groups, associations and party
structures. Party fractions disappeared from the Belarusian parliament
after the Supreme Soviet of XIIIth convocation was dismissed (1996);
deputy groups that could be called “political” stopped functioning
after 2004. Moreover, even nonpolitical groups, such as “Bulgaria’s
Friends”, “Promotion of Economic Development” in HR II, have
disappeared (Table 2).
Table 2. Deputy groups and associations in the House of
Representatives, 1996–2010
The same is true for party structures. The issue of establishing “the
party of the regime” or a significant political conglomeration of pro
regime political organizations has been raised more than once.
Nevertheless, since the moment when the authoritarian regime took
shape, the role, representation and number of political parties as well
as the number of political deputies in the parliament has dropped
(Table 3).
At present, the Belarusian parliament is not an influential political
institution. Its membership shows that it is gradually transforming into
an organ of honorable retirement for regional elites, providing some
assistance in legislation and help with public complaints, as well as
representing Belarus in the international arena.
The deputies show a very low level of political activity and
selforganization. Their role in voicing and representing public
interests is small, though there is some possibility of lobbying
State authority
40 	



interests of business structures, some regional or district groups.
As a result, parties have a marginal character, since 2004 deputy
groups have not been established. Moreover, a deputy mandate
is not a step towards higher state positions (examples are very
rare). The role of the parliament as a tool of vertical political
mobility is constantly reducing. Therefore, when evaluating the
parliamentary activities we should focus on two directions:
legislation and foreign policy.
Table 3. Parties in the House of Representatives, 1996–2010
Staff changes in 2010
During 2010, some prominent staff changes were made in the par
liament, though initiated by executive bodies rather than by the
activity of the representative organ itself. On May 20, 2010, Boris
Batura, Chairperson of the Council of the Republic, was appointed
Chairperson of Minsk regional executive council, substituting Le
onid Krupets. One person is not allowed to occupy both positions,
so Anatoly Rubinov became a new Chairperson of the Council of
the Republic. Boris Batura, just as two previous chairpersons of ex
ecutive councils appointed in 2010, became an ordinary member
of the upper chamber. New regional executives, Semyon Shapiro
(Hrodna region) and Nikolay Ladutsko (Minsk), were appointed
members of the Council of the Republic within the presidential
quota.
Mikhail Rusy, chairperson of the standing committee on
agricultural issues, was appointed Minister of Agriculture instead of
Semyon Shapiro, which is a quite rare thing. Earlier, in 2003–2004,
Mr. Rusy was already performing these duties.
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Legislation
Tendencies in the legislation are stable: the parliament considers and
amends normative acts passed down by the government or the Presi
dent. Deputies do have powers to significantly amend normative acts,
but only when there is no conflict with the fundamental interests of
the executive power.
For example, in 2010 the Council of the Republic of the 4th
convocation voted down a bill, which is rather untypical if not
extraordinary. The bill concerned amendments to the law on children’s
rights and interests. The reason for rejection was a collision of
normative acts. The bill could not be called fundamental or important.
Deputies usually show no initiative in elaborating new laws. Moreover,
such initiatives require total endorsement with the executive bodies.
In 2010, the parliament had two regular sessions and one
extraordinary one. Eventually, more than 180 normative acts were
adopted in first and second readings. No bill was rejected by the House
of Representatives. Among them, the majority of acts were submitted
by the government, the rest – by the President, and only one bill was
initiated by the deputies of the House of Representatives themselves.
These figures are typical for the Belarusian parliament: in 2004–2009
deputies initiated from 0 to 3.5% of the bills. Just as earlier, the
parliament took into consideration all decrees issued by the President.
In September 2010, according to the Constitution, the parliament
appointed the date for the main political event of the year – the
presidential election – for December 19.
Foreign.policy activities
The parliament has no direct influence on Belarus’ external policy; it
does not take strategic decisions in this sphere. Nevertheless, both
the parliament and the deputy corps are involved in representing Be
larus in the international arena. This representation has several es
tablished forms.  Firstly, it is work in interparliamentary organiza
tions. Secondly, it is voicing and promoting the official position dur
ing formal and informal meetings, visits, conferences, sessions. The
deputies generally voice the official position of the Belarusian author
ities and comment events, etc. They usually have no powers for con
ducting real negotiations and making decisions. Thirdly, the depu
ties promote economic cooperation between countries. And, finally,
they provide the executive bodies with tools to use parliamentary pro
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cedures for foreignpolicy games. The situation with recognizing Abk
hazia and South Ossetia is a vivid example of this.
Western vector. According to the general policy towards
improving relations with the West, interparliamentary cooperation
and participation in respective regional and international
organizations were an important activity in 2010. The Belarusian
delegation took part in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Eastern
partnership (Euronest).
The Assembly includes 120 deputies – 60 EP deputies and 10
deputies of national parliaments from each member state. Since the very
beginning the EU has questioned the status of the House of
Representatives because of nondemocratic elections of 2008. On their
part, Belarusian parliamentarians insisted on participation on equal terms.
During 2010, alternative formulas were suggested: 5 + 5
(5 deputies of the Belarusian parliament + 5 representatives of the
civil society), 0 + 10 (only representatives of civil society having no
suffrage but with the right to speak at meetings). The Belarusian side
is peremptorily against any participation of opposition or NGO
members in the Assembly. Minsk officials managed to find support
among the parliaments of all five Eastern partnership member states.
The issue of Belarusian representation did not allow conducting the
first Euronest meeting in 2010, which was postponed. In early 2011,
European organizations showed preference for a 0 + 0 formula – no
delegation from Belarus at all.
In 2010, the Belarusian parliament attempted establishing contacts
with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).
After extraordinary hearings in April 2010, PACE passed a resolution
condemning the death penalty, oppression of mass media, public
organizations and national minorities in Belarus.  Belarusian
parliamentarians – for example, Sergey Maskevich, head of the
committee for international relations and relations with the CIS –
called it nonconstructive and inconsistent.
In August, Sinikka Hurskainen, PACE reporter on Belarus, visited
Minsk to meet with Belarusian parliamentarians. During the visit hopes
were expressed for further cooperation and Belarus gradually joining
the PACE. But it is still unclear, how the fundamental issue of the death
penalty will be resolved: abolition or, at least, a moratorium. According
to the rules governing political life in Belarus, this issue is not within
the competence of the Belarusian parliament.
In 2010, Belarusian deputies commented BelarusianEuropean
relations both in national and foreign media more than once. The
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majority of them included hopes for broader cooperation, complaints
that Europeans are badly informed about the situation in Belarus, calls
to respect Belarusian domestic political traditions, etc. For example,
these issues were raised by Sergey Maskevich, his deputies Igor
Karpenko and Viktor Guminsky; by Alexandr Yushkevich, head of
the committee for human rights, nationality relations and mass media,
his deputy Anatoly Glaz and others.
Russian3Belarusian relations. In 2010, relations between Belarus
and Russia were rather tense, which influenced the work of the
parliament. Parliamentary procedures were used in foreignpolicy
games. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the most vivid
example of this situation. First raised in 2008, this question was handed
over for consideration in the parliament to stall the procedure. It was
announced that the parliament would take the final decision. The issue
was not put before parliament and was sent back to the President in
November 2010.
Similar was the way of stalling the adoption of the Customs Code
of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The issue
was postponed several times depending on the negotiations between
the Russian and Belarusian presidents. The Code was passed on June
30, 2010, at a closed sitting on the last session day. In June 2010, the
parliament ratified the agreement on the Collective Rapid Reaction
Force of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
In 2010, Belarusian parliamentarians also came out with statements
against the smear campaign launched in Russian media against the
Belarusian president. They made denouncing statements in Belarusian
media, backing the country’s leader. They urged that Russia show
more respect for national interests of Belarus, take into account the
long history and strategic importance of bilateral relations, and called
for further cooperation.
These statements were made by both heads of committees and
rankandfile deputies (Igor Karpenko; Vladimir Zdanovich,
chairperson of the committee on education, culture, science, scientific
and technical progress; Sergey Semashko, chairperson of the
committee on industry). In October, the House of Representatives
issued a statement on BelarusianRussian relations urging the Russian
side to take a more constructive position. But these statements cannot
be called influential in this situation.
Other countries. In 2010, the Belarusian parliament maintained
some bilateral contacts. For example, Belarusian deputies paid official
visits to Syria, Israel, and Armenia. In May, they also visited France.
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Besides, the House of Representatives ratified an agreement on the
state border with Ukraine and agreements on border traffic with
Poland and Lithuania.
Meetings with parliamentarians, authorities and businessmen
were aimed at promoting political contacts and intensifying economic
relations. Assessing their effectiveness is not possible.
Conclusion
In 2010, the activities of the Belarusian parliament followed the ten
dency of the previous years.  It remains an institution with auxiliary
functions for executive bodies, optimizing legislation and voicing or
advocating the officials’ opinion in the international arena.
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LOCAL AUTHORITIES: SELF.GOVERNMENT
SACRIFICED TO LIBERALIZATION
Zmicier Kuhley
Summary
Local authorities in 2010 were working within the framework of two election
campaigns. One of them, the April election to local councils, was directly related
to the local representative power branch. The other, presidential elections, was
of decisive character for the whole structure of the Belarusian regime in the
short8 and medium8term perspective. Both election campaigns tested Belarus’
political system for stability. Local authorities are a constituent part of the
“presidential vertical”, with the executive branch dominating the representative
one. They are in no way a separate self8government institution representing
interests of the local community and protecting the latter from excessive
interference from the state.
The new version of the law On local government and selfgovernment that
came into force on January 4, 2010 introduced no changes into the existing
practice. Local authorities went on following the rules that had formed over the
last 16 years. There is a kind of silent agreement between the president and
local authorities: the incumbent country leader guarantees status quo and
powers to local and regional elites; whereas Alexander Lukashenko’s further
terms of office depend on local authorities. At the same time, controversial
tendencies determined the development of local authorities: on the one hand,
the subjective factors of the Belarusian authoritarian regime, on the other hand,
the objective urge for economic modernization of the country.
Tendencies:
• On the one hand, the local elections in 2010 further isolated local authorities
from the public and narrowed the competitive sphere for recruiting candidates
for the ruling elite; on the other hand, up8to8date information and
communication technologies (ICT) being introduced on all state levels,
including local and regional, are contributing to more open and transparent
work of local authorities;
• Local elections highlighted interest discrepancies between local elites and
the incumbent country leader;
• Local authorities keep losing powers in business sphere regulation because
of attempts to liberalize entrepreneurial activities;
• The consolidated budget of the Republic of Belarus is becoming more
centralized; the ratio of non8repayable receipts from the national budget to
local ones is growing;
• Local executive bodies expand their powers for controlling local
communities.
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Maintaining tradition, steering clear of innovation
The two electoral campaigns of 2010 directed the state policy in local
government and selfgovernment to following the principle of “main
taining tradition, steering clear of innovation”. In 2010, Lukashenko’s
2006 thesis voiced after the third presidential election was still topi
cal: “the power vertical must be kept firm from top to bottom; no prac
ticing democracy”.
Since January 4, 2010 local authorities have been following the
new version of the law On local government and self3government in
the Republic of Belarus. The law introduced no decisive changes into
the Belarusian system of local government and selfgovernment. It
simply redistributed powers between local councils of deputies and
regional executive bodies that used to be duplicated at regional and
district levels.
The law also defines the legal status of and the procedure for
establishing territorial public selfgovernment bodies. We should note
that before the presidential campaign of 2010 the local ideological
apparatus grew more active. It focused on establishing territorial
public selfgovernment bodies that were to cooperate with local
authorities to solve local problems by joined efforts of citizens and
executive bodies. Nevertheless, the initiative became purely formal,
turning into a propaganda tool.
Article 59 of the law On local government and self3government now
contains a note that local councils can initiate legal procedures to
protect their infringed or disputed rights and interests to execute their
powers. In 2010, not a single case was registered. This legal norm
enables councils to protect their rights against executive and national
power bodies. Nevertheless, in the overcentralized Belarusian state
system local selfgovernment is absolutely dependent and answerable
to the “presidential vertical”. No lawsuits can be expected between
these subjects. The Belarusian political elite is haunted by the idea
expressed by the state leader that local councils are no bosses on their
territories, they simply share responsibility with local executive bodies.
The new version of the law On local government and self3
government empowered Belarusian authorities to establish local
councils associations to lobby their interests at the European level.
The latter have a right for international cooperation. It is worth
mentioning that the European Union pays much attention to regions
and local community development, including border areas of
neighboring states, and allocates significant sums from its budget.
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Projects involving European partners and local authorities, including
Euroregions, are already functioning in Belarus. Nevertheless,
Belarusian local authorities do not cooperate with European
municipalities to their fullest extent, unlike other EU partners.
Immediately after the local elections, Belarusian authorities launched
activities to establish the Belarusian Association of local self
government bodies, which was not completed until the end of 2010.
Local elections 2010: controversies between the centre
and local elites
After the local elections in April 2010, local and regional elites kept
isolating themselves from the public: few oppositional parties’ repre
sentatives made it to local councils of deputies.
Despite that local councils’ deputies have limited powers, they
can partially control governing bodies, e. g. on issues of financial flows
and budgetary distributions at the local level. We should note that
local functionaries got used to controlling the way in which local
representative bodies are formed. They are used to being
unaccountable to local communities, whose interests they are actually
to represent. In reality, local political elites are accountable directly
to the president in implementing national policy on the entrusted
territories: to ensure good social and economic performance and
stability in the region, including the required number of Alexander
Lukashenko’s supporters among the local population. The president,
in his turn, secures that there is a favorable recruitment policy and no
unwanted business competition at the local level. The situation is
mutually advantageous: the incumbent state leader does not wish his
rivals to strengthen their positions in local governing bodies, whereas
local political elites do not allow “aliens” into their system, so that
their interests are secured.
Nevertheless, in 2010 relations between the president and local
authorities faced new challenges. The number of opposition
representatives in local selfgovernment bodies long ago fell below
the critical level to present any threat for the president. In 2010
Belarusian officials kept working towards improving relations with
Western partners, which required making some concessions. Several
dozen oppositional deputies of local councils would have presented
no danger for the present Belarusian regime but would have evoked
positive reaction from foreign partners, which could have been
translated into financial and economic preferences from the West.
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Despite that the Central Election Commission and top authorities’
strongly wished to show foreign observers some progress in the
election procedure, local and regional functionaries would follow the
16year old campaign scenario and left local councils without
oppositional deputies. Nevertheless, the inaction and unwillingness
to accept the new political reality had little influence on BelarusWest
relations, as the latter placed all their hopes in the presidential
campaign.
Local authorities were traditionally criticized by the country’s
administration, especially before the presidential election. Belarusian
propagandists tried to convince the public that local governing bodies
are to blame for the drawbacks and failures in the social and economic
sphere, while the top administration keeps working effectively and
controlling all government levels, being also capable of solving
problems in the competence of local authorities. This way of
presenting the work of local authorities, besides being purely
propagandistic, further convinced the public that highly centralized
public administration is necessary in the state.
Liberalization causing centralization
In 2010, the consolidated national budget became even more central
ized: local budgets lost the retail sales tax and local duty on parking
users. In 2010 local budgets totaled BYR 18.7 trillion, with transfers
from the national to regional and Minsk budgets reaching BYR 7.3
trillion, or 39% of all local budgets expenditures. Local budgetary re
ceipts decreased because of the new methods to calculate land tax by
cadastral value of land lots. At the same time, in the first quarter of
2010 local councils of deputies were not empowered to apply multi
plying factors to the realestate tax rate. What is more, according to
the National comprehensive program for regional and small and me3
dium urban settlements development in 2007–2010, local councils of
deputies continued granting privileges or delays for enterprises in
paying debts, local taxes and duties, contributing to smaller local
budgetary receipts. We should note that for the last few years local
and regional authorities have been losing their financial independence
due to reduction of local taxes and duties to their minimum.
Local authorities play an important role in the Belarusian licensing
system in business. Decree № 450 On licensing certain activities as of
September 1, 2010 stripped them of a significant number of powers
through abolition of licenses to perform 16 entrepreneurial activities.
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This decree eliminated local barriers for small and medium business.
The most important was abolition of licenses for retail sales that used
to make up 156,000 of a total 240,000 licenses. Independent experts
and businesspersons regarded local authorities as a hindrance for
small and medium business development. At the same time, decree
№ 581 On purchase of real estate for local needs as of November 9,
2010 empowered local authorities with extra mechanisms to influence
the real estate market and, respectively, small and medium business
development on the entrusted territories.
It should be mentioned that liberalization of entrepreneurial
activity is carried out at the cost of local authorities: their powers and
financial independence is reduced. The tax burden on business is
being reduced at the cost of abolishing local taxes and duties; the
business climate is being improved by abolishing licenses that used
to be issued by local administrations and executive councils.
Nevertheless, positive changes of economy liberalization were
partially impaired in early 2010: decree № 518 On certain issues of
rentals and non3repayable use of property enables local authorities
and state enterprises to apply multiplying or reduction factors when
providing rentals. Local functionaries took it as a cart blanche to apply
the highest multiplying factor and increase budgetary receipts.
Eventually, the president intervened and granted the State Control
Committee powers to audit local authorities and state enterprises on
legal grounds for raising rentals.
Local executive and administrative bodies were empowered to
directly intervene in activities of condominiums and influence the
procedure of electing the chairpersons of these nonprofit
organizations. In late 2010 the president signed a decree On certain
issues of condominiums and estate developers that expands local
functionaries’ powers on nonprofit organizations. The decree expands
control functions of local executive councils to condominiums and
estate developing organizations. Local executives now have a right to
endorse candidates for chairperson of the board, to nominate
candidates, to initiate early dismissal, etc.
The country’s administration is attempting to optimize activities
and increase efficiency of state bodies. In 2010, a pilot automated
information system (AIS) “Local councils of deputies” was launched
in Bieladubrauski (Kasciukovicki district) and Janauski (Krasnapolski
district) village councils. AISs promote effective and open work of local
authorities. AISs save time, provide access to legal information,
including lists of administrative procedures. They are expected to
State authority
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promote small and medium business in regions. In 2011, AISs are to
be introduced in all local councils of deputies of Belarus.
On December 11, 2009 Alexander Lukashenko signed decree
№ 622 On improvement of land regulations and state control over use
and protection of land, which transfers land management functions
to local authorities. Land management and geodetic functions of the
State Property Committee are transferred to local executive councils
with maintenance of the total number of civil servants.
Conclusion
Local government and selfgovernment in Belarus is “builtin” into
the “presidential power vertical”. Being its inseparable element, it
continues to perform its function of maintaining stability of the Be
larusian regime. The country’s top leader is afraid to lose power if the
present state system, having been developed over the last 16 years, is
reformed, which hinders reforms of local authorities, despite that the
situation is calling for change.
State authorities are taking certain actions to improve local
authorities’ work, especially in business, but this produces
controversial tendencies. The Belarusian authorities are liberalizing
economic activities at the cost of local authorities: their financial
dependence is growing, the consolidated national budget is further
centralized as local budgetary receipts are reducing. On the other
hand, reduced local budgets demand more nonrepayable receipts
from the national budget, causing parasitical attitudes in and
demotivating local authorities to create a good business environment
on the entrusted territories. Also, local functionaries are afraid to lose
their nonofficial rents or positions and oppose liberalization of
entrepreneurial activities at the cost of reducing bureaucratic
establishment’s powers in business sphere regulation.
51
ELECTION
52 	



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Vladimir Rovdo
Summary
The major election campaign of 2010 did not become a “stunning election”
when the authorities, to their own surprise, surrender the reins of government
to another political force or have to make essential concessions to the
opposition. There was such election in 1994 and it was called “a reactionary
revolt of the masses” against the absolute power of the political establishment.
The 1994 election campaign was however conducted in strict compliance with
the fundamentals of competitive and fair elections, which the Vyacheslav
Kebich’s government adhered to. All presidential campaigns that followed were
actually Alexander Lukashenko’s self8appointment for new terms accompanied
by massive violations of the election laws reported by all the OSCE’s monitoring
groups. The 2010 “election” saw the exactly same scenario. It however shook
Alexander Lukashenko’s position since the outcome of the election and brutal
disruption of the protest rally foiled the two8year8long efforts to bring about a
rapprochement between the European Union and Belarus and to diminish
dependence on Russia. The election and subsequent reprisals against political
activists weakened the opposition, which was splintered even without that.
Tendencies:
• Patchy amendments to the election laws did not change the election process
essentially; the election machine built into the administrative command
system still has enough capacity to secure a desired election outcome
whatever contenders do  or whoever voters really ballot for;
• The dropping rating of the head of state compelled resorting to risky populist
economic shifts, but even the unsecured wage hike did not result in hard8
core loyalty, first of all in Minsk;
• When the time came to choose the geopolitical orientation, President
Lukashenko preferred the Russian vector over the European one, as it did
not require radical economic and political transformations unsafe for the
personal rule regime in Belarus;
• The opposition failed to consolidate, which frustrated the regime replacement
strategy pursued by most candidates, but helped to hold the mass protest
rally on December 19 and prevent recognition of Lukashenko’s self8
appointment as an election win by the West.
Overall results
According to the Central Election Commission, Lukashenko polled
79.6%; Andrey Sannikov got 2.43%; Yaroslav Romanchuk 1.98%; Gry
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gory Kostusev 1.97%; Vladimir Neklyaev 1.78%; Viktor Tereshchen
ko 1.19%; Vitaly Rymashevsky 1.09%; Nikolay Statkevich 1.05%; Ale
ksandr Mikhalevich 1.02%, and Dmitry Uss 0.39%. 6.4% voted against
all.1 According to the public opinion surveys conducted by Belaru
sian sociologists from the Independent Institute of SocioEconomic
and Political Studies (IISEPS), 51.1% of respondents voted for Lukash
enko (39.9% in Minsk and 62.3% in rural districts); Neklyaev polled
8.3%; Sannikov 6.1%; Rymashevsky 3.7%; Romanchuk 3.2%; Mikha
levich 2.7%; Statkevich 1.7%; Kostusev 1.6%; Tereshchenko 0.6% and
Uss 0.5% (i. e. 28.4% for all contenders together). 5.1% voted against
all; 3.8% refused to answer. Counting the virtual votes of those who
refused to answer, the figures made up 58.0%, 9.7%, 7.0%, 4.2%, 3.7%,
3.0%, 1.9%, 1.8%, 0.7%, and 0.6% respectively (32.6% for all contend
ers). We remind that on March 19, 2006, Lukashenko won 63.1% of the
votes (of the total number of those who came to the polling stations),
and three opponents of his (including Sergey Gaidukevich) had 30.3%.
It means that Lukashenko won the presidential election again, which
all previous preelection opinion surveys IISEPS predicted, and redis
tribution of nearly 1,350,000 of votes for the benefit of the incumbent
president and mass arrests were unnecessary actually.2
The past campaign was notoriously distinctive not so much due
to the redistribution of votes for Lukashenko’s benefit, as due to the
unprecedentedly brutal crackdown on the most active part of the
Belarusian opposition, which was struggling for power in a peaceful
manner. Those actions of the authorities were not provoked by the
opponents of the regime and can hardly be explained from a logical
point of view.
More than 50 people face criminal charges in the case on
organization of mass unrest. Among them are seven former
presidential candidates Andrey Sannikov (currently in detention),
Nikolay Statkevich (in detention), Vladimir Neklyaev (under house
arrest), Vitaly Rymashevsky (released on his own recognizance), Ales
Mikhalevich (released on his own recognizance), Grigory Kostusev
(under suspicion, released on his own recognizance), and Dmitry Uss
(under suspicion, released on his own recognizance).
1 See Glod U. SEC dismisses Kostusev’s complaint and recognized the election
returns // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.svaboda.org/
content/article/2258009.html.
2 Press Release “Voice of the people for the people”. Topmost findings of the
December 2010 opinion poll by IISEPS); See http://www.iiseps.org.
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All sorts of government agencies in the capital and in provinces
worked hard so that Lukashenko could stay in office for the fourth
term. The opposition made a lot of mistakes and entered the campaign
as eight uncoordinated standalone teams that only smoothed things
down for the propresidential forces.
Election environment and authorities’ campaign
Lukashenko’s success was ensured long before the 2010 election. The
president admitted in an interview to Euronews on June 24, 2010, “I
have enough political intuition, enough methods to see it [whether
the Belarusians liked him or not. – V. R.]. The election can only con
firm that”.3  In other words, the head of state briefly yet intelligibly
described his plan for the oncoming election campaign and set ad
ministrative tasks for functionaries.
First of all, we should lay emphasis on Belarus’ essential
dissimilarity from other European states, not only democratic, but also
some hybrid regimes, for instance competitive authoritarian systems.
Elections there provide support to one or another leader legitimizing
his position as a ruler. It is different in Belarus: in the beginning, the
administrative resources and officials of all levels and ranks are
mobilized (which Lukashenko calls “other methods”) to gain hundred
percent confidence in election victory and after that comes an election,
which only confirms the preset result that has nothing to do with actual
election returns. It is Lukashenko’s know3how, which he is very proud
of and takes every opportunity to mention it and highlight his
uniqueness.
When talking about equal opportunities for all contenders with a
Euronews reporter, Lukashenko hoped that the Europeans are ignorant
of the situation in Belarus. The proclaimed equality was certainly out
of the question. The low ratings of the opposition candidates showed
that the incumbent president had secured his decisive advantage –
informational, financial, and organizational – at the very start of the
race. Lukashenko controls television, radio, large newspapers, while
the Internet still remains “entertainment” for a small audience of those
inclined to protest that makes it impossible to raise ratings of
opposition candidates quickly and effectively.
3 Rovdo V. Valuable confessions of Alexander Grigoryevich // Nashe Mne3
nie. 03.08.2010 [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://nmnby.eu/
news/analytics/2819.html.
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Reputed political scientist Aris Trentidis was right saying that the
Belarusians’ economic dependence on the state is used by the powers
that be for consolidation. It remained highly valuable during the 2010
presidential campaign. The researcher takes credit for outlining of
this structural factor which after all explains consolidation of
authoritarianism in Belarus: the combination of a lack of economic
liberalization and political democratization.
In fact, unlike other postcommunist states, Belarus has been doing
without structural marketoriented reforms for over one decade and a
half. This situation brings forth people’s dependence on the
government neverbeforeseen in presentday Europe: in 1995–2007,
55% to 60% of the employed population worked for staterun
enterprises and establishments.4  On top of this, the tiny private sector
of Belarus’ economy has fallen under tight control of the state. It all
largely retards development of nongovernmental organizations,
political parties, and independent media outlets. People’s economic
dependence on the government restrains their criticism addressed to
the authorities and their support for the political opposition.
Before the election, the government worked diligently to fetch
voters thus shaking very unstable macroeconomic frame. Economic
analyst Fyodor Zhakhov notes, “Since August 2010, the country’s
foreign trade deficit has expanded much faster than the year before.
To make up for that gap, Belarus needs to borrow almost USD 1
billion from foreign sources on a monthly basis. German economic
advisor Riccardo Giucci is alarmed at the dynamics of the Belarusian
foreign debt, which had reached 45% of GDP by mid2010, an
increase from 20% back in 2007. If this growth rate persists, Belarus’
foreign debt could reach a level, where the country might fail to
service it. This economic policy will inevitably bring about inflation
hikes, and Giucci believes consumer inflation will exceed 10% in
2011. Furthermore, marked fiscal difficulties will likely remain, as
the state budget is suffering from the growing deficit, while the
government prepares for a massive increase in wages in the public
sector, by 30%. The expert believes the wage push may affect the
competitiveness of Belarusian producers on foreign markets and will
further deteriorate the foreign trade figures. Anyway, the German
economist is not the first to point this out to the Belarusian
4 See: Trantidis A. The Economic Understanding of SemiAuthoritarianism.
Explaining Preferences and Power Relations in the Case of Belarus // EU3
Consent. Constructing European Network. 2007. P. 5–12.
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authorities, which would not listen to anyone, including the IMF,
prior to the presidential election”5.
It becomes clear now why the presidential election was held ahead
of schedule: there would be much more people in 2011 unsatisfied
with their financial status.
Belarus’ unreformed economy did not stagnate as it could be
predicted, but developed quite rapidly until 2009. It made it possible
for President Lukashenko to share a part of the profits with the
population thus enhancing its dependence and obedience even more.
The situation is also unique as such state economy “miracles” are
observed nowhere in the world nowadays.
This “miracle” is however explained by the longlasting enormous
support for the regime coming from the Russian Federation. This
orientation to a single foreign partner, quite dangerous when it comes
to national independence, began to change in 2008 after Alexander
Kozulin, Lukashenko’s chief opponent in the previous election, was
discharged from prison and after Belarus was involved in the European
Union’s Eastern Partnership program.
During the global financial recession, the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank gave loans, which helped the regime to cope
with difficulties. It looked like the western foreign policy vector was
attached the same importance as the eastern vector. Since the policy
of rapprochement with the European Union was not accompanied by
economic or political reforms, this Uturn had a latent possibility of
transformation into one more stone to the foundation of individual
rule in Belarus.
This MinskEU rapprochement peaked on November 2, 2010 when
the foreign ministers of Poland and Germany came to Belarus in the
height of the preelection campaign and promised generous financial
support to the amount of  3 billion in exchange for free elections.
During that memorable meeting, Lukashenko said, “The president
and members of parliament have never been elected in an
undemocratic way. Especially the president. The forthcoming election
will be much better now because you want it… You can even count
votes if you want”6. It is worth noting that the Belarusian regime now
5 Zhakhov F. Everything for the Front, Everything for the Victory! Macroeco
nomics takes rest by the presidential election // Belorusskaya Gazeta. 2010.
Nov. 8. № 44(767).
6 See: “Lukashenko: The president and members of parliament have never been
elected in an undemocratic way” 02.11.2010 // [Electronic resource] Mode
of access: http://charter97.org/ru/news/2010/11/2/33478/
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claims that it was Poland and Germany to hatch a plot to overthrow
the president against all constitutional fundamentals.
Right from the start, Lukashenko’s election campaign was
unwinding against the background of the information war between
Belarus and Russia, which however ended before December with a
visit of the Belarusian leader to Moscow. I cannot but agree with
Zianon Pazniak, who said in this respect, “Their political qualities
[meaning opponents of the regime who had been cherishing hope that
Russia would dismiss the election as fraud until the last minute. –
V. R.] were tested December 9, 2010 when Lukashenko unexpectedly
went to Moscow to meet with his alleged “foe”, Medvedev, signed
documents on the common economic space, harmful to Belarus,
received a promise on dutyfree oil supplies in exchange, and came
back to Minsk pretty much satisfied”7.
All the above considered, the crackdown on Lukashenko’s
opponents was totally uncalled for. The president fully controlled the
situation. The mobilized executive chain of command, Central
Election Commission, governmental mass media – the entire
mechanism was running to pave the way for his next selfappointment.
The populist economic policy – no matter that it led to a dead end –
was beneficial for most voters. Prior to the election, the government
entered into meaningful agreements with Russia, and Europe was
likely to recognize the election this time, probably not as free and fair
as it would like it to be, but exhibiting progress towards European
standards.
The opposition managed to attract 30,000 to 40,000 people to the
protest rally, but in general, it failed to consolidate and was not ready
to assume power. There is no radical opposition in Belarus capable of
using force to confront the government. Therefore, the accusations
that political parties and NGOs intended to be aggressive during the
peaceful protest rally were absolutely groundless.
Boris Berezovsky, who knows the situation in Belarus well enough,
believes the 19 December events were instigated by the Russian special
services. All that happened on that night was advantageous to Russia
and totally disadvantageous to Belarus and the West. Russia got
unlimited opportunities to orchestrate the further situation in Belarus
and, as a matter of fact, drove the Belarusian authorities into a corner.
Berezovsky has no doubt that Lukashenko’s closest associates, his own
7 Pazniak Z. Time to dot i’s // Liberty Radio. 01.02.2011 [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/2294204.html.
Election
58 	



special services, just framed him and misguided him on what was really
happening in the city square on December 19. “And those officers
certainly work for the Russian special services as well,” he says.8
I reject this conspiracy theory, as I think it was Lukashenko and
nobody else to make the final decisions being perfectly aware of what
was going on in the square. It’s another matter that those decisions
were coordinated with the Russian leaders. It is well known that
survival and reproduction of the Belarusian regime cannot rely on
strategic partnership with the West in any case, but desperately needs
aid and support from “brotherly” Russia, which does pressurize Belarus
demanding democratic reforms, being an authoritarian state itself,
actually.
It does not mean that all speculations of the Belarusian authorities
and moderate opposition concerning the policy of liberalization in
Belarus are a delusion or selfdelusion. Official Minsk has never
regarded rapprochement with EU as a longterm strategy, but only as
a tactical bargaining chip to squeeze economic preferences from
Russia. The 2010 election campaign cleared the air: leaders of the pro
European opposition are neutralized, the regime obtained support
from Russia, and the country is in isolation from the civilized world
where the Belarusian ruler was not going to lead people anyway by
his own admission.
Opposition’s campaign
It is hard to assess the opposition’s participation in the presidential
campaign in a word. There were ups and downs in comparison with
the year 2006. The fact that most candidates were highly motivated to
fight to the end and attracted a huge crowd to the protest rally was an
appreciable step forward. The presidential candidates realized that
elections in Belarus are a sharade, and mostly focused not so much on
election as mobilization technologies. They tried hard to make the
best use of the three months of the race concentrating on one crucial
point: they explained voters that the election was not free and fair
and call on people to come together for a final protest rally on De
cember 19.
In terms of political science, most opposition contenders intended
to impose their own game aimed at replacement of the regime upon the
8 See “Berezovsky: Officers of the Belarusian special services work for
Russia” // Liberty Radio. 22.01.2011
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president and his associates instead of seeking a pact with the authorities.
In the opinion of known American political scientist Michael McFaul,
“Transitions from communist rule to new regime types are so different
from the third wave democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that
they should not even be grouped under the same rubric… Specifically,
the relationship between mode of transition and democratization outcome
is totally different in the postcommunist world as compared with
Southern Europe and Latin America. Imposed transitions from above in
the former communist world produced not partial democracy but
dictatorship. It is instead revolutionary transitions – the mode of
transition thought to be least likely to facilitate democratic outcomes by
thirdwave theorists – that have actually produced the most stable and
consolidated democracies in the postcommunist world. Balanced, stale
mated transitions – those most likely to facilitate the emergence of
democracyenhancing pacts in Latin American and Southern Europe –
have instead led to unstable regimes of both the democratic and the
autocratic variety in the postcommunist world”9.
Activity within the “replacement” paradigm was more like a non
conscious choice of a certain part of the Belarusian opponents to the
regime, rather than a wellthoughtout victory strategy, but it certainly
might lead to success under certain conditions. It should also be kept
in mind that they had to confront the harshest authoritarian regime
remaining on the European continent, which has eliminated
parliamentarianism, the party system, and elements of independent
judicial branch.
This strategy was also a kind of a reaction to the very poor
campaign of the joint candidate nominated by the United Democratic
Forces coalition (UDF) in 2006 and the political forces in Belarus,
which have been advocating a dialogue with the regime as the only
opportunity to transform it gradually from above. The For Freedom
movement and some of its allies still persist in this opinion.
The fact that the European Union did not accept Lukashenko’s
selfappointment as a free and fair election is undoubtedly the second
accomplishment of the opposition. Many political scientists and
politicians say and write that this threat was very real.
After all, the opposition’s performance was much better in Minsk,
than in the provinces. Lukashenko did not poll even 40% in the capital.
9 McFaul M. The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncoopera
tive Transition in the Postcommunist World // World Politics. 2002 (Jan.).
Vol. 54. P. 221.
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According to the IISEPS, the president was not far ahead of his rivals
as elsewhere across the country.
Now we will try to analyze shortcomings of the democratic
candidates’ campaign. First and foremost, it is the split in the
opposition. The UDF is not a distant past. Until fairly recently, the
coalition united almost all opposition forces from the democrats
communists to the democratsnationalists from the Belarusian Popular
Front (BPF). The largest opposition association began falling apart
after the 2007 congress. Supporters of former joint candidate Alexandr
Milinkevich (mostly members of nationalist parties and NGOs)
attempted to form a new association – the Belarusian Independent
Block (BIB) – but did not survive the strength test either and actually
fell to pieces after failed to compromise over a joint candidate.
Attempts to arrange a primary election among opposition parties
and public associations aimed at nomination of a joint candidate
initiated by the United Civic Party came to nothing. The Belarusian
primaries struck a stone of uncompromising attitude exhibited by the
former joint candidate of the UDF and his followers. Nonetheless, on
August 24, 2010, representatives of some political parties and
organizations put their signatures under an agreement on coordination
of actions. Six paragraphs of the agreement called for cooperation in
such areas as community outreach and negotiations with the
authorities, monitoring of elections at polling stations, and
organization of mass protest actions in case of improper ballot
procedures.10
Later, during the campaign, leader of European Belarus campaign
Sannikov and leader of the Speak the Truth campaign Neklyaev
entered into an agreement being the most popular presidential
candidates. It was obviously not enough. The lack of coordination was
dramatic both at the start and the finish of the election campaign.
Another point is closely linked with the one above. Leaders of most
political parties regarded participation in the presidential election as
an opportunity to popularize themselves and increase visibility of
organizations they represented. Thus some of the parties nominated
not their chairmen, but young and ambitious vice chairmen.
They believed that the three months would be enough to achieve
the stated objectives, which was a strategic mistake. None of the party
candidates could count for the victory or at least make it through to
10 See: “Opposition leaders sign the agreement on coordination of joint
actions” // Liberty Radio. 24.08.2010.
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the second round standing alone, because the public at large just did
not know them well. A narrow channel of opportunities really opened
for them, but it was shut down right after the official election result
was announced. As a matter of fact, the parties had to create a
semblance of political pluralism in the country (first of all for European
observers) during the campaign. It would be wiser to use the available
scarce resources for an attempt to change the rules of the political
game cardinally and create real pluralism in case a joint candidate’s
team prevails.
The harbored illusion about Russia’s position and its role in the
Belarusian election was one more essential shortcoming. It manifested
itself differently among the opposition election runners. On the one
hand, Milinkevich and Kostusev painted a fantasy picture of
intervention of the proRussian opposition. The Belarusian Popular
Front developed a strategy of a fight on two fronts. It only poured oil
on the flames of conflicts between parties and organizations, and their
ambitious leaders speaking on behalf of the opposition. Neklyaev and
Sannikov were assigned the role of proRussian candidates.
But nothing like that was actually observed. It is enough to study
their election programs, TV addresses to the nation, and speeches they
made during protest rallies. Andrey Sannikov is a strongly marked
proEuropean politician, while Vladimir Neklyaev advocates
preservation of Belarus’ sovereignty and cautious rapprochement with
EU in future. Both Neklyaev and Sannikov played a key role in
organization of nonviolent protest actions. Without them it would be
hard to explain the Belarusians, Europe, and Russia this simple fact
that the authorities redistributed popular vote once again in the 2010
presidential elections.
On the other hand, Neklyaev and Sannikov’s opinion that Russia
will not shake hands with Lukashenko after the election is beneath
criticism. The authoritarian regime established in Russia has been
sponsoring autocracies on the entire postSoviet space all the time
maintaining their heavy dependence on Moscow. At the same time,
the Russian elite is not united or consolidated when it comes to the
“Belarusian issue.” The oil and gas monopolies linked with European
and American capital, which are obviously pulling strings in the
Medvedev Administration, are not interested in keeping the
Belarusian economic model afloat. They want to establish market
relations between the two countries, while the Russian Military
Industrial Complex is still inclined to lobby sponsorship for the
Belarusian incumbent head of state.
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Over the years of the oilforkisses policy, Lukashenko has
acquired an image of the only reliable protector of Russia’s interests
on the western direction. Therefore the antiLukashenko trend set
among leaders of the Russian Federation did not last long. After all,
Putin decided to place his stake on the retention of power by the first
president of Belarus, but imposed quite a number of economic
agreements strategically dangerous for Belarus.
The opposition made some other mistakes. Above are the most
general ones. The regime used all of them to secure the self
appointment of the Belarusian leader for the fourth presidential term.
Conclusion
The election campaign of 2010 and its outcome were not a surprise to
experts, political scientists and journalists. Alexander Lukashenko
managed to secure his actual selfappointment for the next term and
crushed the politically active part of Belarusian society. But his fourth
term will be a tough call for citizens of Belarus, even those who gave
votes to this politician openheartedly.
Belarus’ economic and political systems are in desperate need of
pivotal reforms and profound transformations. The country suffocates
without them. Belarus finds itself lagging for decades. Only the
political minority has shown the understanding that the era of “strict
yet fair dictators” ended long ago. The majority still hopes for a miracle
as before. But miracles only happen in fairy tales. To be more exact,
they cost dearly in real life. Lukashenko’s fourth presidential term is
likely to be a period when the Belarusians will have to pay the bills of
the regime to the utmost.
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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
SOCIOLOGY OF ELECTORAL STABILITY
Sergey Nikolyuk
Summary
In the last year of the president’s five8year tenure, Belarusians had anxious
expectations, which even the November surge in wages could not calm down.
Anyhow, Lukashenko managed to accomplish his prime task by scoring another
election Victory. However, the price of this Victory remains unclear either to
himself or his political opponents. The official recognition of a split in society
is just one of the consequences.
Tendencies:
• Electoral support for Lukashenko declined basically due to resource problems
of the government aggravated by the global recession;
• Redundancy of opposition candidates did not affect their electoral ratings;
• The electoral structure of Belarusian society has not undergone essential
changes over the years of independence;
• The ‘winner8takes8it8all’ election deepened the split in Belarusian society.
Final outcome
The outcome of the fourth presidential election (see Table 1 for vot
ing patterns) did not surprise independent sociologists.1 With an 87%
turnout, Lukashenko was in the lead by 59 percent to 32 percent re
ceived by the eight oppositional politicians. Only Viktor Tereshchen
ko and Dmitry Uss found themselves beyond the eight others but it
did not change the picture considerably.
Table 1. Answers to the question “Who did you vote for at the last
presidential election? (% of respondents)
1 Data provided by the IISEPS here and below. See: www.iiseps.org.
64 	



As usual, the data provided by the Independent Institute of Socio
Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) differ from the official results.
The Central Election Commission (CEC) reported a 90.66% voter
turnout, 79.7% ballots cast for Lukashenko, 14.0% for his opponents,
and 6.3% against all. The difference between the IISEPS and CEC’s
figures gets bigger from election to election. With regard to the total
number of eligible voters, it made up 15.2% in 2001, 18.9% in 2006,
and 21.1% in 2010.
The official election returns traditionally coincide with pre
election opinion polls conducted by the Presidential Administration’s
InformationAnalytical Center (IAC) within the accuracy of 1%.
According to the last polls arranged by salaried sociologists,
Lukashenko was supposed to have 80.5%, his opponents were given
14.5%, and 5% were at a loss to answer. And so it happened,
notwithstanding that IAC counted poll respondents and CEC counted
voters.
The IISEPS however did not second the opposition politicians’
belief that a new electoral situation was observed in Belarus. With
this belief in foundation, they constructed a whole Victory strategy
with a crowd in the central square of the capital as a concluding chord.
On the other hand, the figures published by SOCIUM International
Center for Sociological and Marketing Research (33.3% for
Lukashenko, 15.1% for Neklyaev, 10.6% for Sannikov, and 8.2% for
Romanchuk) met the oppositional candidates’ expectations the most.
The sociological characteristics of Lukashenko’s electoral base
did not change considerably in 2010. He enjoyed support of 24% of
voters at the age of 18 to 19 and 73% of those at the age of 60 and over.
Education: grade school graduates – 69%, university graduates –
46%. Social status: state sector employees – 53, nonstate sector
employees – 32%. Population cluster type: the capital – 40%,
villages – 62%. Taking into account that the average female human
life expectancy is considerably higher than that of men and women
are less inclined to take risks and therefore prefer to work for state
run enterprises, Lukashenko’s constituent body still has “a woman’s
face” with 59% against 41%.
Structural stability
Three more candidates – Alexandr Dubko, Vyacheslav Kebich, and
Vasily Novikov – fought for a return to the “Soviet past” in 1994
alongside Lukashenko. All four harvested 54% (35% + 19%). It means
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that the structure of the Belarusian electorate has not changed or
changed slightly since the first presidential election.
Opinion polls did not detect any new tendencies regarding the
respondents’ intent to protest against the election results in case of
improper ballot procedures (Table 2). It should be taken into account
that the figures, which indicate respondents’ willingness to take any
actions, are just declarations of intent. Some sort of a social trigger is
needed to make them pass from words to deeds. The “color
revolutions” – first of all the “orange” revolution in Kyiv – were
such a trigger in 2006. In 2010, the trigger carried a Made in Belarus
tag, and it was put there by the authorities, which wanted a “cheerful”
election.
Table 2. Dynamics of answers to the question “What would you do
believing that the presidential election was rigged?”
(% of respondents)
The relative invariableness of the number of those ready to protest
publicly is one more indicator of steadiness of the Belarusian
electorate’s structure.
An explanation for this steadiness should be looked for in the
“Belarusian economic model” announced during the seminar
arranged for republican and local executives in March 2002.
Specifically, it rests upon a strong and effective government, priority
of state interests over interests of individuals, and privatization aimed
at attraction of a “motivated investor”. Under these social and
economic conditions, the country sees invariably high share of state
property (nearly 80%) and invariably high number of citizens lacking
skills for survival without parental care of the state.
The role of propaganda in regulation of people’s behavior should
not be overestimated. It is the routine practices that make the people
Election
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what they are in this respect. In November 1994, the number of
centrally planned economy supporters in Belarus constituted 46% and
free market economy advocates made up 51%. By September 2010,
the number of the first reduced to 16%, while the latter were up to
67%. The basic changes fell within a short time period between 1994
and 1997. The economic preferences of the Belarusians practically
did not change in the 2000s.
However, the state property prevalence itself does not explain much.
In the Soviet Union, private ownership of the means of production was
under a legal and ideological ban that could not prevent the “largest
catastrophe of the XX century”. The Belarusian economic model is not
a thorough reconstruction of Soviet patterns. In the opinion of its chief
architect, “the distinctive feature of our model is a strong social policy
of the state”. It is really hard to find another country amid the global
recession, the leaders of which would spare no efforts to fulfill precrisis
social commitments with manic persistence.
As a matter of fact, Lukashenko started his fourth election
campaign on December 30, 2009 by giving wages a sacral status. “As
to the wages, you know, we undertook a commitment: average wages
must reach USD 500 within a year. This figure is sacred! It was
established at the AllBelarusian National Assembly five years ago.
We must do it!” he said in a meeting with reporters of Belarusian
national and regional media outlets.
Lukashenko’s lowest electoral rating ever was reported in March
2003 (Table 3). It was caused by slowed down growth in real value of
cash incomes of the population, but then the advance in oil prices
reversed the trend dangerous to the government. The households’ real
incomes had been showing a doubledigit growth for five years in a
row, 2004 through 2008. For this reason, a 60% rating in the third
presidential election year is not something incredible.
Table 3. Fluctuations in A. Lukashenko’s electoral rating
(% of respondents)
The income growth stopped in 2009 but it did not affect popularity
of the only Belarusian politician in any way. The global recession came
in handy to shift the blame onto. This shift would certainly be impossible
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without accompanying explanations provided by the governmental
mass media. Lukashenko’s rating dropped just 4 points between the
last precrisis poll conducted in August 2008 and that of March 2009
when the social indicators were down to the 2000s’ minimum.
The entire year 2010 passed under the banner of struggle for the
“sacred figure.” In conditions of resource scarcity, the wage hike from
the level of 381 dollars was achieved owing to the final spurt in
November 2010 that called for a 31% increase in the first grade wage
rate and a 55% increase in the minimum wage. Five years ago, 61% of
the Belarusians believed in doubling of wages in the U.S. dollar
equivalent. In December 2010, only 36% believed in 500dollar wages.
This paradox is probably one of displays of people’s anxiety on the
threshold of the presidential election. The National Bank’s statistics
seems to reflect this anxiety the best: in 2010, the net purchases of
foreign currencies by the population exceeded 1.5 billion dollars. In
the last analysis, this anxiety resulted in a 7% decrease in Lukashenko’s
electoral rating as compared with “wellheeled” 2006.
The Belarusian version of a “strong social policy” should not be
narrowed down to increase in wages and retirement benefits.
Maintaining of the social stratification close to the European level is
another component. “Everyone in the world says now that in our country
incomes of the poor, roughly speaking, are lower than incomes of the
rich 3 to 4 times, like in Sweden where this index is the best in the world,”
Lukashenko said, “It is 25 to 30 times in Russia, which is catastrophic. It
is a prerevolutionary situation.” The figures that Lukashenko referred
to are the decile dispersion ratio, which presents the ratio of the average
income of the richest 10 percent of the population divided by the average
income of the bottom 10 percent. According to the official statistics,
these figures are 5 to 6 in Belarus and 17 in Russia, but most Russian
experts believe that the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat)
understates the decile dispersion ratio essentially.
Successes and failures of the Belarusian government in fulfillment
of the social obligations assumed at the III AllBelarusian National
Assembly are vividly illustrated by the changes in social indexes, i.e.
the difference between positive and negative answers to the three basic
questions: “How has your personal financial status changed in the
past three months?” (Financial Status Index, FSI), “In your opinion,
how is the socioeconomic situation in Belarus going to change in the
next few years?” (Expectations Index, EI), and “In your opinion, is
the situation in our country changing in a right or wrong way?” (Policy
Correctness Index, PCI).
Election
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In the year of the third presidential election, the values of all three
indexes were the highest over the past five years (Fig. 1). The year
2007 began with a doubled price for Russian gas. The informational
confrontation that followed resulted in a 37 point drop of the EI at
once. We note that the EI is known for the greatest “fearfulness.” This
index is usually the first to react to negative information. As to the
FSI, it is determined “by the life itself.” Its crushing in December 2007
was a direct result of the doubled sunflower oil prices. The global
financial crisis had been the major factor affecting social mood since
late 2008. Its perception peaked in March 2009.
Fig. 1. Changes in the Financial Status Index, FSI; Expectations
Index, EI and Policy Correctness Index, PCI
However, the crisis was not as terrifying as it looked at first. In
2010, the government engaged in ramping up wages and pensions.
By the time of voting, the social indexes were up to an appreciable
level, although they did not reach the values of 2006. Lukashenko’s
electoral result was lower accordingly.
Recognition of a split
Official recognition of a split in Belarusian society was an important
result of the fourth presidential election. During the press conference
held December 20, 2010, the day after the violent disruption of the
rally in the Independence Square, Lukashenko said, “Let’s be honest:
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20% either voted against or voted for alternative candidates. We must
admit that there is plenty to think about.”
We remind that the comment on the outcome of the 2006 election
was totally different. Lukashenko put the Central Election
Commission head in an awkward position saying more than once that
the election was deliberately engineered. In an interview to First
Deputy Director General of ITARTASS News Agency Mikhail
Gusman in August 2008, he said literally, “For your information, I
polled 93% in the past election. And I admitted afterwards, when they
started to pressurize me, that we fixed the election. And I put it straight,
“Yes, we did.” I ordered to make it not 93% but around 80% or
something, I do not remember, because 90% is beyond psychological
comfort. And that was the truth.” In the NewYear greeting speech,
Lukashenko addressed the “majority” and “minority” for the first time
instead of the “solid Belarusian family.”
The split in Belarusian society is no secret for those who stays
updated on independent opinion polls. It comes out with every answer
to a politicsrelated question. Each part of Belarusian society takes an
independent stand on the financial status changes, Belarus’
development prospects, and states opinion on development trends. If
to calculate the social indexes separately in relation to those who trusts
Lukashenko and those who do not (Table 4), it would look like the
first live in Switzerland, and the rest live in Somalia.
Table 4. Values of social indexes* depending on the attitude to
Lukashenko
* FSI – Financial Status Index; EI – Expectations Index; PCI – Policy
Correctness Index
The Belarusian variant of a split does not suggest a dialogue
between the “official” and “independent” communities. The official
recognition of the “minority” does not mean that dissentients will be
given floor to voice their priorities. On December 20, Lukashenko
promised “to think”, but the result of his intellectual efforts have not
been given public utterance yet. Meanwhile, any split is a frozen
revolution, and not necessarily a “color” one.
Election
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RUSSIAN.BELARUSIAN RELATIONS:
ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE
Valeria Kostyugova, Anatoly Pankovsky
Summary
The year 2010 saw more conflicts between Russia and Belarus than any other
year in the history of mutual relations as independent nations. The year
traditionally started with a conflict – this time over crude oil supplies – and
ended in cold uncertainty: Russia de8facto recognized Lukashenko’s authority
as president, but disappointed his expectations of both cheap oil supplies and
large8scale political support.
The information campaign of Russian television channels and other media
targeted against Alexander Lukashenko in the second half of the year was
unprecedented: the Belarusian regime had never before undergone such an
intensive external media pressure. Meanwhile, the December 19 events brought
to naught Minsk’s efforts to pursue autonomous policies internationally and
regionally (this trend had been observed in the past few years); as a result,
Minsk appeared to stay, willy8nilly, with the only political ally, Russia. The
country’s track record of the past decade proves that the dialogue with the East
has been as dramatic as the dialogue with the West.
Tendencies:
• Progressive increase in prices of Russian natural gas and crude oil supplied
to Belarus towards regional tariffs;
• Integration of the trade area of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, unification
of rules within that area;
• Destruction of Lukashenko’s reputation in the Russian media space.
In 2010, three factors shaped the pattern for development of Russian
Belarusian relations. The first one was the election campaign in Be
larus and the presidential campaign in Russia, which marked its start
in 2010. The second factor is connected with the new trend for identi
fying the chief parameters of energy trade in the framework of the
decreasing significance of Belarusian transit. The country is there
fore prompted to seek alternative suppliers of energy, including Ven
ezuelan and Caspian oil. The third factor is the establishment of the
common trade area – the Common Economic Area (CEA) incorpo
rating customs territories of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Howev
er, the jackinthebox grand finale of the year was as far from being a
summary of all trends observed in the first eleven months as it could
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be. The brutality of law enforcement bodies on December 19 made
the task of preserving social and economic stability virtually impossi
ble, whereas the Russian administration was faced with a new compli
cated yet exciting challenge to use the opportunities that all of a sud
den occurred in Belarus.
Media dialogue with Russia: Krestny Batka
Media conflicts between Russia and Belarus have not been infrequent
in the past decade (they were quite rare during the Yeltsin era, though)
and were traditionally accompanied with all sorts of trade wars, spe
cifically oil and gas spats. Therefore, the fullscale media war of 2010
was definitely a new phenomenon characterizing RussianBelarusian
relations.
Krestny Batka (a blend of “godfather” and “nation’s chief”, a. k. a.
“godbatka”) is a fourepisode documentary severely criticizing the
Belarusian president. Russian NTV television channel aired the four
episodes in its Emergency show between July 4 and October 8.1 Besides
the notorious documentaries, the Russian print media published a
series of articles that displeased the Belarusian president (as did many
news reports and analytical television programs). Finally, in his
personal blog Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called on his
Belarusian counterpart to investigate into the cases of missing
opponents of the Belarusian regime, a move that received broad
publicity.
The media attack was so violent that many in Belarus (including
experts and even Alexander Lukashenko himself) concluded that the
Russian administration was going to remove Lukashenko from his
office. The Belarusian president very emotionally shared this news at
a meeting with Russian journalists on October 1. According to him,
the media warfare targeting him was part of a largescale conspiracy
masterminded by Medvedev and Putin. The list of their victims already
included many political heavyweights – castoff rulers of Tatarstan,
Bashkiria and Kalmykia – Mentimir Shaymiev, Murtaza Rakhimov
and Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, respectively, as well as former Moscow Mayor
Yury Luzhkov2.
1 See: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Крёстный_батька.
2 See: Belarus partisan. 04.10. 2010 // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:
http://www.belaruspartisan.org/bpforte/?page=100&backPage=6&news
=68486&newsPage=0.
73
We have to admit that Lukashenko’s words were not politically
senseless, since Medvedev and Putin should be eager to neutralize
potent political personalities on the eve of a new election cycle in Russia.
It is another matter that the media campaign that in this way or another
accompanies each election cycle targets Russian consumers rather than
the Belarusian audience. In this context, Lukashenko’s suspicions
(expressed during the same October 1 press availability) that the
Kremlin was financing the Belarusian opposition are hardly valid.
To kick out some significant political persons, such as Yury
Luzhkov, was only a part of the “conspiracy”, because its “main
course” envisaged a neutralization of harmful (as the MedvedevPutin
tandem saw it) ideas, including the Belarusian “miracle”, a
posthumous edition of socialism. Ironically, while trying to become
an internal factor of Russian politics, Alexander Lukashenko indeed
became such a factor, but his true role appeared to be quite different
from what he had originally expected. The Russian ruling elite now
needs to neutralize this factor, needs to discredit the fetish that
Alexander Lukashenko has turned into. Therefore, as content analysis
shows, the described media campaign as a whole and Krestny Batka
documentaries as its part include the following clear messages to
Russian voters:
(1) Alexander Lukashenko is a not a political ally of Russia; he
ignores integration initiatives of Russia and makes arrangements with
its enemies, such as Boris Berezovsky, Mikheil Saakashvili, etc.
(2) The mediocre economic policy pursued by Lukashenko costs
Russia too much, because the Belarusian “sociallyoriented” state”
can exist only at the expense of Russian taxpayers (“Russians feed
Lukashenko”). Lukashenko will not share this money with Belarusians
(the topics of corruption, clanship and old boy networks);
(3) Lukashenko is not the real choice of the Belarusian nation,
because he rigs elections and eliminates political opponents, therefore,
relations with Lukashenko and relations with Belarusians are two
different layers of relations.
The media campaign is therefore aimed at, firstly, legitimization
of the disintegration trends observed in the past few years, which some
Postsoveticum leaders are blamed for. The message is addressed to
advocates of “grand Russia”, or the USSR3.
3 Sixty percent of Russians regret USSR collapse, 66% support integration in
various forms: see: Yury Levada Research Center // [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://www.levada.ru/press/2009122101.html.
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Secondly, the campaign was designed to discredit socialist ideas,
supported by an estimated 40% of Russians (President Lukashenko is
perceived as a personified fetish of contemporary socialism). Thirdly,
the media warfare neutralizes unwanted topranking figures of the
Russian political field.
Public opinion polls showed that Krestny Batka documentaries
managed to slash Lukashenko’s sympathy rating to 5% (from 30%
previously). A preliminary conclusion that can be drawn here is that
the propaganda campaign was a success. As for Lukashenko himself,
there are good reasons to believe that the MedvedevPutin tandem
had not set itself the more ambitious task of unseating the Belarusian
president.
Problem of oil supplies and Customs Union
The year 2010 started traditionally, with a conflict over terms of
Russian crude oil supplies to Belarus. The original agreement was
inked in early 2007 and stipulated deliveries within three years to
come, therefore, the Russian side believed oil trade with Belarus
should follow the usual procedure starting 2010, that is, subject to
a 100% export duty. The Belarusian side had hopes that starting
early 2010 all oil deliveries would be in accordance with the rules
effective prior to the 2007 deal, that is, cheap and without any du
ties.
The two countries haggled the entire month of January, and on
January 27, First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko and
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin reached a compromise on the terms
of trade in Russian crude oil. Russia imposed a 100% export duty on
the entire volume of deliveries to Belarus except for 6.3 million metric
tons meant for domestic consumption. The new framework
automatically meant a serious reduction in Belarusian oil sector
margins, and since “oil” has always been a benchmark for the
Belarusian economy, the duty introduced in Moscow was regarded
as a threat to the economic security of the country. On the day the
agreement was signed, Vladimir Semashko said: “The agreement as
we sign it today cannot last long.” The Belarusian side therefore
redoubled efforts to look for alternative sources of oil and oil products,
and sought to make Russia resume oil supplies on previous easy terms.
Those efforts proved to be fruitful: firstly, Minsk managed to agree on
Venezuelan oil supplies, procuring an additional bargaining chip in
talks with Russia. Secondly, Belarus contrived to launch oil transport
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via Ukraine by OdessaBrody oil pipeline, which brought into action
the project to transit Caspian oil to the EU by the pipeline system of
Eastern European states (for details, see: Dunaev V. Regional
Integration in Eastern Europe, Belarusian Yearbook 2010). Finally,
Russia undertook to abolish oil export duties in the Customs Union
and the Common Economic Area. For this matter, oil became the carrot
that Russia used quite efficiently (despite the clearly unfriendly tone
of RussianBelarusian relations) to draw Belarus into the Customs
Union and the CEA, that is into an integrated trade and political
project implemented mostly on Russian terms, including the
unification of motorcar duties, sanitary norms, and the use of
safeguards, antidumping and countervailing measures). On
November 19, the premiers of the three CEA memberstates – Russia
(Vladimir Putin), Belarus (Sergey Sidorsky) and Kazakhstan (Karim
Massimov) inked a number of documents from the package of deals
to form the CEA.4
Finally, ten days prior to the presidential election in Belarus, on
December 9, 2010, Lukashenko, Medvedev and Nazarbayev in
Moscow signed a package of seventeen agreements to form the
regulatory framework of the Common Economic Area (CEA).5 The
package included the foreign trade agreement, veterinary and sanitary
control agreements, indirect tax collection agreement, customs
statistics agreement, etc.6  For its part, Russia promised to supply oil
to Belarus without applying export duties starting January 1, 2011.
Importantly, Belarus had taken the entire year to negotiate the
Customs Union and CEA documents and haggled over each provision.
The key condition laid down by the Belarusian side was the supply of
cheap dutyfree crude oil. After December 9, Minsk took just a couple
of weeks to hastily ratify the whole package. Did Russia hold up its
end of the deal? Formally, it did; but de facto it did not, because oil
turned out to be much costlier than Belarus had expected. Crude oil
has indeed been supplied to Belarus on a dutyfree basis since January
1, 2011, but Russian traditional oil suppliers have been uninterested
in further deliveries to Belarus.
4 See: Customs Union, independent survey // [Electronic resource] Mode of
access: http://www.customsunion.by/info/2501.html.
5 See: Belorusskie Novosti // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2010/12/09/ic_news_112_356880/.
6 Customs Union, independent survey // [Electronic resource] Mode of ac
cess: http://www.customsunion.by/search/2010/12/9/.
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Gas supplies: end of easy gas
“Natural gas” has been a media favorite for years, and external ob
servers could easily believe RussianBelarusian relations were reduced
to supplies and transit of natural gas, exclusively provided by OAO
Gazprom. However, in 2010 natural gas took a backseat to more im
portant issues, even though Gazprom suspended deliveries to Belarus
in June to make Belarusian partners pay up. Gas therefore was moved
into the “technical issues” category from “political issues”. The issue
had gained momentum in previous years, and the Belarusian side
could not stop negotiating easier gas trade terms overnight – it con
tinued bargaining over gas supplies in a package with oil issues, sep
arately or just for the sake of bargaining. The Russian side firmly kept
to the “contractual price” line, though.
As of the beginning of 2011, Belarus still enjoyed relatively
preferential natural gas import terms and paid less than its neighbors
(less than USD 300 per 1,000 cubic meters); however, the price keeps
moving inexorably towards the regional level. Gazprom has therefore
managed to teach Minsk some financial discipline and make the
Belarusian gas market profitable.
Conclusion
In 2011, Belarus found itself critically dependent on what proved to
be its single significant ally, despite its enormous efforts to diversify
its foreign and domestic policies, as well as energy supplies. This re
sult was not predetermined by the tendencies observed throughout
the year, though. On the contrary, the events of December 19 nulli
fied many of them, including the efforts Belarus had been making for
months, for instance, its painstaking campaign to improve its con
tacts with the West. Finding itself in isolation (which was the price of
Lukashenko’s “success” at the presidential election), Belarus lost
many of its bargaining chips in negotiations with Russia. As a result,
it was dragged into the Customs Union and the CEA without ade
quate compensations, say, cheap natural gas and oil. Furthermore,
being faced with the crisis, Belarus critically depends on Russian loans.
There used to be a heavy dependence on Russian energy supplies and
Russian outlets before 2010, but the two countries were interdepen
dent, because Russia to a great extent needed Belarusian transit ser
vices. In 2011, that need is not as dramatic as it used to be, whereas
Belarus is in a much more complicated situation than ever before.
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Official Minsk is not just on unfriendly terms with Europe – it
deceived European partners, which is a totally different thing. In this
context, the tactics of wavering between the East and the West are
not efficient anymore, and the Kremlin is perfectly aware of this. It is
in the Kremlin that the main shareholders of the Belarusian regime
reside, and it is on the next election cycle in Russia that the Belarusian
regime ultimately depends.
Foreign policy
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BELARUS – EU: DIALOGUE ANTICIPATING
THE ELECTIONS
Dzianis Melyantsou
Summary
In 2010, Belarusian8EU relations continued to develop along the same
lines as those outlined in the previous year: a political dialogue developed,
the formation of the Eastern Partnership structures proceeded, expert
working groups worked in different directions, and the grounds for signing
of the basic document which would regulate mutual relations were
prepared.
At the same time, there were no breakthrough decisions and events in relations,
as the European Union considered the presidential elections in Belarus as a
test of the intentions of the Belarusian administration and subordinated further
intensification of relations to the progress in the sphere of democracy and
human rights. The delay of the Eastern Partnership development and decisions
on multilateral regional projects and macro financial aid did not improve the
relations between Minsk and Brussels.
The surge of repressions in Belarus after the presidential elections caused a
dramatically negative reaction of the European Union and halted the process of
enhancement of Belarusian8EU relations.
Tendencies:
• Having reached the outbreak in the western direction in 2009, the official
Minsk concentrated on technical problems and the preparation of the legal
foundations for relations with the EU;
• The slowdown of the Eastern Partnership program development and
absence of fast financial results of cooperation contributed to the
decrease of interest of the Belarusian authorities to the European vector
in general;
• The presidential elections of December 19th interrupted the process of
normalization in relations with the European Union.
Normalization without breakthrough
2010 started with another crisis with the Union of Poles in Belarus,
which did not influence greatly the relations with Brussels, but was
noticed by the leaders of the European Union. The Chief of European
diplomacy Catherine Ashton denounced the actions of the Belaru
sian authorities against the Union of the Poles and noted that these
events undermine EU efforts directed at the strengthening of rela
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tions with Belarus.1 This conflict became the background against
which the European Parliament mission worked at the end of Febru
ary.
Due to joint efforts of the Belarusian civil society, experts and
lobbying structures it became possible to redirect the problem of visa
procedure simplification for Belarusians, away from the political
dialogue between Minsk and Brussels. The EU Council approved the
mandate of the European Commission for negotiations on the
preparation of the Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Readmission
Agreement. The Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy tefan Fle during his visit to Belarus
emphasized that the visa issue would be considered without political
conditions2. This decision can be considered as a token because low
price visas and simple procedures of obtaining them is almost the only
instrument of fast creation of a proEuropean mood among
Belarusians. Earlier, Brussels subordinated a price cut for Schengen
visas to the progress of democratization and liberalization in Belarus.
However, lowprice or free visas must be one of the prerequisites of
changes in Belarus, instead of being an award for good behavior of
the Belarusian government.
In February news appeared about the preparation by the European
Commission of the document under the title the Joint Interim Plan
which was supposed to serve as a roadmap of bilateral relations
development between Belarus and the EU, and also as a temporary
substitute of the Agreement of Cooperation and Partnership (ACP)
that had been signed in 1995 but hadn’t come into effect. The Plan
embraces cooperation in those spheres that are mentioned in the ACP
and is basically directed at the trade and economic sectors and at more
profound cooperation between the two sides. According to this
document the EU was to help Belarus implementing reforms. As in
the case of the Eastern Partnership Belarus was involved in
development of the plan, ensuring the interest of Minsk in this project.
Also, the plan is not a legally binding document and thus does not
provide any sanctions for violation of its terms. It had a framework
1 Catherine Ashton condemns police action against Union of Poles in Belarus //
[Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.enpiinfo.eu/maineast.
php?id=20768&id_type=1&lang_id=450
2 tefan Fle: the EU will simplify the visa procedures without political condi3
tions // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.neurope.eu/ar
ticle/2010/11/22/shtefan_fyule_evrosoyuz_uprostit_vizovyi_rezhim_
bez_politicheskikh_uslovii
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nature and in November it was presented to Alexander Lukashenko
in general terms. In case of a positive assessment of the election
process in Belarus the European Union was going to start negotiations
with the official Minsk in 2011 about filling in this roadmap with
specific contents.
The year 2010 was rich in visits of European official persons to
Belarus and Belarusian officials abroad. Foreign Affairs Minister
Sergey Martynov visited Germany and Poland twice, as well as
Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Belgium and Italy. Moreover, he went to
Italy after the presidential elections in Belarus during the early surge
of repressions.
It is necessary to mention the most relevant European visitors: first
of all, the president of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitл who visited Minsk
in October, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy Љtefan Fьle who came to Minsk twice – in
July and November, and also the joint visit of German Foreign Minister
Guido Westerwelle and his Polish counterpart Radoslaw Sikorski in
November.
The majority of Belarusian political analysts tend to connect these
visits of high European officials with the presidential elections in
Belarus. The toplevel meetings touched upon the issue of the
elections in any case. The Lithuanian President, Commissioner Fle,
and the Polish and German Ministers during their visits to Minsk spoke
about the necessity of fair and transparent elections. Only then, the
Belarusian government could hope for more profound relations with
the European Union and for financial and technical aid in reforms.
Dalia Grybauskait met not only with Alexander Lukashenko but also
the oppositional candidates for the presidency and called on them to
unite. She also mentioned Lukashenko’s promise to register all
candidates who would gather the necessary number of signatures.3
The aim of Westerwelle and Sikorski’s visit was even more
transparent – to persuade the Belarusian President into holding
transparent elections in exchange for assistance in economic reforms.
The very fact of such toplevel meetings on the eve of the
presidential elections signaled the interest of the European Union in
further development of relations with Belarus. This interest was even
stronger than the fear to be accused of supporting “the last dictator of
Europe” just ahead of the elections. The EU interest is clear: using
3 Grybauskait met with the opposition in Minsk // [Electronic resource] Mode
of access: http://news.tut.by/politics/art201042.html.
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deterioration in the BelarusianRussian relations to try to solve “the
Belarusian problem” and to expand its influence on Minsk. It is quite
logical that the mission to convey the European message was given
from Germany, which is not only the EU motor, but also has always
had a pragmatic attitude towards Belarus. Radoslaw Sikorski’s
participation can be explained by the fact that Poland presides in the
European Union next year and it will have to actively advance its
initiative, the Eastern Partnership, in which Belarus is one of key
elements.
During the visit the main “reward” that Minsk would receive for
carrying out democratic elections was announced – EUR 3 billion
within three years through miscellaneous EU programs and
instruments. On the one hand, this is a considerable sum,
commensurable with the sum that Belarus annually received from its
allied relations with Russia. But on the other hand, it was not quite
clear how this money would be given: in the form of free aid or as
loans.
The two Foreign Ministers made an unambiguous statement that
the presidency of Alexander Lukashenko can be recognized by the
European Union in case he holds fair and democratic elections: “For
us it is the quality of the elections that is important rather than the
result”, said Sikorski. At the same time, the key points were
highlighted in such a manner that it was clear that the EU could be
satisfied with elections that are simply more democratic than the
previous ones (parliamentary elections of 2008). In addition to this
“reward” Sikorski added that he had lifted the veto on involvement of
Belarus in the EU Northern Dimension, which is a bonus both for
Belarus’ image and financial plans.
Љtefan Fьle’s second visit that took place on November 15th, was
also limited to the elections. The European Commissioner named
those spheres where the EU would like to see progress, such as:
registration of candidates, creation of territorial commissions, early
voting, vote counting, access to massmedia and freedom of assembly.4
Mr. Fle also introduced the project of the Joint Interim Plan prepared
by the European Commission, and publicly announced that the Plan
serves not only as an attempt to overcome the lack of official mutual
relations between the EU and Belarus, but it also aims at helping
Belarus in reforms and modernization. However, neither Fle nor
4 BELAPAN, see: http://belapan.com/archive/2010/11/15/media_eu_fule_
europe/
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Sikorski mentioned any specific numbers concerning financial
assistance.
Despite the quite active exchange of ministeriallevel visits,
Lukashenka did not visit the EU at all in 2010. Firstly, this can be
explained by the absence of such need, given the lack of plans to sign
any important international agreements requiring the presence of
head of state. Secondly, the visibility of the foreign policy outbreak
onto the West had been vividly demonstrated to the Belarusian
electorate earlier in 2009. Therefore, the visits of the Lithuanian
President, and Foreign Ministers of Germany and Poland to Belarus
were sufficient for agitation needs. The Belarusian diplomacy
concentrated on practical issues, such as preparation of the thorough
grounds for BelarusianEuropean relations in the form of a basic
bilateral agreement, entrance to the European market, and search for
additional financial resources.
Still, the Belarusian side did not succeed in realizing its practical
aims as much as it had hoped. The problem of allocation of macro
financial aid to Belarus of EUR 200 million that had been discussed
since autumn 2009 was resolved. Commissioner Fьle during his visits
to Minsk confirmed the possibility to allocate these means. However,
the European Union has apparently linked this assistance to the
presidential election in Belarus and its transparent and democratic
character as well as the official presentation of the Joint Interim Plan
which failed to be negotiated before the earlier stated deadline. In
general it is possible to conclude that the European Union during the
whole year avoided making decisions about Belarus, waiting for the
results of the presidential campaign and their assessment by the OSCE.
All quiet in the Eastern Partnership
The disappointment of the Belarusian authorities by the Eastern Part3
nership program in 2010 led to an attitude towards this initiative as
something marginal in relations between Minsk and Brussels. Enter
ing the Eastern Partnership program, the official Minsk was primarily
interested in obtaining financial aid, investments, and in realization
of joint infrastructural projects. The political constituent of the pro
gram was considered as an annoying supplement to the dialogue with
Brussels which unfortunately could not be ignored.
The turn towards the West was regarded by the Belarusian
authorities only as an exchange of its geopolitical loyalty for financial
aid, which prevented the EU from influencing the internal political
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situation in the country. However, by the end of 2010 the Belarusian
authorities had not succeeded in “capitalizing” on its normalization
of relations with the EU and confrontation with the Russian
administration. The projects, prepared as far back as at the end of 2009
in the frameworks of the multilateral dimension of the Eastern
Partnership, were not considered and the official Minsk did not receive
any answer about their fate. At the informal summit of the Eastern
Partnership in Sopot (Poland) on May 25th, 2010 Belarusian Foreign
Minister Martynov once again called the European Commission to
adopt as soon as possible “accurate and transparent regulations” for
consideration and further financing of the submitted projects and to
fill the whole program with practical contents5. He also proposed to
create the Forum of the Eastern Development in the frameworks of
the Eastern Partnership which would ensure direct dialogue of
business structures with partner countries.
The development of the projects in the framework of the Eastern
Partnership and their further lobbying catalyzed to a certain extent
the cooperation of Belarus with Lithuania and Ukraine. In 2009–2010
there were three trilateral working meetings of the Foreign Ministers
of the mentioned countries. The last meeting was on September 8th,
2010 in Belarus where it was decided to concentrate on 5–7 main
projects which would be promoted within the Eastern Partnership
program6.
On December 13th, in Brussels there was an annual meeting of
Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Eastern Partnership.
Sergey Martynov once again pointed out the necessity to expand the
practical cooperation within the EaP and to intensify the project
component of the program. During the preparation for EaP summit in
2011 the Belarusian side made a suggestion to prepare the recount of
the strategic projects of the EaP, to start the Eastern Development
Forum, and also to develop the roadmap of EaP activity for the nearest
two years7. However, as the main aim of the ministerial meeting was
to review current activity and to assess progress made in the
5 Belarus called upon the European Commission to “faster adoption of clear
and transparent regulations” of consideration and financing of the EaP
projects // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://belapan.com/ar
chive/2010/05/25/eu_387543/
6 Earlier more than 20 joint regional projects were submitted to the EU.
7 Foreign Minister Martynau at a ministerial meeting of the Eastern Partner
ship see: http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/press/news_mfa/f42e09faab4791fe.
html.
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implementation of the Eastern Partnership, no important decisions
were made.
Euronest casus
Euronest remained an additional stumbling block in the program of
the Eastern Partnership for Belarus – the interparliamentary dimen
sion which was to include parliamentary deputies of the EU six east
ern neighbors and European Parliament representatives. It should be
noted that from the very beginning of the creation of this organ there
was a problem of illegitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly in
the opinion of the European deputies who refused to recognize the
right of the Belarusian deputies to represent Belarus. As an alterna
tive the European Parliament proposed to invite Belarusian opposi
tion and civil society representatives to Euronest, which was flatly re
jected by the official Minsk, referring to the Prague Declaration ac
cording to which Euronest should include the representatives of the
legislative authority of the partner countries. Additional doubts ap
pear concerning the representation of civil society, which is already
presented in a separate institution – the Civil Society Forum.
Throughout the year from time to time information appeared that
Euronest was about to start its work without the participation of
Belarusian officials, which caused a negative reaction from Minsk and
further undermined the faith of the countries in bilateral relations.
The list of victories of the Belarusian diplomacy should also include
the demarche of the parliamentary speakers of six member countries
of the EaP organized by Minsk who sent a joint letter to the European
Parliament with the request to include the Belarusian Parliament
equally to Euronest. However, this action did not convince the
European parliamentarians and the casus with Euronest remained
unsolved. Nevertheless, the EaP InterParliamentary Assembly did not
gather in autumn without Belarusian representatives as it had been
planned earlier. In this case, like in other initiatives, the EU decided
to wait for the election results in Belarus.
19.12 as the end of normalization
There is no doubt that the presidential elections of December 19th
marked the end of the political year in Belarus, having stopped those
internal and foreign policy trends which had been formed since 2008.
The European Union as well as other international actors considered
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the presidential elections in Belarus as a test of the intentions of the
official Minsk in relation to the EU and liberalization of the country
as a whole. The European politicians emphasized not once that it was
the election campaign and the Belarusian authorities’ behavior dur
ing it that would be the focal point that would determine the next
stage of BelarusianEuropean relations. It was Lukashenka’s good
behavior during the campaign and on the election day that the allo
cation of EUR 3 billion promised by Radoslaw Sikorski depended on,
as well as the beginning of negotiations on the Joint Interim Plan and
renewal of fullfledged relations with the European Union as a whole.
The elections should have concluded the test period that started in
autumn 2008.
The Belarusian side perfectly understood. Therefore it did its best
(in the context of the current system) to receive the acknowledgment
from the EU and the international community: it allowed the most
free election campaign during the last 16 years, was in touch with
foreign journalists, ensured unprecedented safety measures for OSCE
observers, abstained from criticizing the opposition and the EU. Few
observers and analysts had doubts about the positive reaction of
Brussels to the Belarusian elections and further improvement of mutual
relations. It was these expectations and the sham results that caused a
sharply negative reaction of the European Union to the events of
December 19th in Minsk.
On December 20th, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs
Catherine Ashton made a statement in which she denounced “the use
of violence following the presidential elections in Belarus, in particular
the beating and detention of several opposition leaders, including a
number of presidential candidates”8. The same statements were made
by President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek, Foreign
Ministers of Poland, Germany, Great Britain and other EU member
states. After the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Poland, Sweden and
the Czech Republic submitted their condemning article about the
Belarusian elections to The New York Times under the title
“Lukashenko the Loser”9 it became clear that the brief period of
improvement of the relations between Belarus and the EU has ended.
8 EU leaders condemn violence in Belarus following presidential elections //
[Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.enpiinfo.eu/
maineast.php?id=23637&id_type=1.
9 “Lukashenko the Loser” // The New York Times [Electronic resource] Mode
of access: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/opinion/24ihtedbildt24.
html?_r=1
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Conclusion
The year 2010 in relations between Belarus and the EU can be called
the year of waiting for the presidential elections. Without hoping for
cardinal political changes in the country, the European Union, never
theless, considered the election campaign as a test of seriousness of
Alexander Lukashenko’s intentions as to cooperation with Brussels.
Therefore, no relevant decisions important for Belarus within the Be
larusianEuropean relations throughout the year were made. This fact,
in its turn, facilitated the desire of the Belarusian authorities to search
for closer relations with Russia, which they, at last, achieved just be
fore the elections.
The European Union returned to the idea of a roadmap facilitating
relations with Minsk, reflected in a draft variant of the Joint Interim
Plan that however was not presented to the general public and was
not approved by the two sides.
The presidential elections, the surge of violence and repression
caused a negative reaction of European structures and suspended
normalization of relations. BelarusianEuropean relations were thrown
back to where they were in 2006–2007. However, judging by the fact
that after the elections Belarus appeared in a very inconvenient
foreignpolicy situation, and also by the fact that the EU has no other
strategy as to Belarus except for the policy of pullingin, it is possible
to predict a gradual normalization of relations during 2011.
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BELARUS – U.S.: FROM DIALOGUE TO
SANCTIONS
Andrey Fyodorov
Summary
In 2010, Belarusian8American relations were hard to define in a few words
because the situation before the presidential election changed dramatically
after the election. The ‘before’ period was not something different as compared
with the previous year’s inactivity. Belarusian top officials met with a group of
American businessmen and the outcome was apparently too insignificant to
be speculated about. There was a certain progress however after the Belarusian
foreign minister met with his American counterpart in early December. But the
events of the post8election period not only ruined everything that could take
bilateral relations to the next level, but brought them back to the status observed
three years ago or even before.
Tendencies:
• Before December 19:
– A shaky balance with faintly visible prospects for improvement;
• After December 19:
– Steep decline of political contacts down to the minimum;
– Resumption and expansion of the sanctions applied before suspension;
– Further decline of bilateral economic cooperation, no more backing in
international financial institutions;
– Maintaining of diplomatic representation at the minimum level and threat
of severance of relations at any moment.
January.November: Fruitless meetings and minor
encounters
The year 2010 was so uneventful – except for the last month, of
course – that it is hard to add anything to the history of BelarusU.S.
relations. Nothing special or even noteworthy happened.
Politics. In January, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Foreign
Affairs Committee introduced a bill on monitoring of Belarus’ arms
exports. According to the document, the Department of State is to
submit annual reports on the amounts and mechanisms of arms exports
by the government and enterprises of Belarus, including information
about incomes from such transactions and the likely role of the
government and enterprises of Russia in these exports. However, as
no information about the fate of the bill has been available ever since,
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most likely it was regarded nonurgent. Besides, experts believe that
Belarus has run out of stocks to supply considerable amounts of
weapons, which could seriously affect the situation in this or that
region. Therefore, even if the bill would have been passed, no tangible
consequences were likely to follow.
In midApril, Washington’s “selective interaction” policy was
manifested once again: Belarus was not invited to the nuclear security
summit held in the U.S. capital. Alexander Lukashenko called it
“brainlessness and stupid inertia.” He said he was not going to attend
the summit anyway, but, at the same time somewhat illogically
grumbled that Russia, Kazakhstan, and other CIS states, which sent
delegations to Washington, could have insisted on Belarus’
participation.
If there are no actual events to talk about, imagination is often
used as a substitute. In the middle of May, the oppositional media
claimed that Presidential Administration head Vladimir Makey made
a confidential visit to Washington. He allegedly held a series of
meetings trying to convince the Americans to reconsider policy toward
official Minsk. In exchange, he promised to let the U.S. embassy work
at full breath and, more importantly, to open the country for American
business and foster bilateral relations to get back on track.
If this had indeed happened, it would be a true sensation.
Unfortunately, it was nothing but a newspaper hoax, professionally
played, though. Anyway, Belarus’ offers were quite definite. It would
not be a problem to fulfill the promise, because the Belarusian
government had nothing else to offer, actually, without detriment to
itself.
Meanwhile, despite all contradictions, Minsk kept sending out
signals for reconciliation. Lukashenko’s interview to Syrian Al3Watan
daily in late July is notable in this context. Specifically, the president
said “the policy pursued by the Barrack Obama Administration aimed
at searching for partners, development of relations based on mutual
interests and mutual respect was consonant to our intergovernmental
cooperation principles, the multiplevector approach, integrity, and
openness among them.” He recommended the White House to employ
these principles while shaping its policy toward Belarus. The president
emphasized that Belarus had never triggered deterioration of relations
with the U.S. but always wanted normalization. Nevertheless, these
statements were not seconded with deeds and Washington, which
repeatedly stated concern over the situation and urged Belarus to
respect democracy and human rights, just did not buy it.
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In early November, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon confirmed that the United States would
like to have better relations with the authorities of Belarus but the
latter should have made certain steps for that. He said the American
sanctions could have been lifted in case the situation with democracy
and human rights improved. Gordon gave special priority to the
forthcoming presidential election. He promised that flawless election
would also result in resumption of the U.S. embassy’s full functioning
in Belarus. “We do not think that absence of an ambassador is the
way to maintain contacts with the government,” he emphasized.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russell went to Minsk
two weeks later to address problems extensively. He met with Foreign
Minister of Belarus Martynov to discuss the entire range of bilateral
relations, and also with presidential candidates nominated by political
parties and civil society representatives. Following the negotiations,
Russell said the opportunities for normalization remained limited.
“Our financial and visa sanctions against Belarus remain in full force
and effect because no progress in the field of democracy and human
rights is observed in the country,” he said.
In short, the U.S. suggested the following sequence of events:
elections more or less complying with democratic standards – lifting
of the sanctions – return of the embassy personnel and subsequent
expansion of cooperation on the most relevant matters. However, the
Belarusian authorities obstinately refused to take the first step and
only released the screws a bit, not improving the uneven conditions
for the contenders as a matter of fact. At the same time, the Belarusian
government insisted on fulfillment and even overfulfillment of the
terms set by the Americans, and wanted to go further to the next stages.
Economy. The aggravating complications in the interaction with
Russia and rapidly growing balance of payment deficit pushed official
Minsk to seek economic options in the West. The United States, as
the global economic leader, could help Belarus essentially in tackling
the pressing problems. Therefore, Belarus made attempts to obtain
material aid from its main opponent.
A group of American businessmen visited Belarus March 29 to
meet with President Lukashenko and Prime Minister Sidorsky. The
hosts promised golden opportunities for the transatlantic business,
fullblown support, and the most favorable working conditions. The
U.S. embassy in Minsk said it had nothing to do with the visit. One of
the diplomats informed that the companies, which delegated their
representatives to Belarus, did not address the U.S. government for
Foreign policy
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assistance in arrangement of the trip. It was private and did not “signal
any improvement of relations between the two countries or the human
rights situation in Belarus.” No information about particular results
of the visit was available afterwards.
William Delahunt, Chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on
Europe and Eurasia within the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs
Committee, went to Minsk in midOctober. He discussed trade,
economic, and investment cooperation between Belarus and the U.S. with
Premier Sidorsky, chief banker Prokopovich, and Economy Minister
Snopkov. He also met with Presidential Administration head Makey.
Sergey Sidorsky expressed his hope for reaching the 2007 figures
in the bilateral trade, i.e., as he noted, the volume of mutual trade of
over USD 700 million. “Counting on your investments into Belarus,
we are ready to privatize our economy with the help of American
capital,” he said. According to the United States, the amount was much
higher (see Table 1). The discrepancy is probably caused by different
calculation methods. Anyhow, it is obvious that commodity circulation
between the two countries is decreasing drastically. It looks like the
sanctions imposed on Belneftekhim stateowned petrochemicals firm
by the Treasury Department, which caused such a stir at the time, did
not play a pivotal role actually.
Table 1. Belarus–U.S. commodity turnover, USD mln1
We remind that the sanctions were imposed in November 2007
and expanded in March 2008 by adding Polotsk Steklovolokno and
Lida Lakokraska to the black list. The ban on the two key subsidiaries
of Belneftekhim had been under moratorium since autumn 2008 and
the suspension was extended more than once. I.e. the situation has
not changed considerably over the past two years, but Belarusian
exports to the U.S. shrank 6.3 times, whereas the trade surplus went
down 17.3 times.
1 U. S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division // [Electronic resource] Mode
of access: http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c4622.html.
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Considering that political relations did not worsen, it most
probably happened because the Americans did not see the business
environment in Belarus they got used to. The steps made by the
government to foster investment were apparently too small.
December: Hint of thaw and sudden disruption
Over the first eleven months of the year, BelarusianAmerican rela
tions did not suggest any appreciable changes, so it was like “the calm
before no wind” on the threshold of the election campaign.
Before December 19. Then changes took place, and they were
changes for the better. During the OSCE summit held December 1st
in Astana, Hillary Clinton and Sergey Martynov came out with a joint
statement. Belarus agreed to eliminate the entire stock of highly
enriched uranium by the next nuclear security summit scheduled for
2012. In exchange, the U.S. promised all required technical and
financial aid and seconded Belarus’ intention to diversify energy
sources by constructing a nuclear power plant.
The second part of the statement was even more important. Both
governments recognized that improvements on democracy and
human rights issues were essential for bilateral relations and prosperity
of the Belarusians. The United States expressed hope that the
presidential election would meet international standards.
Belarus most likely wanted to use America’s concern that nuclear
materials could fall into the hands of terrorists, and to show Moscow
the willingness to straight things out with its ageold foe. It is also clear
that the democracy issue was prompted by Washington. This event
looked rather promising. Although the expected democratic
transformations were vaguely phrased, the first public contact with a
highranking official of the U.S. Administration was certainly inspiring.
A group of representatives of U.S. research centers arrived in
Belarus shortly after. It is noteworthy that it included persons not
known to have any warm feelings toward the Belarusian regime. The
visit program was extensive. The experts met with the ministers of
foreign affairs and defense, heads of foreign affairs commissions of
both chambers of the National Assembly, editorsinchief of
governmental media outlets, TV political observers, a number of state
controlled and pseudoindependent research centers, etc. A talk with
Alexander Lukashenko was reserved for later. It was strange however
that the regime’s opponents were not on the list. That is why nothing
is known about the final conclusions of the expert delegation.
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Nevertheless, the very fact of such a visit taking place, undreamtof
before, kind of confirmed a certain thaw in relations between the two
countries.
December 19 and after. Therefore the “Bloody Sunday” and the
events that followed were totally unexpected. They shattered all
dreams and hopes, and the United States’ reaction was not long in
coming. On the next day, the Department of State resolutely
condemned the violent incidents on the election day, demanded the
release of the arrested persons, and declared nonrecognition of the
election. The U.S. mission to the OSCE, the Congress Helsinki
Commission, and Senators John McCain, Joe Lieberman, and John
Kerry seconded the statement.
Hilary Clinton and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton
made a joint statement December 23. They urged to release all those
in detention, condemned the acts of violence, and highlighted serious
problems of the election process and vote count. The politicians
emphasized that improvement of relations with the U.S. and EU was
not possible without an appreciable progress in the field of democracy
and human rights. Although no practical measures were taken by the
end of the year, it is clear that Washington will not confine itself to
mere generalities.
Conclusion
BelarusianAmerican relations thus suffered a setback to the status of
three years ago, i.e. probably the harshest confrontation. According
ly, it is time for a policy of sanctions, and they will be toughened. At
least the White House will be more persistent pushing Congress,
where the Republican Party is much stronger now following the No
vember elections. In particular, the author of the abovementioned
bill on Belarus’ arms export monitoring, Ileana RosLehtinen, now
heads the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.
It is likely that economy will be in focus this time. It is hard to
speak about a strong effect of any restrictions of course, since the direct
ties are almost negligible. But Washington has a very strong hold over
international financial institutions.
Therefore, remaining solid in its approaches, official Minsk cannot
expect credits, which it needs desperately, considering its huge foreign
trade deficit.
A largescale inflow of American business is a utopia now. Besides,
the Belarusian authorities will not manage to maintain present living
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standards without an economic update, and it is not clear how they
intend to do it without aid from the West.
Lastly, the Belarusian regime faces major problems caused by the
significant reduction in material aid from Moscow. Russia would only
agree to provide investment support if Minsk carried out certain
requirements, including those in the political sector.
The Kremlin’s goal is to make Belarus its satellite led by a more
flexible person. The Belarusian authorities perfectly understand this,
but the space for maneuver in the eastern direction has shrunk
together with the opportunities to react against this plan. For this
reason, it is safe to assume that the Belarusian government will try to
reestablish cooperation with the West, including the United States,
as soon as possible.
This article used information from
BelTA, BelaPAN, and Interfax
news agencies.
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POLISH.BELARUSIAN RELATIONS:
ANOTHER CRISIS
Kamil Klysinski
Summary
Belarusian8Polish relations in 2010 were dominated by two conflicts despite
attempts of reconciliation. Firstly, the main source of misunderstanding is the
old conflict around minority interest groups. There has been no sign of
compromise so far – the parties are firm in their positions. There were some
signs of improvement, but even the April disaster at Smolensk did not change
the situation. This great tragedy of Poland and its people was met with deep
sympathy in Belarus. Secondly, at the end of the year Poland was
uncompromisingly severe in its criticism of the Belarusian regime for returning
to the policy of repressions against the opposition. As a result, Belarusian8
Polish relations are again at the brink of a severe crisis.
Tendencies:
• Belarusian8Polish relations in 2010 were dominated by two conflicts: the
dispute about Polish minority interest groups and after8election events in
December 2010; the April tragedy at Smolensk, despite some signs of
improvement, did not change the situation;
• At the end of the year Poland criticized the Belarusian regime severely for
returning to the policy of repressions against the opposition.
Oppression against activists of the Union of Poles
in Belarus headed by Andzelika Borys
In 2005, Belarusian authorities would not recognize the elected chair
person of the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB) and demanded a new
election. Because Andzelika Borys was not controlled by the regime.
As a result, already in 2005 there was a new administration elected,
under the regime’s control. This led to a split in the Polish minority:
since then there have been two societies bearing the identical name
of the Union of Poles in Belarus. The first one, supported by Poland
and headed by Andzelika Borys (by Anzelika Orechwo since June
2010), is illegal in Belarus. The other one is officially acknowledged
by the Belarusian authorities. Alexander Lukashenko’s regime has
been oppressing the activists of the illegal UPB for several years: fines,
detentions, complications at work, provocations, acts of vandalism,
spiteful attacks in statecontrolled media, etc. The aim of these meth
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ods is to force the Union’s heads to give up their independence: to
subordinate to the official UPB and make the members join the pro
regime Union.
Poland’s was an active role in renewing the BelarusEU dialogue,
which resulted in significant slackening of oppressive acts over the
last two years, creating prerequisites for understanding in this issue,
painful for both sides.
In the meantime, in early 2010 the conflict escalated sharply. On
January 21, Belarusian police detained several dozen nonofficial
UPB’s activists, who were driving from Hrodna to Ivianiec (Minsk
region) to prevent the official UPB from occupying the local Polish
House. Though the detained were soon released and the authorities
did not dare intervene, it was a temporary armistice.  Already in early
February, Polonica, a company owned by Andzelika Borys that
sponsored cultural and educational activities of the independent UPB,
received a fine of nearly USD 40 000, which threatened the existence
of this business entity. After February 8, the police evicted Andzelika
Borys’s activists from the Polish House in Ivianiec. Thus the authorities
occupied one of the three Houses that were remaining beyond the
proregime Union’s control.
Another episode in the conflict around the minority
The attack against UPB put Warsaw in a difficult situation. On the
one hand, Polish diplomats had to decisively denounce these actions.
On the other hand, the role of the main BelarusEU dialogue promot
er left little room for hasty and radical actions: the strategic goal was
to involve Belarus in evercloser cooperation with the EU. It was even
more important to keep the balance as Belarusian Foreign Minister
Sergey Martynov was to visit Poland on February 12.
Warsaw’s response to the surge of repression against Andzelika
Borys’ UPB was an attempt to combine an adequate but sharp reaction
to the essential issue and promote the dialogue with Minsk, both within
the EU and in bilateral relations. That is why the Polish Foreign Ministry
issued a sharp ultimatum to the Belarusian side listing 14 points, in which
Polish authorities could help Belarus, in return for more respect for rights
of the Polish minority. The list included, among others, the last tranche
of the IMF credit, support on the Council of the Baltic Sea States’
membership, promotion of Eastern Partnership projects, etc.
At the same time, to promote neighborhood cooperation Poland
did not cancel the visit of Sergey Martynov, Belarusian Foreign
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Minister. On February 12, he and Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski
signed the longawaited agreement on local border traffic. The Polish
opposition and some media severely criticized this agreement and
charged the authorities with inexcusable indulgence towards Minsk.
Despite these charges, we should emphasize that Poland was the
first among Belarus’ neighbors to sign an agreement essential for
bordering territories, which must be recognized as a real success in
PolishBelarusian relations. The Polish authorities realized that the
best way to solve this perennial conflict was negotiations, and not
sanctions or threats.
During his meeting with Alexander Lukashenko in Kyiv
Minister Sikorski suggested establishing a special Polish
Belarusian expert panel to elaborate an agreement on the Polish
minority in Belarus.   The proposal was accepted and soon a
combined panel was established, headed by the Polish Foreign
ViceMinister Andrzej Kremer and the Belarusian Commissioner
for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Leonid Gulyako. There have been
2 meetings so far, but none of them was fruitful. The only progress
so far has been “exchange of views”, which means “a complete
deadlock” in diplomatic language.
The Belarusian side seems not to have been interested in reaching
a compromise when it agreed to establish this panel. Its single goal
must have been to slacken the tension on the Polish side by
demonstrating willingness to negotiate. Since the very first day of the
February crisis the Belarusian authorities denied any fact of repression
and restrictions against the Polish minority in Belarus.  Any action in
this direction was accounted for as a need to enforce the law and
protect interests of the only legal UPC headed by Stanislav Semashko.
Moreover, responding to complaints from Warsaw, Minsk launched
a propaganda counteroffensive to present Andzelika Borys’ fellows
as a minor group of outlaws and political adventurers who have
nothing to do with the real movement of the minority.
At the same time, the Belarusian authorities charged the Polish
side with discriminating the activists of the official Union of Poles by
banning them from Poland and denying contacts with Polish diplomats
and higher authorities’ representatives. In this situation, another year
was passing under the sign of unsolvable conflict, which has become
a classical example of the political stalemate in intergovernmental
relations. So, in November, when there was no chance that the
February fine of USD 40 000 would be repealed, UPB headed by
Anzelika Orechwo submitted documents to register a new company
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Kresowija that would be able to take over duties of Polonica without
financial obligations.
In June, great confusion was caused by the unexpected decision
of Andzelika Borys, head of the UPC for many years, to resign from
her post. She said it was for purely personal reasons but there were a
lot of speculations about probable pressure from the Polish authorities
that allegedly wanted to convince the Belarusian authorities to register
the illegal Union. There is no evidence for these insinuations. After
Ms Borys resigned, Anzelika Orechwo became the acting head of the
UPC.
After Smolensk disaster: solidarity despite everything?
When on April, 10 the Polish president Lech Kaczynski and his wife
were killed in a plane crash at Smolensk, Belarusian authorities did
all their best to help the Polish side: Polish planes were allowed into
the Belarusian airspace and landed in Viciebsk so that delegations
could get to Smolensk by land. But the flawless practical help was not
followed by symbolic gestures typical for international relations, which
are sometimes even more important than effective actions. On April
12, two days after the crash, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine
declared national mourning.  Belarus appeared the only country in
the region to stay outside the mainstream and persisted in its position
the following days. This provoked a surge of criticism from indepen
dent media and opposition; Internet users did not choose their words
carefully in their evaluations of the President’s actions.
But the worst was Alexander Lukashenko’s opinion expressed on
April 15, long before the investigation results were announced, when
he openly called Lech Kaczynski responsible for the crash. At the same
time, Belarusians were very active in offering condolences to their
neighbors. People signed books of condolences in Polish diplomatic
missions, lighted candles in front of the embassy and consular sections,
and spontaneously expressed condolences in private meetings (the
author of this article was in Belarus at that time and personally
witnessed this).
We must admit that Belarusian services offered great practical help
in first days after the crash, but typical for the circumstances symbolic
gestures were really missing. The chance to improve MinskWarsaw
relations, rich in conflicts, was missed. Alexander Lukashenko either
did not manage to or did not wish to raise himself above his not always
understandable calculations and did not use the paradoxically positive
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potential of this great tragedy. Moreover, famous for his political
intuition, the Belarusian leader did not see a chance to improve his
image in Poland and – broader – in the EU by personal participation
in the ceremonial burial of Maria and Lech Kaczynski on April 18 in
Krakow. It is difficult to imagine that he would have been barred from
entering the country. The only political result of the Smolensk tragedy
in BelarusianPolish relations was Ambassador Henryk Litwin’s recall
to Warsaw. He substituted Andrzej Kremer, Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, who was killed together with other members of the
delegation to Katyn.
“Conditional” policy and its failure
The unprecedented pressure from Russia, trying to limit Minsk’s in
dependence, forced Alexander Lukashenko to start limited political
liberalization before the presidential election on December 19, though
the authoritarian regime was not changed essentially. By doing so the
Belarusian President sent the West a clear signal that he was interest
ed in cooperation and understanding.
Changes in Minsk’s interior policy were noticed in EU capitals,
including Warsaw. Polish diplomats made another attempt to be the
main figure in the EUBelarus dialogue. On November 2, 2010, Foreign
Minister of RP Radoslaw Sikorski payed his first visit to Minsk in many
years. He was accompanied by Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister
of Germany. During the meeting with President Lukashenko, Mr.
Sikorski presented an offer based on the socalled “principle of
conditionality”, i.e. that contacts and cooperation would increase with
development of democratization. To strengthen the signal, the Polish
diplomatic leader openly announced that if the election in Belarus
were democratic, in the following three years Belarus would receive
nearly USD 3 billion of financial assistance within the Eastern
partnership and TACIS. Lukashenko assured his foreign guests that
December elections would be “even more democratic than the
previous ones”.
Simultaneously, the Belarusian President met with a group of
Polish journalists who interviewed him on the key issues of Belarusian
Polish relations. Despite numerous provisos on both sides, general
impression was that a quiet and manipulationfree presidential
election would give a new chance for MinskWarsaw relations. But
the unexpected of the demonstration on December 19 in Minsk
destroyed these optimistic hopes. The following days brought news
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about repression against opposition, civil activists and independent
media. The Belarusian regime reverted to repression, and Poland,
being the main promoter of democratization, had to take the position
of sharp criticism and call to the EU for serious sanctions. The reaction
of Minsk was just a question of time. Thus, in late December, Polish
Belarusian relations came into another round of crisis.
Conclusion
In 2010, just like in previous years, the parties involved did not man
age to settle disputes around the UPB. Neither Warsaw nor Minsk
want that their possible concessions are perceived as weakness or even
surrender. Neither should we forget about stereotypes and gossip. It
is true that there is no national discrimination in Belarus. But there is
mistrust towards Polish organizations, especially when they are fi
nanced from Warsaw, as the UPB headed by Anzelika Orechwo is.
Hence, this issue is not expected to be quickly resolved, which will be
undermining PolishBelarusian relations.
While the tension around the UPC is just another round of the
perennial conflict, the severe criticism of the repression launched in
late 2010 is the beginning a new severe crisis in BelarusPoland
relations. In this situation, the only positive and seemingly lasting
achievement of 2010 is signing the agreement on local border traffic.
When it comes into force, it might intensify social and economic life
of the frontier regions of Poland and Belarus.
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BELARUS.UKRAINE:
NEW EMPHASES – OPEN OPPORTUNITIES
Gennady Maksak
Summary
In 2010, development of bilateral relations between Belarus and Ukraine was
substantially influenced by the change of political elites in Ukraine and
involvement of the top echelons of both states in election processes. The
beginning of the year was marked by mutual interest of the heads of state in
neighborhood matters. The interest shifted to the government level by year
end. This can be explained partly by the lack of progress in dealing with sensitive
political issues and partly by the lowered degree of politicization of mutual
relations following the rapid improvement of the Russian8Ukrainian relations.
Despite all preconditions, the chronic issues like the undetermined legal status
of the Belarusian8Ukrainian border and beginning of the demarcation process
remained unresolved in 2010.
The usual emphasis on economic cooperation enabled to set up system8based
frameworks for an upturn of bilateral cooperation and achievement of the pre8
crisis sales turnover. Despite the underdeveloped systematic approaches and
insignificant volumes, the cooperation in the energy sector has become
geostrategic to a certain extent owing to the joint efforts put forth to arrange
an alternative route for energy supplies to Belarus through the territory of
Ukraine.
The 19 December presidential election in Belarus and Ukraine’s decision to
second the OSCE Mission’s assessment added new parentheses to Minsk8
Kyiv relations, which are likely to be shaped up more or less distinctly by mid8
2011.
Tendencies:
• The new political elite of Ukraine did not reconsider the Belarusian8Ukrainian
agenda leaving the basic plans unchanged;
• Contacts between the two governments were quite stable and fruitful
throughout the year that made it possible to concentrate on finding solutions
to particular problems, which both countries needed to address;
• In the economic sector, Belarus and Ukraine approached the commodity
circulation close to the 2008 pre8recession peak;
• The high hopes for joint participation in EU Eastern Partnership projects
deflated due to the EU’s undetermined foreign policy in this area;
• Kyiv’s decision to use the Odessa8Brody oil main in the direct mode for
transportation of Venezuelan oil to Belarusian refineries was a symbolic act
displaying a possibility of joint decision making aimed at energy security of
the two states and the entire Eastern European region.
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New emphases of usual agenda
The events that marked mutual relations buildup in 2009 created a
realistic platform for their rethinking and opening of new directions
conditioned by geopolitical transformations in the Eastern European
region. Resumption of toplevel contacts and stepped up completion
of the regulatory and legal framework signaled a more pragmatic ap
proach to pressing and vitally important problems waiting to be re
solved by both states. In 2009, the BelarusianUkrainian political
“thaw” had a distinct antiRussian foundation.
Early in the year 2010, Ukraine and Belarus signed more than 180
bilateral documents including nine interstate, one interparliamentary,
and 76 intergovernmental ones alongside a number of inter
departmental and interregional agreements.
Appreciable progress was achieved in the dialog with the Viktor
Yushchenko Administration in 2009. When oppositional politician
Viktor Yanukovich took office in February 2010, Minsk was quite
optimistic at first. Lukashenko and Yanukovich spoke over the phone
on February 20. Alongside routine congratulations on the election win,
the two presidents touched upon matters related to bilateral relations.
As soon as February 24–25, the president of Belarus made a working
visit to Ukraine to attend the ceremony of his counterpart’s
inauguration and discuss priority matters of mutual concern.
The BelarusianUkrainian agenda did not undergo a dramatic
change with the coming to power of the new administration in Ukraine.
Kyiv still regarded the status of the BelarusianUkrainian border as a
key point together with infrastructural projects and an upgrade of trade
and economic cooperation. It was clear though that the political
component of bilateral relations related to the projects launched as part
of the European Union’s initiatives would be recalibrated substantially
in view of the new format of relations between Kyiv and Moscow.
As Belarus was approaching the presidential election scheduled
for late 2010, it had to take account of Ukraine’s position when thinking
over foreign policy priorities. Firstly, Minsk was losing an ally amid
the heated confrontation with Moscow that obviously narrowed the
room for maneuver. Secondly, Kyiv was not that eager to play the role
of an intermediary between Brussels and Minsk anymore that gave
less chance for Ukraine’s indulgent opinion of the democratic nature
of political processes in the neighboring country.
Against the background of the shifted emphases in the bilateral
agenda, the 2009 trend, i.e. quite intensive toplevel communications,
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was still intensifying in 2010. During the very first meeting between
the presidents of Belarus and Ukraine held in February 2010, the
parties planned Yanukovich’s visit to Belarus in spring. A huge amount
of work was done to arrange that visit. In 2009, the presidents mostly
focused on joint actions under the Eastern Partnership projects, while
in 2010, political negotiations included participation of the Ukrainian
military in the parade timed to the 65th anniversary of the Viktory in
the Great Patriotic War (19411945) in Minsk, and participation of
Belarusian units in the 9 May parade in Kyiv.
It was symptomatic of the new format of relations that the
BelarusianUkrainian intergovernmental joint commission for trade
and economic cooperation, which was planning on holding a session
on April 15 in Kyiv, served as a basis for bilateral communications.
The primal questions included stepping up of trade and economic
cooperation, transborder cooperation, and energy projects.
It looked like the arrangements on ratification of the border
agreement by Belarus and the consensusbased option of Ukrainian
electric energy supplies to Belarus on preferential terms as redemption
of Kyiv’s debt worked out in 2009 brought the parties closer to
resolving the issues. On April 2, the House of Representatives of the
National Assembly of Belarus ratified the BelarusianUkrainian border
agreement, and the Council of the Republic did the same on April 26.
It was a significant progress in bringing together both positions on
the problem, which had been bothering the two states for a long time.
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich made a working visit to
Belarus on April 29 together with a delegation formed of vice premiers
and ministers that indicated major importance of the visit for both
states. Following the meeting, interdepartmental consultations, and
expert discussions, the heads of state presented a plan of joint actions
focused on BelarusianUkrainian cooperation priorities, the socalled
“road map.”
However, May saw a malfunction in the welltuned top level
communication mechanism. Lukashenko was going to visit Ukraine in
May 2010 to exchange ratifications of the worked out plan of joint actions.
The visit was cancelled and no univocal official comments followed. Most
likely Minsk did not want to make concessions on the issue of the status
of the BelarusianUkrainian border – a matter of principle for the
Belarusian government – after Kyiv reconsidered its position on
supporting Belarus in the conflicts with Russia. Ukraine looked at this
issue as one of the central problems and protraction of the case on the
part of Belarus was rather painful for Yanukovich and his team.
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At the same time, representatives of the diplomatic corps voiced
the opinion that the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus had already
made a strong contribution to development of bilateral relations and
the governments should have taken it from there to maintain relations
at the tactical level, while the border issue was still at the negotiation
stage. The heads of state met twice more by the end of the year during
various international events. No joint declarations concerning bilateral
cooperation were made, though.
Since May 2010, most of the talks were held at the
intergovernmental level. The first vice premiers, Vladimir Semashko
and Andrey Klyuev, signed the road map on May 29 in Homiel.
Considering that both countries had not drawn up a longterm
strategic document to regulate the economic cooperation sector, the
road map was kind of a pragmatic step towards each other. Officials
said it could help to take the bilateral commodity turnover to the new
recordbreaking level of USD 7 to 8 billion. Revitalization of mutual
trade could be achieved by setting up joint ventures to be engaged in
exports to third countries and development of cooperation in such
branches of industry as mechanical engineering, transport, and
metallurgic engineering.
One of the road map paragraphs determined cooperation in transit
of oil through Ukraine and supplies of Belarusian oil products to
Ukraine. Given the situation in the region, this provision was a
cornerstone of Belarus and Ukraine’s energy security.
In April, the first trial delivery of contracted Venezuelan oil –
80,000 out of four million metric tons – was made by sea to a Ukrainian
port from where it was transported by railway to the Mazyr refinery in
Belarus. On June 12, the Ukrainian Cabinet and the government of
Belarus signed the agreement on cooperation in oil transportation to
Belarus via Ukraine. From an economic point of view, the amount of
Venezuelan oil was insignificant relative to the needs of Belarus’
petrochemical industry. But it was a clear and loud political signal
that Belarus and Ukraine could unite efforts to actualize supplies
diversification strategies.
For Ukraine, this project turned geopolitical rather than just
economic when it came to transportation of oil not by railway but
through the Odessa–Brody main in direct mode. In August, the
Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine approved the
use of the OdessaBrody main in direct mode on the condition that
Belarus would guarantee pumping of more than 9 million metric tons
of Venezuelan oil per year. As early as late October, Ukraine and
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Belarus signed a contract on the trial transportation of oil through the
OdessaBrody pipeline.
The first trial transportation to Belarus was arranged in late
November 2010. After doing the math, the parties agreed that the
transportation was economically efficient and the pipeline system was
ready technically. This project will be continued in 2011, but it is
obvious that there is more strategic pragmatism in the energy sector
now that affects energy security of the Eastern European region in
the context of the presentday threats and challenges.
Officials of BelarusianUkrainian institutional departments
continued regular meetings. Defense and foreign policy agencies were
quite active too.
Ukraine appointed a new ambassador to Belarus in the middle
of the year. On June 14, after two months of tenure of appointment,
Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Ukraine Roman Bezsmertny
presented his credentials to President of Belarus Lukashenko. It is
worth noting that Mr. Bezsmertny was appointed ambassador by
President Yushchenko when the latter was already vacating his
office. His motivation to appoint the former party associate is
unclear. It is however symptomatic that neither the new president
of Ukraine, nor the foreign minister disputed Yushchenko’s
decision.
Election processes as an accelerator of bilateral
relations policy
Attention should be paid to BelarusianUkrainian relations in the con
text of the presidential election in Belarus in December 2010. Although
the election outcome was easy to predict, official Kyiv did not openly
declare support for the incumbent president of Belarus, and did not
single out any other candidate for the position. If to have a look at the
election programs, it would be apparent that the presidential candi
dates did not pay much attention to Belarus and Ukraine’s mutual
prospects.
At the same time, official Minsk was very much interested in
recognition of the election results by Kyiv as well as CIS monitoring
missions invited to oversee the election in Belarus. With this objective
in view, the Belarusian government invited representatives of the
Communist Party of Ukraine and observers from the border regions
of Ukraine. During the briefings held by election commissions on
December 20 in the regional centers of Belarus, the election was
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expectedly recognized democratic and free considering many aspects
including the very procedure of “monitoring.”
But the official position of Ukraine was quite different from what
the Ukrainian monitoring mission pronounced. On December 21, the
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said Ukraine was concerned over the
“inadequate” use of force in relation to the opposition and mass media
during the 19 December election and that Ukraine was going to be
guided by the election assessment made by international observers
delegated by the OSCE.
The 19 December presidential election in Belarus and Ukraine’s
decision to second the OSCE Mission’s assessment added new
parentheses to the MinskKyiv relations system, which is likely to be
shaped up more or less distinctly by mid2011.
Economic recovery
In 2010, Ukraine remained one of the major trade partners of Belarus
and was the second largest partner in terms of commodity turnover.
Efforts of the BelarusianUkrainian intergovernmental commission for
trade and economic cooperation greatly contributed to this success.
The commission held two sessions in April and September 2010 to
address expansion of bilateral cooperation.
Both states worked hard on the regulatory and legal framework
last year (they signed four international economic agreements
including the road map), but they still have not developed a strategic
contractual basis capable of setting a right vector for economic
development in view of the latest global and regional transformations.
The Interstate Program for Long3Term Economic Cooperation between
Belarus and Ukraine in 19992008 and the BelarusianUkrainian
agreement on economic cooperation in 19992008 expired in 2008.
No new longterm regulatory platform has been offered yet.
Belarus has not ratified the intergovernmental agreement on free
trade signed in 2007 that opens the possibility of mutual restrictions
aimed at protection of the home markets. After Belarus joined the
Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, resolution of this issue
was postponed indefinitely. In May 2010, the two governments
adopted an action plan focused on cooperation priorities, which is
certainly an accomplishment, but this plan is only a midterm plan.
Formation of the institutional component of trade and economic
cooperation between Belarus and Ukraine continued in 2010. An
advisory council was established on May 29 in Homiel within the
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framework of the 10th BelarusianUkrainian Business Council, which
sat in session on June 16–17 in Vitebsk, following the working
meeting between First Vice Premier of Ukraine Klyuev and First
Assistant to the Prime Minister of Belarus Semashko.
Owing partly to recovery of the Belarusian and Ukrainian
economies and partly to the system measures taken to upgrade trade
and economic cooperation, the 2010 commodity exchange amounted
to USD 4,439.9 million. The share of Belarus’ export reached USD
2,562.3 million and imports stood at 18,776 million with an external
surplus of USD 684.7 million.
Dynamics of foreign trade with Ukraine, USD million
Source: Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in Ukraine
Belarus mostly exported refrigerators and freezers, tractors and
truck tractors, ethylene polymers, sugar, butter, tires, plastic
containers, metal products, mineral fertilizers, petroleum products,
combine harvesters, charred coal and bitumen, hosiery, parts and
equipment for automobiles and tractors, organic solvents and thinners,
synthetic fibers, commercial motor vehicles, and fish products.
Ukraine basically supplied metal products, oilcake, electric energy,
sunflower oil, railway cars, corn, pharmaceuticals, parts for railway
vehicles, tobacco, chocolate, parts and equipment for automobiles and
tractors, equipment for thermal processing of materials, beer,
carbonates, accumulators, pressed woodfiber boards, paper,
cardboard, and confectionery products. In 2010, Ukraine delivered
2.94 billion kWh of electric energy (69.7% of the total exports), which
was up 40.2% year on year.
Mutual investments remain low as usual. In JanuaryJune 2010,
the amount of Ukraine’s investments in Belarus stood at USD 1.6
million. Experts say the inflow of investments was impeded by
meddling of government institutions in management of economic
entities, business activity retardation due to the lack of liquid assets,
and insufficient number of country offices opened by Ukrainian banks
in Belarus and vice versa.
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Belarus continued its taskoriented policy aimed at development
of distribution networks in Ukraine and establishment of joint
ventures. The Minsk Tractor Plant, Belshina, and Keramin opened
trading companies; BelAZ, Gomelsteklo, Santa3Bremor, Mogotex,
Milavitsa, Conte Spa and some other Belarusian manufacturers opened
subsidiary enterprises and joint ventures. The Belarusian Agrarian
Company (sugar), BOC3Ukraine (oil), and subsidiary Production
Association Belorusneft opened in Ukraine in 2010.
Cooperation at the level of the chambers of commerce and
industry in regions of Belarus and Ukraine is also increasing.
Commodity exchange is currently carried out with all regions of
Ukraine, the Kyiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Lvov regions and
the city of Kyiv being in the lead.
Conclusion
Development of bilateral relations between Belarus and Ukraine in
2010 was determined by the change of policy approaches in both
states. Kyiv was likely to pursue operationalization of benefits in bi
lateral relations to a greater degree and Minsk basically attempted to
define acceptable terms for coexistence under conditions of misalign
ment or partial matching of principal interests.
The Yanukovich Administration put an emphasis on optimization
of the process of finding solutions to longstanding and already
traditional cooperation problems. Ukraine is thus less inclined to
substitute political declarations for actual result of cooperation.
Ukraine’s new approach to traditional problems does not always satisfy
Minsk. Perhaps that is why the year 2010 saw no breakthroughs in
resolution of the border issue, which is sensitive for Ukraine.
Leaving aside the motivation of both countries, it should be
acknowledged that the alternative energy supplies way opened owing
to joint efforts of the parties was a huge step forward. Successes in
this field were less than few before and many attempts were often
“extinguished” by Russia, which made advances to one of the
countries thus pressurizing another one.
Maintaining highlevel contacts and creation of system
preconditions for resolutions of traditional problems in bilateral
relations in 2010 should be also attributed to successes. It brought
commercial and economic activities back to a high level.
Unfortunately, the year 2010 did not become a landmark of
BelarusianUkrainian cooperation under Eastern Partnership projects
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since the European Union paid little attention to this initiative. As a
result, most of the promising infrastructural projects did not receive
an impetus to develop. The Russian Federation remained a major
external factor, which indirectly affected BelarusianUkrainian
bilateral relations.
The critical assessment made by the OSCE Mission following the
December presidential election in Belarus did not instill much hope
for a cloudless future of BelarusianUkrainian relations. Kyiv took it
as a signal to be more cautious in building up political platforms with
the participation of Belarus in the near term.
This article uses materials of Belarusian
and Ukrainian news agencies and data
available on the official websites of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
and diplomatic missions.
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REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Vladimir Dunaev
Summary
The year 2009 gave rise to optimistic expectations for regional integration
headway in Eastern Europe, while 2010 was a year of a strategic pause. Against
the background of a thaw in EU8Russia relations, the ideological flatulence in
this part of the continent fell off noticeably. The heads of state, who used to
claim regional leadership, prefer to distance themselves from this mission now
for the benefit of economic pragmatism and political realism. In 2010, the two
chief players, which determine the format of Eastern European integration –
Poland and Ukraine – were busy with redefining their role in regional processes
thus refraining from bilateral projects or promotion of multilateral integration
initiatives.
The institutionalized forms of regional cooperation failed to overcome stagnation
in 2010. Neither the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development, nor the Eastern Partnership has achieved visible success. Only
the Euro8Asian Oil Transport Corridor Project (EAOTC) based on the Odessa8
Brody pipeline was driven from the deadlock under pressure of external
circumstances. Although Azerbaijani oil was finally streamed through the main,
the prospects of diversification of Caspian hydrocarbons delivery to Europe via
the EAOTC remain dim.
Other parts of the meridional energy transport cluster that anchors the regional
economic space on the North8South axis saw no appreciable progress. After
the success achieved in 2009, the transport8logistics system of Pan8European
Transport Corridor IX ran against serious contradictions between the parties to
the agreement on the shuttle train Viking.
Tendencies:
• Basic participants in the integration process in Eastern Europe rethink their
roles and missions;
• Depoliticization of joint projects succeeds ideological pretentiousness of
cooperation;
• Belarusian leaders manifest ambivalence towards the country’s involvement
in Eastern European integration projects;
• EU takes less interest in integration processes in Eastern Europe; regional
cooperation projects are slowed down or suspended.
The process of regionalization in Eastern Europe, where political and
economic cooperation largely depends on geopolitical interests of the
EU and Russia has become distinct in the past few years. It is not just
cooperation for the promotion of internal commerce as it was in EU,
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but also a strong effort to come out to the external politicoeconomi
cal space and use this process to tackle the multidimensional prob
lem of domestic security and development.
Eastern European historic policy
Prosperity of EU members in many respects depends on a transfor
mation of the “ring of friends” around the Union into a zone of
peace and stability. This Neighborhood Policy however turned out
to be a legitimization of new dialectics of the European space: the
family of European nations on the one side and those who should
be only treated as neighbors on the other side. The status of such
neighbors was given to Ukraine and Lebanon, Belarus and Moroc
co, Russia and Egypt. As a matter of fact, the new neighborhood
concept has proved to be unresponsive to the actual diversity of
the European outskirts.
The postSoviet states of Eastern Europe concerned over their
European prospects were not too enthusiastic about the newly
engineered “neighbor” identity molded by the template of classic
Orientalism. On the other hand, proclamation of the dialectic structure
of the new European reality did not dispel suspicions of EU
expansionism. Russia reacted to the aggression against its “canonical”
territories rather painfully, explaining that among other things it
destructs the unity brought forth by the “common, objective history”
(Sergey Lavrov). The Eastern Partnership Program irritated Russia
even more. The country mobilized resources of transnational historic
policy to oppose this new threat.
Unlike politicization of history typical of this region, national
historic politics do not rest upon the ideological monopoly of
totalitarian regimes anymore. It is a combination of practices aimed
at mobilization of administrative and financial resources of a state by
certain political forces to indoctrinate historic consciousness and
collective memory of the entire society by means of political control
over interpretation of history in science and education; attempts to
regulate interpretation of historic evidence by using legislative tools;
creation of special institutions to supervise archives and publishers.1
Since the regions are more like virtual communities like nations,
1 See: Pro et Contra. 2009 (MayAugust). № –4(46) // [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ProEtContra_3.2009_
all_screen.pdf.
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regional symbolical mobilization by means of historic policies can play
a big role in shaping of this space.
Two competing Polish projects of transnational leadership stand
against Russia’s imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe. A heated
discussion of eastern policy paradigms was stirred up in the Polish
media in 2009. Bartolomej Sienkiewicz2, expert in postSoviet politics,
who works closely with the dominant Civil Platform party, and Foreign
Minister of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski3 published articles that were
interpreted as an appeal to admit the failure of Jagiellon imperial
ambitions of Poland in the East. The criticism was not only addressed
to political competitors from the Law and Justice (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwosc) party, but also attacked one of the major foreign
policy paradigms of the Third Rzech Pospolita with its cornerstone
idea of Poland’s responsibility for the future of the eastern neighbors.
The Poles call the Civil Platform’s strategy with its allEuropean
security policy prioritized over relations with the eastern neighbors
“the policy of the Piasts.” This historic image taken from the XIX
century politics is supposed to emblemize Poland’s involvement in
the European project in the East as a counter to imperial ambitions of
the Jagiellons4.
Apart from other considerations, the Civil Platform called on to
change the historic and political paradigm because the Jagiellonian
ideology cannot bring the neighboring countries to recognize the
historic role of Polish transnational leadership.
The reaction of Ukraine with Viktor Yushchenko in office was the
greatest disappointment. Ukrainian historic policy had not modified
the Cossack dominion myth in terms of its antiPolish message. The
situation was aggravated even more when Ukraine came out with its
own interpretation of the national liberation movement and heroized
persons absolutely unacceptable for the Poles. Although Viktor
Yanukovich provided an updated evaluation of their legacy last year,
Ukraine has not offered any options of harmonization of the regional
2 Wojna w Europie (czas przyszіy) // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:
http://tygodnik.onet.pl/1,31176,druk.html.
3 Min. Sikorski dla Gazety: 1 wrzeњnia – lekcja historii // [Electronic resource]
Mode of access: http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6978098,Min__Sikorski_dla
__Gazety___1_wrzesnia___lekcja_historii.html?fb_xd_fragment#?=&
cb=f2fdad030776b48&relation=parent.parent&transport=fragment&type
=resize&height=21&width=120.
4 See: Dounaev V. Eastern European Historic Policy // Our Opinion [Electronic
resource] Mode of access: http://nmnby.eu/news/analytics/2983.html.
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historic policy. The Ukrainian government would like to eliminate
historic matters from economic and political approaches to Eastern
European affairs.
The Lithuanian historic and political paradigm was not
suitable to lay a foundation for regional unity either. The country
views the neighbors’ attempts to lay claim to the legacy of the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania in order to cultivate their own historic
myths with a great deal of suspicion that does not help to create a
proper image of transnational history. The year 2010 was marked
with increased political tension between Lithuania and Poland and
the conflict of interpretations of the XX century history is one of
the reasons.
The 600th anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald celebrated in
2010 could be used as an occasion to work out a joint variant of
Eastern Europe’s history. In a meeting held in 2009 in Kyiv, the
foreign ministers of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine suggested
joint celebrating of this historic event. President Kaczynski
wanted the presidents of all states Viktorious in the Battle of
Grunwald to come together so that he could nail down the
Jagiellonian version of the regional history. Even Belarusian
officials displayed readiness to tailor national history in view of
European prospects. Experts noted that the Grunwald mythology
even obscured the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) mythology a
little in the 2010 official discourse5.
All attributes of the anniversary festivities like the Belarusian
fiveepisode film shown on BT channel and commemorative coins
were supposed to certify claims of the Belarusians to a decent place
in the regional historic myth. The neighbors’ muted reaction to this
aspiration of official Minsk did not strengthen the Eastern
European vector in the historic policy of the Belarusian
government.
In 2010, Eastern Europe failed to come closer to coordination of
the national mythologies and a harmonized image of transnational
history. The year passed in an atmosphere of reappraisal of values
and willingness to sacrifice the regional historic policy for political
realism and economic pragmatism.
5 Грунвальдская бітва ў сучаснай інтэлектуальный прасторы (The Battle
Of Grunwald In The Contemporary Intellectual Space) // Our Opinion [Elec
tronic resource] Mode of access: http://nmnby.eu/news/discussions/
2830.html
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Institutionalization
A very low degree of institutionalization is typical of integration pro
cesses in the Eastern Europe. Countries of this multinational region
cooperate by a moderate scenario which does not require any essen
tial sovereignty cession. The motley, heterogeneous composition of
participants in integration projects, which diverge considerably from
each other with respect to political choices, economic development,
and foreign policy strategies, is changing all the time depending on
circumstances.6
GUAM formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in
1997 as an advisory body is the oldest regional organization in Eastern
Europe. It transformed into the International Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development at the 2006 Kyiv summit7.
GUAM entered the year 2010 hearing a disturbing signal coming
from Ukraine. President Yanukovich criticized this organization in one
of his preelection speeches. Some political analysts hoped that Ukraine
would withdraw from this “antiRussian bloc” after the presidential
election but this failed to materialize. On April, 18, 2010, Foreign
Minister of Ukraine Konstantin Grishchenko told Inter TV Channel that
it was not about withdrawal but GUAM’s economic augmentation.
Ukrainian leaders suggested concentrating on transport and energy
transit rather than political projects to have real feedback8.
6 For the most part, this space has so far coincided with the Polish zone of re
sponsibility as it was conceived at different times by the Polish political class
during the postcommunist era. In 2006–2007, the Baltic States and South
Caucasus were added to the list of the countries, which have been tradition
ally in the focus of interest of Poland as a part of former Rzech Pospolita.
7 According to the Charter, GUAM’s goals are assertion of democratic values,
securing of supremacy of law, and respect for human rights, fostering of sus
tainable development, bolstering of international and regional security and
stability, strengthening of European integration for creation of a common
security space, build up of economic and humanitarian cooperation, devel
opment of socioeconomic, transport, energy, scientific, technological and
humanitarian capacities. Originally, GUAM was supposed to throw an ener
gy supply bridge from Caspian hydrocarbons extraction sites to European
markets. Lithuania and Poland were contributing intensively in 20072008 at
the level of the heads of state. In 2007, Poland initiated an increase in the
membership in the project of the EuroAsian Oil Transportation Corridor with
its major element, the OdessaBrodyPlockGdansk main, through involve
ment of GUAM members and Lithuania.
8 Foreign Minister of Ukraine: Kyiv evaluates effectiveness of GUAM member3
ship // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:  http://analitika.at.ua/news
_uchastie_v_guam/2010041725086.
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GUAM still senses depression even after Ukraine’s explanations.
Despite optimism displayed by the GUAM Secretariat, the summit
scheduled for 2010 had to be cancelled. In many respects the crisis is
caused by concurrence of the new Polish initiative, the Eastern
Partnership, which has a powerful and rich sponsor – the European
Union. Even the relatively modest budget of the Eastern Partnership
outweighs GUAM’s own resources hundredfold.
Besides, the new European program attempts to involve new
countries – Armenia and Belarus – in the integration processes in
Eastern Europe, which is its advantage. Acting President of Moldova
Mihai Ghimpu visited Tbilisi on August 17, 2010 to negotiate Belarus’
membership in GUAM with Mikheil Saakashvili. Alexander
Lukashenko was invited to Georgia to talk about the suggestion.
Tbilisi thought it was a propitious moment to offer integration
given the BelarusianRussian controversies of that time.9  GUAM was
hoping for a positive reply from Minsk by the year end. Although
Lukashenko did not go to Georgia, a representative of Belarus was
expected to take part in the 13th session of the Council of Foreign
Ministers on December 2, 2010 in Astana within the framework of the
OSCE summit. However, regional cooperation within GUAM is not
attractive enough to the Belarusian government. During a press
conference held December 20, Lukashenko actually dismissed the idea
of such alliance. Belarus prefers to cooperate with organization
members separately working on oil transportation projects avoiding
the risk to get involved in the joint policy, which the Kremlin might
take as hostile.
As regards the EU Eastern Partnership project, it was first
introduced in May 2008 as a joint initiative of Poland and Sweden.10
9 Georgia is going to revitalize GUAM // [Electronic resource] Mode of ac
cess: http://actualcomment.ru/news/14583/
10 Eastern Partnership envisages political and economic rapprochement be
tween six postSoviet states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine, and Belarus) and the European Union. Although other countries
claimed authorship, it is no secret for anyone that Poland is the handler of
this new European project. As far back as 2002, the Polish Foreign Ministry
offered its variant of the Eastern Dimension of EU Policy. Poland’s offers did
not find support in Brussels at that time. In 20062007, Poland came out with
a project on revision of the European Neighborhood Policy insisting on a
more differentiated approach to EU’s partners. The documents entitled “Eu
ropean Neighbourhood Policy – Eastern Dimension” and “EUUkraine Re
lations, Polish Proposals” asserted the right of the eastern neighbors of Po
land of the future integration into united Europe, as against the countries of
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In 2010, the parties engaged in seventeen projects and a number of
fundamental initiatives aimed at arrangement of the member
countries’ teamwork.
Around  250 million will be allocated from the budget of the
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument to foster
multilateral cooperation in 2010–2013. In addition, the European
Investment Bank has launched the Eastern Partners Facility with  1.5
billion intended for investment into the partner countries
supplementing the old external mandate of the European Investment
Bank for Eastern European region ( 3.7 billion). Belarus however
failed to access the bank’s resources in 2010 that limits its opportunities
as a partner in bilateral projects but motivates to participate in
multilateral regional cooperation.
Belarus was initially supposed to enter the Eastern Partnership as
an associate participant. The country remains the only partner, which
is not allowed to fully participate in the European Neighborhood
Program for political reasons. The agreement on partnership and
cooperation signed by EU and Belarus in 1995 has not been ratified
and has not taken effect due to violation of fundamental democratic
rights and liberties in the country. While the agreement is not ratified,
Belarus is unable to obtain the status of a full partner of the European
Neighborhood Program and, consequently, it has no access to all
Eastern Partnership programs.
From the point of view of international regional policy, it means
that Belarus has to focus on joint projects with the neighboring
countries. Alongside crossborder cooperation projects under the
neighborhood programs (Baltic Sea Region, LatviaLithuaniaBelarus,
PolandUkraineBelarus), in late 2009, Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine
applied to the EU for financing of nineteen projects in the sectors of
integrated border management, transport, energy, and culture with
North Africa, which will always remain just neighbors of the European Union.
For this reason, EU should have been more fairminded when distributing
attention and funds between the southern and eastern political vectors, the
Poles said hoping for European sponsorship for their traditional policy in the
East. The Eastern Partnership was supposed to back up Poland’s regional
leadership in the East of Europe. They reconsidered priorities later, but the
new European project still had significant integration potential for the re
gion. Above all, contributing to regional integration is a system of multilater
al cooperation for creation of free trade zones and implementation of projects
in four thematic platforms: democracy, good governance and stability; eco
nomic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; con
tacts between people.
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an emphasis on strategic offers concerning development of the
meridional energy transport cluster and EuroAsian Oil Transport
Corridor, which determine the entire Eastern European posture.
The hopes that these projects would be launched in 2010 faded
quickly. In a meeting held September 8 in Minsk, the foreign ministers
of the said countries had to get back to their application following the
preliminary examination conducted by the European Commission.
The ministers voiced hope that four to seven projects of the Three will
be examined during the 13 December session of the Eastern
Partnership foreign ministers. They did not clear up the projects’
future, though.
The “Kyiv Initiative” of the Eastern Partnership – a mechanism
of trilateral cooperation between Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus in the
field of security policy, energy, ecology, etc. initiated by the three
presidents in 2009 – was put on strategic pause in 2010. This regional
cooperation project was stopped in its tracks apparently because a
new president took office in Ukraine.
The Eastern Partnership’s Parliamentary Assembly (Euronest)
could not get to work in 2010 due to disagreements over Belarus’
participation format. So, the institutionalized forms of regional
cooperation in Eastern Europe were not too efficient last year. It
concerns both GUAM and the EU Eastern Partnership, which has not
been given a status of organization yet.
Regional energy transport cluster
Formation of a highcapacity energy transport cluster in this geo
graphical region spurs the national elites to look for strategies and
tactics of regional cooperation and integration. Development of the
TransEuropean and international transport corridors, first of all the
9th intermodal corridor with a possible entrance to the Asian market
via Caucasus (Transport Corridor Europe3Caucasus3Asia, TRACECA),
creation of the BalticBlack Sea oil trunk pipeline, and projects in the
gas transport sector pave the way for a joint strategy of integration
into the global economic environment. For the first time, the meridi
onal mains and macrologistic systems, which maintain transporta
tion of energy resources and commodities on the NorthSouth axis,
give the involved countries a huge integration resource (they used to
be poorly integrated due to orientation to the WestEast axis).
The meridional projects and intensified economic and political
interaction between the Eastern European countries can be regarded
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as an attempt to create a space for survival under pressure of stiffened
competition on the part of alternative energy transportation projects
initiated by Russia, which wants to diminish dependence on Eastern
European transit countries. These challenges have already resulted
in appreciable rapprochement and strategic cooperation between the
countries in the East of Europe.
In this region, diversification of sources and ways of hydrocarbons
delivery to Europe rests upon the EuroAsian Oil Transportation
Corridor (EAOTC), mostly the OdessaBrodyPlockGdansk main with
several routes of transportation of natural and liquefied gas within
the framework of the Southern Gas Corridor.
The idea of the EAOTC came in mid1990s as a project on delivery
of Caspian oil to Western and Central Europe, bypassing the
congested Bosporus. Ukraine managed to lay a pipeline from Odessa
to Brody near its western border by its own forces, but failed to achieve
the designed capacity after it lost the competitive battle for Azerbaijani
hydrocarbons to the BakuTbilisiJeihan main. In 2004–2010 the
Ukrainian pipeline transported Russian oil from Samara to Odessa in
a reverse regime. For all those years, the plan to get back to the original
transportation route from South to the North has been connected with
completion of the Polish section of the pipeline up to Plock.
The governments of Ukraine and Poland and the European
Commission signed a joint declaration of support for the EAOTC project
on May 23, 2003 in Brussels. In 2007, the national oil transportation
companies of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Lithuania entered Sarmatia joint
venture established by Poland and Ukraine to develop the EAOTC. The
feasibility report approved on April, 24, 200911  was supposed to be
presented in early 2010 at the Batumi energy summit to give new
urgency to one of the region’s major economic projects.
Leaders of twelve countries including the presidents of Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Poland were expected to attend the 5th
energy summit on January 14, 2010. A representative of Belarus was
invited to a forum of the kind for the first time. However, none of the
presidents could come for various reasons and the summit was
postponed. The year came to an end but the summit remained ink on
11 Conclusions of the EAOTC feasibility report confirmed the technical capa
bility and costeffectiveness of transportation of up to 40 million metric tons
through the EAOTC. Most importantly, experts predicted volumes of Caspi
an oil sufficient for profitable functioning of the corridor at the branching in
Brody towards Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, Belarus, and
to the Baltic States in 2013–2015.
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paper.12  Apart from other minor issues, everyone was waiting for
Ukraine’s new energy strategies following the presidential election.
Changes were brought about but the scenario was totally different
to what Sarmatia stockholders were planning on. The new president
of Ukraine had to resuscitate the EAOTC after Russia stopped oil
deliveries through Brody–Odessa main in the middle of the year and
partly drained the southern string of Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline.
Belarus suggested filling the pipe with oil from Venezuela. The
Ukrainian government would probably not dare to reorient the
OdessaBrody main, if it had not been for the frustrated agreement
with Russia on guaranteed oil transit through Ukraine.
Putin left Kyiv October 27, 2010 without a mutually acceptable
solution. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev made an official visit to
Ukraine on the same day. He confirmed Azerbaijan’s interest in transit
of hydrocarbons through Ukraine. Earlier, on October 18, President
of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, who visited Russia and Belarus shortly
before, assured his Ukrainian counterpart that Venezuela would
supply enough oil to Belarus to maintain economically viable
operation of the OdessaBrody pipeline. Chavez tried to set
Yanukovich at ease regarding Russian’s reaction to operating the
pipeline in reverse regime. During a joint press conference, he said
he reached a consensus with Vladimir Putin. So the Ukrainians finally
agreed to a test delivery of oil to the Mazyr refinery in Belarus through
OdessaBrody pipeline and the southern string of Friendship on
November 20–23, 2010.
But the EAOTC could only be brought back to life using the
Ukrainian pipe by pumping Caspian hydrocarbons bypassing Turkish
straits. Therefore, Belarus’ intention to substitute South American oil
with Azerbaijani or other Caspian oil by a swap scheme was of vital
importance. Although the guaranteed volume of hydrocarbons
transported to Belarus in 2011 was considerably smaller than originally
planned, the turn of the pipe from the South to the North made it
possible to connect consumers of Azeri Light in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary. Ukrtransnafta also talked about interest of
Polish refineries to Azerbaijani light crude oil specifically beneficial
considering high prices of the raw material.
12 On the one hand, everyone was waiting for an opinion of the new govern
ment of Ukraine on the plans for oil transit diversification. On the other hand,
stalling of regional energy projects, in particular the redirection of the Odes
saBrody pipeline, made debates on any other undertakings premature.
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Construction of the BrodyPlockGdansk string of the EAOTC has
been frozen. In 2009, Poland suggested postponing the project launch
due to the financial and economic recession. Nevertheless, Poland
keeps the EAOTC on the list of high priority projects under the
Infrastructure and Environment Operational Program. Russia’s
declining interest in Friendship pipeline makes it possible to shorten
the EAOTC project dates using the available pipeline transportation
system13.
Sergey Skripka, Director General of Sarmatia consortium, says the
route used to deliver oil to Belarus can be also used to transport oil
from the Caspian region to Poland. It is 400 kilometers longer than
the planned one, but there is no need to wait until the pipeline coming
from Brody is laid. The feasibility report says completion of the Odessa
BrodyPlockGdansk oil transportation system will cost USD2 to 8
billion, and sources of financing have not been determined yet, but
the Belarusian route could simplify creation of the EAOTC and make
it considerably cheaper.
Belarus was assigned a key point in this system of coordinates.
For the first time, Minsk could exercise influence upon energy security
of the Eastern European region essentially by making a strategic
choice. Belarus and its neighbors could obtain effective leverage to
withstand Russia’s oil transit blackmail and at the same time have an
energy transport cluster to influence processes of economic
integration in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. However,
political and economic decisions of the Belarusian authorities made
in late 2010 regarding ratification of the Customs Union agreements
and the consequences it faced following the 19 December events made
this opportunity quite unrealistic.
The ongoing formation of the meridional energy transportation
cluster in Eastern Europe is not only a series of ambitious projects,
such as the EuroAsian Oil Transportation Corridor, but also already
successful elements of the BalticBlack Sea logistics system. This
transportationlogistics complex is based on European Transport
Corridor IX. The NorthSouth concept of this corridor was proposed
by the EU ministers of transport in 1993 in Helsinki. This corridor is
supposed to connect the North and the South of Europe14.
13 See: Odessa–Brody: History And Outlook // Our Opinion [Electronic re
source] Mode of access:: http://nmnby.eu/news/analytics/2779.html.
14 Viking To Run Against Competitor – ZUBR [У «Викинга» появился
конкурент – ZUBR] // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
www.zautra.by/art.php?sn_nid=5415&sn_cat=7.
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The shuttle train Viking is a symbol of effective development of the
logistics capacities of Transport Corridor IX. The train intended for
railing of large goods vehicles and cargo containers started hauling from
Klaipeda to Odessa and back in 2003. The EU Transport Commission
distinguished the Viking as the best European project of 2009. In 2010,
the train transported 10% more cargoes year on year (41804 TEU).
The festive mood was however clouded last year when Lithuania
criticized their Ukrainian partners. In advance of Viktor Yanukovich’s
visit to Lithuania, Ambassador to Ukraine Petras Vaitiekunas said it
seemed that Ukraine was standing aback from the project: the Viking
carried 98% of cargoes between Lithuania and Belarus, and Ukraine’s
share only constituted 2%. This point was among major issues
negotiated October 14, 2010 during the visit of the Ukrainian president
to Vilnius.15
In 2010, President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite made another
attempt to hook up the Turkish direction to the regional route and
officially suggested Turkey joining the trilateral agreement between
Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.16
Transport Corridor IX could cover a huge and rapidly developing
economic space reaching Western China. EU experts persistently
recommended Belarus to consider joining the international project
of the Transport Corridor EuropeCaucasusAsia (TRACECA)
backstopped by the European Union. Belarus remains the only Eastern
Partnership member, which has not been involved in this project. In
turn, Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine entertained fallacious hopes for
financial support needed to implement their transportationlogistics
projects within the framework of Eastern Partnership programs like
construction of the VilniusMinskKyiv highway and development of
the Viking piggyback route. Last year saw no progress in dealing with
problems of Transport Corridor IX, though.
15 Ukraine promised to expedite the procedure of customs clearance of car
goes in the Odessa port from 26 down to four hours. So far, the advantage of
fast transportation from Klaipeda to Odessa in 56 hours used to be whittled
away by unreasonably long procedures at the customs house in Odessa, which
did not encourage freight forwarders. Last year did not kill hopes for intensi
fied cargo traffic through Transport Corridor IX with its inclusion into the
larger EuropeCaucasusAsia transportation system.
16 The possibility to connect the Viking train route via Poti (Georgia) with
TRACECAEuropeCaucasusAsia international transport corridor has been
discussed for some years now. TRACECA was devised as a project of restora
tion of the Silk Route and an alternative to the TransSiberian railway.
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Conclusion
Integration processes in Eastern Europe have their ups and downs.
2010 was a year of a strategic pause. The countries of the region faced
the task to formulate a new strategy of cooperation under the condi
tions of thawed relations between Russia and Europe. The banner of
solidarity against Russia’s expansionism became less attractive to the
political elites for a while. The countries mostly focus on their own
security, political realism, and economic pragmatism.
EU’s interest in Eastern European integration projects is fading
in the face of challenges from the South that pushes Belarus’ neighbors
towards an idealess policy of survival by themselves and all together.
Given this value system, the Belarusian regime can count on a greater
degree of integration into regional economic cooperation processes
than before.
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BELARUSIAN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD IN 2010: CAUTIOUS MONEY.MAKING
Siarhei Bohdan
Summary
In 2010 the internal political situation in Belarus changed, and the Foreign
Ministry and other state institutions’ activities became more West8oriented.
Nevertheless, Belarus’ cooperation with the developing world remained at the
previous level, which testifies that the country’s leadership intends to establish
and promote an alternative vector of foreign policy in the form of relations with
the developing world, which could function regardless of the state of affairs
between Minsk and the West or Russia. Besides preserving allegedly1  successful
dealings with a number of Asian countries with a significant trade surplus
(Vietnam, India, Iran, Syria, Egypt), there is another achievement of Belarus’
policy in the developing countries: alternative oil deliveries from Venezuela.
Tendencies:
• The country’s leadership does not take any serious risks by plunging into
geopolitical adventures. They confine themselves to cautious verbal support
of their often anti8Western Third World partners (except for China).
• Belarus’ “absence” spots on the map of the developing world (as far as its
foreign economic relations are concerned) grew even larger: Iraq and
Northern Africa practically “dropped out”, contacts with Arabic countries of
the Persian Gulf and India reduced.
Belarus’ contacts with China, Venezuela, and Iran were as intensive
as in previous years. In 2010, good relations with Syria and Vietnam
became even more intensive. The main objective of Belarusian policy
in the third world seems to be moneymaking. That is why contacts
with less solvent countries (Cuba) were limited. At the same time,
political contacts did not always correlate with foreign economic re
lations.
There are a lot of ambiguities with Belarus’ foreign economic
relations. The most important questions concern their actual
profitability, potential (what is going to happen to some relations if
the political regime changes in this country) and the actual pattern of
1 There are no grounded statistical data available; these dealings are not trans
parent, therefore, we cannot definitely judge if these dealings are success
ful.
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trade. To a number of countries Belarus does not export techno
logically advanced products, like, say, those of mechanical
engineering, but less advanced, like potash fertilizers (this fact is
officially acknowledged, particularly concerning Vietnam and China).
China
Relations with the PRC were most diversified among countries of this
group. In January, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Aleynik visited
China; in March, deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China Yi
Gang came to Belarus; in late March, VicePresident Xi Jinping visit
ed Minsk and a Belarusian parliamentary delegation headed by Chair
persons of both chambers visited China. In late April, Deputy Prime
Minister Viktor Burya set out to China. In May, a military delegation
headed by Chen Bingde, member of the Central Military Commis
sion, visited Belarus; and Belarusian Minister of Defense set off to
China (his visits to China have already become an almost annual tra
dition). Also in May Minsk hosted a delegation of the National Audit
Office of the People’s Republic of China.
In June, Minsk welcomed Secretary Mayor of Beijing Guo Jinlong
and a delegation to attend the 11th meeting of the BelarusianChinese
Committee on trade and economic cooperation. In July, a delegation
of the Academy of Sciences visited China; in September, Minsk hosted
a Chinese parliamentary delegation. During the presidential campaign
in early October president Lukashenko paid a short visit to China, the
6th in his presidential term of office.
There is a vivid imbalance in BelarusChina relations. Whereas
the Belarusian delegation to Beijing was headed by parliament’s
chairpersons, the Chinese delegation return visit was led by a Vice
Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress. Whereas the Belarusian part of the Committee on trade
and economic cooperation is led by the chairperson of the State
Control Committee, the Chinese part is headed a Vice Minister of
Commerce of China. This Vice Minister is received by Prime Minister
Sergey Sidorsky and First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko.
In relations with China Belarus has cooperation committees on
provinces’ level, while normally such committees are established at
the national level. Anyhow, one should not expect anything different,
as the balance of forces is far too uneven. Another thing is that
Belarusian officials often pretend that BelarusianChinese relations
are based on equality.
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Relations with China are probably supported by ideological
sympathy. The policies of the postCommunist regime are surely more
appealing to Belarusian officials and establishment than the more
ideologically exotic models of Iran, Libya or Venezuela: they allow
Chinese officials to make good money but keep society under control.
The last two ambassadors to China were exchairpersons of the State
Control Committee, which shows the significance of this position. In
the 2000s, the function of ambassador to China became a key position
in the ambassadorial list (equal to the Ambassador to Moscow or
Washington). Having returned to Belarus, former ambassador to China
Anatoly Tozik was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in late December,
which establishes prerequisites for imitating the Chinese model.
China is in the top ten of Belarus’ foreign trade partners by volume
of trade, though a trade deficit is prevailing. In 2010, economic relations
with China were developing actively: the official information has it that
export to China grew by 6.3 times, import from it – by 4.9 times2 . The
bulk – up to half – of Belarusian exports consists of potash fertilizers3.
It should be noted separately that the accommodating Belarusian
Foreign Ministry follows the Beijing principle of “one China” and adds
up trade figures on the PRC, Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The idea that at least some part of Belaruskali could be sold
became the main intrigue of the year: Chinese buyers could be
regarded as serious partners. Being a significant player on the world
market of potash fertilizers, Belaruskali was excluded from the list of
essential national property and prepared for takeover by foreign
investors.
The question of best Belarusian enterprises being sold in some
form arises in connection with huge credits from China –
Belarusian authorities openly express hopes to receive some. The
danger is that the sale procedure might be nontransparent. There
are property issues in relations with developing countries. For
example, it is not clear, what part of JSC “Amkodor” belongs to
Nepali businessmen. The procedure of transferring a plot in the
historical centre of Minsk to an Omani investor in spring 2010 was
also nontransparent.
2 Economy and business, TUT.BY: Services trade surplus of Belarus in 2010
was USD 1.7 billion: http://news.tut.by/economics/215569.html. Date of
access 18 February 2011.
3 On trade and economic cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and
the People’s Republic of China: http://www.china.belembassy.org/rus/re
lations/trade/
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Military and militarytechnical cooperation is an important part
of BelarusianChinese relations. Unlike other developing countries,
China is consistently developing this aspect of relations.
Other Asian countries
In January, Belarus hosted Minister of Justice of Vietnam Ha Hung
Cuong, in June – president of Vietnam Nguyen Minh Triet and mayor
of Hanoi Nguyen The Thao. In October, chairperson of the House of
Representatives Vladimir Andreychenko visited Vietnam. In Novem
ber, Minsk hosted the 8th meeting of the BelarusianVietnamese Com
mission on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, at
tended by the First Vice Minister of Industry and Trade of Vietnam.
In 2010, BelarusianVietnamese volume of trade grew up to USD 145.7
mln, with Belarus’ export totaling USD 105.5 mln. It is officially ac
knowledged that “the chief Belarusian export to the SRV is potash
fertilizers”4.
At the same time, the Belarusian side tried to find other contacts
in the region. In first halfyear of 2010 Minsk welcomed the Chief of
the General Staff of Laos. In May, First Deputy Prime Minister
Semashko met Minister of Industry of Indonesia in Tehran; in June,
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik set off to Indonesia, Myanmar and
Malaysia. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry keeps trying to move
national trade into the huge region of Southeast Asia, besides
traditionally close Vietnam. In September, Belarus welcomed a
delegation of Indonesian businessmen headed by Indonesia’s Minister
of Trade Mari Elka Pangestu. Nevertheless, these are just first steps
of cooperation. In September, during a UN session in New York,
Foreign Minister of Belarus Sergey Martynov met his Bangladeshi
colleague; in late September, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik met
the Foreign Minister of Indonesia during a conference of the Non
Aligned Movement.
Serious contacts with India were limited: in April the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of India K. G. Balakrishnan paid a visit to Minsk
(he visited Belarus a year before); in late October, a Belarusian
delegation led by First ViceMinister Semashko visited Delhi. The
goods turnover between Belarus and India approximated USD 0.5
billion, with a usual significant trade surplus for Belarus.
4 See: Trade and Economic Cooperation : http://www.vietnam.belembassy.
org/rus/relations/trade/.
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Relations with Turkey after usual foreignministry level consultations
between Deputy Foreign Ministers in May and parliamentary
delegation’s visit to Minsk exploded with Belarusian president’s visit to
Turkey. The purposes and the format of the visit remained unclear, though
Lukashenko met with the Turkish president and Prime Minister.
Iran
In late January, Minsk welcomed Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, head of
the Iranian presidential administration and president Ahmadinejad’s
companion in arms. In February, Belarus’ Foreign Minister visited Iran.
After that Hamid Behbahani, Minister of Roads and Transport, and
Ahmadinejad’s former teacher visited Belarus (impeached by the Par
liament of Iran in early 2011). In May, Minister of Industries and Mines
Aliakbar Mehrabian visited Belarus; and First Deputy Prime Minister
Semashko with a delegation of the State Committee for Science and
Technologies visited Iran. Minister of Industry Radevich visited Te
hran in October. Also in May a Belarusian parliamentary delegation
visited Iran; in December, the National Bank Governor Petr Prokop
ovich visited Tehran.
The Iranian side might be regarding relations with Belarus as a
possible way to solve some problems: Iran’s position in the world has
worsened because of US and recent UN sanctions against it and
Belarus could become its “window to the outside world”. Though
Minsk does not make haste to risk anything for Iran: no suspicious
relations with Tehran have been reported.
It is doubtful that there are good reasons for the permanent topic
of some oppositional media – an alleged military cooperation. But,
as Fars News Agency reported, when a delegation of the State
Committee for Science and Technologies was visiting Iran, the sides
negotiated common PhD programs on military management and
control. Another scandal broke out about alleged deliveries to Iran of
S300 missile systems. This topic arises every year and each time it
turns out to be a fake. This time the scandal, triggered by Fars in late
August, was probably caused by interior political struggle in Iran.
Originally, Fars did not report any deliveries at all; the news was a
slip of the tongue by the Iranian Associated Press correspondent.
Iranian projects in Belarus have not been remarkably successful.
Many of them are located in Homiel region, and most of them are still
in the organizational stage. In particular, the project of Samand car
production near Minsk still remained obscure in 2010.
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It was announced in May that in the second half of 2010
Lukashenko would visit Iran to launch an oilfield allocated to Belarus
and to negotiate oil delivery to Belarusian oil refineries. In the end,
nothing happened5. Some problems might have been caused by the
peculiarities of the Iranian state machinery, or the fraction structure
of Iranian politics, or even the Iranian state itself.
In 2010, the goal set in the early 2000s – to bring bilateral trade
up to USD 100 mln – was reached. The trade turnover totaled USD
104.8 mln, with Belarusian export being 97.2 mln. The big trade surplus
in relations with Iran is a positive point in the general negative picture
of Belarus’ total trade deficit. To put it formally, it is a big success, but
we need to point out once again – economic relations with Iran are
much less intensive than political contacts. This political commitment
may negatively influence the economic relations in the future,
especially if any shift occurs in Iranian politics.
Arab countries
Syria was a key partner in this region. A parliamentary delegation
visited Syria in January and Oman in March. In late April, Damascus
hosted a meeting of the Commission for military and technical coop
eration. In May, Belarus welcomed Minister of Education of Oman,
in June the Foreign Minister of Belarus set off to Syria and Lebanon.
In June, Minsk received Speaker of the People’s Assembly Mahmoud
alAbrash; in July, during the 3rd World Conference of Speakers of
Parliament, Chairperson of the House of Representatives of Belarus
met with his Lebanese and Bahraini colleagues.
In late July, the Syrian president visited Belarus. The Syrian side
seems to be more interested in geopolitical games than the Belarusian
one. That is why Lukashenko was very reserved in commenting the
heavyloaded statement of the Syrian leader: “I assume that relations
we are establishing today are not relations between countries but
between Eastern Europe and Middle East”6.
5 Sekhovich, V. From Sudan till Iran: Belarus’ alternative hydrocarbon histo
ry // Ezhednevnik.by: http://www.ej.by/economy/20100630/ot_sudana_
do_irana_alternativnaya_uglevodorodnaya_.html. Date of access:
15.12.2010.
6 Alexander Lukashenko holds talks with President of Syria Bashar alAssad.
27 July 2010: http://www.syria.belembassy.org/rus/news/~page__m12=
1~news__m12=212826
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In September, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik met with Omani
Foreign Minister during a conference of the NonAligned Movement.
A BelarusianEmirates business forum in Abu Dhabi was held in
October; in November, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik made a
working visit to Syria to participate in the trilateral meeting of Foreign
Ministers of Belarus, Syria, and Venezuela. Belarus was obviously
underrepresented at the forum, which showed Minsk was not ready
for significant geopolitical games that could get Belarus involved in
risky situations. At the same time, Belarusian authorities would not
give up cooperation with
the opponents of the USA, especially since the annual volume of
trade with Syria totals several dozen million dollars, with a surplus for
Belarus.
The number of contacts with North African countries reduced to
almost zero. Nevertheless, in October (just like in 2009) a Belarusian
delegation headed by the Belarusian President’s National Security
Aide Viktor Lukashenko visited Libya. Also, throughout 2010
delegations of MTZ, Belshina, Belneftechim and Bellesbumprom
concerns visited this country. The official data about the volume of
trade is presented incompletely and inadequately: it is supposed to
be minimal. Running an embassy in Libya must be motivated by hopes
for future contracts rather than actual relations.
Contacts with Egypt were limited: Mamdouh Marei, Egyptian
Minister of Justice, visited Minsk in October. We should point out
that despite rare contacts, BelarusianEgyptian economic relations are
equal to those with Iran, though the latter are promoted by a strong
political will.
Latin America
The primary partner was Venezuela. In March, First Deputy Prime
Minister Semashko and President’s Special Commissions Aide She
iman set off to Venezuela, just after president Lukashenko personally
paid a working visit. Mr. Sheiman visited Latin America – Bolivia,
Venezuela, and Ecuador – once more in late Juneearly July. In No
vember, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela visited Belarus. Also, Ven
ezuelan President Chavez traveled to Belarus for the umpteenth time.
The key issue of the discussions was oil supplies from Venezuela
that were launched early in the year. The arrival of Venezuelan oil –
despite its limited volume – provoked a negative reaction from Russia.
The economic expedience this oil is disputable, but in 2011 and 2012
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annual oil supplies to Belarusian oil refineries might be as high as 10
mln tons, said the Venezuelan ambassador.7
At the same time the Belarusian side managed to get serious
contracts within the modernization campaign launched by Chavez. As
a result, Belarusian export to Venezuela in 2010 totaled USD 302.3 mln.
Relations with other countries in the region were much more
marginal. In March, President paid his first visit to Brazil, but both its
format and results remain unclear. In May, Belarus hosted a small
delegation of the Brazilian business community. Despite the absence
of stable political contacts, the volume of trade between Belarus and
Brazil in 2010 totaled USD 862.6 mln, which is more than that of 2009
but still less than the record figure of 2008, when it amounted to USD
1 bln, with a trade surplus for Belarus. Therefore, for the last few years
Brazil has been one of Belarus’ top ten trade partners among countries
outside the CIS.
During the September session of the UN General Assembly
Foreign Minister Martynov met with his Bolivian and Nicaraguan
colleagues. In September, Belarus also welcomed a Cuban business
delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and
Foreign Investment.
Africa
Africa remained predominantly undiscovered by Belarus. In Febru
ary, a delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik visited
Cфte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Mali. Undoubtedly, the issues of trade and
payment security are the most serious question in relations with Afri
can countries. One of the schemes to secure African contracts might
be the strategy to tie Belarusian trade policy to the Russian one. In
early August, a mixed RussianBelarusian delegation visited Ghana,
Belarus was represented by Mr. Sheiman. In August, Belarus also wel
comed Mamadou Tangara, Gambian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Conclusion
Developing countries remained a remarkable vector of Belarusian for
eign policy in 2010. Already in late Soviet times, the share of BSSR
7 Belarus and Venezuela are implementing more tan 120 agreements and con
tracts in different spheres of mutual interest 2 February 2011: http://www.
venezuela.belembassy.org/rus/news/~page__m12=1~news__m12=
247776.
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foreign trade with partners outside the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance was nearly 10%. Hence, trade with Asian, African and Lat
in American countries is a logical continuation of the earlier coopera
tion. It is difficult to estimate the trade volume as there are no reliable
data, but according to official statements, Belarusian trade with Asian
and African countries totals USD 3.9 bln8  (true, such developed coun
tries as Japan, Israel and South Korea have also been included), i.e.
nearly 8% of total Belarusian trade. If we include trade with Latin
American countries, we will have grounds to suggest that the volume
of trade with developing countries remains at the level of BSSR times.
There are many reasons to suggest that this state of affairs will not
change in the near future. At the same time, the year 2010 showed
again how shaky the basis of Belarusian policy is towards the majority
of Third World partners. The number of partners is limited: a dozen
countries.
The most lasting, developed and stable relations are with China,
which has been in the first ten of Belarus’ foreign economic partners
for several years. But these relations are also quite ambiguous: firstly,
they might be inadequately perceived by the official Minsk; secondly,
they include certain political obligations that make Belarus give up
neutrality and adopt politicallyloaded and ethically doubtful
statements (about events in China itself, Taiwan and Tibet). For
example, there is an aggressive statement on the Belarusian embassy
to China website: “The Republic of Belarus always supports Chinese
initiatives in international organizations; Belarusian authorities have
more than once officially supported the “one China” policy, against
separatist onslaughts in Tibet”9. In return, the official Minsk might be
expecting that in response the PRC will support Belarus on the issue
of economic sanctions by the USA and other members of the
international community (as Beijing already did in April 2008).
Vietnam is another stable partner of Belarus, which has its roots
in Soviet times. Relations with other countries should be regarded as
shaky rather than stable. In numerous cases big political relations do
not lead to the promised economic results (Iran); in others shortterm
achievements could be nullified if the market situation and political
8 Belarus and countries of Asia and Africa // Belarus’ Interior Ministry web
site: http://www.mfa.gov.by/bilateral/asia_africa/bel/cc70c5ddc1585b71.
html/ Date of access: 18 February, 2011.
9 Cooperation in the political sphere: http://www.china.belembassy.org/rus/
relations/
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circumstances unfavorably change after deeper penetration into a
given country (Venezuela for example).
At the same time, the Belarusian side avoids any unnecessary
geopolitical or ideological involvements in its foreign relations.
Minsk’s participation in the trilateral meeting of Foreign Ministers of
Belarus, Syria and Venezuela was minimal; it has no serious projects
with Iran, which could stir a negative reaction from the USA; and
establishes strictly pragmatic relations even with the traditional
partner – Cuba. All the more careful is the Belarusian government
with arms trade: despite all the rumors, no evidence of illegal activities
in this sphere has ever been provided.
The main problem of Belarus in the developing world is difficulties
to expand traditional markets and a number of partners in the
developing world. Undoubtedly, the majority of these countries (Africa
and less developed Arab countries) are a problematic option for
Belarusian enterprises because of high risks for trade: the Belarusian
government cannot provide additional guarantees for contracts there.
But there are still countries, “nonproblematic” from the point of
view of trade security; that are not covered by Belarusian foreign
policy. They are more than promising for economic and, to some
extent, political cooperation: South East Asia besides IndoChina,
Latin American countries and Pakistan. Anyhow, penetration to these
markets is probably hindered due to a number of causes: no country
expertise on many nations, lack of qualified specialists, discrepancies
in technical characteristics of products as well as absence of
established contacts with local partners.
Generally, analyzing the topic is immensely complicated by the
fact that more or less full information is unavailable. The Foreign
Ministry leaves out some events and contacts from its official releases,
in particular, it shuns to present the full picture of the Belarusian trade
with all countries; some Belarusian embassies update their news pages
once in half a year (e.g. the embassy to Syria) 10.
10 http://www.syria.belembassy.org/
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CIVIL SOCIETY: HYPERACTIVITY WITH A VIEW
TO FUTURE PERFORMANCE
Inna Fedotova, Vitaly Belovsky
Summary
Belarusian civil society is developing in a somewhat ambivalent manner. On the
one hand, many independent third sector organizations appeared to be involved in
construction of a quasi8civil society’s “infrastructure”. On the other hand, authentic
civil society has made a statement as a social force capable of not only asserting its
autonomy or fighting for survival, but also contributing to expansion of civic
participation and rendering influence on electoral processes and rapprochement
between Belarus and the European Union. Accomplishments of such civil campaigns
as Speak the Truth and NGOs’ initiatives in the field of legislative policy and the
Eastern Partnership program should be highlighted in this context. These initiatives
however have not resulted in appreciable breakthroughs when it comes to civil
society development and equitable dialog with the government.
Tendencies:
• Growing domestic and international influence of the National Platform of the
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum;
• Accelerating efforts of the authorities and pro8governmental public
organizations aimed at creation of a vertical model of interaction between
the third sector and the state;
• Ignoring of the third sector’s role in the Eastern Partnership program by the
government, and then its fruitless attempts to form a Belarusian delegation
to the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum of pro8governmental public
organizations in the second half of the year;
• Clash of concepts of the vertical and horizontal models of interaction between
the third sector and the government resulted in occurrence of new rifts in
civil society;
• The presidential election largely contributed to political involvement and
consolidation of the pro8democratic segment of civil society and its greater
influence on “society at large”;
• Certain consolidation of a considerable part of civil society over the
amendments proposed by experts of independent NGOs in response to the
authorities’ resistance to the attempts of some third sector organizations to
achieve liberalization of the bill on nonprofit organizations.
Overall picture
The third sector – nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations – form
the basic structural force of civil society. According to the Ministry of
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Justice, as of January 1, 2011, Belarus totaled 2,325 registered public as
sociations, 35 trade unions, 25 unions of public associations, and 99 funds.
These are just formal parameters outlining the third sector’s institutional
framework. As concerns the content, the public sector niche remains a
sphere of confrontation of authentic civil society and statecontrolled
quasicivil society. The first one is formed of nongovernmental organiza
tions (NGOs), civic initiatives, and other mostly grassroots interest groups
initiated by citizens. The second one is formed of statepublic and public
associations patronized by the authorities.
The political regime presents publicly active organizations of the
third sector with a thorny dilemma: either to act autonomously,
independently, or surrender and fall under strict control of the state.
The first strategy strengthens civil society, which emerges
spontaneously through selforganization of individuals, displays of their
independent grassroots initiatives, and calls for coordination of actions
for protection of rights and legitimate interests of stockholders. Such
activity however entails a serious risk for NGOs to be brought into direct
confrontation with the regime that inevitably leads to political
engagement of civil society and probable suppression of disloyal groups.
The second strategy brings the third sector closer to the Soviet
“controllable system of interest groups”, where public organizations
played the role of “driving belts” channeling public efforts into the
courses determined by the oneparty state. On the one hand,
implementation of this strategy results in elimination of budding
groups in civil society. On the other hand, it generates simulated forms
of civic engagement providing required numerical strength of NGOs
and their numerosity, but renders their authentic content noxious and
substitutes independent political engagement with mobilization.
The presence of progovernmental NGOs secures legitimization
of the ruling establishment, political mobilization, control over
election processes, and helps to establish cooperation with foreign
partners. The fragmentary economic liberalization, imagemaking
attempts, and seeking of Belarus’ wider participation in EU programs
stepped up the use of foreign grants by NGOs. Management of some
progovernmental NGOs regard foreign and, likewise, domestic grants
for particular projects (alongside with commerce) as a most feasible
strategy for transition to selffinancing1.
1 For instance, see: Бузовский И. Форматный неформат (Format 3 No For3
mat by I. Buzovsky) // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
www.belta.by/ru/person/interview/i_497428.html
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In our opinion, among all events of the year 2010 illustrating the
current status of Belarusian civil society, the spotlight should be on
the efforts of the National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil
Society Forum and collision with advocates of the allnation platform
idea; the Speak the Truth civic campaign; NGOs’ involvement in
debates on the bill on nonprofit organizations.
National platform vs. “all.national platform”
Involvement of some leading independent NGOs and initiatives of
Belarus in the EU Eastern Partnership Program in 2009 gave a strong
impetus to development of civil society in Belarus2. In 2010, this pro
cess continued with formation and advancement of the National Plat
form of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum coalition by pro
European organizations of Belarus as a platform for coordination of
actions of civil society entities in relation to the Eastern Partnership
and a tool for dialogue and cooperation with the authorities.
The year 2010 began with Belarusian NGOs’ preparation for the
second Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF) scheduled for
November 18–19 in Berlin. The decision to develop the National
Platform was made on January 29 in a meeting between participants
in the first Forum and Belarusian civil society stakeholders. A National
Platform conference was held in summer (July 5–6). It totaled 150
2 See: Водолажская Т. Третий сектор: два варианта ответа на вызовы /
Белорусский ежегодник 2009. Минск, 2010. С. 143–145. (The third sector:
Two response options to challenges by Tatyana Vodolazhskaya, in Belaru3
sian Yearbook 2009. Minsk, 2010, pp. 143145).
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representatives of 90 public sector organizations. Elaboration of road
maps (stepbystep action strategies) for introduction of European
standards in the field of the municipal reform, mass media reform,
fixed term employment contracts, freedom of conscience, culture, and
scientific research was the major point on the agenda. Matters related
to education, the youth policy, environmental safety, etc. were added
later. Six road maps were completed by the end of 2010.
The right to recommend Belarusian organizations for participation
in the second Eastern Partnership CSF in Berlin was exercised during
the July conference: 32 out of 88 applicant organizations were put on
the final list. The conference suggested the public advisory council
(PAC) formed at the Presidential Administration of Belarus in 2009 to
consider the Eastern Partnership Program and participation of civil
society during one of the next sessions.
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The OSCE program entitled “Development of the Potential for
Interaction Between State And NonGovernmental Organizations”
launched in August 2009 jointly with CIVICUS international alliance
could be used by the public advisory council as a springboard for
coming up to the European level of civil society cooperation. PAC
3 Moreover, due to official Minsk, Brussels expelled the Belarusian third sec
tor (and also the third sector of other member countries of the Eastern Part
nership) from the delegation to the negotiations at the intergovernmental
level. As a result, Belarusian NGOs lost the official channels of information
that covered the projects Belarus offered for implementation under the East
ern Partnership program; See http://news.tut.by/society/203970.html.
4 See http://afn.by/news/i/142024.
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member Yury Zagumennov, Chairman of the Board of the NGO SCAF
Center, acted as the initiator and head of this project. The CIVICUS
program methodology used in more than 100 countries all over the
world envisaged a study of the Civil Society Index in Belarus5  and
formation of thematic platforms “for consolidation of civil society and
interaction with the state, business, and international communities”6.
SCAF offered the following pattern: start with gathering of
proposals to be studied by participants in the working groups
(platforms) at least twice a year; following the discussions, the working
groups are supposed to work out consolidated positions and send all
the proposals to the public advisory council at the Presidential
Administration and public councils of ministries and agencies. The
proposals accepted by consensus should be prioritized.7  Members of
PAC and relevant councils will undertake to lobby the packages of
proposals developed by the platforms in agencies of state jurisdiction.
According to SCAF, in autumn 2010, participants in the OSCE
project (including representatives of a number of independent NGOs)
created twelve thematic civil society platforms for cooperation with the
government in the field of education, culture, human rights, social
security, business, etc. In order to coordinate actions of the national
civil society platforms, it was recommended to create the socalled all
national civil society platform under the auspices of the public advisory
council at the earliest opportunity. Speaking of the anticipated benefits
of this intersector cooperation format, the developers referred to
experiences of France where 16 thematic platforms had been acting
alongside an allnational civil society platform, a public advisory council
communicating with the top echelon, and also councils hosted by
relevant ministries and departments.8
However, the third sector organizations, which consolidated
around the National Platform, did not like the idea to arrange civil
society platforms under the aegis of PAC, which actually means
5 Ten years earlier, Belarus participated in the pilot Index research. The next
round of research was conducted in 2005 without Belarus, and in 2010, Be
larus was invited to participate in the third round again.
6 See: Лашкевич К. Не расколет ли «Восточное партнёрство» граждан3
ское общество Беларуси? (Would the Eastern Partnership split Belarusian
civil society? by K. Lashkevich )// [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
news.tut.by/society/203970.html.
7 See: Виртуальная платформа белорусского гражданского общества (Vir3
tual platform of Belarusian civil society) // [Electronic resource] Mode of
access: http://civilsociety.blog. tut.by/?page_id=5.
8 Ibid.
Society
138 	



patronage on the part of the Presidential Administration. Members of
the National Platform believed it would result in a topdown nature of
the governmentcivil society interaction rather than an equitable
dialog. The offered pattern determines superiority of the Presidential
Administration and public advisory council over the civil society
platforms with all ensuing consequences, like removal of certain topics
from the agenda of public discussions and political decisions,
formation of a fully controllable third sector, and so on.
Participants in the National Platform believe that in the
contemporary context, Belarusian civil society would benefit more
from the socalled “Scandinavian” (horizontal) model with the focus
on cooperation, partnership, and equitable dialog between society and
the state, rather than the “French” model. The process of creation of
platforms for communication within civil society and with the state is
based on interaction mechanisms, i.e. negotiations and inter
connection between the existing networks and platforms. But for this
purpose, the framework of the third sector activity, which limits
freedom of associations to a considerable extent, should be changed:
section 191.1 of the Criminal Code should be abolished; the procedure
of registration of NGOs and other nonprofit organizations should be
simplified; there should be a regulatory enactment promoting equal
cooperation between public associations and the state, etc.
On October 24, 2010, representatives of the National Platform took
part in the OSCE project to negotiate fundamentals and approaches
to creation of civil society platforms in Belarus. They acted unilaterally
for there was no invitation from the organizers. The idea of accelerated
generation of a national platform in the current situation stirred up
the harshest criticism. In the opinion of the National Platform
representatives, the framework conditions for activity of the third
sector had not changed. The idea of creation of an allnational platform
had no objective grounds. An attempt to actualize it would only
reinforce dominancy of the state and, we must add, hierarchical
structuring of civil society itself, which just cannot be built up as a
vertical intrinsically, as National Coordinator of the Forum on Belarus
Vladislav Velichko says.9
9 See: Пульша С. Третий сектор: Полноправный диалог власти и
гражданского общества в нынешней ситуации невозможен (The third
sector: An equitable dialog between the authorities and civil society is impos3
sible at this junction by S. Pulsha) // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:
http://news.tut.by/society/202639.html.
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Following the meeting, on October 26, it was stated on behalf of
the National Platform that the parties reached understanding that civil
society platforms can only emerge being guided by the principles of
grassroots selforganization, involvement, transparency, publicity, and
responsibility for decisions made. “Initiatives, which do not adopt these
principles, would be destructive and hollow, and eliminating the very
opportunity of a dialogue between the state and civil society.”10  In order
to actualize the idea of a national platform “all stakeholders pursuing
development of such platform are to go a long and difficult way to come
to mutual understanding, respect for common interests, creation of a
widest possible institutional base of relevant organizations and
initiatives, practicing of delegation of powers and other democratic
mechanisms.”11  Representatives of initiatives aimed at creation of civil
society platforms supported by the authorities were suggested “to
continue the stepbystep discussion and coordination of positions at
the expert and public levels.”12
A national conference attended by more than 250 delegates of
NGOs was held November 14 as part of the OSCE project “Develop
ment of the Potential for Interaction Between State And Non
Governmental Organizations.” Officially, it was arranged to present
and review findings of the Civil Society Index research conducted by
NOVAK sociological laboratory requested by SCAF Center. The
preliminary report of SCAF research project prepared for the
conference listed propositions on intersector cooperation, upgraded
interaction between the public advisory council and nongovernmental
organizations, and further development of civil society in Belarus.
However, following the research assessment, independent experts
pointed out methodological inconsistency of the document. They said
the conclusions and propositions did not correspond to the results of
opinion polls and phrased the requirements supposed to bring the
Civil Society Index research in Belarus to conformity with the
CIVICUS’ methodology.13
10 Заявление участников Национальной платформы ФГО ВП о развитии
диалога. Минск, 2010. 26 октября (Statement of participants in the Nation3
al Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum on the dialog
progress. Minsk. October 26, 2010) // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:
http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/4866/21.
11 See the Statement…
12 Ibid.
13 See: Шелест О., Водолажская Т., Силицкий В. Экспертиза результатов
исследования Индекса гражданского общества в Беларуси (Expert exam3
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The conference established that the statement on achievement of
common understanding regarding the approaches and concept of civil
society platforms of October 26 was mistaking the wish for the reality,
and the conflict between the two fundamentally opposite viewpoints
on interaction between the third sector and the state ran high again.
Yury Zagumennov and his supporters reasoned their adherence to the
“French model” referring to the lack of timehonored traditions of
grassroots initiatives and dialoging in Belarus, which still need to be
developed.14 Here comes the question, how they are supposed to
evolve without an adequate institutional basis and not involving
people in the corresponding practice of civic participation? Mr.
Velichko is correct saying that advocates of the “French model” lay
stress on what can be done under the presentday conditions, while
those who speak for the “Scandinavian model” concentrate on what
should be done in the current situation and insist that “the dialogue
with the authorities should be established upon proclaimed principles
and values”15.
The choice of an adequate model of national platforms buildup
provoked a spirited discussion, and the conference organizers finally
took the national platform issue off the table. The third sector
representatives failed to agree on the principles and mechanisms of
interaction and to allay mutual suspicions and accusations, though.
On November 15, representatives of the National Platform addressed
Stefan Fle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neigh
borhood Policy, among other things saying that the model of
interaction between civil society and the state offered by the public
advisory council would result “not in promotion of the dialogue,
marginalization of the already operating civil society associations and
coalitions, which adhere but to the principles of selforganization, and
their dropping out of international processes and social life inside the
country”16.
ination of the findings of the Civil Society Index research in Belarus by
O. Shelest, T. Vodolazhskaya, V. Silitsky) // [Electronic resource] Mode of
access: http://eurobelarus. info/images/stories/ Expert_INGO.pdf.
14 See: Лашкевич К. Гражданское общество в Беларуси: война на пути к
объединению (Civil society in Belarus: The war on the way to unity by
K. Lashkevich) // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://news.tut.by/
society/204936.html.
15 Ibid.
16 Совместное обращение участников Национальной платформы ФГО ВП
к еврокомиссару Штефану Фюле. Минск, 2010. 14 ноября (Joint address
of the Belarusian third sector representatives – participants in the National
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So, Belarus sees two national civil society platforms largely
overlapping functionally. One of them has been evolving since early
2010. It represents interests of most NGOs seeking cooperation with
EU. Another one came out with its own approaches in autumn 2010
eager to represent interests of entire civil society. The first one stands
up for horizontal (network) cooperation between NGOs and equal
partnership between the third sector and the state, while the second
one prefers a vertical model under the patronage of government
institutions.
In such a way, the national platform idea, which was supposed to
consolidate civil society around European values and give an impetus
to the further development, actually heated up disputes between
organizations of the third sector that exposed the deepened split in
Belarusian civil society over the social values and regulatory basics.
The hope for an equitable dialogue between the public sector and the
state also deflated due to the barriers set up by the authorities, mutual
distrust, and the lack of experience needed to establish contacts
between independent NGOs and government institutions at the
national level.
During the second Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum held
November 18–19 in Berlin, Belarus was represented basically by
organizations of the National Platform. Among 27 public organizations
approved by the European Commission for participation in the Berlin
Forum, 26 were recommended by the National Platform that can be
regarded as a true acknowledgement of the growing political weight
of Belarusian proEuropean NGOs in the international arena. That
fact that representative of EuroBelarus International Consortium Mr.
Velichko, a Belarusian, was elected speaker of the Civil Society Forum
this time, speaks for itself.17
The Belarusian idea of road maps offered by nongovernmental
organizations to other Eastern Partnership member countries aroused
keen interest among participants in the Berlin Forum. However, the
19 December events frustrated the BelarusEU rapprochement and
put the future of the National Platform into question.
Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum – to the EU Commis3
sioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Mr. tefan Fle. Minsk,
November 14, 2010)  // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
eurobelarus.info/content/view/5706/21/
17 Sergey Matskevich (NGO Assembly) was the previous speaker of the Civil
Society Forum.
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Civic initiatives
The degree of political engagement of civil society goes up once in a
while in every country. It usually happens during all sorts of election
campaigns. In 2010, such engagement was observed in Belarus dur
ing the local and presidential elections. Independent NGOs did not
render considerable influence on the election processes, although they
put forth efforts to get involved through entering election commis
sions and monitoring the procedures. If one has a look at the compo
sition of polling station commissions, which undoubtedly plays a key
role in vote counting, it becomes obvious that most of those who ob
tained commission mandates were members of NGOs loyal to the pres
ident.
Monitoring of the elections by Human Rights Activists For Free
Elections produced much more appreciable results. But the observers
were still unable to prove election engineering for the benefit of the
incumbent president, as they had insufficient powers to come close
to any ballot box.
To our opinion, civil society succeeded the most in greater civic
participation and publicizing of the authentic presidential election
returns owing to the Speak the Truth campaign launched on
February 25, 2010 by Dvizheniye Vperyod (Headway) educational
enlightenment movement assisted by distinguished community
leaders. The proclaimed goal of the Speak the Truth campaign was
to provide the population with truthful information about the real
situation in the country. The campaign started with a series of
activists’ trips around the country in order to draw attention of the
authorities and society to local problems. The activists handed out
blank postcards with the Speak the Truth logo. People were invited
to use the postcards to address to the Presidential Administration
requesting immediate intervention to resolve pressing issues. As a
result, the processes of civic selforganization stepped up greatly.
For instance, on June 2, Mogilev residents started collecting
signatures for renovation of a local automobile road.18  Publication
of the work schedule of individual office receptions at local councils
was requested on June 10.19  A series of actions took place in June in
the cities of Brest, Gorky, Orsha, etc.
18 See http://zapraudu.info/article/mogilevnachalsyasborpodpiseizare
konstruktsiyudorogifoto.
19 See http://zapraudu.info/article/umagleveaktyvstykampankazhypra
duntsyyavalzborpodpsa.
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Prior to the local elections, leaders of the Speak the Truth
campaign sent an analytical bulletin on legal and political problems
of the election process to the Central Commission for Elections and
Republican Referenda. The bulletin covered amendments to the laws
on elections recommended by the European Union and OSCE, and
described procedural tricks the authorities resorted to in order to avoid
fair and transparent elections. On June 2, near the Zaslavskoye water
storage basin, Speak the Truth leaders arranged a presentation of a
collection of articles under the name “100 Faces of Unemployment”
focused on the problem of employment in Belarus. The collection tells
stories of 100 people, who could not get jobs for a long time.20
On the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the victory in the Great
Patriotic War (1941–1945), Speak the Truth collected signatures for
naming of streets in Minsk and Grodno and an underground station
in Minsk after writer and former frontline soldier Vasil Bykau. Around
65,000 signatures were collected in the Belarusian capital to eternalize
memory of Bykau. A total of nearly 105,000 signatures were submitted
to the Minsk city administration on July 12 for renaming a street in
the capital after Bykau. On July 16, the Grodno executive committee
received a list of propositions including naming of a city street or
square after Vasil Bykau, installation of a commemorative tablet on
the house where he lived, and renovation of the Vasil Bykau museum
in Grodno. Speak the Truth reported 7,414 signatures collected to
support those initiatives.21
In the summer, Speak the Truth engaged in politics, turning into
the preelection campaign of its leader, poet and public man Vladimir
Neklyaev. On June 2, Neklyaev stated his support for A Million New
Jobs For Belarus program announced by Yaroslav Romanchuk,
presidential candidate nominated by the United Civic Party (UCP),
during the presentation of 100 Faces Of Unemployment collection.22
After that, in a meeting with a private entrepreneur held on July 19,
he declared the intention to obtain a delegate’s mandate to attend
the IV AllBelarusian National Assembly23, and then stated his
presidential ambitions on September 2 in a live interview on Echo of
Moscow FM station.24
20 See http://www.nvonline.info/by/79/300/15109/
21 See http://www.zapraudu.org/article/grodnasvyatkue600goddzegrun
valdskaibtvy?lang=eng.
22 See http://www.nvonline.info/by/78/211/15062.
23 See http://www.belmarket.by/ru/86/25/6688/
24 See http://echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/707492echo.
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By that time, Speak the Truth had already achieved a certain effect.
Some apparent shifts in public involvement were observed. By late
August 2010, campaign activists organized nearly 80 actions in 33
localities of the country and collected 55,000 signatures to tackle local
problems. Over the three months – June through September – the
percent of respondents, who answered ‘yes’ to the question “Do you
know anything about the Speak the Truth civic campaign?”, was up
from 12.5% to 23.5%.25  Besides, as Neklyaev said during a press
conference on the intermediate results, a number of local officials took
a friendly attitude to towards the Speak the Truth campaign.26
The authorities’ counteraction to Speak the Truth felt even before
it entered the political field, means that the movement gathered
momentum and exerted strong influence on public opinion. On March
6, law enforcers confiscated 9,000 postcards with the campaign logo
from Minsk activists. On March 11, Neklyaev’s online conference
hosted by Borisovskiye Novosti (Borisov News) newspaper was stopped
after the telephone line was disconnected. On April 25, the police
broke into the private house where Neklyaev was meeting with Mazyr
city residents. The police claimed they were chasing after illegal drugs
dealers. On May 1, the police detained campaign activists, who handed
toy balloons over to passersby in Victory Square of Minsk.
On May 18, law enforcers came to offices of NGOs and private
apartments of Speak the Truth activists all over the country.27  On May
19, the police conducted searches in the office of Dvizheniye Vperyod
and 24 offices and apartments of campaign activists in Gomel, Brest,
Grodno, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Soligorsk, and other settlements.
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Assessing the Speak the Truth campaign, it should be noted that
an independent presidential candidate popularized himself by means
of a preliminary, mass civil campaign in Belarusian regions for the
first time in the history of elections in Belarus, which is an outstanding
achievement per se.
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In spite of the threat of persecution, independent public
organizations came out with a principled opinion concerning the
authorities’ actions on the election day. On December 24,
representatives of 27 human rights, environmental, and educational
NGOs signed a joint appeal of the National Platform of the Civil
Society Forum to the Eastern Partnership program, in which they
condemned the brutality against the protesters on December 19 and
urged the authorities to release all former presidential candidates and
their supporters from custody and stop politically motivated
persecution.29  A similar appeal was addressed to the European Union
and the governments of EU member countries on January 6, 2011.
Belarusian civil society organizations called on forming an
international commission for a transparent and unbiased investigation
of the 19–20 December events and bringing the real offenders to
responsibility.30
Bill on nonprofit organizations
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28 See http://www.belaruspartisan.org/bpforte/?newsPage=0&news=
73514&backPage=19&page=100.
29 See http://belapan.com/archive/2010/12/24/eu_438037.
30 Обращение Национальной платформы Форума гражданского общества
программы «Восточное партнёрство». Минск, 2011. 6 января (Statement
of participants in the National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Soci3
ety Forum. Minsk. January 6, 2011) // [Electronic resource] Mode of access:
http://www.eapcsf.eu/ru/newsevents/news/jointaddressofthenation
alplatformoftheeasternpartnershipcivilsocietyforum.
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In the opinion of the NGO Assembly working group, the new bill
tightens governmental agencies’ control over activities of public
organizations. It enshrines the principle of registration upon approval
for all nonprofit organizations, including those exempted from this
procedure at the time. The bill introduces the notion of a conflict of
interests in relation to NPOs and bans creation of establishments by
persons, who acted as founders of public associations liquidated
through a court proceeding. Expert Y. Chausov says if a public
association founder stopped being its member long before liquidation,
31 http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/12/29/ic_articles_116_171861/
32 Новикова Т. Будущее третьего сектора государство решает за
закрытыми дверями (The government determines the future of the third sec3
tor behind closed doors by T. Novikova) // [Electronic resource] Mode of
access: http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/12/29/ic_articles_116_
171861.
33 See http://www.regnum.ru/news/1361883.html.
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he or she would be deprived of certain rights anyway regardless of
what the founder had done personally.34 Therefore, civil society
representatives want the regulatory and restrictive provisions to be
replaced with those aimed at improving of conditions for nonprofit
organizations. Specifically, they suggest forming public councils in
governmental agencies, creation of a social mandate institution, and
the status of socially relevant organization.35
The Center for Legal Transformation and the Foundation for Legal
Technologies Development addressed the Ministry of Justice of
Belarus and the National Centre of Legislation and Legal Research
with letters and recommendations produced during expert meetings,
round tables, and discussions of the Google Group. Following the
debates on the bill held by the expert community and propositions
made by a number of organizations, experts of the NGO Assembly
and the Center for Legal Transformation worked out a joint address
of Belarusian NGOs and call on all Belarusian nonprofit organizations
to sign the document.
In a result, the address signed by authorized representative of 110
nonprofit organizations (270,000 people in total) was submitted to the
lower chamber of the parliament and the Council of Ministers of
Belarus on March 9, 2011. This mass action was definitely an
unequalled case of joined efforts to promote the interests of Belarusian
NGOs. The organizers hope for future public hearings on the legal
regulation of public associations’ activities prior to consideration of
the bill in the first reading.
Conclusion
In 2010, Belarusian civil society was developing in an adverse
environment withstanding the continuous pressure on the
independent third sector and strenuous efforts to push it out to the
periphery and replace it with loyal entities. One more attempt of the
government to streamline civil society’s undertakings to achieve a
desired effect made this time upon the pretext of Belarus’ participation
in the EU and OSCE programs was unsuccessful. Statecontrolled
34 Чаусов Ю. Эксперт: Проект закона «О некоммерческих организациях»
не решит проблем гражданского общества (Expert: The draft bill on non3
profit organization will not resolve problems of civil society by Y. Chausov) //
[Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://news.tut.by/society/
217552.html.
35 Ibid.
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public organizations tried to take advantage of participation in
international projects to actualize the vertical model of interaction
between the state and civil society, but they encountered determined
resistance of independent third sector organizations.
At the same time, activity of the Belarusian third sector in 2010
did not render essential influence on formation of mass civil society.
Firstly, a significant part of the Belarusian “big society” was not
motivated enough for active civic participation and took little interest
in alternative political forces capable of political system
democratization. Secondly, state policy – from combating crime and
elimination of unemployment to support for sports, young families,
and talented youngsters – aims at making citizens dependent on the
state as much as possible, and to prevent the societal and political
impact that independent civic and political institutions may create.
The NGOs, which advocate the official model of (quasi)civil
society, as well as the ideological vertical created in 2003–2004, are
supposed to legitimize the measures taken to make the third sector
stay where it is. Thirdly, the strategy of behavior offered to promote
development of civil society and alternative projects is still not very
attractive to many third sector entities.
Although the events observed throughout the year display
people’s growing aspiration to selforganization based on the values
of freedom and democracy, they did not have an impact on the
authoritarian, paternalistic nature of the Belarusian state.
Development of the bill on nonprofit organizations intended to tighten
the government’s control over the third sector was met with reactive
legislative initiatives of independent NGOs, which, however, were put
on ice by the authorities.
Involvement of independent NGOs in the Eastern Partnership
program did not result in appreciable breakthroughs in development
of Belarusian civil society either. The notorious events on the
presidential election day and their consequences deepened the split
in society and made the chance for its consolidation around the
European values much slimmer.
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PARTY THEATRICS FOR POLITICAL PROCESS
Yury Chausov
Summary
The year 2010 could have witnessed the peak of party activity in the Belarusian
political field. It was a “big political year” with two election campaigns conducted
in line with reformed election regulations, envisaging, among others, additional
opportunities for political parties. However, the local elections failed to become
a significant event due to limited party engagement. Anyway, parties viewed
those elections as a drill before the presidential election campaign. However,
during the presidential campaign itself, non8party candidates took the lead.
They regarded parties as containers with human and organizational resources
up for grabs. This balance of forces between party and non8party opposition
agents was mostly due to centrifugal trends in the opposition and actual break8
up of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) coalition.
The organizational fragmentation of opposition structures and conflicts among
parties were to a large degree predetermined by the progress in learning the
lessons of the previous presidential election of 2006, when the interests of the
personified democratic leader collided with the interests of the general
opposition coalition. That structural conflict was further complicated by
disagreements over strategies: opposition entities advocating a milder regime
for Belarus and its geopolitical redirection towards the European Union are
accused of compliance and opportunism by uncompromising opposition agents
campaigning against any dialogue with the regime, denying the possibility of
its evolutionary transformation and using revolutionary rhetoric. Both structural
and strategic discrepancies have remained in party interactions since the 2006
election, although the severer policy adopted by the regime recently had
promoted a nominal association of opposition forces.
Tendencies:
• Opposition political parties’ engagement in the presidential election was
determined by the need to retain their political identity in a situation where
non8party centers accumulating resources and influence have taken on
leading roles in the opposition system;
• Amendments to election regulations in early 2010 offered political parties
more powers in the organization of the election process, hence additional
efforts of the parties supporting the current political regime to nominate
their representatives in election commissions and teams of election
observers;
• The largest pro8governmental public association Belaya Rus redoubled its
efforts to perform the functional role of a pro8presidential party that would
become an efficient mechanism to ensure public support for the current regime;
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• Centrifugal trends in opposition parties had reached their peak by mid82010,
when a few parties that formally make part of a single coalition nominated
their candidates for the presidency, whereas a single party could have
representatives of a few initiative groups supporting various candidates;
• After the presidential election and the dramatic escalation of political
repression that followed, the centrifugal trends in opposition structures were
replaced by a tendency towards convergence with a view to resolving the
common task of resisting further crackdown;
• Disagreements between the groups advocating dialogue with the authorities
and warring opposition determined the nature of the interaction among parties
during the presidential campaign and remained unresolved after the
presidential campaign had been completed.
Legal climate for parties’ activities
As of January 1, 2011, there were 15 political parties in Belarus and
976 registered local party organizations.
In 2010, 274 new party organizations were registered, 15 times as
many as in 2009, when only 18 new organizations were registered.
The substantial number of new registrations did not result in an overall
increase in the number of party branches, though. On the contrary,
the number has been falling from year to year. It appears that the
impressive increase in the number of newly registered party
organizations was exclusively in the domain of progovernmental
parties, whereas the number of offices of opposition parties dropped
correspondingly, as they were struck off registers.
Structures of opposition parties are most frequently liquidated
under the traditional pretext that they have no legal address (or their
address is revoked), mostly for economic reasons and because of total
state control of the real estate market.
One example of the use of the legal address leverage to exercise
pressure on opposition political parties was the revocation of the
Belarusian Popular Front Party (BPFP)’s right to lease the premises
that the party had rented for over 20 years. The headquarters of the
party used to be the center of activity free from the interference of the
Society
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authorities in downtown Minsk: the premises were used to host not
only the events of the party itself, but also congresses of other political
parties, expositions, concerts and press conferences. After the mass
arrests of December 19–20, the party headquarters became the center
for raising money and providing other kind of support for the detained
activists and their families. Therefore, the letter the BPFP received on
December 29 from the proprietor of the premises (local authorities)
with a demand to vacate the office starting April 1, 2011 should be
considered a punishment for the solidarity campaign. If the party fails
to defend its right to lease the premises in a court of law in spring, the
oldest political party of the country will be faced with a threat of losing
its legal address and, consequently, the status of a registered
organization.
Since the regulatory framework for the creation of new political
parties in Belarus remains very tight, the liberalization of social and
political life in the country prior to and during the presidential election
did not result in registrations of any new parties. A new attempt to
register the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD) (its fifth overall
attempt as an organization and third as a political party) failed. The
Justice Ministry said the BCD had provided inaccurate information
about the founders of the organization, including forged documents,
while the initiators were said to have violated the generally accepted
procedure of establishing a political party. Based on questioning of
the founders and a probe into documents submitted for registration,
the Justice Ministry on October 25 decided to turn down the
application for registration. In November 2010, the Justice Ministry
denied the application for registration filed by the Belarusian
Communist Party of Workers, led by Leonid Shkolnikov. That new
party was a joint effort of former members of the Party of Communists
Belorusskaya (PCB) who firmly opposed the renaming of PCB into
the Party Fair World and its withdrawal from the MarxistLeninist
ideology.
During the election campaign, the authorities never lessened
control and rigid regulation of the activity of political parties, despite
the fact that the limited liberalization period was not over. For instance,
the Justice Ministry refused to recognize the extraordinary XIII
congress of the BPFP as legitimate and declared its decisions void
(the congress made the decision to nominate the deputy chairman of
the party as a presidential candidate). It is noteworthy that when
announcing its decision not to recognize the results of the congress,
the Ministry cited complaints and reports that it received from the
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party members who represented the previous generation of the party
leadership, which was replaced during the previous BPFP congress in
2009. Because of the gross violations of the charter of the party and
legislation of the Republic of Belarus during the preparation and
conduct of the extraordinary XIII congress, the Justice Ministry on
July 2, 2010 officially warned the party.
It was the Belarusian Social3Democratic Party (Hramada) that was
faced with the most severe interference of the Justice Ministry, though.
The latest congress of the BSDP(H) that took place on October 10,
2010, was also declared illegitimate because of major violations of the
party charter and legislation of the country. The registering authority
therefore did not acknowledge the powers of Anatoly Sidorevich, who
superseded Anatoly Levkovich as chairman. The latter did not
recognize his dismissal as party leader and further expulsion, though,
and, just the way it happened with the BPFP, the previous leadership
of the BSDP(H) chose to cooperate with the registering authority
seeking to have the powers of the new leadership officially nullified.
The party has been proposed to prepare and hold a repeated XIII
congress of the BSDP(H) and received a warning letter, while
consultations with the Justice Ministry over ways to overcome the legal
deadlock were conducted with the previous party administration. It
was the Ministry that made the choice of the legitimate leader based
on its own vision of the problem and political reasons.
The amendments to the legislation on political parties in early 2010
were advertized by the current regime as major improvements in the
legal environment for parties. Specifically, the newly effective Special
Part of the Tax Code reduced the rate of duties for registration of
parties, their branches and amendments to charters. At the same time,
the amendments to the law on political parties, which came into effect
on January 4, 2010 left the legal procedure of party registration
unaffected. On the contrary, the law allowed arbitrary registration
denials based on minor and easily rectifiable defects (for instance,
mistakes in paperwork). The law officially formalized the limitations
that had been often resorted to in actual practice long before the
amendments came into effect. The official ban on financing of political
parties and party unions from the republican and/or local budgets
was a novelty.
The reform of the election regulations and their implementation
during the local councils election campaign (April 25, 2010) and the
presidential election campaign (December 19, 2010) became essential
for the development of the Belarusian party system. The new version
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of the Electoral Code dated January 4, 2010 enhanced the role of
political parties during the preparation and conduct of elections.
Specifically, the Code introduced quotas for representatives of parties
and other public associations in election commissions, whereas the
numbers of state officials in commissions were to be limited. The
procedure of nominating candidates for deputy by parties and
initiative groups was simplified, and the same holds for canvassing.
The document identified legal reasons for collection of donations to
finance election campaigns.
However, in practice the role of parties in organizing elections
remained virtually unchanged: the quotas in election commissions
were mostly filled by representatives of progovernmental public
associations and trade unions. The number of representatives of parties
supporting the authorities (the Social and Sports Party, Republican
Labor and Justice Party, etc.) also increased, albeit to a lesser degree.
As for opposition parties, their representation in election commissions
did not increase much. The remarkable fact is that nearly all
representatives of progovernmental parties were included in
commissions, whereas most of the nominees of opposition political
parties, as before, faced denials.
Coalition building
Opposition political parties entered the year 2010 in two coalitions,
which positioned themselves as the main representatives of the oppo
sition before the presidential campaign. The United Democratic Forc3
es (UDF) still strove for the leading role in the coming election, its
key players being the United Civic Party (UCP), Belarusian Party of
the Left Fair World, Belarusian Social3Democratic Hramada and some
other organizations. These ambitions were not realized in 2010, be
cause neither during the local nor the presidential election the coali
tion managed to act as an integral entity, although progress was made
in coordinating activities.
The UDF’s influence as a center that formulated strategic
approaches for the Belarusian opposition was quite significant in the
country’s political landscape. Specifically, on January 24, 2010, the
political council of the coalition convened for the first time in a very
long time to adopt amendments to the UDF strategy passed at the VII
Congress of Democratic Forces in 2007. The changes were aimed at
working out a harder position of democratic forces on the dialogue
with the authorities, polarizing resisting groups in the opposition and
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transmitting the bipolar picture of Belarusian political life (the regime
vs. the opposition). That strategy for polarization and placing emphasis
on social rift later became a starting point for few presidential election
campaigns: most of the candidates dismissed it and built their election
platform on its negation. However, some politicians employed that
approach as a strategy for the postelection period, when political
repressions made it clear that the struggle against the authoritarian
regime had no room for compromise.
In the first half of 2010, the Belarusian Independence Bloc (BIB)
contended for the role of the gravitation center consolidating national
democratic forces. The coalition was formed in late 2009 by the BPFP,
the For Freedom movement, the Belarusian Christian Democracy and
a few other minor organizations. The association was perceived as the
core of the future election campaign of Alexandr Milinkevich after
his second nomination as a presidential candidate. However, in May
June 2010, BCD representatives blocked the procedure of nomination
of a single candidate by the coalition. By that time, the opposition
structures forming the BIB had already announced nomination of their
own candidates for the presidency, while Milinkevich, the leader of
the For Freedom movement, was considered an obvious favorite of
any initiative to nominate a single candidate of the bloc. The BCD yet
again claimed it would be involved in the nomination process only if
its representative was officially appointed as the head of the election
headquarters and the initiative group of the single candidate. As a
result, the bloc as good as suspended its activity in June 2010, and a
few weeks later, the leader of the For Freedom movement gave up his
nomination plans. By that time, nonparty candidates representing
Speak the Truth! and Charter97 initiatives had assumed leading
positions in the Belarusian opposition alongside representatives of
the UCP, which is part of the UDF.
To save their faces, the national democratic forces announced
the creation of the Belarusian Choice initiative after the presidential
election campaign had officially started. The foundation agreement
was signed by chairman of the Belarusian Zelenye (Green) Party Oleg
Novikov, leader of For Modernization Union Ales Mikhalevich, BPFP
nominee Grigory Kostusyov, For Freedom movement leader
Alexandr Milinkevich and BPFP chairman Alexey Yanukevich. The
new coalition was founded on the idea of protection of state
independence of Belarus and a policy towards changing the political
regime. The political initiative was in fact an attempt to put a good
face on things. After the presidential election, the coalition has
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provided a platform to coordinate joint actions of national democratic
forces.
Importantly, not a single interparty coalition played an
independent role during the presidential campaign itself, mostly
because of the loss of trust in the UDF and its almost complete
dissolution in late 2009. Most of senior UDF executives were engaged
in the Speak the Truth! campaign (representatives of Fair World and
the UCP). The strategic approach of some of the former leaders of the
BPFP, which supported the UCP strategy, to a large extent
predetermined the ideological foundation of Andrey Sannikov’s
campaign.
After the election, nearly all opposition parties became involved
in the new consolidating body – the National coordinating center of
democratic opposition, which articulated the position of the “united
opposition” amid unfolding repression.
Participation in elections
Opposition parties did not regard the elections to local councils of
deputies of April 25, 2010 as a significant event. The parties that are
commonly considered democratic in Belarus were mostly interested
in assessing the adjustments in the process of organizing the elec
tions in accordance with the newly adopted electoral legislation. The
opposition political community prioritized the possibility for opposi
tion representatives to be included in election commissions, empha
sis being placed on district election commissions. The true objective
of Belarusian democratic forces was not to get a certain number of
mandates, but have party nominees included in election commissions.
Judging by the real numbers, opposition parties admitted that their
experience of taking part in local elections was negative: the number
of opposition representatives in district commissions increased only
slightly, to around 0.1% of the total number of commission members.
A total of 25,033 candidates strove for 21,301 mandates of deputies
of local councils, around 1.17 candidates per mandate, but less than
ten opposition representatives – all of them from the BCD and Fair
World – got the coveted cards.
Therefore, the changes that the opposition took so many years to
fight for and that were finally included in the Electoral Code through
consolidated efforts of Belarusian opposition groups and the OSCE
ODIHR, had no impact whatsoever on the essence of the election
process. Legal fetishism played a bad trick on opposition parties: after
157
years of seeking amendments to electoral regulations, the two election
campaigns of 2010 made it absolutely clear that not everything
depends on laws in the political legal process.
The parties regarded the elections to local councils as a dress
rehearsal for the presidential election campaign; however, party
nominees played a minor role during the presidential campaign
compared to nonparty candidates. The Belarusian political field had
reached such a high degree of atomization that entities that used to
be secondary were now showing ambition and planning their own
political game using their own resources. One of the chief newsmakers
of the presidential campaign was the Speak the Truth! initiative
inaugurated in February 2010. Charter97, the coordinating center of
a broad range of political forces, had been preparing its own leader
under the European Belarus plaque, in order to bypass the traditional
party mechanisms of identifying the leader.
The named structures were the centers of accumulation of
financial and other resources; therefore, they can be called “real
parties” of the Belarusian opposition as opposed to nominal political
parties, which struggled to preserve their own identity during the
presidential election. Those nominal parties are viewed by “real
parties” as a feeding ground: they are used to engage activists and
functionaries; sometimes, entire nominal party organizations are
employed by real parties.
Under the circumstances, political parties had to nominate their
own presidential candidates to preserve their identity. In most cases,
they did not nominate leaders, though, but functionaries acting as
deputies or cochairmen. For example, the UCP, weakened by the
“proselytism” of Speak the Truth!, nominated deputy chairman of the
party, economist Yaroslav Romanchuk; the BPF Party also nominated
its deputy chairman Grigory Kostusyov, a Shklov resident. The
unregistered BCD party nominated its cochairman Vitaly
Rymashevsky, and the leader of one of the splinters of Belarusian social
democracy, the chairman of the permanently unregistered Belarusian
Social3Democratic Party Narodnaya Hramada, Nikolay Statkevich,
was nominated for presidential candidate at the European Choice
congress in June 2009. All the nominees mentioned above managed
to collect 100,000 signatures, sufficient to be registered as presidential
candidates, although some of them were accused of forging signatures.
The Liberal3Democratic Party of Belarus nominated its chairman
Sergey Gaidukevich, who ran for the presidency in 2001 and 2006,
however, Gaidukevich withdrew from the race during the collection
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of signatures citing “the evident outcome of the campaign”. Back in
2001 and 2006, Gaidukevich was considered Lukashenko’s sparring
partner, therefore, his withdrawal was interpreted as a proof that
Lukashenko needed no sparring partners in a situation when the
opposition was unable to agree a single strategy, whereas the risk of
losing alternatives (should all candidates withdraw) was minimal.
Gaidukevich claimed he had collected the necessary 100,000
signatures to support his status as a candidate.
The only party nominee who failed to collect the required number
of signatures was deputy chairman of the Belarusian Green Party Yury
Glushakov, who had to admit his failure.
The Belarusian Party of the Left Fair World (former communists) chose
a different survival strategy – through the organization of an election
monitoring service and campaign to support nomination of opposition
representatives in election commissions. That campaign, dubbed For Fair
Election, became a continuation of a similar project conducted by the
party together with the For Freedom movement and other opposition
structures during the parliamentary elections of 2005. The project was
implemented simultaneously with the monitoring campaign of the public
organizations making part of Human Rights Activists for Free Elections
and was somewhat overshadowed by that initiative.
According to Human Rights Activists for Free Elections, of the 84,084
representatives of political parties, public associations, enterprises and
communities nominated for membership in 6,346 district election
commissions, only 1,073 people were nominated by opposition political
parties. The remaining representatives were nominated under control
of local authorities, which had “quotas” for enterprises and institutions,
and had all members of commissions approved in high places even
before the nomination process was completed.
It turned out that only 183 representatives of opposition parties
or 17.1% became election commission members, which compares to
the average acceptance rate of 84.3% (70,815 people out of 84,084
nominees); the figure was at 87.7% for representatives of the parties
loyal to the regime (1,586 out of 1,808) and 93.2% for the four largest
progovernmental public associations and one trade union with the
same stance (23,689 out of 25,419). For instance, the acceptance rate
for Belaya Rus and Belarusian Women’s Union reached 100% (808 out
of 808 and 869 out of 869, respectively).
As a result, representatives of political parties made up 0.25% of
all members of district election commissions and were present in 3%
of the total number of commissions, which was not enough to influence
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the work of commissions and the key element of the election – the
organization of the voting process and vote count.
Conclusion
The year 2010 was marked by an active participation of political par
ties in the presidential election, however, this participation had very
little to do with the real struggle for power – opposition parties ei
ther pursued their own ends or performed auxiliary functions for non
party candidates. The latter had a lot more material resources and
were not bound by coalition treaties, which enabled them to domi
nate in their relations with parties and dictate their will. The active
nomination of presidential candidates by political parties was moti
vated by the wish to preserve their identity, including through mani
festations of ideological otherness of this or that party.
In the near future, the development of political parties will be
defined by the factor of the parliamentary elections slated for the autumn
of 2012. The key areas and initiatives for political parties to channel
their efforts in 2011 are as follows: to resist repression and fight for the
release of the political prisoners; influence the position of the
international community on the situation in Belarus and possible
imposition of political and other sanctions against Belarusian officials
responsible for human rights abuse. Parties may become the basic
internal entity to announce the end of the period of mass political
repression, which marked their start on December 19, 2010, the day of
the Belarusian presidential election. Political parties are yet to choose
their strategy for the coming parliamentary elections in order to make
use of the preelection situation and improve the situation with
democracy and human rights in the country. Most of discussions in
parties and coalitions will be over the conditions of participation or non
participation in the parliamentary elections should the country still have
political prisoners at that time. Those advocating participation in the
parliamentary elections will insist on having a new reform of the
regulatory framework of the election process, including amendments
to the Electoral Code. However, such a reform looks very unlikely, and
so does the possibility of a transfer towards elements of the proportional
election system. It is also unlikely that the public association Belaya
Rus will be transformed into a party, although this topic will be widely
discussed in the state media on the initiative of Belaya Rus functionaries,
who are interested in increasing the status of that ambiguous structure
in the framework of the national political system.
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RELIGIOUS SPHERE: IN THE RUN.UP
TO THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Natallia Vasilevich
Summary
The Presidential election was the central event in 2010. In the run8up to the
campaign the repressive mechanism, including that in the religious sphere,
was relaxed. Nevertheless, despite some liberalization, there were reports about
violations of religious freedom; the conflict around the New Life Church has
not been resolved.
In 2009, religious life in Belarus was developing under the sign of the Pope. In
2010, the top media event was Lukashenko’s visit to Constantinople and his
meeting with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, which triggered
discussions about the probable autocephaly of the Belarusian Orthodox Church.
The Belarusian Christian Democratic Party (BChD) inspired believers of different
denominations to take part in the Presidential campaign of Vital Rumaљeuski
(Rymashevsky), who used a lot of religious rhetoric and became popular as an
active churchgoer of the Belarusian Orthodox Church (the BOC).
As for the BOC, its activities were not intensive; the probable retirement of the
BOC top patriarch Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeev) was even discussed.
Throughout the year, there were reports that classes on Orthodoxy might be
introduced in schools according to the approved syllabus. In reality, no progress
on this front was made. Discussions took place around the probable concordat
with the Vatican, but there have been no progress here, either. In the first half
of 2010 tension developed between the Belarusian regime and the Russian
Orthodox Church (the ROC). Nevertheless, in the forerun to the Presidential
elections heads of the ROC even tried to mediate the reconciliation between
Minsk and Moscow. They also supported the Belarusian regime after the
Presidential election, though the Belarusian Exarchate’s attitude to the campaign
and the events after it was ambiguous.
Tendencies:
• There is still pressure in the religious sphere: certain religious organizations
and foreign citizens are persecuted;
• There is no threat of the BOC’s autocephaly in Lukashenko’s visit to
Constantinople; the Moscow Patriarchate, despite many misunderstandings
with the Belarusian regime, remains the latter’s supporter;
• Relations with the Vatican are developing much slower than the public and
experts have expected: the concordat was to be concluded last year,
nevertheless, it is still “being elaborated”;
• The BChD introduced religious rhetoric into the broad political discourse; its
participation in the Presidential election changed electoral behavior of active
churchgoers.
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General information
According to the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs, in 2010
the number of registered religious organizations grew from 3263 to 3321,
the number of religious communities among them as of January 1, 2011
is 31621. Significant regional differences can be observed: 719 commu
nities are found in the Brest region, but only 2692  in the Mogilev re
gion. The biggest number of parishes is in the Belarusian Orthodox
Church (1545); the Roman Catholic Church has 472 parishes, Protes
tant – 1005 (including the Pentecostals – 505, the Evangelical Chris
tian Baptists – 275, the SeventhDay Adventists – 72). The number of
believers of each denomination is still estimated by polls, but other sta
tistical data are available as well: according to the Interior Ministry,
Christmas masses in Catholic churches were attended by 236 thousand
people3  (including 7 thousand in Minsk4), whereas 134 thousand peo
ple (including 9 thousand in Minsk) attended Orthodox churches5.
Before the Presidential election oppression in all spheres of social life
lessened; and, unprecedentedly, two sentences on Ivan Michaylov6 and
Dmitry Smyk7 were vacated: the young men were demanding alterna
tive military service because of their religious beliefs. At the same time,
Andrej Cianiuta (conscripted for military service) and Jauhien Jakavi
enka (sentenced to 1 year’s penal labor), who demanded alternative
military service on grounds other than religious, were not acquitted.
Uladzimir Kachahura, pastor of the New Generation Church (Navahr
udak) and BChD activist, was convicted of “conducting divine services
without local executive body’s permission” and sentenced to a fine.
However, the superior court vacated the sentence, submitted the case
to reconsideration and, finally, closed it.8 Vasil Palujanau, leader of Je
hovah’s Witnesses group from Babrujsk, was sentenced to a fine for
illegal religious activities, but a higher court vacated the sentence.9
1 h t t p : / / w w w . b e l a r u s 2 1 . b y / r u / m a i n _ m e n u / r e l i g i o n / s o t r /
new_url_1648988856
2 Ibid.
3 http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/society/Vrozhdestvenskixbog
osluzhenijaxvkatolicheskixxramaxBelarusiprinjaliuchastieokolo236
tyschelovek_i_537362.html
4 http://www.map.by/news/society/news_ic_news_116_358158.htm
5 http://belapan.com/archive/2011/01/10/440852/
6 http://ags.by/?p=9093
7 http://www.belhelcom.org/ru/node/10081
8 http://new.nvonline.info/by/88/40/17020/
9 http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1452
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It is still too early to say that the state decided to stop oppressing
religious organizations. Just to name a few cases: on May 23, in
Drahiиyn three Baptists were detained for setting up a Christian library
in the street; on June 26, in Kobryn Viktar Novik, pastor of the
Pentecostal church in Hruava was sentenced to a fine on charges
“violating public events’ regulations” for singing and distributing
leaflets10. The perennial controversy between the authorities and New
Life Church entered a new round. The attempt to take away the
church’s building took a new turn. The church was sentenced to a
BYR 257 million fine (ca. USD 100,000) for alleged contamination of
the ground around its building with petroleumbased products, but
refused to pay the fine.11  The authorities had to turn to international
experts for help. For example, according to ONT, a stateowned TV
channel, Thomas Gandow, German expert on religious sects, allegedly
called the New Life Church a cult.12  Later, Mr. Gandow denied having
characterized the organization in this way.13  This cult expert turned
into a big mediafigure: besides the New Life, the Belarusian Christian
Democratic Party was also presented in a negative light, but this might
be a case of unethical journalism.
The civil campaign to protect St. Joseph Church in Upper Town
is still running. On March 19, 2011 it has been 5 years since its
beginning; 30,000 signatures have already been collected. In 2010,
another signaturegathering campaign headed by the BChD, that
engaged themselves actively, collected 6.5 thousand signatures for
a petition14, which were sent to state and church administrations15.
Since September 16, during the Presidential campaign, the picketing
has been held on a daily basis. Unfortunately, after 20 days the
participants had to take a vote whether to continue picketing or not,16
especially after the unfavorable opinion of the Roman Catholic
Metropolitan Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz in his interview for state
newspaper Belarus Segodnya (Belarus Today).17  The campaign
continued in the form of daily meetings with figures of culture,
concerts and performances. The Spiritual Heart of Minsk civil
10 http://photos.state.gov/libraries/belarus/136671/pdf/IRF%202010_Bel.pdf
11 http://newlife.by/news_full.php?id=865
12 http://ont.by/news/our_news/0058178
13 http://www.newlife.by/news_full.php?id=835
14 http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=42293
15 http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/2158733.html
16 http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/2177589.html
17 http://www.sb.by/post/106218/
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committee was established.18 Unfortunately, the campaign has not
achieved anything so far.
Two major statereligious events took place in 2010: the 300th
anniversary of Minsk Arch Cathedral Church of the Name of the
Blessed Virgin Mary and burying of the remains of unidentified
soldiers in the Church of All Saints in Minsk. No highlevel visit of
Patriarch of Moscow Kirill to Belarus took place, except for a transit
stop in Vitebsk. Among foreign visits we should mention President
Lukashenko’s meeting with the Patriarch of Constantinople
Bartholomew in Istanbul and his meeting with the Cardinal Secretary
of State Tarcisio Bertone during the OSCE Summit in Astana. Both
meetings were rather ceremonial, albeit the one with the Ecumenical
Patriarch stirred speculations, both in Belarus and Russia, about the
probable autocephaly of the Belarusian Orthodox Church.
In 2010, media focused on two main topics: the probable
introduction of Basics of Orthodox culture into the school
curriculum, which is being initiated by the Belarusian Orthodox
Church; and a potential agreement with the Vatican, which is still
being elaborated.
Legislation and institutions
The law On freedom of conscience and religious organizations has seen
no changes in its restricting part. Any religious community has to meet
a number of conditions to become legal: compulsory registration; re
ligious buildings in possession (Leonid Gulyako, Commissioner for
Religious and Ethnic Affairs, paid special attention to this point in his
annual report on 2010, because of numerous examples when religious
communities exploited buildings being their property but of nonre
ligious character – which violates the law19); territorial restrictions
on activities.
In late 2009, part 2 of section 9.9 of the civil code (administrative
punishment for illegal religious activities) was repealed. But the
criminal regulation of the same type of offence was retained. Hence,
criminal punishment will be applied immediately, i.e. the legal
regulation became more repressive. On the other hand, during 2010
this norm has never been applied against religious activists.
18 http://new.racyja.com/news/gramadskikamitetzavyartannekastsela
svyatogayazepavernikam
19 http://www.belta.by/ru/person/opinions/LeonidGuljako_i_511480.html
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Under the Regulations on foreign citizens and stateless
individuals coming to Belarus for religious activities,20  activities of
foreigners, mostly Catholic and Protestant activists, have been
impeded.
In 2010, the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic
Affairs elaborated the Regulations on the structure, content and
procedure of submitting information for registering a religious
community practicing a religion previously unknown in Belarus.21  The
goal of the document is to prevent registration of unlawful religious
organizations; the Council of Ministers approved it by Ordinance No.
548 as of April 9, 2010.
Tension in the religious sphere is caused by legal regulations
rather than by single cases of persecution: the former are applied
selectively, there are no precise or unified mechanisms regulating and
protecting freedom of conscience. The Belarusian regime has no
resources to control the religious sphere. Therefore, its task is to
establish institutional mechanisms for religious organizations so that
they limit their activities and do not transgress the limits determined
by the state.
On September 10, Minsk hosted an international conference on
problems in the sphere of freedom of conscience to solve institutional
problems caused by regulations and their enforcement.
Representatives of state bodies, religious and international
organizations, civil society, and experts passed a resolution on
measures to improve the situation22  and presented the Road Map of
the Eastern Partnership.23  Both events show that civil society is about
to solve the issue of religious liberty, but so far this process involves a
limited number of actors.
A special working group of youth and human rights activists
worked out suggestions for the law On the alternative military service24
specifying probable refusals to serve because of religious beliefs. The
Alternative Civil Service campaign was quite active in 2010 and
managed to involve state organs, and yet the bill has not been
elaborated.
20 http://pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?start=1&RN=C20800123#%C7%E0%
E3_%D3%F2%E2_1
21 h t t p : / / w w w . b e l a r u s 2 1 . b y / r u / m a i n _ m e n u / r e l i g i o n / s o t r /
new_url_1648988856
22 http://ecumena.by/?p=62#comments
23 http://eurobelarus.info/images/stories/DK5.pdf
24 http://ags.by/?p=9353#more9353
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The adoption of the Education Code25  limits home education. We
should note here, that in the USA a great number of Protestants prefer
this very type of education: this tendency applies to Belarusian
Christians as well, especially Protestants.26  To expand options for
home education, the initiated Christian Movement, coordinated by
Aliaksej Љein (Shein), BChD cochairperson, submitted 500 signatures
to the House of Representatives.27  Nonetheless, the deputies did not
take them into consideration.
There is one more religious issue in the educational sphere:
introduction of religion classes in comprehensive schools. Their main
promoter is the Belarusian Orthodox Church. They organized several
conferences on this topic and elaborated a number of syllabuses,
including the muchtalkedof optional course Basics of Orthodox
culture. The course Orthodox shrines of Eastern Slavs for grades 1 to
11 was elaborated by the Coordinating Council of the Ministry of
Education and the BOC28. But it was not approved by the National
Institute of Education as there were no proper workbooks.29
Nevertheless, some educational establishments organize optional
courses of this kind, even without proper, i.e. approved, syllabuses. In
most cases, the administration decides. Though, in reality, even if both
the administration and parents agree, it is difficult to introduce such
classes because the course is not on the list of optional courses of the
Ministry of Education. The course was improperly advertized
(allegedly, it was to be introduced in all schools), which stirred a broad
discussion in the media: in Zvyazda daily, Nasha Niva weekly, on the
Internet.
The campaign to protect St. Joseph Church proposed a bill On
restitution of realty of religious worship from state or community to
religious organizations. The bill was proposed as a “BChD”
document.30  Nevertheless, the party did not include it into its official
program. Moreover, the law is quite “raw”: it does not take into
consideration the situation in Belarus.
The Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs considers the
realty issue very acute for stateconfessional relations: Protestant
churches “misuse” the property of religious organizations; some
25 http://pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?start=1&RN=Hk1100243
26 http://alaksiejsein.livejournal.com/3240.html
27 http://new.racyja.com/node/6290
28 http://churchby.info/bel/news/2010/07/291/
29 http://churchby.info/bel/624/
30 http://zmkby.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=39&t=377&start=0
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organizations, despite receiving help from the state, “fall behind in
protecting the buildings”. He concludes that “we should pay more
attention to the process of restitution of objects that are valuable
historical buildings”31 . There was a big scandal around St. Boris and
Gleb’s Church in Novogrudok, when the reconstruction workers
substituted the original domes with onionlike ones (typical of
Orthodox churches in Russia).32  The public tried to intervene and
protest, but the reconstruction was finished.
In 2011, legal regulation on religious organizations might be
changed as there is a law On non3profit organizations to be passed.33
Religious organizations take little part in discussing it.
Orthodox believers regularly submit requests about individual
registration numbers. Such initiatives are quite wellorganized, though
not as numerous as in Russia or Ukraine. These requests receive no
answers.
The Council for Morality is still functioning, but its activities are
limited: attempts to forbid concerts of Rammstein or Elton John for
moral reasons. These attempts have no effect, which shows the actual
power of this institution.
Belarusian Orthodox Church: Are autocephaly and
independence possible?
The year 2010 was not rich in events for the Belarusian Orthodox
Church. Nevertheless, some events raise the question of its future.
The first one was the news that on May 31, Metropolitan Filaret (Va
khromeev), Primate of the Belarusian Exarchate, submitted an appli
cation for retirement. Despite that Metropolitan Filaret remained the
ruling hierarch; the question of his successor became topical. The
mechanism of election and decisionmaking is highly nontranspar
ent, that is why we can only discuss potential candidates. One thing
is clear: this decision is made in Moscow, by the Synod of the Russian
Orthodox Church, according to the status of the Exarchate. The dis
cussions revolve about two main candidates: Georgy, Archbishop of
Nizhny Novgorod and Arzamas, of Belarusian origin, paying often
visits to Belarus34; and Dmitry, Archbishop of Viciebsk and Orsha.
31 http://churchby.info/rus/671/
32 http://churchby.info/bel/642/
33 http://www.lawtrend.org/ru/data/644/
34 http://eparhiya.by/main/42svizitomnagomelshhinuprebyvaetarx
iepiskopnizhegorodskijiarzamasskijgeorgij.html
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Patriarch Kirill met with the latter in Vitebsk on June 4, 2010, during
his transit trip through Belarus (he also visited this eparchy in 2009).
Nevertheless, due to the reasons mentioned above discussing the
chances of either candidate is futile.
The news of the probable retirement provoked a stormy reaction
in the Belarusian Exarchate: archimandrite Alexius (Shinkevich) was
dismissed from his position of the media relations executive after
publicizing this statute procedure of age retirement. In 2009 the
archimandrite unexpectedly denounced a negative report about the
BChD on BT, Belarusian TV1. As a result he gained respect among
the opposition and suspicion among state functionaries. There seemed
to be nothing scandalous in the news about Filaret’s probable
retirement, but nevertheless, archimandrite Shinkevich lost his media
relations position.35
Why? When Bishop Benjamin (Tupeko) of Borisov, was appointed
Vicar of Minsk diocese, it became even more apparent that
Metropolitan Filaret cannot fully perform his duties. The young
hierarch was also appointed head of the newly established institution:
the Publishing Council, which is to coordinate publishing Orthodox
literature in Belarus.
Who is managing the Belarusian Exarchate after all, if Metro
politan Filaret is gradually losing his position? At the level of relations
with the regime, we can state that degree of Metropolitan’s loyalty to
it in speeches and addresses is reducing. It is reducing from the
opposite side as well: more than once did Lukashenko ignore both
traditional services in the Holy Spirit Cathedral and the Metropolitan
personally in his relations with the church administration in Moscow.
The leading position in statechurch relations is being taken by Feodor
Povny, an archpriest close to President Lukashenko.36  His authority
in the BOC is based on his closeness to the state, the symbol of which
was the President’s participation in the pompous burial of remains of
unidentified soldiers in the crypt of the Church of All Saints on July 2,
2010. At the annual meeting with the Synod on April 22, 2010,
Lukashenko called the harmonious relation between the state and the
[Orthodox] Church “a symphony”37. The President presented his
35 http://www.interfax.by/article/66634
36 Малютин А. Церковный премьер Беларуси. Федор Повный – священник
у олимпа политической власти // Портал Кредо: http://www.portal
credo.ru/site/?act=press&type=list&press_id=980
37 http://churchby.info/rus/491/
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vision of this “symphony”: “Strong power is the pledge of confidence
of Belarusians, the Orthodox Church has always been and remains its
faithful ally”38.
But before and during the Presidential election the Belarusian
Orthodox church turned out to be not that faithful to the “strong
authorities”. Metropolitan Filaret gave speeches both at the All
Belarus Assembly and inauguration, but, unlike previous political
seasons, they were not that proregime. A lot of believers and priests,
having an alternative to the “Orthodox atheist” Lukashenko – the
active “Orthodox churchgoer” Rymaseuski – started giving
preference to the latter. The BChD campaign, addressed to church
activists, was successful among the Orthodox.
Unlike the congratulations that Patriarch of Moscow Kirill
immediately sent to Lukashenko, the BOC’s reaction to the results
and the followup of the election was not that definite. Archpriest
Feodor Povny denounced actions of the protesters on BT (Belarusian
TV1), but the events afterwards showed that the Orthodox community
of Belarus is showing unprecedented signs of civil identity – with
little inclination to “strong authorities”. For example, the official
BOC’s monthly Carkounaje slova (Ecclesiastical Word) published a
letter from believers concerning the December 19th events39; there were
letters addressed to the Patriarch expressing bewilderment at his
congratulation40; in parishes people prayed for the arrested and injured
on December 19, etc. These actions were initiated by the middle rather
than “the ruling top” of the BOC. Nevertheless, we can talk about
certain changes in the BOC’s position on the civil and political
situation in Belarus, despite the opinion expressed by its superior
administration in Moscow. This situation stimulated more active talks
about wider autonomy both from the centre and the state.
Lukashenko’s visit to Constantinople, when he met with
Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople, provided another cause
for discussing autocephaly.41  Some regarded that visit practically as
a step to autocephaly. Nevertheless, according to the Greek sources
and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the visit was purely ceremonial and
the issue of autocephaly could not have been discussed. Moreover,
38 http://ont.by/news/our_news/0056060/
39 http://churchby.info/bel/654/
40 http://churchby.info/bel/652/
41 http://arche.by/by/30/10/3309/%D0%92%D1%96%D0%B7%D1%96%
D1%82%D1%83%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%A0%D1%
8B%D0%BC.htm
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the panOrthodox dialogue, preparations for the InterOrthodox
Council make any drastic changes almost impossible as another Inter
Orthodox meeting in Chambesy (Switzerland) did not arrive at any
consensus regarding the mechanism of announcing and recognizing
autocephaly.42  For Lukashenko, his visit to Constantinople, just like
his visit to Vatican, became another PRmove, though a bit less
pompous. This visit drew a much wider response in Russia, where it
was regarded in the geopolitical light and against the Ukrainian issue.
Closeness to Russia, support of the “canonical” Orthodoxy, i. e.
subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, is welcomed in
Lukashenko’s policy, whereas support of Catholicism or independent
Orthodox Church is not. For Lukashenko this could have been a kind
of signal that, together with his proWestern policy of the recent years,
was to have stirred unrest among the Moscow political elite and, hence,
secure support at the Presidential election. The “church factor” must
have been an important one. The Patriarch could not have taken fright
of the “Vatican” and “Constantinople” signals. But having his own
geopolitical and geoecclesiastical opinion of “the Russian World”,
he could have contributed to better relations between the Belarusian
regime and the Kremlin.
The Roman Catholic Church: Is a concordat possible?
The issue of the international agreement on cooperation between
Belarus and the Roman Catholic Church has been under discussion
for several years. The talks began as far back as 2002, after the law On
freedom of conscience was passed, stipulating a possible concordat.
In 2003, a corresponding agreement with the BOC was signed. But
they began to work on the document only in 2007, when Deputy Prime
Minister Mikail Kosinets announced the real possibility to sign an
agreement. The most heated discussions around a concordat began
in 2008, when Cardinal Secretary of State Tarcisio Bertone visited
Belarus.
Nevertheless, there has been no progress since 2008, except for
numerous loud statements that the document would be signed by the
end of that summer or year. Alexandr Kashkevich, Chairperson of the
Conference of Catholic Bishops of Belarus (the CCBB), told Radio
Vaticana in December that the document is ready and we “should
pray that it is signed as soon as possible, but that signing is in
42 http://churchby.info/bel/news/2011/02/271/
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jurisdiction of the Apostolic Nunciature”43. According to the
documents of the Conference, the issue of the concordat was not even
discussed.44
So, what is the actual situation with the document? How do Belarus
and the RCC cooperate? Sergey Aleynik, ambassador of Belarus to
the Holy See, in his interview for Radio Vaticana said that “the project
to restore frescos in the Arch Cathedral Church is an example of fruitful
cooperation, initiated by the President”45. He also pointed out that
bilateral relations became more active after Cardinal Bertone’s visit
to Belarus in 2008. But it turned out that only during Lukashenko’s
meeting with the Pope in 2009 “arrangements for the agreement
between the Holy See and Belarus were made”; “the agreement is
being elaborated” and Belarus hopes that “the work will be finished
soon, though the document needs more time”, said Mr. Aleynik in
the interview. Who is there in the working group? Is the document
“ready” or will “the work will be finished soon”? Who represents the
Catholic Church – the Secretariat of State of the Holy See, the
Apostolic Nunciature, the CCBB? What Belarusian experts are
elaborating the document – the Foreign Ministry or the Office of the
Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs? According to the
Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs, “at present an
agreement between the Republic of Belarus and Vatican is being
elaborated. The Foreign Ministry is the main developer but the Office
of the Commissioner is taking part in elaborating the text of the
agreement”.46  The issue of the concordat was raised during the OCSE
Summit in Astana. The President met with Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone
who said that “the main sign of trusting relations between the two
countries is the agreement that is being now elaborated”47. The
relations between Belarus and the Vatican might really be trusting.
Why is then the signing of the document always postponed? Can it
be so that, despite the President’s initiative to restore the frescos, the
relations between the Catholic Church in Belarus and the Belarusian
state are not that trusting? Bishop Kashkevich pointed out that “the
Catholic Church is always trying to establish dialogue with
authorities”. But “the number of foreign priests” reduced (from 85 to
43 http://www.radiovaticana.org/bie/Articolo.asp?c=443835
44 http://catholic.by/2/conference/docs.html
45 http://storico.radiovaticana.org/bie/storico/201010/426955.html
46 http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/sotr/new_url_
1648988856
47 http://belapan.com/archive/2010/12/02/431509_431511/
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48 in Hrodna diocese). Moreover, “they are issued visas for only half
a year”, which complicates their work.48
The state is not always happy with the Catholic Church, either.
The Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Gulyako pointed
out that “Catholic communities tend to erect illegal monuments”,
some priests “ignore the legal framework prohibiting religious
organizations to take part in political activities”49, which becomes very
topical before and after election campaigns. There are priests and lay
people in the Catholic Church who take an active part in movements
(e. g. the one to protect St. Joseph Church) or parties (the Belarusian
Christian Democratic Party), but the administration of the RCC tries
to dissociate itself from them. For example, before the Presidential
election priest Jury Barok, close to BChD, was commissioned to Israel;
Metropolitan Tadeusz Kondrusewicz in his interview for “Belarus
Today” daily distanced himself from the activists protecting St. Joseph
Church, after BChD had became leader of the movement.50  After the
election the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church made no reaction
whatever to the events on December 19th. Nevertheless, many priests
said masses for the imprisoned, a number of Catholic activists applied
to the administration of the bishopric to express their opinion about
the situation in the country51; one priest published an Internet article
“Gloomy Christmas”, saying that keeping silent is a sin in this
situation.52  Nevertheless, there is still silence, and the document, for
which this silence was traded, still remains a bleak prospect.
Belarusian Greek.Catholic Church
In 2010 no significant changes occurred in the life of the Belarusian
GreekCatholic Church. Two issues remained unresolved: absence
of a bishop (in 2009 the priests applied to the Vatican to settle this
canonical issue) and absence of a proper ecclesiastical building in
the capital city (GreekCatholic intelligentsia addressed a request to
the President). Moreover, St. Joseph Centre53 in vul. Ordzonikidze, 6
was threatened to be closed because the building was not in the gen
eral layout plan of this district. Masses are celebrated regularly in the
48 http://www.radiovaticana.org/bie/Articolo.asp?c=443835
49 http://www.belta.by/ru/person/opinions/LeonidGuljako_i_511480.html
50 http://www.sb.by/post/106218/
51 http://churchby.info/bel/672/
52 http://churchby.info/bel/656/
53 http://www.svjazep.org/
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chapel of All Belarusian Saints there, the centre hosts cultural and
religious events. Negotiations with the authorities were successful and
the GreekCatholic centre was included into the proper plan.
Alternative Orthodoxy
The influence alternative Orthodoxy did not increase in 2010. Struc
turally, it is comprised by 3 groups of churches.
Group № 1 is the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church headed
by bishop Sviataslau (Longin), with one parish – “Religious Community
of St. Euphrosinia of Polack in Minsk”54 – and one priest, Fr. Leanid
Akalovich. The community applied for state registration but was denied it.
Group № 2 is the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
(BAOC) headed by Archbishop Jovan (Puric).55  Its main activist is
archpriest Sergey Gorbik (Lviv, Ukraine), who moderates the blog
“Belarusian Autocephaly”. Fr. Sergey’s conflict with the Greek
Orthodox movement, headed by Bishop Basil Kostyuk, continued in
2010 in the form of mutual reproaches.56
Group № 3 is a parish of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad
headed by Metropolitan Agathangelos (Pashkovsky). Archpriest
Leonid (Plyats) governs this group of several parishes in Minsk and
Brest regions.57  The first three groups support the idea of autocephaly
from the Russian Orthodox Church in one way or another, but none
of them is recognized by canonical churches. The issue of autocephaly
became topical when President Lukashenko visited Constantinople,
though the talks were mainly about the Belarusian Orthodox Church.
As the results of the meeting in Chambesy in February 2011 show, the
issue of autocephaly and its mechanisms is one of the most
controversial and unresolved in the interOrthodox world: the question
was discussed but consensus remained elusive.58
Belarusian Christian Democratic Party
The Belarusian Christian Democratic Party became more active in
2010, which is partially due to the Presidential election: the party nom
54 http://www.belapc.org/religijnaagramadasvatoeeuprasinnipolackaeu
menskuparishofsainteuphrasyniaofpolatskinmiensk
55 http://baocinfo.blogspot.com/
56 http://belpat.narod.ru
57 http://rocor.wmsite.ru/drugye/DIRECTORY/prihodyrpcza/
58 http://churchby.info/bel/news/2011/02/271/
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inated its candidate – the Orthodox believer Vital Rymaљeuski. This
fact was often emphasized and became a kind of symbol. The party
also tries to “guide” some civil campaigns, first of all, the one to pro
tect St. Joseph Church, which has been going for more than 5 years.
Moreover, during the election campaign the BChD used Christian
rhetoric and appealed to Christian values. They attracted support of
active believers, including Orthodox ones, who, for the first time, had
an option to vote for a candidatebeliever. A similar situation could
have occurred in 2001 when Leonid Kalugin, the then director of Atlant
Inc. (refrigerators plant) made an attempt to be nominated as a
Presidential candidate but did not gather 100 thousand valid
signatures. In 2010, thanks to a relatively free campaign, the BChD
managed to reach a wide group of believers, which used to be,
especially the Orthodox ones, faithful Lukashenko’s supporters. It is
difficult to say if the party managed to break the stereotype of
supporting the regime and denouncing the opposition among the
Orthodox, but its role in this process is obvious.
We want to emphasize that these changes did not affect the people
who generally call themselves “Orthodox”; it only applies to active
church members, people of the “ecclesiastic subculture”, so to say.
It is peculiar that heads of different denominations “keep silent”
about the BChD and its leaders. Neither Orthodox, Catholic or
Protestant leaders denounce the party that positions itself as “Christian”.
True, there is some “distancing” from the party, especially on the
Catholic side: Metropolitan Kondrusievich in his interview for
newspaper Belarus Today about St. Joseph Church denounced
politicization of its defense; priest Yury Bark, who expressed himself
favorably about the BChD, was expelled from Belarus. But we do not
consider these facts public dissociation. The state and its media were
even forced to substitute “the voice of the Church” with a foreign one:
in 2009 BT (Belarusian TV1) used the words of deacon Andrey (Kuraev)
to discredit the BChD and show that the Church does not support it.
But the BOC media relations executive openly denounced Kuraev. In
2010, the authorities had to use words of the German cult expert Thomas
Gandow. His answer concerning the BChD for 7 dniey (7 days) daily
was so vaguely formulated that it could be interpreted as criticism.59
Some Protestant activists and religious organizations openly
supported the party, e. g. the New Life Church, Pastor Uladzimir
59 http://7days.belta.by/7days_plus.nsf/All/9D719891F20A839BC225773
6004DFDAB?OpenDocument
Society
174 	



Kachahur from Novogrudok (BChD member), and others. We should
say that Protestants grew in their general critical attitude towards the
regime rather than in support of any particular political force, as we
can infer from Sergey Khomich’s, bishop of the Union of Christians of
Evangelical Faith (UCEF).60  In general, the critical attitude of religious
leaders to the present regime is much stronger than their support of
the BChD as a political party: i. e. protests do not necessarily turn into
support of a particular political party though there is some correlation
here.
Forecast
December 19th and the following repressions show that in 2011 the
pressure on the civil society in general and the religious sector in par
ticular will increase. The new law On non3profit organizations, if passed
in its actual wording, will become the main legal and institutional tool
of oppression of and worsen the position of religious organizations.
On the other hand, the regime will have to look for legitimization
in the international arena, and religion can become an easy mechanism
for that. Lukashenko has already paid the most scandalous visits – to
Rome and Constantinople, he has nothing surprising in reserve.
Hence, old issues, especially that of the nonsigned concordat, might
be raised. During the year it might be in development and “at the last
stage”, but it is unlikely to be signed.
As for relations with denominations, if Orthodox and Catholic
priests dare express any “oppositional” views, state organs will
pressure senior clerics with arguments that engagement in political
life violates Belarusian law. Nevertheless, it is also probable that pro
regime priests will be exploited as “voice of the Church”. For example,
Mikhail Morgulis, representative of the Protestant Spiritual Diplomacy
Foundation, congratulated Lukashenko on his victory at the post
election press conference on behalf of Protestants.61  Archpriest Feodor
Povny might make another attempt to the Council of the Republic;
his influence in the BOC will grow during 2011. Lukashenko will try
to build relations directly with the Moscow Patriarchate rather than
through the Belarusian Exarchate.
60 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWvZlE1k6Vk&feature=
player_embedded
61 http://baznica.info/informatsiya/dukhovnayadiplomatiyanavyborakh
group
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The number of church leaders criticizing the Belarusian authorities
will grow in all denominations. Civil awareness among believers will
grow at the level of religious “civil society” rather than at that of top
hierarchs. It will involve not only political but also social, legal and
moral issues. The number of grassroots initiatives will grow.
Orthodox culture classes will not be widely introduced into the
school curriculum, though this question will be widely discussed in
2011 again.
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BELARUSIAN EDUCATION: A SHORT.TERM
VICTORY OR A LONG.TERM LOSS?
Svetlana Matskevich
Summary
Belarusian education in 2010 after the end of the interrupted reform of higher
school continues to stagnate. Trying to perform according to the standards
dictated by the Ministry of Education the educational establishments lose
creativity and strategic prospect in their work and confine themselves more
and more to formalization and standardization tasks. As a result, even having
high indices of population involvement in the educational system, the training
quality of secondary and tertiary schools remains the object of criticism from
both students and the country leaders.
The major event in the educational sphere in 2010 was the adoption of the
Education Code. Despite the attempt to imitate the discussion of this document
among the interested public, its final variant does not include the additions and
remarks made by civic organizations and civil initiatives.
Last year the third sector initiatives in the field of alternative education continued
to develop but they are of local character and cannot influence the state of the
Belarusian education in general.
Tendencies:
• Quantitative and qualitative indices in the educational system decrease: the
number of pupils and teachers at schools decreases, the former structure is
preserved, ideological content of education remains invariable;
• The involvement of people over 25 into the training process decreases;
• The state remains a monopolist in the educational field and using its position
to simulate dialogue with other subjects of education;
• Adoption of the Education Code in 2010 did not promote dialogue between
the state and civil society on educational problems at all;
• Joining the Bologna process acquires a technical rather than a strategic
character;
• Educational projects available in the third sector are not numerous and
isolated; they cannot influence essentially the state of affairs in the educational
system of Belarus.
Is transition from quantity to quality possible?
In the practice of educational system analysis there is a stable tradi
tion to begin with determining quantitative indices of an educational
level of the whole population. We will not depart from the tradition.
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After the population census held in 2009, the data concerning educa
tion were published (Fig. 1). It should be noted that such information
was not available for a long time since the previous population cen
sus of 1999: the educational statistics basically was conducted in edu
cational institutions or in the field of employment, instead of among
the population as a whole.
Figure 1. Education level of the population of Belarus
(aged 10 and over)
Source: National Statistics Committee, 20091
It is necessary to make efforts to estimate the educational level in
Belarus not in absolute, but in relative indices and, moreover to provide
their substantial interpretation. For example, is 1,530.5 thousand
people with higher education a big or a small number for a country
which successfully overcame an economic crisis and choose the path
of innovative development? Does this fact mean that 1.5 million people
have a high standard of living and form the cultural layer of the
population that defines developmental trends of the country?
According to the population census, out of 7,246.2 thousand
people aged from 6 to 60 about 1,719.8 thousand people (23.7%)
received training in educational institutions on the territory of the
country. Out of them 26.2% – are in the system of higher education,
9.8% – in special secondary education, 5.7% – in vocational schools
1 See: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/itogi1.php.
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and 58% – in general secondary education. Training captures almost
all groups of the population. Basically, it is the young generation aged
6 to 24 that receives the education.
The involvement in education decreases for groups of the
population aged 25 and over and practically drops to nothing for those
aged 60 (Fig. 2). Global tendencies such as “LifeLong Learning”
remain a goal for the future rather than a present fact.
Figure 2. Age groups of people trained at education establishments
Source: National Statistics Committee, 2010
According to the results of the population census the data about
distribution of the population from the point of view of command of
the Belarusian and Russian languages were obtained. About 53.2% of
the population called Belarusian their native language, 41.5% called
Russian their native language. However in daily communication only
23.4% of the total number of population uses Belarusian, Russian is
used by 70.2% of the population. These data brightly testify to the fact
that during the whole period of the country’s independence the
program of Belarusization in the education system was not placed on
a broad footing, and it is unknown whether it will be brought into the
agenda in the near future.
As of the beginning of 2010/2011 academic year there were 4,097
preschool institutions, 3,584 day state comprehensive schools, which
is by 72 establishments less than last year, from them 212 – grammar
schools, 32 – lyceums. Besides, at the beginning of the academic year
9 private educational institutions operated in the Republic (the number
of pupils – 558).
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Analyzing the official data of Main Information and Analytical
Centre of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus, it is
possible to fix an obvious tendency towards the decrease in the number
of pupils of comprehensive schools. The principal cause of such
reduction is the demographic factor. An attempt to compensate
consequences of the comprehensive school reform (1994–2008), the
change of planning and decisionmaking at the governmental level
about the number of budgetary and paid places at the educational
establishments led to an insignificant increase in the number of
students at technical training colleges and special secondary
educational establishments and to a powerful gain of students at the
institutions of higher education (about 12 thousand per year) (Fig. 3).
Figure 3. The number of students at educational institutions
of Belarus
Source: Main Information and Analytical Centre of the Ministry of
Education of the Republic of Belarus, 20102
The number of teaching employees at comprehensive schools
decreases (Fig. 4), the number of highereducation teaching personnel
2 See: http://www.giac.unibel.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=16281.
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increases a little (from 22,542 in 2002/2003 to 24,451 in 2009/2010
academic year). On average, the nominal accrued salary of teaching
employees was BYR 881,9343.
Figure 4. Pedagogical staff of the day comprehensive schools
Source: Main Information and Analytical Centre of the Ministry of
Education of Belarus, 2010
Figure 5. The number vocational training establishments
Source: Main Information and Analytical Centre of the Ministry of
Education of Belarus, 2010
3 See: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/wages.php.
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According to the indices, the vocational training system is
characterized by stability (Fig. 5). As of 2010/2011 academic year, it
includes 222 state vocational schools and 7 private ones, 202 state
special secondary education establishments and 12 – private ones,
45 state higher educational institutions and 10 private ones.
On the whole, over the last 10 years the structure of the education
sphere and the control system did not undergo essential changes in
Belarus. Such structural stability, on the one hand is justified under
the conditions of mass education, whose process is provided by certain
standards, publication of textbooks, material and information
equipment of educational institutions, etc. But, on the other hand,
the absence of tendencies of development and updating in education,
conceptual and strategic uncertainty in the conditions of global
development generate social and economic threats. This has already
become obvious both for consumers of educational services and for
subjects of the labor market, scientists and politicians.
The problem of the quality of Belarusian education that has been
discussed throughout the last 5–6 years remains unsolved. The main
reasons for such a long stagnation is an excessive bureaucratization
of the education system, the state monopoly in educational services,
simulation forms of social partnership and market relations in this
sphere. Existing conceptual and scientific standards concerning the
quality of education, the attempt to use international quality standards
ISO 9000 cannot be adequately integrated into the current Belarusian
education system if outofdate stereotyped and ideological principles
of education management are preserved. Such duality (on the one
hand, there are certain standards, on the other hand – the
corresponding control system is absent) leads to the discredit of the
whole “Quality Management” campaign.
Working out and introduction of the Quality Management System
(QMS) on the basis of international standards are quite productive
for mobilization of the resource available in educational
establishments, for streamlining and ordering of internal activity of
an organization. But the main condition of effective introduction of
such system is free market of educational services, competition,
academic freedoms, economic independence of educational
institutions and reflective attitude of administrations and councils of
the institutions of higher learning to formation of their own strategy
and policy. Application of the standard in management cannot replace
in any way the processes of “cultivation” of a new human potential
and generate new subjects of development in education. On the
Society
182 	



contrary, the introduction of standards disables an administrative
reflection, in many respects deprives of independence and
consolidates the principles of the Soviet administration managerial
control, the essence of which is to act according to stereotypes.
As such standards are introduced into the educational institutions,
the air of freedom and creativity disappears there. Universities cease
to be universities inherently. At schools the prestige and value of
knowledge falls. Under these circumstances, teachers need not think
how to improve sending the message and essence of the courses – it
is more important to have enough time to give all lectures, to write
the plan of academic and educational activity, to raise formally the
level of their skills. For a student it is important to pass tests or
examinations, “to get a wallpaper degree”, rather than to join the
professor in a discussion, to understand a problem in its essence.
Indices of pedagogical and educational activity will be fulfilled but
the necessary quality and content will not appear. In the humanitarian
sphere where education also belongs, the consequences of a
formalistic approach will come in due time. It is safe to predict that
prestige of Belarusian diplomas of the higher establishments will
decrease in comparison with the Russian and foreign ones, that the
Belarusian school leavers will continue their education in other
countries.
In 2010 the new fashion in education focused on quality, can be
considered as an attempt to transfer administrative activity from the
level of strategic management, program development and substantial
aspects to the average level of administration and standardization.
The Ministry of Education and other state executive power bodies
should be engaged in both activities. But they do only what they can4.
Education and politics
The year 2010 was not only the year of quality, stable functioning,
regulatory actions and standardization for education. It was the year
of traditional participation of educators in the election campaign.
Politicians are inclined to see the main administrative resource in the
education system – thousands of teachers work in election commit
tees, voting precincts are located in educational institutions. Through
4 For the results of work of the Ministry of Education in 2010 and main tasks
for 2011 see: Report of the first Deputy Minister of Education of Belarus Ale
ksandr Zhuk // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
minedu.unibel.by/main.aspx?guid=42283.
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schools and kindergartens it is possible to carry out efficient interac
tion with the population, parents and students, to wage PR campaigns
and other actions. The authority actively uses this resource. Alexandr
Radkov, the Minister of Education and at the same time the leader of
the public association Belaya Rus (White Rus) headed President
Lukashenko’s preelection campaign team. This fact did not surprise
or confuse anyone, either politicians or representatives of the civil
society.
Article 12 of the Education Code declares a completely different
approach to the political activity in education establishments: “In
educational institutions of Belarus the activity of political parties or
other public associations whose aims are political, also the children”s,
teenage or youthful associations that act exclusively on the basis of
charters of such parties or associations is forbidden”. Opposition
parties and nongovernmental organizations become by default
included in the blacklists of the Ministry of Education, as well as
certain teachers and professors who received an unspoken prohibition
to practice. The interdiction does not apply to the organizations that
are under the auspices of the state. Under the conditions of passivity
and adaptability of the academic community and control of the
management system over thinking, cynical and authoritative
management style starts to prevail in educational institutions. Earlier
adopted laws are rewritten to suit certain conditions of administration
and control.
In December 2010, the Council of the Republic adopted the final
variant the Education Code5, which evoked ambiguous reactions of
public organizations, business structures and the expert community.
Within the context of the public initiative of the educational and
human rights nongovernmental organizations created in the middle
of the year attempts to publicly criticize the Code project were
undertaken and the written requests were sent to the Parliament.
However, the deputies’ response can be estimated as nonprofessional
if to put it mildly. The reasoning “people will not understand what
informal education is” testifies to the preservation of the Soviet
administrative methods of communications or to a deliberate
unwillingness to join the dialogue with the representatives of the civil
society and independent experts.
5 http://www.president.gov.by/press110548.html; http://www.belta.by/ru/
all_news/society/SovetRespublikiprinjalproektKodeksaob
obrazovanii_i_536916.html
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Last year an encouraging factor for renewal of democratization
processes in education was some thaw in relations between Europe
and Belarus, development of the Eastern Partnership program and
other international educational programs. Many public educational
organizations of Belarus considered the Eastern Partnership as a
chance to start a dialogue between the civil society and the state
including the education problems within the context of the fourth
thematic platform “People to People”. The National platform of the
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum whose leaders publicly
declared their adherence to dialogue and law norms6  is created; the
process of the working out of road maps in the frameworks of thematic
platforms began7.
Bologna process: a matter of technique
In 2010, the president and the Belarusian government changed their
attitude towards the Bologna process several times. At the beginning
of the year, Lukashenko rejected the suggestion of the Ministry of
Education to enter the Bologna process. Then on June 7th at the meet
ing concerning higher school development and the quality of prepa
ration of specialists, he demanded a more detailed study of the ques
tion from the Ministry. However, at any outcome the president was
convinced that “it is necessary to keep the present education system”.
The Ministry of Education tries to suit such directions, ascribing to
the Bologna process the features in the logic of evolutionary charac
ter: “The Bologna process does not demand unification and submis
sion, sharp revolutionary steps alienated from national contexts. What
is important is a considered, complex, flexible strategy of an evolu
tionary development of education aimed at the increase of its quali
ty”8.
It is also stated that the country that enters the Bologna process is
not supposed to carry out a number of principles (most likely, it is
academic freedoms that are meant). Thus, the belated inclusion of
Belarus into the international educational space is declared to be only
a technical matter. That is, it is necessary to prepare a package of
documents, to create an anonymous expert community, to take part
6 http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/4856/164/
7 http://eurobelarus.info/content/view/3998/164/
8 A. Zhuk Higher Education of Belarus: from the Bologna process to the Euro3
pean space of higher education // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://
minedu.unibel.by/
185
in events and to report about the improvement of quality and increase
in number of foreign students etc. The process goes on but, as usual,
not on a program but administrative level.
Independent experts in the sphere of education V. Dunaev,
V. Matskevich, A. Kozulin, etc. expressed their concern in connection
with this succession of events9. It is obvious that without a widespread
public discussion, the participation of the academic and student’s
community in the discussion and the control of the civil society over
Belarus’ entering into the Bologna process the process itself can turn
into a show or a phony act.
The third sector: reaction or strategy?
Besides official programs a number of independent alternative plat
forms and projects are created in the educational sphere. On the ba
sis of the Humanitarian Technologies Agency and Social Innovations
Center under the direction of the philosopher Vladimir Matskevich
the constant methodological seminar10  functions. In the frameworks
of this seminar the idea of cultural policy and strategic game on uni
versity problems are developed, the club “Belarusian Philosophical
Space” (Paval Barkouski, etc.) works11. The process of creation of
Universities of the Third Age, in particular on the basis of the non
governmental organization “Third Sector” (Hrodna)12  or the Social
Service Territorial Centre of Lenin city district (Brest) is developed.
Scales of student’s and academic exchanges and study placements
broaden13.
From time to time the education questions are discussed in the
context of economic problems and labor market development.
International experts (the European Education Foundation, the World
Bank), Belarusian business structures (Institute of Privatization and
Management, the consulting company Zdes i seichas (‘Here and
Now’) etc.), analytical centers (Humanitarian Technologies Agency,
Center of European Transformation, BISS, “Strategy”, Mises Center
etc.) take part in this discussion. International programs such as
9 See: http://www.zautra.by/art.php?sn_nid=5756&sn_cat=19; http://
belapan.com/archive/2010/02/08/eu_eu1928/; http://www.aif.by/ru/arti
cles/social/item/12677evropa.html?tmpl=component&print=1.
10 See: http://methodology.by.
11 http://www.prastora.org/
12 http://uzvhrodna.blogspot.com/
13 See: http://adukacyja.info/news.
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Erasmus Mundus, TEMPUS continue to work in Belarus but the scale
of their activity does not increase.
After the events of December 19th, the Kalinouski Scholarship
Program (“Salidarnasc” Center) received a new impulse and became
very topical. Human rights organizations (the Center for Legal
Technologies, Viasna396) and independent associations of journalists
(BAJ) continue their minieducational programs.
With all diversity of processes, in general it is possible to say that
the activity of the third sector in the sphere of education has a chaotic
and reactive character. Independent educational structures lack a
unified strategy and the program of education development in spite
of the fact that the sufficient intellectual resource is concentrated in
this sector. The factor of help and support from the international funds
plays a huge role in adjustment and work coordination in non
governmental sector of education. However in relation to Belarus
activity of these foundations should be reformatted and rethought
taking into consideration the specificity of the situation in the country.
Conclusions and forecast
Belarusian education will continue to evolve according to variable
demographic, technological and social factors. External political and
economic processes will periodically “stir up” the education system.
Probably, it will lead to some revision of the basic ideological and con
ceptual grounds, however not to their essential change or to a start of
a new round of education reforming.
The Education Code accepted in December 2010 will cause some
confusion among the structures of postsecondary education as of
September 1st, 2011 they will have to function according to the new rules.
It is possible to predict with confidence the tightening of
administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms of management at all
levels, which sooner or later will balance and stabilizes the system,
will bring the real practice of education into accord with public and
private norms.
Entrance into the Bologna process will not essentially change the
quality and structure of the education system, but it will substantially
shake up the activity of administrative structures. Most likely, the
education system management will suggest various plans and
programs on modernization of higher and vocational education,
motivated rather on the level of additional financing than on the level
of content.
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Nongovernmental subjects in the system of the Belarusian
education, academic community, noncommercial and business
organization can be competitive with the state only under the
condition of the common strategy, the concept of development and
joint actions on consolidation. Otherwise, the further state
monopolization of the educational sphere and stagnation of the system
on the whole will prevail.
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SCIENCE: NEW GOALS INDICATE DECLINE
   Alexandr Gritsanov
Summary
Throughout 2010 the country’s leadership, as well as heads of research
institutions answerable both to the Academy of Sciences and to sector
ministries, were working towards narrowing the traditional range of goals for
Belarusian science. The first signs that budgetary financing is being reduced
appeared in 2010 and have turned more apparent since early 2011; therefore,
the officials responsible for “national science and scientific services” kept
“specifying” the list of promising research areas and “tailoring” the amount of
financing for science.
Relatively long8term research projects were practically excluded from planning
and denied financial support. Only short8term projects with guaranteed quick
profits could be developed. As a result, researchers focused on trivial topics
and applied and technological developments. Generally, the structure and
productivity of scientific research in the Republic of Belarus tend to stay at the
level of second8rate industrial corporations.
Tendencies:
• The already scanty allocation for budget8supported science is gradually
decreasing;
• Reduced financing can cause a kind of debureaucratization, provided that
newly appointed executives have to go through less formalities;
• The staff of research institutions (academic, in the first place) is to be reduced;
so far they have been functioning as “social security agencies” for nominally
highly qualified pre8retirement scientific personnel;
• Budgetary financing for academic science is being radically reduced, hence,
running costs of certain research institutions could be optimized or even
reduced.
New goals
On 22 July, 2010 President Lukashenko signed decree № 378 that
defines priority areas for scientific and technical development in Be
larus in 2011–2015. Financial and human resources are to be con
centrated in the following research areas:
• Energy and energy saving;
• Agroindustrial technologies and production;
• Industrial and constructional technologies and production;
• Medical science, medical equipment and technology, pharmacy;
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• Chemical, nano and biotechnologies;
• Information and communication, aero and space technology;
• New materials;
• Rational nature management, resource saving and emergency
protection;
• Defense and national security.
Most of these areas are lifesupporting and contribute to a better
standard and quality of living and national security. The aim of this
decision is to steer science and technology towards implementing
projects that will create new economic branches producing high value
added, low energy and resourceintensive products. These measures
are to strengthen the national economy and improve the wellbeing
of people1, according to officials. At the same time, fundamental
research, as well as longterm developments that could be of interest
for the militaryindustrial establishment, are gradually leaving the
proscenium of Belarusian science. The “military science” institutions
in Russia are on the decline and this tendency affects analogous
Belarusian institutions.
In August 2010, amendments to the law On scientific and technical
policy took effect. They provide mechanisms for establishing regional
techno parks financed from the national budget under the section
“science”. Even the presidential administrationprinted media SB –
Belarus Segodnya (SB – Belarus Today) “will not dare to predict that
techno parks will generate a stream of effective projects as the process
requires an effective legal basis, which is only under construction”.
As a result, of all techno parks established in all regions of Belarus,
only the Technological Park Mogilev (Mahiliou) is functioning to its
full capacity and status, with the Scientific and Technological Park of
the BNTU METOLIT close by, reads the newspaper.2 On 11 August,
2010 the newspaper informed that Valery Tsepkalo, director of the
Administration of the Park of High Technology (PHT), reported to
President Lukashenko about the PHT’s progress in the first half of
2010. He assured that from January to February the volume of software
production grew by 140% compared to the same period of 2009.3
Tsepkalo pointed out that the main goal for the PHT is training
1 Presidential Press Service releases // SB – Belarus Segodnya (SB – Belarus
Today). 2010. 27 July.
2 Dralyuk V. List ozhidaniya dlia knowhow (Waiting list for knowhow) //
SB – Belarus Segodnya. 2010. 29 May.
3 In 2009 the Park of High Technology innovative technologies sales reached
USD 130 mln (obligations being as high as USD 200 mln).
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professionals, both at existing universities and at educational
establishments to be founded in future. President Lukashenko was
also informed about details of the PHT construction. Director Tsepkalo
underlined that PHT residents have accumulated enough finances to
be able to invest them into construction of manufacturing and
educational buildings. The PHT is to be put into operation by 2014.4
All in all, according to A. Lukashenko, Belarusian “science should be
selfsupporting and make money”5. This means that in the future
fundamental research will be abandoned. This decision is undoubtedly
disputable. However, it signals that the organizational structure of
Belarusian science as a heritage of the Soviet model cannot be
preserved any more.
Problems
Administrative controls in the applied sciences and
innovation will be given more power
During the discussion about the PHT, Lukashenko demanded that
construction works in Minsk be finished by 2014. In reality, over the
past 5 years, i.e. since the Park was established, only 1 building has
been overhauled on its territory, consuming the total of BYR 3.8 bil
lion from the national budget and BYR 50.5 billion of investments.
President Lukashenko promised to exercise personal control over this
project for the period of 2011–2016.
The results of the State program for innovative development in
2007–2010 (SPID) highlight the disturbing tendencies in the
Belarusian “hightech” economy. Just as in Soviet times, admini
strative methods take the lead in its implementation, i.e. scientific and
technological advances are “imposed” on the industry, which is
resistant to innovation.
According to the Council of Ministers resolution No. 1713 as of
November 23, 20106, executives guilty of failing to implement
innovative programs will be punished. The appendices to this
document comprise several lists. Appendix 1 enumerates innovative
projects in which the facilities have not been commissioned or the
production has not been mastered by the target date. Appendices 2
and 3 present lists of innovative projects where (2) the estimated
4 See: SB – Belarus Segodnya. 11 August, 2010.
5 See: SB – Belarus Segodnya. 31 December, 2010.
6 See: http://www.pravo.by/pdf/2010288/2010288(040058).pdf.
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capacity has not been achieved and (3) working stages have been
behind schedule.
According to the State Committee on Science and Technology
(SCST), as of October 1, 2010 in 28 innovative projects commissioning
the facilities or mastering the production are behind schedule. For
example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food is in charge of 7 projects
from this list, Bellesbumprom Concern (forestry and mills) – of 5,
Minsk regional executive committee – of 4, Ministry of Industry,
Bellegprom Concern (light industry) and Vitebsk regional executive
committee – of 2 projects each, Ministry of Trade, Belbiopharm
Concern (pharmacy), Belneftechim Concern (oil and chemistry) and
Gomiel regional executive committee – of 1 project each.
In 9 innovative projects the estimated capacity has not been
achieved: 2 each in those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food,
Bellegprom, and Vitebsk regional executive committee; 1 each in the
Ministry of Architecture and Construction, Belbiopharm, and Mogilev
regional executive committee. Working stages were behind schedule
in 40 innovative projects.
The Council of Ministers resolution orders the state organs’
executives to take personal responsibility for commissioning the
facilities and mastering the production, reaching the estimated
capacity and completing the working stages of the innovative projects.
These actions should meet the deadlines determined by the plans of
innovative development in branches and regions.
Besides, the resolution has provisions that heads of statelevel public
administration organs, Academy of Sciences, regional executive
committees and Minsk city executive committee, the Administration
of the Park of High Technology as clients of state programs are
authorized to bring disciplinary proceedings against public officers. The
penalty range is wide – up to termination of the employment contract
for failing to ensure that the facilities are commissioned by the target
date. The resolution foresees a penalty if there is an ungrounded refusal
to implement innovative projects in the State program.
True demands of the “sci3tech sector”
of Belarusian industry
According to experts, the implementation itself of the Program of in3
novative development will demand until 2015 USD 32 billion7, with
7 Website Belorusski partisan. 1 February, 2011.
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half of the amount to be foreign investments, reported Mr. Voytov,
chairperson of the State Committee on Science and Technology
(SCST), at the meeting of the Presidium of the Council of the Repub
lic, 1 February, 2011. The SCST initiates an innovation and invest
ment bank and a national technological development fund to be es
tablished with the purpose of backing small and medium businesses
(SMBs).
In 2011, science is to be financed from the state budget by 30%
more compared to 20108, says Pyotr Vityaz, first deputy chairperson
of the Presidium of the National Academy of Science (NAS) of Belarus.
“These allocations are insufficient; we are aware of this fact and admit
it. However, we agreed on this amount with the head of the NAS so
that next year science does not lose more. We are positive about that,”9
said Minister of Finance Kharkoviets.
Commenting the law on the budget for 2011, Mr. Vityaz pointed
out that relief from the income tax and taxes on manufacturers are
not enough to boost innovative scientific research. Therefore, the
Belarusian Academy of Sciences is interested in raising the issue of
tax relief for nonbudget investments into science, reports BelTA. Mr.
Vityaz underlined that at present scientific institutions have to reach
a serious goal of drawing all the finances allocated for science
development in 2010, though there are certain difficulties in the aspect
of upgrading the material and technical basis10.
Belarus: typical deadlocks of modernization
and innovative economy11
In 2006, Belarus witnessed a pompous presentation of a 5year State
program of technical infrastructure development. The announced goal
was to supply the national banking system with domestically manu
factured bank cards. The initial goal was to increase the ratio of non
cash transactions with retail payments up to 30%, while the hightech
nology enterprises of the Ministry of Industry were to have manufac
tured 3.4 million bank cards.
What is the result? The amount of noncash payments has hardly
gone beyond 13%. As for bank cards, there have been produced
8 I. e. the allocations of BYR 500 billion are to be increased up to BYR 650 bil
lion, or USD 200–215 million (according to BelTA).
9 According to BelTA.
10 Website Belorusski partisan. 26 October, 2010.
11 See: SB – Belarus Segodnya. 11 January, 2011.
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slightly over 400,000: only 5% of the 9 million bank cards that
Belarusian banks have issued, are domestically produced. Meanwhile,
one of the project contractors, Integral JSC (the second being OJSC
CNIITU), did not participate in the program. CNIITU’s production
capacity is 1 million cards of an acceptable quality a year. However,
the enterprise was too late and slightly unprofessional to join the
marketplace.
Russian and Ukrainian card manufacturers’ capacities are 10
million cards a year, with manufacture costs known to be lower than
Belarusian ones. Besides, the biggest international payments
technology company Visa (est. 1972, USA) holds more than 50% of
the world card marketplace; with Master Card, its AmericanEuropean
competitor, holding other 30%. None of the potential Belarusian bank
card manufacturers holds a certificate of conformity to international
payment systems. The entrance fee is just a few thousand dollars (plus
USD 60,000 to be paid annually). No state enterprise will risk this,
though comparatively trifling, amount of money.
In 2010, Integral JSC started producing bank cards of a good
quality. However, the Belarusian card always “loses” in tenders, as it
is 10% more expensive than the Russian one. Even heads of nominal
flagships of the “innovation sector” in Belarusian economy are helpless
to break through the wall of the stiff administration system.
Conclusion
In the nearest future, we are to expect lively debates between the bu
reaucratic establishment and the experts about the possibility to inte
grate scientific institutions into industrial concerns and major manu
facturers. Supposedly, this procedure is “to harmonize science and
practice” and “to raise innovation and export potential” of enterpris
es. These debates are sure to end with decisions that meet official ex
pectations and secure “survival” for enterprises, with no room for any
longterm, or even midterm, projects.
The next 5year plan will end in drastic change and decline of the
system of scientific establishments of the 2010 pattern.
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SPORTS: OLYMPIC UPS AND DOPING DOWNS
Boris Tasman
Summary
In 2010, Belarusian sports inched away from the cliff it nearly fell into in 2009.
At the Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Belarusian athletes delivered the greatest
performance in the short history of the independent nation: they won three
medals, including the first gold one ever. The quantitative indicators at world
championships in the Olympic disciplines improved (16 medals against 12),
while the “quality” was not that high: only two sportsmen joined the ranks of
champions. Among the winter sports, freestyle skiing and biathlon have held
much promise so far; among the summer sports, rowing and canoeing proved
most successful for Belarus.
Track and field athletics and swimming saw no progress. All most promising
rowing crews have fallen apart. The men’s tennis team dropped out of the
second division of the Davis Cup. Freestyle wrestlers and judoists made a step
back too. Still, the team sports made considerable progress, and the women’s
basketball team was among the top four at the past World Championship. The
past season was a great success for Belarusian football.
Many medal winners are approaching the age critical for sportsmen: all three
Belarusian champions have are thirty or over. Belarusian sports were marred
by high8profile doping scandals at the world and European track and field and
weightlifting championships once again. The Court of Arbitration for Sport
however returned the Beijing medals to hammer throwers Vadim Devyatovsky
and Ivan Tsikhan.
Tendencies:
• Progress at the Olympic Winter Games;
• Achievements quality degradation;
• Critical ageing of Belarusian sports stars;
• Rise of Belarusian football;
• Widespread doping use;
• Aggravating criminalization of Belarusian sports.
Vancouver achievements
The 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver were the fifth games in
the history of independent Belarus and the most successful regarding
the results achieved. Two medals came from Lillehammer in 1994 and
two were taken in Nagano in 1998. The Olympics in Salt Lake City in
2002 and Turin in 2006 resulted in one medal each. Vancouver was
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generous with three medals at once: Alexey Grishin fought his way to
Olympic gold in freestyle skiing (men’s aerials), Sergey Novikov and
Darya Domracheva took silver and bronze in biathlon respectively.
Belarus at Olympic Winter Games
There are three medal places and a gold medal for the first time.
Is this success logical or incidental? Freestylers had not come home
without medals since 1998. Although only two of them – Alexey
Grishin (bronze and gold medals) and Dmitry Dashchinsky (bronze
and silver medals) – turned up at the podium, the Belarusian aerial
skiing school should be prized for nurturing their achievements. As a
matter of fact, five out of six Belarusian freestylers competing in
Vancouver reached the finals. However, Dashchinsky, Timofey Slivets,
and Alla Tsuper stayed behind the top eight in qualification, while
Assol Slivets was the fourth best. So, the accomplishment was quite
logical.
Biathlete Darya Domracheva was one of the favorites for Olympic
medals, therefore her winning a bronze medal was not unexpected.
Her 6th and 8th places in other races just confirm her capabilities. At
the same time, Sergey Novikov’s silver medal was more like a smile of
fortune. His entering the top ten in separate disciplines of the World
Cup season used to be regarded as an excellent result. No one
expected a medal in the men’s biathlon, though. But the national team
coaches did a great job when scheduled training thoughtfully to let
the athletes get in optimal shape. Lyudmila Kalinchik and Nadezhda
Skardino paraded their skills alongside Novikov performing at their
best in their entire careers. There is a common opinion that they should
thank German expert Klaus Siebert, who has been working with the
Belarusian team for a few years now.
The athletes competing in other sports, such as skiing, skating,
and short track, shot blank rounds again. Two ski mountaineers trained
in Russia for the Belarusian team were quite predictably too far from
the top.
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It would be natural to expect an advance in speed skating after an
open skating rink was constructed in Minsk. Also, Belarus had tasted
success in this sport before: Igor Zhelezovsky took silver at the 1994
Games and Andzelika Kotyuga was 5th in 2002. But Belarus preferred
pushing ski mountaineering, having no natural conditions, a proper
infrastructure, or sufficient experts.
Ice hockey abundantly provided with invested money did not show
any favorable results yet. Both the national team and the league have
made no headway so far. The national team did not manage to make
it through to the quarterfinals either in Vancouver, or at the World
Championship in Germany. The youth and junior national teams
stagger behind in the top division slipping down to Division One every
now and then.
Gross figures and stock list
In Soviet times, targets with respect to two basic parameters were
imposed on companies: gross earnings and the line of goods. If the
gross earnings target was not hit, an enterprise saw no bonuses. But if
the stocks were filled up with goods of each particular type as planned,
the bonus money was good. It did not happen too often, though.
As to the total number of medals won during world
championships in the Olympic disciplines, Belarus took 16 medals
in 2010 against 12 in 2009, or even 19 against 12 if Olympic prizes
are considered. The progress is obvious. However, it would be more
accurate to compare the results of 2010 not with 2009, but with 2006.
The matter is that the number of largescale sport events is different
in oddnumbered and evennumbered years. For instance, rowers,
wrestlers, and weightlifters compete every year, shooters and boxers
compete once in two years, while track and field athletes have
another schedule: Olympic Games and summer world champion
ships (47 sets of medals each) in evennumbered years, and indoor
world championships (26 sets) in oddnumbered years. There
fore, the years 2006 and 2010 are comparable regarding achieve
ments.
World championships
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In total, the year 2010 yielded just one medal less than 2006, but
the regress is considerable when it comes to gold medals: six gold
medals were won in 2006, while on only two athletes – shooter Sergey
Martynov and shotputter Nadezhda Ostapchuk – were above all on
the winners’ podium four years later. The qualitative regress is as clear
as the quantitative progress.
Ageing stars
The quality degradation is not incidental. It is caused by ageing of
Belarusian sports stars and poor efforts towards replacement with
younger athletes.
Olympic Champion Grishin and World Champion Ostapchuk are
over 30 years of age. Martynov has attained 40. Yekaterina Karsten,
38, is the only medal winner in boat racing. Dmitry Kasperovich, 33, is
the only prizewinner among gymnasts. Andrey Mikhnevich,
renowned shotputter, who comes up to the podium quite regularly,
is 34; pistol shooter Victoria Chaika is 30; legendary rowers Roman
Petrushenko, Vadim Makhnev, and Alexey Abalmasov are 30 to 31;
European Champion in GrecoRoman wrestling Alexander Kikinev
is 31; European Champion in table tennis Viktoria Pavlovich and her
sister Veronica are 32.
Hammer throwers Vadim Devyatovsky and Ivan Tsikhan, who
took the medals won at the Beijing Olympics back from the
International Olympic Committee, are 33 and 34 respectively. In the
men’s table tennis team, which took silver at the European
Championship, three out four players are over 34: Vladimir
Samsonov attained 34 in 2010, Vitaly Nekhvedovich is 35, Yevgeny
Shchetinin is 40. They will be two years older by the time of the
London Olympics.
The situation is critical. It is not that the Ministry of Sports is
unaware of this. It is the bureaucratic habitual practice to report on
the “here and now” that takes its toll. Therefore, the money is invested
not in the reserve, but in those who can get a medal today, at least a
bronze one.
And those who can replace the oldtimers are quite few. They are
rowers Denis Garazha, 22, and Oleg Yurenya, 20; rhythmic gymnast
Melitina Stanyuta, 17; weight lifters Sergey Lagun, 23, and Andrey
Aryamnov, 22; track and field athlete Andrey Kravchenko, 24; wrestler
Timofey Deynichenko, 24… Who will qualify for the 2011 Olympics
and win Olympic medals in 2012?
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Instant results or chronic disease of Belarusian sports
The Olympic meeting held on April 9, 2010 was dedicated to buildup
of replacements of today’s Olympic participants. Unfortunately, it was
quite ineffective. The decision was made to elaborate a concept of
training young athletes. Almost a year has passed but things have not
budged an inch.
In 2010, Singapore hosted the first Youth Olympic Games, a rather
harmful tournament, which stimulates boosted training of sportsmen
of 16 to 17 years of age. First Vice President of the National Olympic
Committee Igor Zaychkov said that the sports authorities did not set
any medal targets. It turned out otherwise: targets were specified
anyway and medals were counted thoroughly. Nonachievers were
peppered for the failure to produce the results the sports functionaries
looked forward to, while those who distinguished themselves were
awarded and panegyrized.
It is generally admitted that only few junior champions keep
leading positions in adult league sports. Rushing juniors off their feet,
sometimes with the use of pharmacological boosters, alongside
practice loads inappropriate for the age, only yields shortterm effects.
Such intervention quickly results in traumas, diseases, nervous break
downs, loss of interest in sports, and, as a rule, poorer results or
stagnation remote from international standards. This is a chronic
disease of Belarusian sports.
In order to remedy the situation, there should be no financial
stimulation of sportsmen and coaches for successes in the under17
and under19 sports. Most sports officials (as well as coaches) do not
care much about the sportsmen’s future. They try hard to sponge the
youngsters of everything they are capable of.
The story of Baranovichborn track and field athlete Yekaterina
Artyukh is a prime example. In 2009, the 17yearold girl won a
medal at the European Junior Championship. In February 2010,
she won the Junior Championship of Belarus in hurdle race.
However, her doping test run by the National AntiDoping Agency
(NADA) came back positive and Yekaterina was disqualified for
three months. The Belarusian Track and Field Athletics Federation
and NADA kept the public and international organizations – the
World AntiDoping Agency (WADA) and International Amateur
Athletic Federation (IAAF) – in the dark, although the Belarusian
sports authorities were supposed to inform them in line with the
World AntiDoping Code.
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Artyukh entered competitions as early as May. She did not
undergo doping tests until the departure for the World Junior
Championship in Canada in July. The predeparture test result was
negative. In Canada, Yekaterina made it through to the finals and won
the gold medal in a 400 m hurdles race leaving the others far behind.
It became known two weeks later that the doping test of the 18year
old Belarusian was positive. The world champion was stripped of her
title and she was disqualified for two years.
Neither her personal coach Konstantin Tverdokhleb, nor head
coach of the reserve Yury Moyseyevich, nor the team doctor, nor the
Belarusian Athletics Federation chiefs suffered any consequences. On
the contrary, Moyseyevich was soon promoted to vice director of the
Republican Center for Olympic Athletics Training. The Artyukh case
is not an exception, but a regular practice.
Doping controversies
Six Belarusian sportsmen (track and field athletes and weightlifters)
were disqualified or suspended in 2010. Five out of six violations were
revealed at world and continental championships. Above is Artyukh’s
story. An even more sensational scandal erupted few months after the
end of the April European Weightlifting Championship in Minsk. Gold
medal winner Andrey Aryamnov and bronze medal winners Shems
hat Tulyaev and Nikolay Chernyak were reported to have been test
ed positive for banned drugs.
A synthetic androgen, Proviron, was found in Chernyak’s test.
Clenbuterol was found in Tulyaev’s test. Both are looking at fouryear
disqualification. Aryamnov is suspected of smoking “spice”, which
contains marihuana. He is suspended for six months. It is notable that
none of the three have been officially punished by the International
Weightlifting Federation (IWF), although they had to miss the
September World Championship.
Seventeenyearold weightlifter Vladimir Yakuta won the
European Cadet Championship. The doping control authorities
detected the anabolic steroid called Metandrostenolon in his test.
The sportsman faces the threat of fouryear disqualification. So,
Belarus had to give back five medals in one year that had never
happened before. NADA caught six more violators. All of them
were young sportsmen. The habitual use of doping for spurring
young sportsmen is one of the major problems of Belarusian
sports.
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In this context, the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport
in Lausanne to give Olympic medals back to Belarusian hammer
throwers – silver to Vadim Devyatovsky and bronze to Ivan
Tsikhan – is somewhat a consolation. The Court recognized that the
Beijing laboratory did not fully observe the established procedure
when handling the samples, therefore the International Olympic
Committee’s resolution on disqualification of the Belarusians was
revoked.
Symptoms of degradation
Some other facts show that the climate in Belarusian sports is far from
being favorable. For example, 11 out of 18 rowers left the national
women’s boat racing team. Winners of the silver medals of the 2009
European Championship in women’s eights Nina Bondareva, Natalia
Gavrilenko, Zinaida Klyuchinskaya, Natalia Koshel, Olga Plashko
va, and Olga ShcherbachenyaZhilskaya refused to work under head
coach Vladimir Sinelshchikov. Another three, Nadezhda Belskaya,
Natalia Privalova, and Marina Maslova, are done with sports seeing
no future in their rowing careers. And they all are medal winners. The
discontent was caused by the disappointing results against the back
ground of excessive physical loads and the lack of confidence in
Sinelshchikov. Two men’s rowing fours known for their achievements
fell apart too.
The men’s tennis team dropped out of the second division of the
Davis Cup after losing to Italy and the Netherlands. The drubbing
taken from the Italians (05) was even more painful considering the
conflict between captain and head coach of the national team Vladimir
Volchkov and team leader Vladimir Ignatik, which occurred right on
the tennis court.
Head coach of the national track cycling team Stanislav Solovyov
was found having improperly used budgetary funds to the amount
of over 50 million Belarusian rubles, which he has to pay back now.
Last August, after all doping troubles, the road police detained
Olympic champion Andrey Aryamnov for drunk driving for the third
time in one year and a half. He paid a 10.5 million fine and settled
the question.
The National Track and Field Athletics Championship in Grodno
saw ugly manipulations in several disciplines. Specifically, according
to eyewitnesses, judges added one centimeter to a triple jump of one
of the sportsmen, who beat the favorite in this way. The protest that
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followed was simply shelved. The matter is that the jump length was
measured in favor of the trainee of the national team’s head coach.
The wind speed of 1.7 meters per second was entered in the record
during the women’s 100 meters race. The actual wind speed was no
less than 4.0 meters per second. Yelena Nevmerzhitskaya led the
European standings with 11.05 seconds, and then failed to qualify for
the second round with an embarrassing 11.63 seconds at the European
Championship one month later.
Following BATE
Football lives its own life not connected with other sports in any way.
Perhaps that is why Belarusian football players reached an alltime
high. The national team started the qualifying competition for UEFA
Euro 2012 nicely and beat the French and Albanians onenil and two
nil respectively and managed draws against Romania and Luxem
bourg. Belarus finished the year second in Group D below France.
The under23 football team crushed the Italians and qualified
for the continental championship finals. The reigning champion of
the Belarusian Premier League, FC BATE Borisov, reached the play
offs stage in the UEFA Europa League for the first time. Dnepr
Mogilyov, Dynamo Minsk, and Torpedo Zhodino did a good job too.
It looks like the reform of the national championship – particularly
the reduction in the number of clubs down to twelve – was
successful.
The women’s national basketball team has been doing well
representing the country at toplevel tournaments for the fourth season
in a row. Playing at the World Championship for the first time the
girls reached the semifinals. Back home, they addressed the Belarusian
Basketball Federation Executive Committee with an open letter
demanding to arrange a decent training camp “for highgrade
practicing.” “In our opinion, normal training conditions mean suitable
locker rooms, a massage room, a team’s physician’s office, a coach
room, and a properly equipped workout room. Over the past years,
the national team has not been given even a remotely suitable sports
center for permanent and longterm use… The outfit quality gives rise
to unfavorable criticism. Therefore, it makes sense to think over the
improvement options,” reads the letter.1
1 See Charter’97 // http://www.charter97.org/ru/news/2010/10/22/33170/
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Conclusion
The success at the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver was
due to two small groups of professionals, but it does not attest to the
overall progress of Belarusian sports in any way. Neither biathlon, nor
freestyle are very popular sports. And in the popular sports like ski
ing, speed skating, or hockey progress plateaued long ago.
The 15thousand crowds at hockey matches in Minsk Arena
attracted by Dynamo Minsk – Belarus’ representative in the
Kontinental Hockey League, KHL (this is the official spelling) – is
probably the only gratifying thing about ice hockey. The medal
advance in summer sports can hardly be explained by the personnel
reshuffle in the ministerial offices. Besides, it is highly unlikely that it
will last long.
The longplaying leaders of Belarusian sports have reached a
critical age. There is no fully prepared reserve and no one seems to be
eager to take pains to cultivate young leaders. The large scale doping
of potential Olympians is really alarming. Weak and poorly financed
NADA is obviously outnumbered in the antidoping fight.
The total dependence of sports on the national budget is one more
acute problem. Sports provisions are gradually tightening up while
sports functionaries are working up their appetite.
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PUBLIC OPINION: YEARLY DYNAMICS
AND CERTAIN RESULTS
Nadezhda Yefimova,
NOVAK Axiometrical Research Laboratory
Summary
The economic self8perception of the population at the beginning of 2010 was
similar to that of late 2009: thoughts about the crisis and anxiety about the
nearest future were dominating. However, by the mid8year evaluation of the
economic situation became more optimistic. During the year the total amount
of monetary income of the population was growing but this growth was leveled
off by rising prices for foodstuffs and goods.
The Belarusians traditionally put their trust in the Orthodox Church and the
army. Governmental institutions still enjoy high confidence but the fact of
growing mistrust should be pointed out. The ratio of trust/mistrust in state8
owned mass media, local authorities, and traditional trade unions is nearly
fifty8fifty. Such institutions as the OSCE or the NATO arouse a negative
attitude.
The geopolitical choice of Belarusians was changing together with the change
of “moods” in Russia8Belarus relations, especially among ardent supporters
of the “union with Russia”. As a result, the number of EU supporters or people
skeptical about any kind of union is growing.
Tendencies:
• During 2010 the rate of suspense dropped and optimistic views on the
economic situation increased;
• The loans taken by the Belarusian authorities that are extending the foreign
debt find ambivalent support among the public;
• During the year the total amount of monetary income only marginally
outstripped the growth of prices for foodstuffs and products, which remained
the key problem for the majority of Belarusian citizens;
• The percentage of people “hesitant” about Belarus’ geopolitical choice has
grown;
• The commitment to “European values” has been revealed in Belarusian
society, which ensures that throughout many years there has been a stable
amount of respondents supporting accession to the EU.
Economic self.perception of people
In terms of economic selfperception of the population, the begin
ning of 2010 was similar to that of late 2009. Thoughts about the crisis
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and anxiety about the nearest future were dominant. Taking part in a
sociological survey, more than 80% of respondents answered affirma
tively to the question “Is there an economic crisis in Belarus at the
moment?” 40% of them mentioned a significant income decrease due
to the crisis. The respondents saw the future even gloomier than the
present: Februaryearly March survey showed that 65% of respondents
expected to reduce consumption, 53% expected income decrease, 28%
expressed concern about losing their job.
The actions taken by the authorities that could actually improve
the situation in the shortterm perspective found support among 50%
of the population. For example, the question on foreign loans, which
in 2010, by estimates of experts, have increased the external public
debt of Belarus by more than 22%, has split public opinion: 40 % of the
adult population questioned by sociologists, supports borrowing
money by the state, whereas 38 % (practically just as much) are against
it (22% of respondents could not give a definite answer). The main
arguments of those who see a life buoy in external credits and supports
state actions in this direction, are the following: “This is a measure
without which we would not have survived during the crisis” (43%);
“The loans will help to avoid unemployment and bankruptcy of
enterprises during the crisis” (34%). Opponents of the public debt
increase put forward their arguments: “People will have to pay off the
national debt” (48%); “Belarus will become dependent on foreign
creditors” (29%); “We should use internal resources, rather than count
on foreign help” (27%).
However, by midyear, talks about the crisis ceased and public
opinion began turning more optimistic about the economic situation,
which was especially noticeable during the last months of the year
(Tables 1 and 2).
The data in the tables show that the public considered their
economic position in the first half of 2010 more negative than that in
the second half, both statically (the situation at the given moment)
and dynamically (changes over the period). For example, in December
2010 twice as many respondents defined the economic position of their
household as “good” and “very good” compared with January the
same year. The number of those who assessed their position as “bad”
and “very bad” reduced by 1.4 times. On average, by the end of the
year the percentage of respondents that saw positive dynamics in their
economic position tripled.
These subjective evaluations reflect the official statistics: in
2010 the total amount of monetary income grew by 24.2%
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compared to 2009. The real income (with account of the consumer
price index) grew by 15.2%. In December 2010, the real income
grew by 10.6% whereas in November it increased by 6.7% and in
October – by 0.7%.1 The evaluations might have been higher but
income rise was “eaten” by growing prices. Throughout 2010,
rising prices remained the problem that public opinion kept
mentioning and calling the sharpest for all groups of population.
By the midyear, the top10 of the most acute problems looked
the following (Table 3).
Table 3. Top.10 of problems in 2010 (public opinion)
As seen above, high and constantly growing prices by far outstrip
other problems, taking the first position. This is the only problem
mentioned by more than half of respondents.
Therefore, income rise and growing prices were the coordinates
for economic selfawareness of people in 2010. Expert Leonid
Zlotnikov said that “salaries did grow last year, but it strained the
economy. Wages outstripped the growth of productivity and GDP.
The prices simply had to grow after this. If the amount of produce
grew in the second half of the year by, say, 5% and the wages grew by
35% it means that the income of the population outstripped the growth
of the pie that we are eating together”2.
1 See: http// www.bel.biz/news/38039/html.
2 http// www.bel.biz/news/38039/html.
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People’s confidence in government and public institutions
and organizations
Table 4 below shows the level of people’s confidence in government
and public institutions and organizations in early 2010.
Table 4. Answers to the question: “What is the degree of your trust in
government and public institutions and organizations?”(%)
Top10 in the ranking of trust is headed by the Orthodox Church
and the army, whose authority with the public is traditional: the vast
majority of the population trusts them automatically, without
considering this issue, whereas the percentage of mistrustful or
doubtful about them is small. But from the third position of the ranking
the picture turns totally different. The index of trust remains high
Society
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(though not that high as in previous two) – over 50%, but the
percentage of mistrustful respondents grows sharply. More than a
quarter of adult population mistrust the National Bank, the President
and the Government. More than a third mistrust the judicial system
and the police; more than 40% mistrust the stateowned media.
The proportion of respondents trusting the institutions in the
second ten of the ranking is lower than 50% but higher than 33%. At
the same time, the level of mistrust remains high. Generally, the
position of these institutions concerning the ratio of trust and mistrust
is much worse than that of the institutions from the first ten. For
example, 48.9% of respondents trust local authorities but 40.0% –
mistrust them; 40.5% of respondents trust statecontrolled trade unions
but 38.7% – do not; the Council of Europe enjoys confidence of 34.1%
of respondents, 31.3% of people mistrust it. Public opinion is balanced
in the trust/mistrust aspect in all the above mentioned positions.
Starting from privatelyowned media the balance shifts towards
mistrust: respondents’ trust in independent media, the OSCE,
independent trade unions, the Protestant Church, the NATO is lower
than mistrust. At the same time, the proportion of respondents with
no definite opinion about many institutions increases. It refers even
to the UN. Nevertheless, the evaluation stereotype is triggered here:
despite lack of awareness, there are organizations towards which
public opinion has adopted a steadily positive attitude (the CIS, the
UN, the World Bank, the Council of Europe) and organizations with a
stable negative reputation (the OSCE, the NATO).
Among public organizations, the Union of Entrepreneurs enjoys
the highest degree of trust. Statecontrolled trade unions have a
balanced trust/mistrust position in public opinion. People do not trust
independent trade unions rather than trust them, but 37.6% of
respondents know nothing about them and, hence, do not have a fixed
opinion.
The level of trust in all the media is low (though we should note
that, as you know, state and independent media are put into different
conditions in terms of accessibility for the audience and positioning).
Stateowned media have earned their trust (51.5%) and mistrust (41.6%)
in total accessibility and intrusive advertising. Nonstate media have
earned their trust (33.5%) and mistrust (44.6%) in limited accessibility
and counteradvertising. So, the difference in trust level is not that
big.
As for the influence of gender on the degree of trust, women are
more inclined to express confidence in government institutions than
209
men are. Men express mistrust more often. The situation with non
state and international organizations is quite the opposite: men trust
them more than women do, whereas women are more likely to express
mistrust or find it difficult to give any answer at all.
The influence of age on the degree of trust: support of state
authorities increases from younger to older age groups. The situation
with international and independent media is the opposite: young and
middleaged people trust them more whereas support among elderly
people is minimal.
Geopolitical preferences
During 2010, Belarus’ relations with Russia and the EU remained the
focus of public and media attention, as registered by sociologists. For
a number of years NOVAK sociologists have chosen the following
question as the key indicator of geopolitical preferences of Belaru
sians: “What union of states would be preferable for the people of
Belarus: the EU or union with Russia?” The answers to this question
in 2010 are given in the tables below (Tables 5 and 6).
The dynamics of public opinion on the geopolitical choice can be
commented on in the following way. In the first four months of 2010,
more than half of respondents supported union with Russia rather than
that with the EU; nearly 30% of respondents chose integration into
the EU and less than 17% had no fixed opinion about this question.
Starting from May the picture changed, mainly in terms of the opinion
on union with Russia. Right up until November the percentage of
respondents supporting union with Russia declined linearly while the
share of respondents supporting the EU, respectively, increased. At
the very end of the year, the tendency halted and started changing in
the opposite direction.
But the proportion of those who “haven’t decided yet” and thus
“can’t give any definite answer” was increasing even faster than that
of supporters of this or that union. In November, their number totaled
almost one third (!) of all respondents. One more detail: the percentage
of respondents absolutely sure about union with Russia (“No doubt,
with Russia”) had always been by 1.52 times higher than that of those
who are absolutely sure that Belarusians should better live in the EU
(“No doubt, the EU”). But we see that in the midyear (June
November) both indicators became equal.  It means that the
percentage of supporters of union with Russia decreased and they
became less sure about their choice.
Society
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To interpret the abovedescribed dynamics we just need to
“superimpose” survey results on the vicissitudes of foreign policy and
foreign economic relations of Belarus in 2010, about which the media
reported actively. In May, a first conflict happened, when Russia
demanded that Belarus pay its debt for gas: President Medvedev said
that Belarus should pay within a fiveday period. After that, the
notorious media wars Between Russia and Belarus followed. The whole
story ended up with signing documents on establishing the Common
Economic Space (CES) and abolition of export duties on Russian oil
deliveries to Belarus. These events raised doubts among a part of
Belarusians about the advantages of fraternization with Russia, made
them think more favorably about cooperation with the EU or inspired
skepticism about any kind of closer relations at all. But the results
that surveys showed could not have been influenced solely by the
media. There must be some other deeper value grounds of the
geopolitical choice of Belarusians.
Certain results of the survey “Belarus and the world”3 provide
material for verification of this hypothesis. The respondents were
asked to agree or disagree with a number of value judgments, which
was interpreted as acceptance or rejection of values traditionally
defined as “European”. In the sample representing the adult
population of Belarus, a group of respondents was singled out
identifying themselves as “Europeans” and consistent supporters of
closer relations between Belarus and the EU (13% of the sample). This
allowed making some comparison.
The survey results show that 66% of Belarusians think that “the
state should promote international contacts of Belarusian students and
professors”; 61% consider that “the state should provide more freedom
for private entrepreneurs”; 49% share the view that “disagreement with
the state policy and public criticism of the authorities cannot lead to
ban from the profession, occupied position or expulsion from the
educational establishment”. More than 40% agree that “the state
should respect rights and freedoms of the citizens, even if the latter
sometimes abuse them”. Almost 40% agree that “people who come to
Belarus from other countries have a right to promote their own culture
3 The survey “Belarus and the world: geopolitical choice and security through
economics and culture” was conducted in spring 2010 by the NOVAK Axio
metrical Research Laboratory and the Belarusian Institute of Strategic Stud
ies (BISS). The representative sample totals 1071 respondents in all regions
of the country.
Society
212 	



and traditions, different they might be from the Belarusian ones”. In
the group of “Europeans” the level of political tolerance for all these
positions is on average by 15% higher.
At the same time, more than half of respondents (57%) supported
tight state restriction on penetration into the country of nontraditional
religious denominations. 63% of respondents supported the view that
“homosexuality should be prohibited and punished according to the
Criminal Code”. 42% of respondents would consent to introduction of
media censorship if it counteracted spreading extremist ideas. (Among
the “European” group these indexes are by 1015% lower). In general,
the answers are contradictory and do not always correspond with the
European standards of understanding human rights and political
correctness. Nevertheless, we can speak about certain value grounds
for the European choice in the Belarusian society. It shows itself in
acceptance of corresponding values (it is revealing that “Europeans”
show a higher degree of agreement and acceptance).
One of the goals of “Belarus and the world” survey was to find out
the degree to which Belarusians consider themselves Europeans.
Particularly, how close is the Belarusian national character to the
European one. It presupposed comparing stereotypes about the
Belarusians and their mentality with those about the Russians and the
Europeans (Table 7).
These findings show that public opinion is unanimous that national
traits of the Belarusians are hospitality, kindness, and diligence (the
overwhelming majority of respondents pointed them out). The top10
of the Belarusian national character is constituted by modesty,
tolerance, spirituality, thoroughness, inquisitiveness, love of freedom
(independence), and discipline. All qualities that respondents attribute
to the Belarusian national character are positive ones.
Hospitality and kindness bring Belarusians together with Russians
(these qualities have the highest rank value for both nationalities).
But the difference is also visible straight away: Belarusians positioned
laziness second in the Russian national character. Apart from these,
the top10 of Russian national qualities includes: failure to keep
promises, enterprise, and nationalism – qualities not typical of
Belarusians. As for tolerance and discipline, which were called basic
for the Belarusians, they take last positions in the description of the
Russian character (17th and 18th respectively).
Professional qualities in the character of Belarusians are also
important; they are all positive and describe diligence and the quality
of work. Professional qualities of Russians are more negative: place
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#2 is laziness, #6 is failure to keep promises; diligence is only on
position #7. Therefore, high morality (kindness, hospitality,
spirituality) bring Belarusians and Russians together, but Belarusians
excel in diligence and discipline.
Table 7. Answers to the question: “Which traits of the national
character are most typical of (a) the Belarusians; (b) the Russians; (c)
the Europeans?”
From the point of view of Belarusians, the Europeans are thorough,
disciplined, enterprising and diligent (all the traits are professional
ones). Besides love of freedom, inquisitiveness and hospitality, which
bring Belarusians and Europeans together, the top10 of European
qualities is constituted by nationalism and greed, moneygrabbing.
22.9% of respondents consider nationalism a Russian feature as well.
As for greed and moneygrabbing, they are obviously European
qualities (16.4% of respondents attributed them to the Russians, 5.7%
to the Belarusians and 26.3% – to the Europeans).
The Belarusians differ from the Europeans by their moral and
sociopsychological positive features: kindness, unselfishness,
Society
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hospitality, diligence and thoroughness in work. But they lack
enterprise and energy. Belarusian public opinion sees Europeans
mainly as businesspersons. Just like the Belarusians, they are
thorough, obliging and diligent in work. But they are enterprising and
show initiative as well (which Belarusians lack).
So, generally speaking, who is closer to whom and to what extent?
To answer this question an integral index – the index of rank
correlation – was calculated. Its maximal possible value is +1,
minimal possible is –1. The index of closeness of the Belarusian to
the Russian (in terms of the national character) is +0.3, that of the
Belarusian to the European – +0.1. The index of closeness of the
Russian to the European is –0.1. Therefore, whereas the stereotypes
of the Belarusian and Russian national characters are close, the
difference lies in their correlation with the European character: the
Belarusians are to some extent similar and close to them, whereas the
Russian character has absolutely no resemblance with the European
one.
215
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MACROECONOMIC SITUATION:
GROWTH AT ANY COST
Dmitry Kruk
Summary
The year 2010 saw Belarus gradually being pulled out of cyclical recession
owing to the revival of external markets and massive incentives provided by
the economic authorities. However, the administration set itself a priority task
of reaching ambitious GDP and income growth targets while largely ignoring
economic requirements for sustainable and fast8paced long8term economic
development. Moreover, the investment expansion scenario formulated by the
government, which envisaged measures to restrain the accumulation of
structural disproportions, de facto was not implemented, as some of its
prerequisites proved unfeasible.
The outcome was twofold: on the one hand, the campaign to reach quantitative
indicators resulted in quite impressive GDP and income growth figures; on the
other hand, new disproportions in the economy were created, and those already
in existence were enhanced. The problems of the foreign account deficit, external
debt, money market imbalances, inflationary potential, fragile financial standing
of domestic companies had therefore aggravated by early 2011. These problems
put a question mark over both current macroeconomic stability and long8term
sustainable growth.
Tendencies:
• High GDP and income growth in 2010 was artificially propelled by
unprecedented arrangements to stimulate the economy;
• New structural disproportions were accumulated and existing misbalances
were enhanced as a result of the campaign to stimulate the economy;
• In the fiscal sector, the “room for maneuver” almost disappeared, which will
limit possibilities for the use of fiscal instruments to overcome shocks in the
future;
• Stronger imbalances of the current account, widening external deficit, limited
possibilities for improving the financial situation at Belarusian enterprises,
and low level of savings produce a profound negative impact on prospects
of the country’s economic growth.
Introduction
The global recession marked something of a Rubicon for the Belaru
sian authorities, which can be associated with modifications in the
economic expansion model. The chief growth factors Belarus used to
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have in the lead up to the crisis (that is, prior to 2008) were the special
terms of energy trade and preferential access to the Russian commod
ity markets. The aftermath of the crisis resulted in major adjustments
in competition mechanisms on foreign markets, including Russian
commodity outlets, and Belarusian exporters saw their positions de
teriorate. Furthermore, for Belarus the recession period coincided with
a number of unfavorable shocks that appeared to be more political
than economic. Those included changes in the terms of trade in Rus
sian crude oil and substantial increases in Russian natural gas fees.
The active economic policy aimed at surmounting the recession
in 2009 impeded the development of adaptive reactions in the
economy that could have helped the country deal with the accumu
lated disproportions. The foreign trade deficit remains the cornerstone
of these disproportions, leading to stronger/new additional structural
misbalances – a buildup in foreign liabilities, increase in financial
dollarization, etc. The excessive efforts to encourage domestic demand
in 2009 led to new disproportions, including the accumulation of
additional risks in the banking system.
The depletion of old growth factors alongside the accumulation
of new structural misbalances affecting the growth prospects therefore
reduced the potential of the Belarusian economy.
Given those prerequisites, the economy could have done away
with misbalances and got closer to the longterm equilibrium level in
2010 if “natural” economic mechanisms had been employed, the
“natural” scenario envisaging a relatively modest GDP growth, from
1% to 4% yearonyear, based on various methodologies.
The said scenario did not fit in the plans of the economic
authorities, formulated mostly based on political reasons. The forecast
for the election year of 2010 had been presented by the economic
authorities back in December 2009; the country’s top economic
managers were eager to target an 11–13% GDP growth and an
increase in real personal incomes by 14–15% on the year. Therefore,
the economic theme line of the year 2010 was the race for quantitative
economic parameters, with economic policy instruments being the
chief factors of macroeconomic dynamics rather than natural
economic mechanisms.
Macroeconomic dynamics
The economic policy scenario called for an expansion from the start
of the year, similar to what the country saw in 2009. At the beginning
Economy
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of 2010, the Belarusian economy pulled out of cyclical recession, and
given that economic position, it is hard to account for the expansion
ary policy that the country made its priority. The potential points of
macroeconomic misalignment emerged at the turn of 2009, indicat
ing the results of the incentivesbased economic policy: foreign trade
performance deteriorated, the domestic foreign exchange market saw
a deficit that rapidly expanded, the ruble exchange rate pressures built
up, and so did inflationary pressures. The government was well aware
of the corresponding risks and sought a balance between the political
reason for boosting GDP growth and the need to minimize the accu
mulated macroeconomic disproportions. Under the circumstances, in
a bid to work out a compromise, the authorities opted for capital in
vestments as a priority component of aggregate demand. Below are
the key ideas of the government’s macroeconomic dynamics scenario.
Firstly, a growth based on investments had a potential for
facilitating a longterm growth in productivity, thus contributing to
the resolution of some structural economic problems.
Secondly, a growth in investments seemed the most realistic plan,
because the government kept to itself direct instruments to stimulate
the investment activity of companies, especially budget financing,
promotion of bank credit, etc.
Thirdly, this scenario envisaged restraints of accumulating
disproportions at the macro level, primarily the additional foreign
trade deficit, through administrative reductions in the domestic
demand elasticity of import. For instance, by using its levers to shape
the investment policy of the nonfinancial sector, the state is in a
position to channel financing primarily into the investment projects
that require minimum spending on imported investment products.
Fourthly, the impact of stepped up investment efforts on price is,
as a rule, not as significant as that of, say, encouraged consumer
demand. The scenario therefore provided for measures to anchor
inflation.
Fifthly, the investment growth scenario prioritized foreign
investments as the main source of capital investment financing, which
by definition was supposed to foster stability on the domestic foreign
exchange market.
This scenario, however, was impeded by not only a reduction in
the growth potential, but also the relatively unfavorable market
situation.
Firstly, the external demand for most Belarusian traditional
exports restored only partially, and the process took some time.
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Secondly, a new oil shock came at the start of the year, when Russia
adjusted its terms of oil trade with Belarus. This automatically affected
the country’s trade balance (according to our estimates, in terms of
the 2009 export mechanism, net export revenue loss1 amounted to
around USD 1.8 billion, or 3.1% of GDP in 2010). Furthermore, the oil
shock caused a drop in budget revenues, which shrank by an estimated
USD 2 billion in annualized terms, according to the Ministry of
Finance’s reports.
Thirdly, another prerequisite of the investment growth scenario
proved inconsistent later, namely, additional inflows of foreign
investments, mainly FDI. The authorities had planned to attract foreign
capital investments at least 23–25% in excess of the 2009 level. That
major increase called for about USD 4 billion in financing of capital
investments from external sources.
The government believed China could become a major investment
contributor, enabling this country to meet the ambitious investment
targets. Framework agreements with potential Chinese investors and
banks make it possible for Belarus to take out up to USD 15 billion in
Chinese resources to finance investment projects in various sectors
of the national economy. Nevertheless, only a tiny part of those
resources was provided. Therefore, the mission to ensure a fast
significant growth in gross domestic product was complicated by not
only the slow recovery of demand in partner countries, but also a
number of additional adverse shocks.
In the first half of the year, a crucial tendency towards a
“redistribution” of roles in the structure of domestic demand emerged
amid persisting difficulties with the implementation of the investment
growth scenario. During that period, a number of factors, such as the
adaptation to the crisis, decline in negative expectations about the
external environment and acceleration in personal income growth
resulted in a faster increase in households’ consumption. Throughout
most of the year (the trend gradually subsided towards the end of the
year) the propensity to consume appeared to grow, that is, households
were increasing the share of consumption in their incomes, and
consumption growth outstripped the expansion of incomes.
1 We compare the actual results of import and export of crude and refined oil
in 2010 with the scenario envisaging unchanged crude oil import terms com
pared with 2009, and, consequently, identical import and export volumes (at
the 2009 level, that is, 21.5 million metric tons of imported crude and 15.5
million metric tons of exported refined oil).
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Various schemes can be employed to explain the said trend. On
the one hand, we can mention consumer optimism and positive
expectations2, which promoted consumer enthusiasm. On the other
hand, the propensity to consume may be partially attributable to
negative expectations, for instance, of a rise in prices and curtailment
of spending power in the future, which naturally encourages
immediate consumption.
We believe both groups of factors account for the increase in
propensity to consume. As a result, household consumption became
the key factor of GDP growth based on demand from the very start of
the year. By October 1, 2010, household consumption had accounted
for 5.1 percentage points out of the 6.6% GDP growth in yearonyear
terms. In the last three months, propensity to consume stabilized and
even decreased a bit amid a substantial growth in household incomes
resulting from the directed wage push. In JanuaryDecember, household
consumption remained the key demandbased GDP growth factor.
Another essential element of domestic demand – capital
investments – was showing reverse dynamics: they tended to shrink
at the start of the year making a negative contribution to GDP growth,
however, the second quarter saw the growth in capital investments
resume (it picked up pace towards the end of the year). In early 2010,
the economic authorities, pinning high hopes on foreign investment
inflows, somewhat alleviated the credit boom in the national economy
by way of reducing the intensity of directed lending and pursuing a
relatively rigid monetary policy. Since bank loans have dominated
among all sources of capital investment financing, that policy resulted
in limited implementation of some investment projects by non
financial businesses.
The authorities had to resume and broaden the practice of directed
lending later in an attempt to promote GDP growth amid shortages of
foreign resources to finance investment projects. In order to keep the
banks servicing state programs from liquidity shortages and
encourage lending by privatelyowned banks, the National Bank in
the second half of the year mitigated its monetary policies and allowed
active refinancing of commercial banks. As a result, gross capital
formation became the fastestgrowing element of domestic demand
in the final months of the year.
2 The same process may be characterized as consumer behavior getting back
to “normal”, which is attributed to the exhaustion of negative expectations
of the recession period.
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On the back of the state’s support for domestic demand came a
considerable increase in import demand. Whereas in the first quarter
net export contribution to GDP growth was positive, that is, the trade
deficit was smaller than in the first three months of 2009, in the final
three quarters, the deficit grew. In 2010, the reliance of the Belarusian
economy on imports revealed itself stronger than before, as a
substantial part of artificiallybacked demand was for imported
commodities rather than domesticallymade products.
This dependence was manifested both directly and indirectly.
In the former case, economic agents showed demand for final
products and gave preference to imported commodities. The latter
mechanism presupposes a demand for domesticallymade goods,
which on the one hand promotes the real sector’s output, but on the
other hand ultimately leads to an increase in imports, since many of
the Belarusianmade commodities rely on supplies of foreign raw
materials and components. As a result, net exports’ negative
contribution to GDP dynamics appeared to be commensurable to
the positive contribution of household consumption or gross capital
formation.
The economic model of artificial promotion of GDP growth by way
of encouraging domestic demand therefore proved inefficient even
in the short term, because much of the demand created by the
authorities was for imported commodities rather than domestic
production. Furthermore, that approach aggravated the problems with
financing of the economy’s balance of payment deficit.
Real sector
Of all the sectors of the national economy, the manufacturing sector,
construction, transport, communication, retail and public catering
contributed most to GDP growth in 2010.
Similar to the previous year, the production sector, by far the
largest economic sector, expanded faster than the average for the
national economy. The fastestdeveloping industries were mechanical
engineering and metalworking, with a 16.7% growth yearonyear, the
ferrous metals industry with 16%, forestry, woodworking and pulp
andpaper industry with 14.9%, chemical and petrochemical industry
with 13.3%, and electricity industry with 12.9%. The two largest
industrial sectors are mechanical engineering and metalworking and
the chemical and petrochemical segment. Those two became the key
sources of growth, fueling the entire manufacturing sector.
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The impressive growth of mechanical engineering was a result of
the “recovery” growth in the automotive sector. In other words,
following a major drop in partners’ demand and stagnation of 2009,
the modest recovery of partner countries and the poor performance
in the previous period caused a vigorous growth in yearonyear terms.
The considerable expansion of the automotive sector was recorded
amid the unsettled problem of excessive inventories: as of early 2011,
stocks of finished products of Belarusian automotive companies stood
at BYR 643.3 billion, or 154.4% of the average monthly output.
Another important contributor to the overall industrial growth was
the foodprocessing industry, despite the modest expansion of 9.5%
on the year. The meat industry was the leader in terms of growth with
13.1%, mostly owing to its competitive edge on foreign markets.
Another critical subsector – the butterandcheese and dairy
industry – showed only a 3.6% expansion yearonyear, despite the
strong growth in both export volumes and prices.
The fuel industry suffered more than any other Belarusian industry
in 2010 because of the adjusted Russian crude oil import terms and
consequent reduction in crude imports. At the start of the year, the
economic authorities claimed the deficit of Russian crude would be
offset by new deliveries from Venezuela, however, the country
imported only 12.9 million metric tons of crude oil from Russia and
1.8 million metric tons of crude from Venezuela in 2010, 14.7 million
metric tons in total, which compares with 21.5 million metric tons of
crude oil imported in 2009. As a result, the oil refineries were not using
their entire capacity, hence a 21.5% fall in output by the oilprocessing
industry and 16.1% drop in production by the entire fuel industry.
Amid the moderate growth in most of the larger industries (at least
compared with the original annual targets) and slump in the fuel
industry, the overall performance of the industrial sector owed its good
results to smaller industries traditionally categorized as “other
industries”3. It was that group of smaller industries that contributed
the most to the Belarusian industrial growth in 2010.
Companies’ finance
A key problem for the financial position of the real sector in 2010 was
the increase in labor unit costs, promoted by the policy to support
real incomes at the previous level, despite the slump or low growth
3 “Other sectors” also include changes in the structure of relative prices.
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rates in most economic sectors. The increase in labor unit costs de
facto means that compensations paid to workers increased faster than
labor productivity. In the first half of 2010, the economic authorities
were busy looking for ways to promote economic growth and relaxed
their efforts to ensure a wage push (at least compared to the planned
rise in incomes), therefore the urgency of that problem decreased. In
the first six months, labor unit costs even showed a decrease yearon
year, although they remained above the precrisis level.
In the second half of 2010, the government intensified the wage
promotion policy, which resulted in an increase in labor unit costs
and affected the competitiveness of domestic producers. Furthermore,
the finances of Belarusian companies were under pressure of the
increase in costs resulting from higher tariffs on electricity and other
energy types, a natural result of the rise in prices of Russian natural
gas. Companies therefore had economic preconditions to raise prices;
however, the economic authorities resorted to measures, including
administrative levers, to restrain price increases. Under the
circumstances, arrangements to promote demand and the consequent
increase in costs amid efforts to keep a moderate rise in prices and
encourage a growth in output resulted in profit restraints. On the other
hand, the marked reduction in inventories in almost every industry
had a favorable impact on profitability dynamics.
Therefore, despite the simultaneous sharp increase in domestic
demand and growth in the real sector’s production, both sales margin
(10.1% in 2010 and 9.9% in 2009) and profit margin (6.3% and 6.1%,
respectively) indicators remained almost at the level of the crisis year,
that is, way below the precrisis figures. Furthermore, throughout the
year, there was no evident tendency towards a yearonyear increase
in profitability rates. This behavior of key indicators characterizing
economic efficiency accounts for the largely artificial nature of the
GDP growth in 2010.
Households
Individual incomes and expenditures
The first grade wage rate, the benchmark for calculating compensa
tions at enterprises, was raised twice in the first half of 2010; however,
the total increase amounted to 16.8%, which was not much, consider
ing that wages had been last increased in the second half of 2008.
Therefore, wages increased at a moderate rate of 8.1% yearonyear
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in JanuaryJune 2010 (which was not enough to meet the ambitious
income growth target set for the entire year). In real terms, individual
incomes, which include wages, social transfers, property and business
incomes, etc., grew almost at the same rate in JanuaryJune, 2010, at
8% yearonyear.
In the second half of the year, the government pursued a more
aggressive income policy in a bid to reach the annual target. In
September, a special ruling introduced adjusting indices to increase
compensations for lowerincome households.
Two months later, in November 2010, there came a 31.1% hike in
the first grade wage rate, which brought the overall annual rise in
incomes up to 53.2%. Real personal incomes rose 15.2% in 2010 from
the 2009 level, and real disposable incomes (incomes minus taxes)
went up 14.9%.
As we mentioned before, the rise in incomes and corresponding
expectations resulted in an increase of households’ propensity to
consume. The hike in consumers’ activity was most obvious in the
nonfoods sector: trade in foods showed a continuous decrease in
volumes in 2010 (as incomes grew), whereas retail turnover of non
foods in the same period was increasing. The same trend was revealed
as a result of sample survey of households: acquisition of nonfoods
became the key expenditure, and the share of nonfoods in the total
spending kept growing.
Therefore, a considerable proportion of the “new demand” that
owed its appearance to the government’s demand promotion policy,
was shifted to the nonfood market, where pressures on price levels
increased correspondingly. Another important consequence of the rise
in incomes was the increase in companies’ propensity to import: the
share of imported products went up markedly in almost all groups of
nonfood consumer goods. The aggressive income policy thus led to
a substantial additional demand for consumer imports.
At the end of the year, the expectations of higher incomes came
true, and households’ propensity to consume started to decrease. In
the twelve months of 2010, the share of consumption of commodities
and services in total incomes was almost the same as in the previous
year. However, the trend was not accompanied by an increase in
savings share (the share of expenditures on taxes and duties went up
instead), which would have been a welcome development for the
country. On the contrary, the share of savings in incomes was going
down throughout the year, to reach 4.5% of incomes, which compares
to 5.7% in 2009.
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Also noteworthy is the gap between spending and incomes:
expenditures were 4.2% above the level of incomes, which was mostly
due to the rise in bank credit (by 6.5% of the income level). As a result,
the tendency towards a decrease in propensity to save observed
throughout the year grew stronger at the end of the year because of
the increase in the overall debt under loan agreements, and the po
pulation turned into a net borrower of resources from banks, whereas
previously households’ contributions to the banking system used to
be in excess of borrowing. The problem of insufficient savings, which
are traditionally required to finance investments, therefore aggravated
in the national economy, enhancing current imbalances and blighting
longterm development prospects.
Commodity and service markets. Prices
Consumer inflation totaled 9.9% in 2010 (as of December ), which com
pares to 10.1% in 2009, and the average annual consumer price increase
was at 7.8%, down from 13% in 2009. On the one hand, this indicates a
trend towards a slower increase in consumer prices compared to the
previous year’s dynamics; however, this may be attributed to the high
comparative base, especially in the case with the average annual indi
cator. Furthermore, in early 2010, the “crisis impulse” of the previous
year was still felt, when amid slowly growing or decreasing demand
prices behaved correspondingly in most markets. On the other hand, if
we consider price dynamics in 2010 alone, it is evident that the price
rise accelerated in the course of the year. This was a result of a gradual
enhancement of measures to shore up the economy, with the use of
monetary, fiscal and other instruments, including administrative levers.
Since household consumption was the main growth component
of demand during most of the year, the inflation overhang in consumer
markets emerged quite fast. However, the economic authorities used
countermeasures to restrain price increases; for example, the exchan
ge rate was de facto kept within a narrower band than originally plan
ned in the Basic monetary guidelines for the year. In this connection,
producers had to contain the increase in prices despite the substantial
increase in demand in order to be able to compete with imports,
especially of nonfoods, thus restraining profitability in the real sector.
The government allowed only minor increases in regulated prices
in 2010. For instance, utility fees, which make up an important part of
the consumer price index (CPI), mostly remained unchanged in 2010
(only heating rates rose 7.8%; utility fees rose only 1.7%).
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Therefore, despite the upward pressure that the growing demand
produced on the entire range of prices, the economic authorities
managed to rein in those trends on nonfood markets, as well as in the
segment of chargeable services to the population, with price increases
at 7.4% and 6% yearonyear, respectively. To curb the rise in prices
on the food market appeared to be much more difficult because of the
low crop yields both in Belarus and in the wider region. Under the
circumstances, domestic supply restraint, rise in prices of imported
products, as well as the likelihood of the failure to meet the domestic
requirement (should the price gap with neighboring countries widen
too much because of the growth in food export) accounted for the
inevitable increase in prices of most foods. It was the food prices that
contributed the most in the CPI structure (food prices increased
13.1%).
Producer prices showed a more significant increase in 2010
compared to consumer prices, rising 19.3%. Prices of intermediate
materials went up most of the other components of the producer price
index (PPI), by 25.5%, which is attributable to higher energy fees.
Therefore, branchwise, the fuel, chemical, petrochemical industries
and the electricity sector accounted for most of the price hike. Inflation
calculated based on the index of producer prices for consumer goods
amounted to 13.5%. The gap between this figure and CPIbased
inflation is another indication of the inflation overhang in the
economy, which in 2010 was contained chiefly by profitability
restraints and additional burden on the consolidated budget.
The inflationary pressure became even more evident in the final
months of the year, and additional efforts were required to deal with
it. The faster increase in consumer prices, except for December, did
not fulfill the inflationary potential, and most of the pressure was
passed on to the first few months of 2011, given the unprecedented
arrangements to promote domestic demand in the final month of 2010.
External sector
Foreign trade
The current account deficit has been one of the most sensitive issues
for the Belarusian economy for years. The year 2009 saw truly alarm
ing trends, though, when amid the global crisis and foreign demand
drops, the Belarusian commodity trade deficit widened to 14.8% of
GDP, whereas in other transition economies it shrank. The adopted
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scenario of promoting domestic demand left no room for measures to
address the trade deficit problems in the postcrisis year. However,
early in 2010, the foreign dynamics proved positive, inspiring opti
mism and expectations of favorable changes and alleviation of the
foreign trade predicament: the foreign trade deficit went down both
in nominal and real terms. As a result, in the first quarter of 2010, net
exports made a positive contribution to GDP, chiefly because of the
reduction in Russian oil import at the start of the year, while export of
refined oil showed a less significant decrease owing to the crude re
serves accumulated in 2009.
At the same time, favorable trends were recorded in trade in other
commodity groups (besides energy). However, the positive trends
slackened during the second and third quarters, when the foreign
trade deficit resumed its steady growth. While in the first six months,
the foreign trade deficit remained below the level reported in January
June 2009, the first three quarters saw a 19% expansion in the deficit
yearonyear, whereas the fourth quarter witnessed an unprecedented
growth of 63.2% on the fourth quarter of 2009 due to hikes in domestic
demand. In JanuaryDecember, foreign trade deficit widened 32.7%
on the year, reaching 17.6% of GDP.
Since the commodity portfolio is grouped into broad economic
categories, we are able to indicate each commodity group’s
contribution to the growing trade deficit: trade in energy products
accounted for 23% of the deficit growth, which is a result of the hikes
in import and export prices amid drops in trade volumes; and trade in
“other intermediate goods” accounted for 21.4% of the increase. From
the perspective of commodity structure, import of intermediate
products was increasing mostly due to the overall growth in volumes,
as well as rise in ferrous metal prices. In the scope of the entire broad
commodity group, trade performance deteriorated largely because
of the increment in the volume of imports, and to a lesser degree due
to the rise in average import prices (imports rose 26.5% in volume
terms, whereas average import prices went up 9.7%). The burden of
Belarus’ trade in intermediate products, commensurable to the impact
of energy trade in the overall deficit, indicates that import consump
tion of production is very high in the Belarusian economy. This level
of import intensity results not only from the need to acquire foreign
energy for the production sector, but also from additional import of
other raw materials and components.
The expansion in Belarus’ foreign trade deficit was also promoted
by trade in nonfood consumer goods, which accounted for 5.3 points
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of the commodity trade deficit growth. This trend is conditioned by
the growing households’ propensity to consume imported products
and is mostly associated with the growth in the physical volume of
imports, by 24.9% yearonyear in this commodity group alone.
Trade in foods and investment commodities resulted in improve
ments in trade figures (that is, made a negative contribution to the
deficit expansion) – by 9.9% and 2.3%, respectively. It should be noted
that the increase in investment commodity exports (which mostly use
imported intermediate products) contributed much less to foreign
trade than imported intermediate materials. In other words, the policy
to encourage domestic demand also promoted domestic production,
which increases import of intermediate products to meet the new
demand. At the same time, the growth in domestic output does not
lead to increases in exports that would suffice to offset import hikes.
As a result, the policy to promote domestic demand and production
became a crucial factor in the overall growth of the foreign trade deficit
in 2010.
Other foreign flows and balance of payments
In 2010, Belarus’ current account deficit amounted to USD 8.5 billion,
or 15.6% of GDP. BoP commodity trade deficit reached USD 9.1 bil
lion, 16.6% of GDP, service trade surplus was at USD 1.7 billion, 3.1%
of GDP, income balance was in deficit of USD 1.3 billion, 2.4% of GDP,
and current transfers came to a surplus of USD 0.3 billion, 0.5% of
GDP.
The negative trends in the external sector were manifested not
only in commodity trade, but also in service trade. The service trade
surplus as a proportion of GDP went down 0.5 of a point yearonyear
in 2010; furthermore, it offset only 18.7% of the commodity trade
deficit, whereas in 2009, it was enough to make up for 20%.
The key reason behind the deterioration of relative results of
external service trade was the outrunning increase in transport and
construction services imports. Despite the poorer “transport services”
trade balance, compared to the previous year, it was the transport
sector that provided the bulk of the surplus, with around 97% of the
entire service trade surplus (the remaining segments performed close
to zero).
Income deficit kept widening in 2010, primarily due to the increase
in net capital outflows in the “investment incomes” category: in 2010,
net capital outflows rose 21.2% yearonyear, commensurable with net
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FDI inflows in previous years. This attests to the low efficiency of a
substantial part of incoming FDI, because at a later phase such
investments form a reverse flow of investment incomes. It is getting
increasingly important for the economic authorities to offset this effect,
which means additional efforts must be taken to facilitate FDI inflows
in the projects targeting primarily foreign rather than the domestic
markets. Furthermore, it is essential that additional incentives be
offered to investors, in order to ensure reinvestment of incomes from
FDI and prevent their almost entire outflows as investment incomes.
In 2010, nearly all possible sources were used to finance the record
high current account deficit. Most of the financing came from net
inflows of loans and credit, at USD 3.5 billion, FDI, at USD 1.3 billion,
portfolio investments, at USD 1.2 billion, and commercial loans, at
USD 1.1 billion.
Commercial banks were the main borrowers on foreign markets,
with net inflows of foreign resources at USD 2.2 billion. Foreign funds
were mostly attracted by commercial banks with foreign capital,
primarily those with Russian shareholdings, which borrowed from
parent structures. Those loans were clearly not enough to finance the
current account deficit. Also, most of the funds raised by domestic
banks were shortterm loans, which could not guarantee stable inflows
of finance. Therefore, not only banks, but also the central government
and the National Bank borrowed from external sources.
Early in 2010, Belarus received the final tranche of the IMF loan;
however, it was time to start repaying previous loans in the second
half of the year, and net inflows of foreign resources thus came to a
mere USD 500 million. In JulyDecember, as the foreign trade situation
deteriorated, the NBB had to step in; the central bank managed to
draw USD 700 million on a net basis. The country owed the substantial
inflow of “portfolio investments” to the debut placement of sovereign
Eurobonds on foreign capital markets.
Nevertheless, despite the employment of new external borrowing
instruments, capital inflows were not enough to cover the current
account deficit. The shortage was financed from reserve assets, which
fell by USD 800 million in 2010.
Currency market
The changing dynamics of foreign trade performance and expecta
tions of the population had a prompt impact on foreign exchange trade
patterns domestically. In the first quarter of the year, foreign trade
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performance improved because of a reduction in sales of crude oil
and oil products. However, in the segment of resident companies the
trend resulted in hikes in net demand for foreign exchange, by 57.8%
yearonyear, with net demand reaching USD 1.5 billion). This was
mostly due to the limited increase in the supply of foreign exchange
caused by shorter export of refined oil.
At the same time, demand was growing steadily in this segment,
despite the moderate growth in imports, as the share of foreign
exchange acquired to service earlier loans markedly increased in the
structure of purchases. In other words, active borrowing from external
sources by privatelyowned businesses with a view to financing the
current account deficit led to additional demand for foreign exchange
from corporate entities.
The first quarter of the year saw major improvements in the
balance of cash exchange trade between commercial banks and
households compared with the first three months of 2009: net supply
of cash exchange reached USD 174 million, whereas in the same period
of 2009, net demand for exchange stood at USD 605 million. The deficit
that was not offset by trade with individuals was covered by additional
currency sales by banks and NBB’s interventions. A similar situation
was observed in the second quarter, when resident companies
remained the main foreign exchange beneficiaries (although their net
demand was growing at a much slower pace than in the first quarter).
The key donors in that period were commercial banks, which were
taking out new loans from external sources, and the National Bank,
which continued its efforts to keep the exchange rate stable.
In the third quarter, corporate demand for foreign exchange grew
even faster, 57.6% on the third quarter of 2009, or USD 1.2 billion,
mostly due to heating of demand and additional demand for imports.
Furthermore, foreign exchange trade with households swung to a
deficit of USD 56.3 million (from a surplus, or net supply, of USD 131
million). The burden on banks and gold and foreign exchange reserves
of the country therefore markedly increased, and banks started
performing “double” functions in financing the deficit: they had to
form a net supply of foreign exchange on the domestic market while
placing currency deposits with the National Bank in order for the latter
to be able to stabilize the amount of net foreign assets.
The aggressive economic expansion in the fourth quarter brought
about a record high deficit of foreign exchange trade on the domestic
market. Firstly, net demand of resident companies more than trebled
yearonyear to reach USD 2.8 billion. Secondly, the increase in
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incomes and less optimistic expectations of individuals stood behind
an unusually high net demand in that segment, reaching USD 1.2
billion.
The considerable net supply of foreign exchange by nonresidents,
at USD 0.6 billion, was also a statistically important source to finance
the deficit. The statistical result was due to the currency swap deal
between the National Bank of Belarus and the People’s Bank of China;
that money was not part of currency supply on the market, but was
included in the gold and foreign exchange reserves.
Financing of the record high deficit was mostly by intensifying
the scheme tested in the previous quarter: currency supply was formed
by commercial banks and NBB, which used depleting foreign
exchange reserves. Furthermore, to stabilize reserves of the central
bank, commercial banks placed new deposits with the NBB in addition
to forming net supply of exchange.
The disproportions on the money market therefore became the
first noticeable result of the largescale economic expansion
undertaken by the authorities in 2010.
Finance
State finance
The main innovations of the state budget2010 were the abolition of
transfers to the agriculture promotion fund, local tax on sales, tax on
sales of vehicles and parking fees. To offset the losses, the valueadd
ed tax was raised to 20% from 18%. Importantly, the Social Security
Fund was withdrawn from the consolidated budget.
The new terms of oil trade became a serious shock for the state
budget in 2010, as it had been drafted based on the 2009 trade terms.
The Ministry of Finance estimated budget losses close to USD 2 billion,
which called for additional revenues from other activities or spending
cuts; otherwise, the country would have had to put up with a higher
budget deficit. All of those options were used, with the dominance of
the increased budget deficit (compared with the originally planned
figure). In autumn, the Ministry of Finance had to admit that a broader
deficit was required, setting the forecast between 2% and 3% of GDP
(the deficit had originally been planned at 1.5% of GDP).
Consolidated budget deficit amounted to 2.6% of GDP in 2010,
compared to 0.7% of GDP in 2009. Budget revenues were at 29.9% of
GDP, down from 34.2% in the pervious year, because of drops both in
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taxbased revenues, to 27.5% of GDP in 2010 from 30.2% in 2009, and
nontax revenues, to 2.3% of GDP from 3.9%. The reduction in tax
revenues was caused by the cancellation of the export duty on oil
products, which stood behind the fall in tax revenues from foreign
trade to 3.5% of GDP from 5.8%.The remaining slight reduction in tax
revenues was due to the simplification of the tax system.
In 2010, consolidated budget expenditures amounted to 32.5% of
GDP, down from 36% of GDP in 2009. The decrease was attributed to
the reduction in national economy expenditures, to 7.6% of GDP from
12%, caused by the abolition of subsidies for oil importers. Furthermo
re, these expenditures fell in December 2010 in yearonyear terms
because of the curtailment of bank recapitalization volumes,
traditional for the final months of the year since 2008. In December
2010, around BYR 2 trillion was allocated from the budget to support
banks (1.2% of GDP), which compares to BYR 4 trillion, or 2.9% of GDP,
in December 2009.
The substantial consolidated budget deficit is a new situation for
Belarus, as the country used to have either a surplus or a balance close
to a zero in the previous five years. The budget deficit may be inter
preted as the government’s losing the room for maneuver in the fiscal
sector and narrowing of possibilities to manipulate fiscal instruments
to resist shocks.
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BELARUS’ FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
AND BANKING SYSTEM
Alexandr Mukha
Summary
In 2010, the Belarusian economy faced very serious economic shocks caused
primarily by the introduction of export duties on Russian crude oil and a general
increase in prices of imported energy products. As a result, the country’s foreign
trade deficit reached a new all8time high, which aggravated the situation on the
domestic foreign exchange market. Amid the presidential election campaign,
households’ demand for foreign currency grew stronger, whereas the banking
system saw dollarization of deposits resume. The widening gap between the
supply of foreign exchange and demand for it caused a drastic reduction in the
country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves, even though Belarus received
the final tranche of the loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
last installment from Gazprom for a shareholding in Beltransgaz and proceeds
from the placement of the debut Eurobond issue.
Belarus believes the situation on foreign markets will become more favorable
for domestic companies in 2011, and the government expects an increase in
FDI inflows (including through sale of state property), which the authorities
hope will suffice to finance the current account deficit and ensure financial
stability.
Tendencies:
• Introduction of export duties on Russian crude oil supplies and increase in
energy product prices aggravated the situation in foreign trade and caused
hikes in demand for foreign exchange;
• Presidential election campaign triggered a stronger demand for foreign
currency from individuals and encouraged households to convert ruble8
denominated deposits into foreign exchange;
• In 2011, Belarus expects a more favorable situation in foreign trade,
reductions in net demand for foreign currency and resumption of de8
dollarization processes.
Oil and gas shock
Last year, Belarus faced serious economic shocks caused mainly by
the introduction of export duties on Russian oil deliveries and a rise
in prices of energy resources, including natural gas. This aggravated
negative trends in the foreign trade sector: the country’s foreign trade
deficit climbed to a new record high of USD 7.426 billion in 2010 from
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USD 5.518 billion in the year 2009, when the global economy was hit
by the recession. In other words, in 2010 alone, the deficit broadened
by USD 1.908 billion. The deficit of trade in intermediate materials
(including energy products, raw materials, components and materi
als) increased by USD 3.196 billion in 2010, or 54.8% yearonyear, to
reach USD 9.024 billion. This means the entire increase in the coun
try’s foreign trade deficit was due to the expanding deficit of trade in
intermediate materials.
The deterioration of the situation in foreign trade brought about
an increase in net demand for foreign exchange on the domestic
market. According to the National Bank of Belarus, in 2010, net
demand for foreign exchange (demand minus supply) from corporate
entities increased by USD 3.246 billion, or 90%, to a new record high
of USD 6.874 billion. In December alone, companies’ net demand for
foreign exchange reached a new high of USD 1.451 billion, which
compares with USD 876.8 million in November 2010, USD 521.1 million
in October 2010, and USD 297.1 million in December 2009.
According to the central bank statistics, Belarusian companies’
foreign exchange proceeds totaled USD 29.343 billion in 2010, up
16.2% yearonyear. The Russian ruble accounted for 36.6% of the total,
up from 25.5% in 2009, the share of the U.S. dollar fell to 31.4% from
38.3%, and the share of the euro decreased to 30.4% from 34.7%. The
Belarusian ruble accounted for 0.7% of all proceeds in 2010, down 0.1
of a percentage point, whereas the share of other currencies increased
0.1 of a point to 0.8%.
At the same time, in 2010 payments for import of commodities
and services increased 16.4% to USD 34.583 billion. As a result, the
balance of foreign exchange proceeds and payments for imports
reached a deficit of USD 5.24 billion, compared with USD 4.468 billion
in 2009 and USD 2.799 billion in 2008.
In 2010, the overall foreign trade deficit of the country, at USD
7.426 billion, did not coincide with net payments for imports (payments
minus proceeds), standing at USD 5.24 billion. The difference may be
attributed to the increase in net current liabilities of Belarusian
companies under foreign loan agreements amounting to USD 2.141
billion (the surplus of foreign trade transactions that do not envisage
monetary payments amounted to mere USD 44.6 million). In other
words, a substantial part of imported commodities and services
supplied to Belarus in 2010 will have to be paid for in 2011, which will
add to negative pressure on the domestic money market. As of October
1, 2010, companies’ debts under trade loans stood at USD 6.74 billion.
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It is noteworthy that in 2010, of companies’ overall net demand
for foreign exchange, at USD 6.874 billion, payments for imports
accounted for around USD 5.24 billion. The remaining USD 1.634
billion was connected with net outflows of foreign capital from the
corporate sector, which is quite alarming. Repayment of foreign loans
by Belarusian companies, both of principal debt and interest,
exceeded new borrowing in foreign exchange, including on foreign
markets.
In the four quarters ending on October 1, 2011, Belarusian
companies will have to repay (or refinance) at least USD 7.925 billion
worth of shortterm foreign credits and loans – and this sum includes
only principal debt, which means companies will additionally be
paying nonresidents interest, dividends and other fees, which brings
total corporate debt to USD 8.9–9.3 billion.
The deficit of currency to pay for foreign loans and imported raw
materials, components and equipment is traditionally covered by the
state (companies file applications for currency acquisition with the
Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange), which is the main reason
why the state banned down payments for imports from foreign
exchange loans of Belarusian commercial banks and raised the
exchange charge for currency application to 2% from 0.0095% of the
amount of transaction.
These decisions will enable the government to limit import of
commodities and services and reduce net demand for foreign currency
at the exchange. In January 2011, the demand for U.S. dollars, at USD
682.631 million, exceeded supply, at USD 520 million, by USD 162.548
million. The demand for euros was EUR 74.052 million above the
supply, at EUR 282.311 million and EUR 208.259 million, respectively.
In contrast, the supply of Russian rubles was RUR 463.085 million in
excess of demand, at RUR 6.255 billion and RUR 5.892 billion,
respectively. In the first month of the year, net demand for foreign
exchange fell to USD 405.1 million, including trading at the OTC
market. However, this result was largely due to the absence of supplies
of Russian oil January 1 to January 24.
According to experts’ estimates, Belarus’ recent agreement with
Russia on import of crude oil and export of oil products will result in
around USD 1.3 billion net benefit for this country in 2011 alone.
Belarusian companies also expect a more favorable foreign trade
environment this year, with substantial increases in prices of their
commodities and services, which will enable the country to bring down
the foreign trade deficit.
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Election fever
The second essential factor that shaped the situation on the domestic
money market in 2010 was the sharp increase in the population’s de
mand for foreign exchange, caused by growing inflationary and de
valuation expectations of households amid the presidential election
campaign. According to the central bank, net demand for foreign ex
change from individuals (including cashless transactions) exceeded
USD 1.5 billion in 2010, and in the fourth quarter alone, purchases of
foreign exchange from banks exceeded sales by USD 1.537 billion. In
other words, the situation on the market of cash foreign exchange
and in the banking sector remained stable in the first three quarters
of 2010, however, in OctoberDecember, during the election cam
paign, households reduced their deposits with banks by BYR 1.041
trillion, or 9.6%, to BYR 9.811 trillion as of January 1, 2011. At the same
time, foreign exchangedenominated deposits rose by USD 520.6 mil
lion, or 13.5%, to reach USD 4.382 billion. Interestingly, since the one
off devaluation of January 2, 2009, rubledenominated personal de
posits never exceeded currency deposits, see Figure 1. The share of
ruble deposits fell to 42.7% of the total deposits on January 1, 2011
from 44.1% on January 1, 2010, 58.3% on January 1, 2009 and 64.2% on
January 1, 2008.
In absolute terms, personal deposits in Belarusian rubles and
foreign exchange amounted to BYR 4.804 trillion. The monetary
guidelines for 2010 had a more optimistic forecast for the increase in
personal deposits – between BYR 5.6 trillion and BYR 7.2 trillion.
Banks had clearly expected more from the population in 2010;
however, retail deposits were short of the target amid the election race.
Nevertheless, now that the election campaign is over and net
demand for foreign exchange from individuals has narrowed, de
dollarization processes have resumed. In January 2011, net demand for
foreign currency shrank to USD 56.9 million from USD 649 million in
December 2010. In February 2011, households sold more exchange than
they bought for the first time since May 2010: during the first two weeks
of February, net sales of currency by the population amounted to USD
10 million. Ruble deposits also showed an impressive increase in early
2011: in January alone, they rose by BYR 332.4 billion, or 3.4%, to BYR
10.143 trillion as of February 1, 2011. Personal deposits in foreign
exchange increased by USD 206.7 million in January, or 4.7%, to a new
alltime high of USD 4.589 billion. By February 1, 2011, overall bank
deposits of households had reached the equivalent of BYR 23.96 trillion.
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Including savings certificates and bonds issued by banks, households’
funds in the banking system reached BYR 25.043 trillion, another all
time high. The banking system now keeps an estimated BYR 2.641
million worth of savings per capita, an equivalent of USD 877.
Figure 1. Deposits in Belarusian rubles and foreign exchange
in January 2008 – January 2011, equivalent of billions of Belarusian
rubles
The first months of 2011 saw a positive tendency toward a decrease
in inflationary and devaluation expectations in the economy. The
government also decided to “tie” a part of the increased personal
incomes by increasing utility fees on February 1, 2011 with a view to
compensating for additional energy costs. Wages are expected to
stagnate in real terms, that is adjusted for consumer price inflation, in
2011, which will help balance the economy. Belarusian banks are likely
to keep offering positive interest rates on rubledenominated deposits
(above the inflation rate). In other words, the level of yield on deposits
denominated in the national currency will be kept quite high (interest
rates now stand at 18%19%.
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The Basic monetary guidelines for 2011 forecast an increase in
retail deposits by BYR 6.4 trillion to BYR 7.2 trillion, but we have doubts
that the target will be reached, because individuals are likely to try
new savings instruments, such as precious metals, diamonds,
corporate bonds and shares.
By the way, banks had sold 7.64 tonnes of gold in bullion to
households and companies by February 2011, and bought back only
1.391 tonnes, which means individuals and corporate entities (except
banks) had 6.249 tonnes of gold, worth about USD 280–305 million
as of February 1, 2011.
Interestingly, in January 2011 alone, individuals and companies
increased 999.9 gold purchases 190% yearonyear to 118.08 kilograms.
Sales of silver bullions rose 320% to 329.32 kilograms. Since central
banks keep buying gold now, which they consider to be the best way
to form reserves, regular participants of the precious metals market
should follow suit.
Reasons against devaluation
In the medium term, money market players expect the U.S. dollar to
depreciate against most global currencies, mainly because of the grow
ing public debt and budget deficit in the United States. In 2010, the
U.S. saw its public debt expand by USD 1.714 trillion to a new record
high of USD 14.075 trillion as of December 31, 2010. We believe the
reduction in the U.S. dollar exchange rate on the international FOR3
EX market will help keep the domestic money market of Belarus sta
ble. In this case, the NBB will find it easier to ensure flexible and pre
dictable dynamics of the Belarusian ruble visаvis the U.S. dollar.
At the same time, the stronger euro and Russian ruble will
contribute to the competitiveness of Belarusian products on the
European and Russian markets. The Belarusian exporters whose costs
are denominated in Belarusian rubles and proceeds are mostly in euros
or Russian rubles will benefits most of all.
We do not expect significant fluctuations of the Belarusian ruble
to major currencies in 2011. In this case, a sharp oneoff devaluation
may aggravate some economic and financial risks
Firstly, consumer prices will hike. However, inflationary pressures are
already very strong because of the recent wage push, inflationary
expectations of households, faster increase in producer prices and fast
increase in lending volumes. According to our estimates, the inflation rate
will reach 11–12% in 2011, allowing for all the factors mentioned above.
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Secondly, a devaluation of the Belarusian ruble will result in
additional devaluation expectations and stronger dollarization
processes in the economy.
Thirdly, a sharp devaluation of the national currency will cause a
substantial increase in the debt burden connected with servicing the
overall foreign liabilities of the economy, as well as a drop in the
solvency of the government and companies. This will affect the
capacity of Belarusian residents to attract foreign financing (including
for the purposes of refinancing previous foreign credits and loans).
Belarus’ overall foreign liabilities had reached USD 25.593 billion by
October 1, 2010, 48.8% of GDP, still short of the safety limit, at 60% of
GDP. However, a 20% oneoff devaluation would increase the debt to
GDP ratio to 58.5% because of the reduction in the U.S. dollar
equivalent of GDP, which is very close to the ceiling that ensures
economic security.
A smooth continuous devaluation of the Belarusian ruble against
the key foreign currencies is therefore more likely in the short run (to
the U.S. dollar, the ruble is likely to depreciate between 6–8% annually).
Conclusion
The Belarusian economy enters a phase of structural transformations
and market reforms. One of the key economic trends of the year 2011
will be an increase in FDI inflows in the economy. The government
expects net FDI inflows at USD 6.4–6.5 billion in 2011, including over
USD 3 billion from sale of state property.
The projected increase in FDI will enable the government to
finance the current account deficit and increase gold and foreign
exchange reserves in 2011. This will serve as an additional guarantee
of financial stability in Belarus, including the situation in the domestic
money market.
In 2011, the NBB plans an increase in international reserves at
least at USD 1.2 billion, which, alongside possible reductions in import
of commodities and services, will improve the indicator of adequacy
of gold and foreign exchange reserves.
We believe the expected recovery of the chief export markets and
international capital markets will reduce the risk of depletion of gold
and foreign exchange reserves, which will not threaten the economic
and social development of the country any longer, however, the
country needs to allow major transformations and develop new
productions and projects.
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LABOR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY:
POST.CRISIS RECOVERY AMID PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
Kiryl Hajduk
Summary
The pressure of the global recession on the Belarusian economy somewhat
slackened in 2010. The demand for labor increased, underemployment went
down, and wages hiked at the end of the year. Repeating previous years’ trends,
the increase in real personal incomes was followed by a reduction as early as
January and February. There were no changes in the social security system –
reforms were postponed for a year or two. At the same time, the government
plans a drop in the number of jobs in the public sector and reductions in
subsidies of utility costs.
Tendencies:
• Reduction in the share of labor force because of demographic reasons and
general decline in population;
• Rise in wages that is not supported by a relevant increase in labor productivity,
but based exclusively on targets set in state programs;
• Stable controllable level of registered unemployment with no structural
reforms underway; difficulties with determining the real unemployment rate;
• The state gradually forsakes its social obligations and tends to pass the
responsibility for growth in prosperity on to each citizen.
Demographic indicators and labor market situation
Belarus had 9.508 million inhabitants as of late 2010, down from 9.514
million people in late 20091. Natural population loss slowed to 0.1% in
2010 from 1.8% in 2009, but the number of deaths rose 1.6%, whereas
the number of births went down 1%. The share of ablebodied citizens
decreased to 62.7% from 64.8%, and the gap between economically
active population (workforce) and the number of ablebodied citizens
widened by around 7%, to 1.479 million people from 1.384 million
people. The reduction in the share of ablebodied population is mostly
1 Demographic data for 2009 published in early 2010 differ from the data that
appeared in statistics digests in early 2011. We will use the most recent data
unless specifically indicated otherwise; see http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/
indicators/doclad/main2011_1.php.
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due to demographic factors: those who were born during the post
WWII baby boom have now reached retirement age, while those born
in the 1990s, during the demographic slump, reached active working
age and childbearing age.
To alleviate the impact of unfavorable demographic factors,
Belarus in 2010 worked out the concept of the Program for demo3
graphic security, which provides demographic impetuses such as
pegging of child care allowances to the average wage of one of the
parents and measures to encourage women to give birth to a second
and third child. Belarus also plans to introduce additional allowances
for multiplechild families, or “maternal capital”.
In 2010, inflows of migrants dropped 15.9% from the 2009 level, to
10,303 people from 12,949 people, and net inflows of migrants made
up for 35.3% of natural population loss in 2010, down from 47.4% in
2009. Most of migrants in Belarus come from the CIS, especially from
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, whereas most of migrants leaving
this country choose to go to Russia, 73.4% of 6,866 persons last year.
Inflows of labor force have been growing stronger in the past few years;
however, they do not exceed 0.05% of the population.
In 2010, there were insignificant changes in the employment
pattern, which fit perfectly in the general trend of the past decade
(the share of workforce employed in the manufacturing sector
decreased, whereas employment in the service sector went up). The
number of the employed in the industrial sector went down to 25.6%
of the total workforce in 2010 from 27.2% in 2009, in agribusiness fell
significantly to 9.7% from 12%), whereas the proportion of Belarus’
workforce employed in the construction sector rose to 9.3% from 7%,
and in services and public catering to 14.8% from 12% (the number of
jobholders in the housing and public utilities sector also increased).
The number of vacancies (officially registered in the job bank of
the state employment service) rose to 544,000 from 450,000, most of
them being bluecollar workers, who have seen a steadily growing
demand for their work. Bluecollar job vacancies accounted for 77.6%
of all vacancies in 2010, while in 2009, they made up 73.4%. The
territorial imbalance of demand and supply remained unchanged:
about a third of all vacancies were registered in the city of Minsk, and
the number of vacancies in the capital city was 4.5 times above the
number of registered jobless citizens.
Based on the findings of the 2009 population census, the situation
is not as favorable as official statistics make it appear. Under the
census, in 2009, 5.6% of ablebodied citizens residing in Minsk said
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they were out of jobs, about 70,000 people altogether, whereas the
officially registered unemployment rate stood at 0.3%. As for other
regions, only in Minsk Region the number of the unemployed
appeared to be below the number of vacancies, and in Brest Region,
the numbers were equal; in the other four regions, the number of
vacancies is lower than that of jobseekers. The authorities also
admitted there was a problem of excessive employment in the public
sector. In February 2011, Finance Minister Andrei Kharkovets2  said
it was necessary to reduce the number of jobholders in the public sector
by 10–15% (which is the estimated excessive employment) with a
view to cutting budget costs by BYR 2 trillion.
Large companies are also suffering from excessive employment.
Some 4,500 workers were sacked at Minsk Automobile Plant from
December 2009 through December 2010. First Deputy Prime Minister
Vladimir Semashko admitted that some other large producers
employed excessive workforce as well. On February 3, 2010, about
100 workers of Baranovichy automotive component works went on
spontaneous strike seeking higher wages. In response, the admini
stration of the plant said wages could only be raised if around 300
employees were fired3. Nevertheless, some sectors of economy are
still faced with shortages of qualified personnel: the Ministry of Health
said it was short of over 4,000 medics and almost 5,000 nurses, whereas
around 3,000 medical workers resign every year. Mandatory job
assignment upon graduation does not help, because once the
obligatory employment term is over, about 30% of young medical
workers resign. The most popular reason for giving up jobs is
insufficient compensations. In 2010, wages in the healthcare sector
averaged USD 330 a month, which compared to USD 440 on average
in the economy. To earn more, medical workers tend to work extra
time – last year, they worked an average 1.39 of the standard rate.
In 2010, the economy was slowly recovering from the crisis, which
is evidenced by falling underemployment rate, including in the
industrial sector. Back in 2009, 357,000 workers, or around 10% of
the average monthly workforce, were forced to work part time, while
a year later the figure dropped to 75,000 people, or 2.3% of the
average monthly workforce. The number of workers forced to go on
leave (with no pay or with partial pay) fell 22% from the 2009 level,
2 PRACA3BY.INFO: http://pracaby.info/cont/art.php?sn_nid=3794.
3 PRACA3BY.INFO: http://pracaby.info/cont/art.php?&sn_nid=2902&sn_
cat=1.
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while the total period of leave almost halved. However, we need to
take into account the active administrative measures to regulate
partial employment. Many enterprises made use of “social” leaves
that are initiated by employees themselves instead of regular (forced)
leaves, which contributed hugely to the reduction in underemploy
ment figures.
In March, presidential ordinance No. 164 offered employers a
chance to have termless labor contracts with workers employed for
over five years and having no disciplinary infractions. Employers used
to have this right before, but most Belarusian workers are still
employed based on fixedterm labor agreements (twothirds of them
are signed for over three years, though). The new norm is a
“recommendation” and does not modify the nature of the contractual
employment system.
Unemployment
The authorities had expected hikes in unemployment in 2009 and
planned an increase in financing of employment promotion programs,
including wage earning community services. However, in 2010, the
situation proved different. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security
tagged the situation with registered unemployment as “stable, man
ageable and controllable”4. According to BelStat statistical service,
the number of the officially registered unemployed fell 18% to 33,100
people. Unemployment rate fell to 0.7% in 2010, a new record for the
past decade (down from 0.9% in 2009). Some of the trends observed in
the last few years persisted: the share of unemployed males kept grow
ing (to 47.4% in 2010 from 42.9%), while the share of unemployed fe
males decreased to 52.6% from 57.1%. Moreover, the number of va
cancies in employment and social security centers kept growing in
2010 to reach 48,800 as of the end of the year.
Nevertheless, the real situation with unemployment is very hard
to assess, because Belarus has never introduced the global practice of
assessing unemployment based on interviews of workforce. Including
those who stayed on forced leaves (potential and latent unemployed),
we have 2.4% for the year 2010. Since the results of interviews in
households will be available only in May 2011, we can only quote
expert estimates here. Taking into account the dynamics registered
4 See: Ministry of Labor and Social Protection // http://www.mintrud.gov.by/
ru/activity/sostojanie.
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in previous years, we believe the real unemployment rate in Belarus
stood at 4.6%–4.8% in 2010.
Wages
At the end of 2010, the average monthly wage before taxes rose to a
new record high of USD 530 in the U.S. dollar equivalent (around USD
470 in the public sector). The average monthly wage in 2010 reached
BYR 1.238 million, or about USD 415, and in the public sector, BYR
983,700, or about USD 330. The year 2010 saw the highest increase in
wages in the dollar equivalent in the past seven years. In real terms,
the average wage rose 14.9% on the year, and in the public sector, the
increase was by 18%.
That fast rise in wages should be attributed not only to the ongoing
presidential campaign. The wage targets had originally been set in
the Belarusian socioeconomic development program for 2006–2010,
and in order to attain those targets, the first grade wage rate was raised
thrice in 2010 (whereas in 2009 it remained unchanged): on January
1, it was increased 5.2% to BYR 81,000 from BYR 77,000, on June 1 it
rose 11% to BYR 90,000, and on November 1, it further increased 31.1%
to BYR 114,000. It was that November push that enabled the
government to increase wages in the public sector 30% on average, or
by BYR 135,000. Furthermore, on September 1, the government raised
the payroll rate for lowwage earners and some categories of social
and cultural workers.
Directors of organizations financed from the state budget are
instructed to pay increments of 15–30% of wage rates to qualified
specialists.
As for the minimum wage, in was raised twice in 2010, in
November, to BYR 400,000 from BYR 258,000, and in December, to
BYR 460,000. That was a step ahead from the practice set in 2005, which
allowed increasing the minimum wage once a year. However, the gap
between the minimum wage and the minimum subsistence level (BYR
274,510 per capita on average and BYR 293,880 per ablebodied citizen,
or USD 98) remained.
The increase in wages for lowsalaried workers stood behind a
reduction in the sectorwise pay differentials, to 3.3 times in late 2010
from 3.6 times in 2009 and 6.7 times in 2000. The traditional leaders in
terms of wages are the energy sector, oilprocessing industry, pipeline
transport and the banking sector. In those four sectors, the average
wage had exceeded USD 700 by mid2010. The chemical and
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petrochemical industries, metallurgy, the construction sector and state
authorities, courts and legal institutions are slightly behind the leaders
with wages averaging USD 500 by mid2010 and even USD 1,000 in
some of them by the end of the year.
In 2010, an average wage of USD 500 could be earned by 16
categories of workers with their overall number totaling almost 770,000
people, or around 22.2% of the average number of employed workers.
The leastpaid sector was social services (where about a third of
workers earned less than USD 300 a month). Despite the increase in
wages, a Wage Indicator survey conducted in the fourth quarter of
2010 showed that 50.1% of the respondents were dissatisfied with their
incomes, of them 23.9% were extremely dissatisfied), whereas only
19.1% were satisfied, and 3.7% were extremely satisfied. At the same
time, official statistics often fails to take into account wages in the
private sector. According to the Ministry of Taxes and Duties’
estimates, in 2010, compensations paid in the shadow economy
amounted to 10% of the country’s official wagebill, 29.8% of GDP, or
about USD 137 million), which resulted in shortages of income tax
transfers to the budget of BYR 150200 billion5.
As for the private sector, the situation in the city of Minsk differed
significantly from elsewhere in Belarus. According to Zdes i seichas
(Here and Now)6 consulting agency’s labor market survey covering
the first half of 2010, wages rose 10% to 20% in U.S. dollar equivalents
in the private sector in the capital city owing to increases in additional
payments, bonuses and interest payments. According to findings of
another study, conducted by Mojazarplata.by, salaries of top executi
ves increased 10.2% on average in real terms; however, they never
reached the precrisis level reported in 2008.
In Belarusian regions, state officials started demanding that
entrepreneurs raise the minimum monthly wage to an equivalent of
at least USD 250. They must have been guided by the orders of then
Prime Minister Sergey Sidorsky, who instructed trade union leaders
in August 2010 to pay at least USD 200 in the public sector. According
to cochairman of the Republic confederation of entrepreneurs, Viktor
Margelov7, for many private firms working in regions it would be a
problem. In many smaller settlements entrepreneurs find it hard to
5 TUT.BY: http://news.tut.by/economics/209254.html.
6 See.: http://www.zis.by/articles/recruiting/0002940/
7 Salidarnast: http://www.gazetaby.com/index.php?sn_nid=31422&sn_
cat=34.
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pay their employees even USD 200, and wages often stand close to
USD 150 a month in both private and staterun enterprises.
The sharp increase in wages was slammed by the IMF, when
Resident Representative Natalya Kolyadina said there were no
“economic grounds for such a significant increase in compensations”8.
Furthermore, that rise in wages ran counter to the agreements between
the IMF and Belarus: it cost the Belarusian economy about BYR
7 trillion and led to an expansion of budget deficit to 3% of GDP.
In June 2010, the government announced a new target for the
average wage in the national economy for the period to 2015, at USD
1,000. In his turn, President Alexander Lukashenko pledged that the
average wage in Belarus would reach 80% of the compensation level
in neighboring European countries in five years’ time.
Social security and pension system
There were no serious modifications in the Belarusian social support
system. Subsistence wage per capita increased by BYR 32,980, around
USD 11, and child care allowances for children under three years of
age were raised by the same amount. On January 1, 2010, child care
allowances were made equal to the subsistence wage; however, a
Mojazarplata.by survey showed that over half of all parents spend the
monthly child allowance in less than a week. In 2010, the average per
capita minimum consumer budget for a family of four rose by BYR
71,930, around USD 26.
On May 1, 2010, the number of social and demographic groups
with separate per capita minimum consumer budgets decreased to
eight from 18. In September, the government revised the consumer
goods basket. Since the Ministry of Health revised wholesome food
standards, the government had to introduce changes to the grocery
basket: some goods were excluded from the consumer goods basket,
some were exchanged for others, and the average lifetimes of clothes
and underwear were reduced. New items on the list were rentals of
sports equipment and acquisition of a daily newspaper, and spending
on cosmetics and hairdressing was increased.
In mid2010, the government announced plans to alter the
approach to the calculation of unemployment payments. The concer
ned ministry had prepared a draft resolution to raise the unemploy
ment benefit to the average subsistence wage; however, it will take a
8 SLON.RU: http://slon.ru/news/466169/
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year or two to make the final decision. At the same time, President
Lukashenko said during the VI congress of the Trade Unions
Federation that there were plans to gradually “squeeze” the
unemployment benefit”9, because there were more vacancies than job
seekers. Also, it was mentioned at the congress that Belarus would
increase the number of jobs at least 30% in the five years to come and
“radically” increase labor productivity.
In 2010, Belarus adopted the Strategy for energy development until
2020, which envisages an increase in utility tariffs closer to cost
recovery levels – from around 25% in 2010 to 34% in 2011. In 2011,
households will be paying 100% of costs for natural gas used for
cooking and in 2014, the entire cost of natural gas used for heating. A
similar approach will be applied to electricity and thermal energy.
The housing and utility services system will therefore break even in
the next four years. This move may also affect lowerincome house
holds, because in 2010, cashless subsidies to lowerincome households
were replaced by targeted support. That support is definitely lower
than the sums provided through subsidies, though.
In 2010, the total volume of targeted social support went up 20.9%
on the year to BYR 50.8 billion, or USD 17 million, because of the
increase in overall payment of lumpsum social allowances (by BYR
3 billion) and introduction of the social allowance to pay for rehabili
tation equipment. The average allowance totaled BYR 51,200 per
beneficiary, and the lumpsum allowance amounted to BYR 176,100.
For over 70% of recipients, allowances were calculated six months in
advance.
Also in 2010, Belarus completed the State program for prevention
of disability and rehabilitation of the disabled for 2006–2010. During
those five years, primary disablement rate decreased to 33.4 per 10,000
people from 41.32 in 2005. In 2010, the number of people with
disabilities decreased 0.5% on the year. In 2010, a new type of social
allowance was introduced, namely, the allowance to pay for
rehabilitation equipment. Some 15,200 people were paid the new
allowance last year, around BYR 552,000 per person.
In 2010, Belarus opened 32 new social service offices (to bring the
total number to 815) and 60 new social stations (the total number
reached 603). Social service centers had around 1.7 million people in
their registration books in 2010. The rise in the average wage last year
brought about an increase in pensioners’ incomes (minimum labor
9 TUT.BY: http://news.tut.by/society/197426.html.
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and social pensions also increased because of the growing per capita
subsistence wage). Pensions were raised thrice in 2010 – in January,
August and November, while in 2009, they were only increased once,
in November. Last year, monthly retirement pensions averaged BYR
612,276, or about USD 205.
Social pensions were recalculated four times in 2010, in February,
May, August and November. In November 2010, a presidential
ordinance introduced extra monthly payments of BYR 40,000 in
addition to social pensions provided to children with disabilities aged
under 18, disabled citizens of the I, II and III disability groups and
children who have lost a family provider. As of late 2010, Belarus had
2,468,900 pensioners, around 26% of the total population. The average
pension reached BYR 584,700, about USD 196; retirement pensions
averaged BYR 612,100, disability pensions BYR 532,700, survivors’
pensions BYR 356,400, and social pensions BYR 244,300.
In late 2010, the authorities announced plans to introduce
conventional contribution pension systems starting 2012. It will be
based on the Swedish model (Sweden also started reforming its
pension system, having only the distribution system). The demand
for a contribution pension model is quite strong: based on question
naires10, over 40% of Belarusians are ready to make additional savings,
and 12.5% are already saving to add to future pensions.
Conclusion: challenges of the year 2011
The election year is over, but the Belarusian economy is still faced
with many unresolved problems. From the look of it, real wages will
likely decrease in 2011, and faster increase in consumer prices will
become one reason for it. Lower wages will enable the authorities to
put off ruble devaluation, which is the Sword of Damocles for the Be
larusian economy with its substantial current account deficit. Arrange
ments to contain further rise in real wages, which is not matched with
a corresponding increase in labor productivity, will contribute to Be
larusian producers’ costcutting efforts.
Another problem the authorities need to address is excessive
employment. Redundancies are planned in the public sector in 2011
in order to keep the average wage level sufficiently high. The situation
with employment will largely depend on privatization progress – if
the administration of the country agrees to privatize large enterprises,
10 Conducted by the IPM Research Center, see: www.research.by.
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a decline in jobs may follow, however, it will affect only bigger towns,
where labor markets are capable of absorbing released workers.
As for the reform of the social security system, it is contingent on
the general economic situation in the country. Because the authorities
pursue the policy to promote employment and subsidize lossmakers,
there will be no drastic changes in the social security sector, for
example, new measures to provide more support to the unemployed
are highly unlikely. In broader terms, as long as the government makes
economic growth, the burden of the current account deficit and
support for a stable ruble exchange rate its key priorities, the social
security system reform will remain a secondary objective.
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ENERGY SECTOR: RENT CUTS
Alyona Rybkina
Summary
The terms of Russian energy supplies to Belarus kept changing throughout
2010, and prices of energy products delivered from Russia kept growing,
although Belarus still enjoyed lower energy tariffs than other consumers in the
region. The relatively low energy prices enabled the authorities to postpone
structural reforms in the election year, and the tariff policy in the energy sector
remained unrevised. In the oil sector, alternative (Venezuelan) crude oil supplies
commenced, however, the declared efficiency of deliveries has never been
proved.
The government was in talks with Russia over arrangements to improve the
terms of supplies of fuel and energy resources in the framework of the Common
Economic Area (CEA). The lack of any structural transformations, despite the
adopted Concept of the development of the energy potential remained a factor
that reduced the efficiency and competitiveness of the sector, as well as its
appeal to private investments.
Tendencies:
• The country still depends crucially on Russian supplies of fuel and energy
resources despite the attempts to diversify oil imports and increase the share
of local fuels in the total consumption;
• The rent, currency proceeds and profits generated by the sector go down;
• The efforts to enhance energy security and develop the energy sector potential
are impeded by shortages of financing, technological constraints and current
principles of economic policy.
Oil sector
In 2010, Belarus reduced both import and processing of oil for the
first time in many years. The country imported 12.9 million metric
tons of crude oil from Russia, of them 6.3 million metric tons without
paying the export duty and 6.6 million metric tons subject to full pay
ment of the duty. The authorities attempted to diversify imports in
order to respond to the new terms of trade with Russia: in 2010, Be
larus started importing crude oil from Venezuela (imports amounted
to 1.8 million metric tons).
Belarus therefore imported a total of 14.7 million metric tons of
crude oil in 2010, down 32% yearonyear (in 2007–2009, the country
imported 21.5 million metric tons of crude oil from Russia annually).
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The introduction of export duties on crude oil and refined oil deliveries
from Russia caused a drop in imports of oil products, to 900,000 metric
tons in 2010 from 3.8 million metric tons in 2009. Furthermore, Belarus
did not export crude oil in 2010, whereas in 2009, exports reached
USD 738.1 million in value terms.
Despite the serious reductions in the volume of imports and
insignificant domestic oil production, at 1.7 million metric tons, oil
products remained a very serious Belarusian export, and proceeds
from foreign sales of refined oil remained one of the key channels of
foreign exchange revenues (see Table 1). Last year, Belarus exported
only 11.3 million metric tons of oil products (to compare: in 2009,
export of Belarusian oil products reached 15.5 million metric tons, up
from 7.7 million metric tons in 2001). Traditionally, countries beyond
the CIS accounted for most of the exports, 80%, however, the structure
of consumers changed in 2010: Ukraine accounted for 90% of all
deliveries to the CIS, while shares of traditional European importers
decreased (the Netherlands accounted for 43% of all exports, the UK
for 14%, and Latvia for 8%).
Table 1. Dynamics of oil product exports in 2005–2010
Source: Belstat statistical committee, author’s own calculations
The rise in prices of Russian crude oil (the regular price plus the
duty) and relatively high price of Venezuelan oil (USD 647 per metric
ton) resulted in a dramatic reduction in the profitability of the oil
processing industry for the state budget and poorer foreign trade
performance (trade in oil and oil products came to a deficit of USD
909 million). Because of the changes in the terms of oil deliveries in
2010, the two Belarusian refineries were operating at 60–70% of their
capacity in the first half of the year. OAO Naftan reached its design
capacity in September 2010, and OAO Mozyr NPZ oil refinery first
used 100% of its capacity only in late October. The profitability of oil
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processing kept falling: according to preliminary estimates, OAO
Mozyr NPZ’s total net profit for the year 2010 reached USD 15 million,
down from USD 68 million in 2009.
On the domestic market, oil product prices were raised three times
in 2010 (in the first half of the year); the resulting increase in prices
was between 15% and 20%. Despite the supplies of dutyfree Russian
crude, the prices of diesel fuel and gasoline kept rising in order to
keep the refineries profitable. AI95 gasoline price ultimately
increased to around USD 1 per liter, which is the highest price in the
CIS.
The decisions to increase oil product prices domestically were
made contrary to the government’s general policy to keep fuel prices
low. Firstly, the country is interested in having transit haulers fill their
tanks in Belarus (rather than in Poland or Lithuania), which means
even if return on sales were low, Belarus would still generate
substantial profits by selling additional volumes. Secondly, the
Belarusian side had hoped until very late that the dutyfree quota of
6.3 million metric tons would be revised if the country increased sales
of oil products on the domestic market.
The intrigue around the privatization of the refineries after all came
to nothing. Despite the fact that the deterioration of the terms of oil
deliveries affected the profitability of both Belarusian refineries, the
country kept insisting not only on very high prices of their assets, but
also on additional conditions that potential investors were supposed
to meet. Although Russia is still interested in having control over the
Belarusian refineries1, the price and terms of the acquisition of control
laid down by the Belarusian authorities discouraged the Russian side.
To promote the competition for its refineries, Belarus repeatedly
mentioned that its oil assets might be sold to Venezuela, a new partner.
In 2010, oil transport by Belarusian oil mains amounted to around 80
million metric tons. The government forecasts a reduction in the
volume of transit by 25% starting 2011 because of Russia’s successful
efforts to build oil pipelines bypassing Belarus. To minimize losses
and keep potential investors interested in the Belarusian pipeline
1 For example, the Program of efficient use of foreign political factors with a
view to longterm development of the Russian Federation, which the Rus
sian Foreign Ministry drafted last year on behalf of President Dmitry
Medvedev, includes a task to “seek the agreement of the Belarusian au
thorities to sell to Russian oil companies controlling stakes in Belarusian
oilprocessing enterprises”; see.: http://flot2017.com/file/show/none/
24253.
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networks, the country is getting ready for privatization of its oil pipes.
On December 29, 2010, Gomel city executive committee registered
OAO Gomeltransneft Druzhba, and on December 30, 2010, Novo
polotsk city executive committee registered OAO Polotsktransneft
Druzhba.
Gas sector
In early summer, BelarusianRussian relations in the gas sector were
once again compromised by yet another case of “gas embrace” (a term
coined by Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov2: the two
countries accused each other of nonperformance of obligations. Since
the start if 2010, Belarus had been paying for Russian gas the price
that it had set independently without having the supplier’s agreement,
which resulted in a USD 190 million debt accumulated by early sum
mer. The Russian side had warned Belarus that gas supplies could be
limited unless Belarus had repaid the debt by June 21. Belarus failed
to pay on time, and Gazprom started limiting deliveries at 10:00 on
June 21.
According to the Belarusian side, Gazprom’s debt for natural gas
transit through Belarus had reached USD 260 million. Belarus claimed
the pipe should not be shut while the two sides had mutual debts:
Gazprom owed Belarus USD 260 million, and Belarus owed the gas
giant USD 190 million. Gazprom insisted that it had nothing to do
with the gas transit debt, because it was ready to pay for transit at
previous rates, but Belarusian colleagues would not accept such
payments.3  The fifth “gas war” lasted for three days. On June 20,
Gazprom made claims, on June 21 it cut gas supplies to Belarus by
15%, on June 22, deliveries were further cut by another 15%. After
Gazprom issued an ultimatum that supplies might be reduced by 85%
2 See.: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2010/06/22/ic_news_112_333561/
3 Spokesman for Gazprom Sergei Kupriyanov explained that a protocol had
been signed when the joint venture between Gazprom and Beltransgaz was
being established, which stipulates a possibility to increase transit rates to
USD 1.74 in 2009 and USD 1.88 in 2010, however, the decision to raise transit
rates depended on the introduction of a wholesale markup for Beltransgaz
on the domestic market, enabling Gazprom (that now owns 50% in Beltrans
gaz) to gain profits from its work in Belarus. Kupriyanov emphasized that the
markup had been expected at USD 10.47 in 2009 and USD 11.07 in 2010;
however, Belarus had failed to introduce it. Therefore, there was no adden
dum to the gas contract that would increase transit tariffs in 2010.
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if Belarus failed to pay immediately4, Belarus paid up late on June 22.
On June 24, Gazprom transferred to Belarus USD 228 million for gas
transit at the old rate of USD 1.45 per 1,000 cubic meters. The
remaining issues were resolved a bit later: Beltransgaz’s wholesale
markup was set at USD 11.09 per 1,000 cubic meters and the transit
rate was raised to USD 1.88 (the decisions were backdated to January
1, 2010).
In 2010, Belarus imported 21.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas,
up 23% yearonyear, or by 4.03 billion cubic meters. Since the natural
gas price for Belarus is pegged to the price of the oil basket, and the
latter is adjusted on a quarterly basis, Belarus saw quarterly changes
in the gas price. The average annual gas price came to USD 185 per
1,000 cubic meters, an increase of 15.6% from 2009. Gas price
fluctuations are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Dynamics of gas import prices, 2011–2010
Note: VAT not included
Source: Belstat statistical committee
Gas transit remained almost unchanged in 2010 compared with
previous years, at 43.2 billion cubic meters, down 3% from the 2009 level.
It is the maximum transit volume that the Belarusian gas transport
system can deal with. The government expects a reduction in Russian
4 According to First Deputy Energy Minister Eduard Tovpenets, articles 8.1
and 8.2 in the contract between Gazprom and Beltransgaz enable the parties
to resolve disputes by way of negotiations, which may take up to 45 days,
however, this condition was not met. Besides, “we have not paid for gas sup
plies in the first four months in full, but the deficit is about 15%, not even
close to 85%”.
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gas transit through its territory by around a quarter in the next few years
because of the projected launch of Nord Stream and South Stream gas
mains. Transit by YamalEurope gas pipeline amounted to 27.9 billion
cubic meters in 2010, down 8% yearonyear, and by Beltransgaz
pipelines reached 15.3 billion cubic meters, up 7%.
Tariffs for consumers
In February 2010, natural gas rates for corporate consumers and indi
vidual entrepreneurs were raised by 25% to USD 217 per 1,000 cubic
meters from USD 174, and in summer, rates were additionally increased
by 13.2% to USD 240 per 1,000 cubic meters (VAT not included). Gas
tariffs for households remained unchanged, at around USD 158 per 1,000
cubic meters. The gap in tariffs thus widened, and subsidies of house
holds by industrial gas consumers became even stronger.
Electricity sector
The Belarusian power grid includes six independent regional
republican unitary enterprises, or RUPs5, also called oblenergos and
HV power lines connecting them to power grids of neighboring
countries (Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland). This system is
governed by Belenergo concern, which is accountable to the Energy
Ministry of Belarus. The power grid of the country is a vertically
integrated company, in which generation, transfer and distribution
are not separated.
Electrical power generation in Belarus totaled 34.5 billion kilowatt
hours (kWh) in 2010, a rise by 14% from 2009. Import of electricity fell
34% yearonyear in 2010 to 2.97 billion kWh because of tariff
disagreements with Russia. Ukraine provided most of the country’s
imports, with 2.94 billion kWh, whereas Russia delivered only 30.3
million kWh of electricity. In 2010, Belarus exported 270 million kWh
of electricity, mostly to Lithuania (there were no electricity exports in
2009). The low volume of export may be attributed to difficult
conditions of supplies to the Baltic States. In 2010, electricity tariffs
for households remained unchanged, at USD 0.05 per kWh. In 2010,
electricity rates for industrial consumers were raised twice, in February
and August. The combined increase in prices was at 33%, to USD 0.144
5 RUP stands for Republican Unitary Enterprise. All oblenergos are state con
trolled; there are no plans to turn them into joint stock companies.
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from USD 0.114. Therefore, despite relatively cheap natural gas, which
is currently the key raw material used to generate electrical power,
and low costs (labor, etc.), Belarusian electricity rates for industrial
companies are close to those European and highest in the CIS. There
are a few reasons for this: there is crosssubsidy to compensate for
lower rates for households; some of the costs to generate heat are
passed on to electricity producers; the sector remains inefficient and
nontransparent; there are many consumers enjoying reduced rates
(lower tariffs are compensated by the electricity sector itself rather
than the Finance Ministry).
The fact that natural gas prices were growing faster than electricity
tariffs resulted in a dramatic deterioration of the situation in the
electricity industry. Return on sales fell to 2.8% in 2010 from 5–7% in
previous years, mostly owing to the increase in tariffs in the second
half of the year (in JanuaryJune 2010, the electricity sector reported
losses).
Strategy for the development of the energy potential of
Belarus for the period to 20206
The Strategy envisages at least USD 18–19 billion in investments
in modernization of the energy system during that period. Spend
ing on energy saving and promotion of the use of local fuel and
energy resources is estimated at USD 16.9 billion. The strategy will
be financed through state programs from the state support fund,
private and Public Private Partnership (PPP) funds, funds borrowed
from international financial institutions and loans of domestic
banks.
It is planned to invest at least USD 1 billion in the electricity
industry annually. Most of the investments will be channeled into the
Belarusian nuclear power plant – projected investments total USD
9.334 billion within 10 years.
Furthermore, it is planned to gradually reform the Belarusian
energy system in the next five years (restructuring and tariff reform),
which will be crowned by the creation of the national wholesale market
of electricity (capacity) and privatization of electricity suppliers. The
energy system will be reformed in three phases by 2015.
6 Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1180 dated August 9, 2010.
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Conclusion
In 2010, the energy sector continued providing substantial currency
and budget proceeds, however, the volume of revenues markedly
decreased. The transition to market prices in energy trade with Rus
sia affects both the macroeconomic stability in the country and the
sustainability and competitiveness of the energy sector. The shortage
of funds to finance modernization in the Belenergo system, limited
financing capacity of the state budget, as well as regulated prices and
tariffs reduce the efficiency of energy enterprises. Furthermore, the
current privatization strategy and approach to the engagement of tech
nical assistance from specialized international organizations restrains
the capacity of the sector to attract foreign investments.
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FOREIGN INVESTMENTS: NOT ONLY LURE
THEM, BUT MAKE THEM WORK
Maria Akulova
Summary
When it comes to Belarusian efforts to attract foreign investments, the year
2010 looked a lot like the previous year. Foreign capital inflow kept growing at
a slow pace; there were no major privatization deals, as the state is still unwilling
to put up for sale large property units and is reluctantly ready to cede control
only in insignificant enterprises.
Nevertheless, the year 2010 was marked by the country’s successful debut on
European stock markets with issuing Eurobonds, listed at the Luxembourg
Stock Exchange in summer. Furthermore, important steps were made to
increase the investment appeal of the country: in 2010, the government
abolished licensing of many business activities and lifted the ban on sale of
shares of Belarusian joint8stock companies, a move contributing to a recovery
of the domestic stock market.
Tendencies:
• FDI does flow into the country, albeit at a very slow rate; privatization is
pursued on a case8by8case basis and looks like a forced measure rather
than an instrument to introduce structural economic changes;
• New financial instruments are tested; the country enters international stock
markets with its debut Eurobond issue;
• Loans still dominate in the structure of foreign financing;
• A number of regulatory documents are adopted to enhance the investment
attractiveness of the country.
The state had pinned high hopes on the year 2010 when targeting
external sources of financing. Belarus had planned to attract USD 5.6
billion in foreign investments, of them USD 2.8 billion, or exactly one
half, in FDI. By October 1, 2010, FDI inflow had reached USD 1.27
billion, which was short of the target.1  Against the first three quarters
of 2009, when FDI inflow amounted to USD 1.22 billion, there was a
slight increase in the share of FDI in the overall volume of external
financing, to 26% from 23%; however, in JanuarySeptember 2010,
gross foreign investments shrank 5.3% yearonyear.
Also in JanuarySeptember 2010, Belarus’ foreign liabilities
expanded 16%, or by USD 3.533 billion, to reach USD 25.593 billion
1 See: http://nbrb.by/statistics/BalPay/Comment/2010_3.pdf.
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on October 1, 2010, or 48.8% of GDP. Although the country’s foreign
liabilities stood only at USD 6.844 billion, or 18.5% of GDP, back in
2007, last year’s increase was well within permissible limits, especially
compared with neighboring countries. However, it is not the amount
of the debt that is alarming, but the growth rate. As of October 1, 2010,
state foreign debt, including the debt of the government and corporate
debts guaranteed by the government, was at USD 9.97 billion, an
increase by USD 1.607 billion from the start of the year, or by 19.2%,
and reached 19.5% of GDP (with the permissible limit previously
approved at 20%). Since it will soon be time for Belarus to repay the
loans it took in 2008 and 2009 and pay interests on Eurobonds, this
pace is truly alarming, as it is not quite clear how the government
plans to service this debt.
As is known, foreign investments in Belarus are divided into three
categories – FDI, portfolio investments and other foreign liabilities
of the country. Practice shows that now that the market of corporate
bonds is underdeveloped, only the capital coming as FDI is capable
of facilitating modernization and enhancement of competitiveness.
The remaining types of financing aim at tackling other problems: they
help improve the current situation and shore up gold and foreign
exchange reserves with a view to further servicing the foreign debt
and covering the balance of payment deficit.
The structure of foreign investments in the first three quarters of
2010 indicates that “other foreign liabilities”, that is credits and loans
of the government and banks, as well as commercial loans, accounted
for 54% of overall investments. FDI made up 26% of gross capital
inflows in JanuarySeptember 2010, and portfolio investments made
up 20% of the total.
Foreign Direct Investments
The year 2010 did not see a breakthrough in Belarus’ efforts to lure
FDI compared with the previous year: we already mentioned that Be
larus attracted only USD 1.27 billion in FDI in the first three quarters
of the year. FDI in Belarus may be split into two groups: Greenfield
investment, or financing of enterprises and facilities built from scratch,
and mergers and acquisitions. The latter currently dominates in Be
larus. The relatively slow increase in FDI inflows in JanuarySeptem
ber 2010 may be attributed to a few factors. Firstly, the presidential
election in late 2010 and likely economic reforms that were supposed
to follow stopped potential investors from making hasty decisions.
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Secondly, relations with the Russian Federation remained cool as never
before throughout the year. Given the direct dependence of Belarus
on its eastern partner, the tensions increased investment risks and
prompted investors to take a pause and see what happened. Thirdly,
the government gave halfhearted consent to privatization transac
tions considering privatization only from the fiscal point of view. As a
result, there were very few privatization deals.
The key M&A transactions included first of all the transfer of the
fourth and final USD 625 million installment by Russian gas giant OAO
Gazprom for the remaining 12.5% shareholding in OAO Beltransgaz.
In the spring of 2010, Belarus sold a 52% stake in OAO Minsk watch
plant to Swiss Franck Muller for USD 12.6 million. Russian OAO Katren
paid some USD 30 million for a 51% stake in pharmaceutical company
Dominantapharm.
Furthermore, Lithuanian distributor company Ipsun acquired a
90% interest in leasing company Belfin for USD 5 million. In the autumn
of 2010, Danish brewery Carlsberg bought a 25% stake in Belarusian
Olivaria brewery for USD 10 million and increased in shareholding in
the company to 55% from 30%. OAO Gomelsteklo and German Hom
Glass Industries AG reached an agreement on supplies of equipment
for Gomelsteklo modernization worth a total of EUR 35 million. Finally,
in late 2010, Turkish Turkcell transferred a USD 100 million tranche
to Belarus under the 2008 agreement to buy an 8% stake in ZAO BeST.
When it comes to Greenfield investments, one of major transac
tions of 2010 was an investment agreement on the construction of a
logistical center in Minsk worth an estimated EUR 15 million between
Belgospischeprom concern and Cypriot Lebortovo Capital Partners
Limited, inked in February. In summer, Lithuanian Vakaru Medienos
Grupe in association with Swedish IKEA signed an agreement with
Mogilev region administration on the construction of a vertically
integrated woodworking complex in the free economic zone Mogilev,
including factories making veneer and other products from wood chips
with a total value of EUR 64.3 million. German Enertag and Minsk
region administration in 2010 signed an agreement on the construction
of a wind farm. In addition, Alutech and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) signed a deal to finance a EUR 22 million plant to
make aluminum constructions in Belarus.
The III Belarusian Investment Forum in Frankfurt am Main held
in November 2010 was also quite successful. Compared with the first
forum of this kind in London back in 2008, the German forum saw not
only many more projects and guests, but also more agreements. The
261
fact that deals were signed in many sectors of economy proves that
Belarus has lots of promising areas to develop in future. However, since
most of the agreements signed during the forum were statements of
intent, it will depend on the economic situation in the country, political
and economic risks, as well as the general investment climate whether
they will be successfully implemented. In other words, it will take time
to see whether the investment forum was efficient or not.
As can be seen from the above, there were some sporadic
successful transactions in 2010, however, the government never made
up its mind to allow structural privatization of any large significant
enterprises that truly interest foreign investors and instead put up for
sale a few less substantial entities in a bid to “minimize losses”. The
few attempts to privatize statecontrolled enterprises were not
successful, though. In order to get the final installment of the IMF
loan under the SBAsupported economic program, the state opened
competitive tenders to sell state stakes in five companies: OAO
Bobruisk Engineering Plant (starting price set at BYR 16.75 billion),
OAO VolMET (BYR 2.54 billion), OAO Barkhim (BYR 32.97 billion),
OAO Lida casting and mechanical plant (BYR 12.26 billion), and OAO
Rechitsa textile (BYR 23.9 billion). There were a couple of attempts to
auction state stakes in those five companies, however, there were no
bids from potential buyers.
Why were foreign investors not interested in the Belarusian
companies? The main reason was, as always, the price, as well as long
lists of additional conditions and requirements that buyers were
supposed to meet. The price of state assets remains the main obstacle
impeding fast privatization. Belarusian regulations disallow
privatization of enterprises in which the market value of assets is below
the balance sheet value, and, naturally, investors are not ready to pay
precrisis prices for Belarusian enterprises given the current market
situation, competitiveness of the companies that are currently “up for
grabs” and risks inherent in Belarus, both economic and political. In
addition to high prices, Belarus also demands that future investors
preserve the number of jobs and the core activity of the companies in
question and contribute considerable monetary and nonmonetary
assets to the development of the companies. As a result, potential
investors were not interested, there were no bids, and the auctions
were frustrated.
Two more issues that still remain undecided are the sale of OAO
Belinvestbank and a shareholding in OAO Belaruskali. The govern
ment made up its mind on the bank long ago, whereas Belaruskali has
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always been the country’s contingency plan for the worstcase
scenario: no one wants to give up one of very few blue chips. The
government has not reached price agreements with investors on either
project: OAO Belinvestbank was put up for sale at USD 530 million
(the government cited its systemic role as one of Belarus’ five largest
banks). However, BPSBank, which is larger than Belinvestbank, was
sold for USD 280 million in 2009, so it will be very hard for the
government to find an investor ready to cough up almost twice as much
for a smaller bank. The same applies to OAO Belaruskali: in 2010,
Belarus was ready to sell 25% in the potash maker for USD 67 billion,
but there have been no specific proposals for concrete investors so
far: potential buyers believe the Belarusian administration has set an
unreasonably high price.
Portfolio investments
As for portfolio investments, the year 2010 differed radically from pre
vious years: in summer, Belarus completed its debut placement of five
year Eurobonds totaling USD 1 billion with an average weighted cou
pon yield of 8.7% and biannual coupon payments2. In addition, Be
larus placed twoyear bonds on the Russian market, worth RUR
7 billion, at a rate of 8.7% and quarterly coupon payments3. Belarus
clearly benefited from the new financing instrument, which enables
it to borrow for long periods of time. The country’s entering the glo
bal stock market increased investors’ interest and awareness, which
means further cooperation is facilitated, provided the country pur
sues the right economic policy.
However, buyers of Belarus’ debt securities on foreign stock
markets are not supposed to demand structural reforms in Belarus;
the only thing they are genuinely interested in is the profit, whereas
loans extended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presuppo
sed certain commitments of the borrower under the agreed programs.
Since the Belarusian government is intimidated by any sort of change,
this peculiar feature of deals with debt securities makes bond offerings
a welcome instrument. The high price of borrowing through bond
placement is a major disadvantage, though, because the coupon rate
2 See: http://www.cbonds.info/by/rus/emissions/emission.phtml/params/
id/12968.
3 http://www.cbonds.info/by/rus/emissions/emission.phtml/params/id/
13672
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of 8.7% is quite high (especially given the fact that prior to its default,
Greece placed its Eurobonds at a rate of 6.2%). Unfortunately, there
are no indications now that prices will come down soon. On the
contrary, the events that followed the presidential election of late 2010
will likely result in higher rates. The new sevenyear USD 800 million
Eurobond offering in January 2011 proved this: Belarus will have to
pay coupons at a rate of 8.95%4.
Other foreign liabilities
Other foreign liabilities decreased 30.5% yearonyear in JanuarySep
tember to USD 2.708 billion as of October 1, 2010. The chief channels
of “other foreign liabilities” were inflows of foreign credits and loans
(71.8%) and foreign trade loans (38.7%), whereas nonresidents’ bank
accounts and deposits with Belarusian banks, as well as “other liabil
ities to nonresidents” shrank 1.8% and 8.7%, respectively, indicat
ing outflows of investments.
Most of the foreign credits and loans were from commercial
banks and the final installment of the IMF loan under an economic
program supported by a Stand3By Arrangement, which reached USD
638.5 million. Commercial banks borrowed USD 1.241 billion,
including USD 832.6 million in shortterm loans. Significant loan
deals concluded by Belarusian banks included a EUR 103 million
subordinated loan to Belarusian ZAO Bank Trade Capital from
Iranian Tejarat and two syndicated loans taken by ASB Belarusbank
in early and late 2010, amounting to USD 60 million and USD 145
million. Both loans were taken in order to support exportoriented
Belarusian producers, credit domestic investment projects, finance
modernization and upgrade of productions and construction
operations.
In the first three quarters of 2009, Belarus observed a totally
different trend, as banks’ liabilities under foreign loan agreements
decreased by USD 322.8 million. This dramatic change in the situation
with foreign loans is attributed to the policy of the central bank, which
was insisting on commercial banks’ cutting their loan rates for
companies. The demand was not unreasonable, because the National
Bank had to take measures to encourage the real sector by facilitating
lending by commercial banks. On the other hand, soft loans to
4 See: http://www.cbonds.info/by/rus/emissions/emission.phtml/params/
id/14035.
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inefficient companies and bankrupt ones increase both the burden
on the banking system and the economy’s debt to banks.
Arrangements to attract foreign financing and improve the
investment climate in 2010
Last year was not really rich in economic reforms or arrangements
designed to encourage foreign investors. Nevertheless, some progress
was reached, which means the situation may change for the better in
the future.
1. Establishment of the government agency “National Investment
and Privatization Agency”
On May 25, 2010, the Belarusian president signed ruling #273
on the establishment of the government agency “National Investment
and Privatization Agency” (NIPA)5. The objective of the new structure
is to increase the efficiency of privatization in Belarus and promote
constructive dialogue between potential investors and state authorities
of Belarus, which is expected to increase the overall level of Belarus’
investment appeal internationally.
As of today, none of the NIPA objectives has been attained.
Although the ruling was approved back in May 2010, the documents
to flesh out the framework of the new agency are still discussed and
reviewed by concerned authorities. Furthermore, it is not clear yet
what the NIPA administration will be guided by when identifying state
run entities for sale, as it is the State Property Committee that is
responsible for privatization now (however, it is no secret  that all
decisions regarding privatization transactions in Belarus are approved
personally by the president). Under the circumstances, the relevance
of the newly established privatization champion is somewhat doubtful.
2. Abolition of licensing of some business activities
On September 1, 2010, the president signed ruling #450 on
licensing of some activities6. Given the propensity of the state
authorities to exercise total control over all types of business activities
in Belarus, the document is supposed to have a major positive impact
on investment inflows. Starting January 1, 2011, the state considerably
expanded the list of activities that businesses can engage in without
taking out licenses. Licensing was abolished for woodworking,
extraction of minerals, fishing and hunting business, auditing
5 See: http://www.pravo.by/WEBNPA/text.asp?RN=P31000273.
6 See: http://www.pravo.by/WEBNPA/text.asp?RN=P31000450.
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activities, travel services, transport and forwarding business, geodesic
and mapmaking activities, and retail, except for retail of tobacco
goods and alcohol. The president also abolished licensing of invest
ment funds’ business, which is expected to foster the development of
the financial and stock markets of the country.
3. Abolition of the moratorium on sale of shares.
On January 1, 2011, Belarus lifted the ban on sales of shares in
jointstock companies7. The move will encourage the Belarusian stock
market, which had remained passive in the past few years. Potential
buyers of shareholdings in Belarusian companies are also expected
to step up their efforts to grab larger stakes in most appealing
businesses. Furthermore, the decision will result in an increase in
domestic investments, because households, entrepreneurs and
companies have been offered additional instruments to improve their
wellbeing or gain additional profits through acquisition or sale of
shares.
4. Directive № 4 on liberalization.
Directive № 4 “On the development of entrepreneurial initiative
and encouragement of business activity in the Republic of Belarus”8
was adopted on the last day of the year. The document aims at
enhancing the protection of investors’ and entrepreneurs’ property
rights and will definitely boost business initiative in the country. The
directive stipulates more liberal priceformation and labor compen
sation methods, preferential tax treatment of some activities or even
abolition of taxation and reduction in the number of documents
required to conduct business. On the other hand, some problems still
remain. One of them is the implementation timeframe; besides, the
directive fails to provide the stock market of the country with promised
incentives, whereas the insurance market still expects equal treatment
of stateowned and private insurers.
Forecast for 2011
Given the current uneasy situation, which is further aggravated by
the events that took place following the presidential election in late
2010, experts agree that the year will be very tough. On the one hand,
the discrepancies in BelarusianRussian relations that entailed a re
duction in support from the eastern neighbor make further conces
7 See: http://www.stock.bcse.by/index.phtml?page=35056&iid=38875.
8 See: http://www.president.gov.by/press107177.html.
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sional lending and supplies of resources at relatively low prices quite
unlikely in the near future. On the other hand, the harsh response of
both the US and EU to the events of December 19, 2010 and nonrec
ognition of the election results that came later will definitely affect
the investment attractiveness of the country.
Furthermore, the decision of the state to adopt the operational
administration scheme at ZAO Pinskdrev in early 2011 became another
controversial step increasing investment risks, as investors may have
concerns about the real degree of investor protection in Belarus. The
country should not expect many investors to come to Belarus and
acquire or found an enterprise locally. Under the circumstances,
foreign capital will only be interested in the socalled “blue chips”
larger strategic companies that form the backbone of the Belarusian
economy, especially OAO Belaruskali, OAO BelAZ, OAO MAZ.
It looks like Belarus will have to sell at least one of them eventually,
even if potential investors offer lower prices. Belarus will definitely
continue offering Eurobonds on European and Russian markets.
However, given the current attitude of the West to the Belarusian
administration, the coupon yield of 8.7% of the debut Eurobond issue
seems quite lucky, and further issues will prove much costlier. The
chance is slim Belarus will be able to borrow from the IMF or any other
international organization again, because Belarus failed to meet its
commitments as soon as it received the final tranche of the loan, and
in order to apply for a new loan, the Belarusian authorities will have
to pursue the economic reforms that the West originally expected.
Should Belarus wish to borrow from Russia or China, the country will
very likely get into the area of influence of the creditor.
The Belarusian authorities will have to respond to very serious
challenges in 2011. Although the situation still remains stable (it is
not 2012, when the state will have to spend considerably to service
the foreign debt), there is too little time left for the government to
persuade investors to get back into the country. It looks like the
government will have to make concessions to receive foreign
financing, and further liberalization and economic reforms seem to
be the best options for the authorities, or else they will have to put
state property up for sale at giveaway prices. Last year’s arrangements
to liberalize and develop the stock market will have a positive effect;
however, as things stand now, they are simply not enough.
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AGRICULTURE: GROWTH AMID POVERTY
Konstantin Skuratovich
Summary
The year 2010 proved quite successful for Belarusian farms. Despite the
unprecedented heat last summer, gross farm output increased from 2009,
profitability went up, and the share of loss8making farms fell. At the same time,
production costs soared, and so did debts of the sector to the national economy.
Because of their low paying capacity, farms remain the weakest link in the
chain of settlements between economic entities and the largest and least reliable
borrower. The problem of technical modernization of farms is tackled chiefly
through additional lending. Belarusian agribusiness is up against a new
challenge – to increase production volumes and exports.
Tendencies:
• Increase in farm production and reduction in losses of Belarusian farms are
not enough to cut the combined debt of the sector;
• Agribusiness, the largest borrower of all branches of economy, pays its
workers the lowest wages;
• Government keeps increasing loans to the sector to promote further growth
in production and export.
Growth in output amid growing debts
According to the National Statistical Committee, overall farm pro
duction reached BYR 30.8 trillion in 2010, an increase of 2% yearon
year in comparable prices. Belarusian farms reported BYR 16.6 tril
lion in revenues, up 17.5% on the year, production costs went up 12.5%
to BYR 13.4 trillion, and net profit hiked 54.8% from 2009 to BYR 1.9
trillion. Sales margin increased to 4.2% from minus 0.2%, the number
of lossmaking farms fell to 20 from 32 (their share went down to 1.2%
from 1.9% of the total number of farms), and net loss dropped to BYR
39.7 billion from BYR 45 billion.
At first thought, last year proved rather successful for Belarusian
agricultural enterprises. Despite the abnormally hot summer, the
country managed to increase farm output from previous year’s level,
saw higher profits, lower losses and smaller share of lossmaking farms.
One thing that is alarming is the substantial increase in production
costs, which will inevitably entail a rise in food prices. The financial
results of Belarusian agricultural organizations are traditionally a
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matter of concern. As of January 1, 2011, farms’ receivables were at
BYR 2.2 trillion in current prices, a rise of 29.4% from January 1, 2010.
Overdue receivables went up by BYR 26 billion to BYR 489 billion,
and their share in total receivables rose to 22.4%. Although gross
production increased 2% yearonyear in 2010, the growth was
discounted by poor financials: overdue credit commitments of
Belarusian farms rose 16.7% in 2010 to reach BYR 2.2 trillion.
Agricultural enterprises therefore accounted for 35.9% of total overdue
debts under loan agreements in the country. Overdue payables
exceeded receivables 4.6 times as of January 1, 2011.
As of January 1, 2011, farms were responsible for 32.3% of overall
arrears of taxes and dues, and social security payments in the country
and 66% of overdue loans. Due to their insufficient paying capacity,
farms appear to be the weakest link in the chain of settlements between
economic entities and the largest and least reliable borrower (although
the share of agribusiness in the country’s GDP is below 10%).
Respites, preferences, debt remissions
The financial performance of the agricultural sector seems quite
poor, however, in reality it is even less satisfactory, given the large
share of farm produce made by private households and farmers.
According to Belstat statistical committee, farmers and private
households account for a third of the entire agricultural output in
the country. We cannot provide precise statistics here, however,
since all the remaining indicators are taken from official sources,
we will have to draw this conclusion. In this case, the share of state
controlled (“organized”) agribusiness in the country’s GDP stood
as low as 6–7% in 2010, with overall output amounting to BYR 20–
21 trillion in value terms.
When assessing the financial standing of Belarusian farms
accountable to the Agriculture Ministry, we have to bear in mind that
all of them were allowed to repay current liabilities in installments
within 10 years of March 1, 2010, when a corresponding presidential
ordinance came into effect. The overall debt of Belarusian farms was
cut by BYR 1.6 trillion, to BYR 7.7 trillion. Overall liabilities of domestic
farms stood at BYR 20 trillion as of March 1, 2010, and by the end of
the year, farms’ total debt must have exceeded BYR 22 trillion.
Judging by the current financial situation in the sector and trends
of the previous couple of years, we can make a definite conclusion
about the prospects of financial rehabilitation of agricultural organi
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zations. As of today, there are no prerequisites for major improvements
in farms’ financial health.
Nevertheless, Belarusian agribusiness has very ambitious targets
to meet. Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich set the agricultural
sector a task to increase export of produce to USD 7 billion annually
by 2015 while ensuring at least a USD 4 billion trade surplus. Such a
foreign trade breakthrough would be an extremely tough task even if
Belarus were able to keep a very high pace of agricultural production
and secure sustainable financial performance. However, as Myasni
kovich himself had to admit, “the economic situation in the sector is
bad… outrageous.”1 The premier worries about the impossible debt
burden on agricultural producers and calls on the government to “deal
with it.” How can this problem be addressed? Thus far, the relations
between farms and creditors have been built on a most simple scheme:
decisions would be made to reschedule loans, the debt would not be
pegged to the inflation rate and farms would easily repay it within a
few of years. Alternatively, a “zero option” was used: debts would be
written off to offer borrowers a clean slate for further relations with
creditors. The government would also resort to increasing procure
ment prices of farm produce in a bid to balance the debtorcreditor
relations.
Mixed economy, modifications in statistical recording,
farm production in the private sector
Belarus has a mixed agricultural economy, with state organizations
(experimental facilities, institutes, seed and breeding farms, subsidiary
and test/experimental units with educational and scientific facilities),
agricultural production cooperative societies and other organization
having the same legal status, farm enterprises, personal subsidiary
plots and gardening cooperatives. The law has prohibited the autho
rities to interfere with the work of organizations that are not subordi
nate to the Agriculture Ministry; however, statistical agencies keep
adding their production volumes to the figures reported by state
controlled farms accountable to the ministry to have gross farm output
figures. At the same time, the responsibility for meeting production
targets lies with the ministry, region and district executive committees.
Back in the 1990s, when partial liberalization of land relations
resulted in a sharp increase in production by the private sector,
1 See: BelTA // http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/economics?id=542724.
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administrative and controlling agencies seemed quite satisfied with
improved statistics. However, market reforms were phased out shortly
afterwards; the situation was further deteriorated by depopulation
trends, especially in rural areas. In the period between the two
population censuses of 1999 and 2009, rural population fell by 645,000
people, or 21%, to 2.439 million people. In that decade, the number of
rural households, key agricultural production units, dropped 18%, or
by 1,041 units.2 These precise figures are not good enough to determi
ne the real reduction in the rural production potential, because the
natural loss of population is caused by ageing. Senior citizens residing
in the countryside are not only demotivated, but also incapable of
working on their personal subsidiary plots as intensively as before.
It appears the initiative expressed by then Agriculture Minister
Semyon Shapiro – to set growth targets for agribusiness annually
without including the combined output of private plots – became
quite popular with professionals despite the fact that the government
dismissed it. The minister claimed the target should be modified,
because the output of private subsidiary plots kept falling, and the
process was unstoppable. Since private plots account for 36% of the
gross farm output in the country, the tendency toward a farm
production cutback (by around 5% yearonyear) in the country may
only be offset by at least a 19% increase in output by farms subordinate
to the ministry3. The Agriculture Ministry is naturally unwilling to bear
responsibility for the farms and plots that it cannot influence directly.
In addition, officials could have major concerns about the authenticity
of statistical information about the output of private subsidiary plots.
The thing is that statistical data are taken from registers compiled by
village councils based on the information that households provide on
a voluntary basis, therefore, there is sufficient room for manipulation
(village executive committees that are supposed to report relatively
favorable statistics are virtually forced to fudge figures).
Common sense finally prevailed, when the Council of Ministers
issued resolution No. 88 to oblige BelStat to conduct random tests of
private plots and use the findings as the basis for reports on farm
production. According to Belstat specialists, some 600 plots must be
surveyed to get objective information (about 0.3% of the total number).
Surveys will be conducted by 80 professional interviewersstatisticians
2 See: National Statistical Committee of Belarus // http://belstat.gov.by/
homep/ru/indicators/pressrel/Census_households.php.
3 See: Interfax News Agency // http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/61339.
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who will receive bonuses of BYR 875,000, or USD 290, in addition to
their monthly wages.
The proprietors of subsidiary plots are expected to take part in
questionnaires voluntarily; they will be paid one base unit of BYR
35,000 a month. Surveys of this kind conducted abroad proved quite
efficient4, and Belarus hopes the global experience will help it receive
authentic statistics of farm output by private subsidiary plots.
Budget cooperatives, compensations, low incomes
Given the prevalence of cooperative organizations in the agricultural
sector, it would be more reasonable to address incomes of coopera
tive members rather than wages, or at least split the incomes received
in advance to pay compensations and those received at the end of the
business year. Since farms quite frequently report losses instead of
profits, cooperatives do not pay their members any bonuses, howev
er, they do not make deductions from the sums already paid, either.
It is for that reason that the specifics of economics within a
cooperative were neglected long ago, and all incomes received by
members of production agricultural cooperatives are accounted for
as “wages”. This illustrates the complete isolation of members of
cooperatives from participating in management processes. In fact,
cooperatives have been transformed into statecontrolled budget
financed organizations, where wages are paid on the socalled
“leftover principle”. In other words, the size of wages is hardly pegged
to economic performance; it is simply pushed toward the level of
compensations paid in other sectors.
For example, in the first quarter of 2010, monthly wages in
Belarusian agribusiness averaged BYR 652,000, 62.7% of the average
wage in the country and 55.6% of the average wage in the manufac
turing sector. In the fourth quarter, the nominal average wage reached
BYR 936,000, up 43% from the start of the year, but the proportion
remained unchanged: 64.5% of the average Belarusian wage and 58.9%
of the average wage in industry.
Agribusiness ranked last by the size of wages in the national
economy in the fourth quarter of 2010, behind public catering with BYR
1.005 million and nonproduction public services with BYR 1.013 million.
Based on sample surveys of households, the average per capita
4 Telegraf // http://telegraf.by/2011/01/vbelarusivvoditsjaobsledovanie
lichnixpodsobnixxozjajstv.html.
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disposable incomes in towns and urbantype settlements were at BYR
781,000, 30% above the average income in rural settlements. On average,
the share of lowerincome households (with disposable incomes below
the minimum subsistence level) in Belarus stood at 3.4%: 2.7% in towns
and urbantype settlements and 5.4% in rural settlements.
Technical retooling: financial problems and efficiency
In 2010, the Belarusian president signed an ordinance on the national
program for supplying agribusiness with modern machinery and
equipment and construction, maintenance and modernization of ag
ricultural facilities for 2011–20155. The program came into effect on
January 1, 2011 and is implemented based on the following scheme.
The Agriculture Ministry and region executive committees adopt
annual equipment procurement plans and submit them to staterun
Belagroservice, which is responsible for bulk purchases financed from
bank loans that are extended against the security of the government
and region executive committees.
In 2011, loans are provided for the period until July 1, 2019 and
are to be repaid starting January 1, 2012 in equal monthly installments
without interest payment. The machines and equipment purchased
under this scheme (on financing lease terms) are transferred to
agricultural organizations6.
The government thus confirms its adherence to the policy of faci
litating technical reequipment of domestic farms by way of concessio
nal lending. The problem is urgent for Belarusian agribusiness: the
physical infrastructure of most farms is outdated, and more and more
machines and tractors need replacements.
However, the main objective of the campaign to reequip the
agricultural sector is to introduce innovative sophisticated technolo
gies, advanced energysaving solutions and methods to increase the
efficiency of the use of material and energy resources rather than to
simply make up for decommissioned machines and equipment. Apart
from organizational matters, in which the country has accumulated
substantial experience (albeit quite ambiguous, experts say), Belarus
will also have to address very serious technical challenges. It is planned
to focus modernization efforts on domesticallyproduced machinery,
which, some experts claim, is better than foreign analogues or at least
5 See: BelTA // http://www.belta.by/ru/articles/officially?cat_id=1402.
6 Agriculture Ministry // http://www.selhoz.by/news/view/1721.
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has comparable characteristics. Many operators of equipment and
independent experts disagree, though.
Availability of farm machines in Belarusian farms7  (late 2010, units)
* Not including tractors with mounted earthmoving, reclamation and other
machines
The key problem is financing, and in the next five years, drastic
measures will be called for to tackle it. During a meeting with the newly
appointed government, Lukashenko admitted that there were serious
defects in the action plan to implement the State program for restora3
7 See: Data Processing Center of the National Statistical Committee of Bela3
rus // http://www.ivcstat.by/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=67&Itemid=65
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tion and development of the village, and emphasized the problem of
efficiency. “Agriculture has not yet reached selfsufficiency and is far
from selffinancing”.
The president was dissatisfied with the range and quality of farm
produce, low increase in exports and absence of visible progress in
approaching new markets. According to him, agribusiness is capable
of achieving financial sustainability by doubling revenues by 2015,
increasing profits at least nine times on the 2010 level and boosting
profit margin to 11%.8 The trend observed in the previous years
continues: the authorities demand improvements in efficiency while
setting ambitious gross production targets.
Conclusion
The year 2010 did not see any new methods to tackle the traditional
problems of Belarusian agribusiness. The key performance indicator
is the growth in farms’ gross output, and the main instrument to at
tain the targets is the bank loan. The debt of the sector grows much
faster than production volumes and export proceeds. In the mean
time, farms that are not subordinate to the Agriculture Ministry ac
count for a third of farm output and do not require budget injections,
partial payment of interests on bank loans from budget funds, debt
remissions and other traditional measures to “support the village”.
The Belarusian agricultural sector is therefore split into two subsystems
with polar organizational systems. On the one hand, there are formally
independent farms subordinate to the Agriculture Ministry that enjoy state
resources either free of charge or at reduced rates; on the other hand, there
are private farms and private plots that are independent of the state both
dejure and defacto. The latter are mostly small commodity productions
(farms) or subsistence plots (households), however, they do produce added
value. On the contrary: agricultural organizations mostly report net losses
(negative added value) – this conclusion can be drawn from comparisons
of the value of output and costs.
All programs to promote agricultural production target exclusively
the farms subordinate to the Agriculture Ministry and offer the good
old solution – production growth through increases in lending
volumes. The poor results registered in the past few years show what
the prospects of the sector look like.
8 See.: BelTA // http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/president/Selskoexozjajst
voBelarusidolzhnovyjtinasamookupaemost—Lukashenko_i_544048.html.
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Dear readers!
BISS Trends is a quarterly analytical survey covering the key political,
economic, social, foreign political and cultural tendencies in
contemporary Belarus. The project is an attempt of an “early warning”
and near realtime contemplation of the modifications that may lay
the foundation for fundamental, core transformations in the country.
BISS Trends presents an assessment of changes rather than the
overall condition; it is an attempt to articulate shifts that may not be
obvious today. A sort of chronicle of contemporary life, BISS Trends
looks into the future and helps shape a vision of the country, in which
we will live tomorrow.
Belarusian Yearbook 2010 presents the BISS Trends issues covering
not only the year 2010, but also early 2011, mostly because of the
December 19, 2010 events that modified the country, altered every
trend that we monitor.
BISS  Trends
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SYMBOLS USED IN THE REPORT:
  progress (upward trend)
    — status quo
—  minimal progress
—  minimal regress
      regress (downward trend)
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# 2 January – March 2010
Executive summary
The basic trends in the political, economic and social life of Belarus in the first quarter of
2010 did not undergo significant changes compared to the previous period. The period under
report was characterized not by new trends but rather by accentuation of existing ones, such
as the dual8track process of ongoing reversal of political liberalization and the simultaneous
continuation of a limited and superficial economic liberalization, which, however, still fails to
bring about any systemic changes. Zigzags in foreign and cultural policies indicate that the
Belarusian authorities are trying to win for themselves room for maneuver, without committing
firmly to a particular scenario of development (liberalization vs. increased repression, pro8
Russian vs. Pro8European vector of foreign policy etc.) This tactic will be feasible and will be
maintained for as long as it will be possible to continue geopolitical maneuvering and obtain
external funding from various sources, separated by fault lines of “civilizational” conflict.
In the political sphere, a paradoxical simultaneous process of political de8liberalization
and democratization (as noted in the preceding report), ceded to a simultaneous regression in
both areas. De8liberalization was manifested in new restrictions on the freedom of speech
(the imposition of government warnings on independent media, searches in the apartments
of journalists) and on the freedom of association (the changes in the law “On public
associations” and “On political parties”), as well as in repressive actions against street protests.
Signs of de8democratization include intensification of pressure on opposition political parties
during the local election campaign, including those ready to serve in election commissions.
Already in the first quarter of 2010 it became clear that local elections would not bring any
noticeable breakthrough in the political life of the country, and will not be a factor in the
democratization of Belarus.
In the area of economic policy, we note the continuation of facade liberalization triggered
by short8term needs of securing foreign loans and investments, and bringing no fundamental
changes to the rules of the game in the economy. Thus, legislative changes the field of taxation,
international trade, and credit, have been made with only one purpose: that is, to increase the
rating of Belarus in the World Bank report Doing Business Report. More fundamental changes,
such as privatization, were ruled out. At the same time, the Belarusian authorities, in our
opinion, have shown signs that they might have reconsidered their approach to privatization
of enterprises where the change in ownership and restructuring may involve the dismissal of
employees (as shown by the privatization of the Minsk watch factory).
In the field of quality of governance and the rule of law, we mark a minimal improvement
related, again, to the work of the government to bring Belarus into the top 30 countries of the
World Bank rating. Most measures taken by the government and discussed in the report
remain being draft laws.
In the geopolitical orientation, we mark a certain crisis in the “multi8vector” policy of the
Belarusian authorities: the inability to stop political repression led to a further deterioration of
relations with the EU (the conflict around the Union of Poles in Belarus), while relations with
Russia have been soured by disagreements over the Customs Union. Attempts to find new
BISS  Trends
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vectors of foreign policy through economic cooperation with Venezuela and China may not
provide tangible economic results, but will make good PR on the background of a crisis in
relations with the “geopolitical monsters”. At the same time, attempts by Lukashenko to bring
Latin American oil to Europe may have interesting long8term consequences for the entire
region.
Finally, in the field of cultural policy, we note a continuation of the policy of limited
Belarusization, and Europeanization. As we predicted, the authorities have launched a new
campaign to strengthen the Belarusian identity, the country observed the day of the Belarusian
language, cultural ties with European countries (France, Italy, Lithuania, Greece) have intensified.
For the first time, an official who allowed derogatory remarks against the Belarusian language
and culture was subject to punishment: such statements were a commonplace among top
officials just a few years ago.
TREND 1
Political democratization and liberalization 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
The trend of political de8liberalization identified in the preceding period largely continued
in the first quarter of 2010. Political liberalization has halted in the field of freedom of speech
and of freedom of association, with even liberal rhetoric in these areas having come to naught.
Repression against street protesters continued with the same intensity as in the previous
period. We view this not as a short8term lapse of liberalization during the local council elections,
but rather as a long8term trend that will go on for at least the duration of a “grand political
year” (i. e., until the end of the election campaign in early 2011).
In the field of political democratization, the authorities stick to the rhetoric about the
“unprecedented democratic” nature of the local election campaign, which takes place on
the basis of the modified electoral law. This rhetoric is justified by the window8dressing
improvements in the electoral process (a somewhat larger number of opposition
representatives allowed to join election commissions, there were no refusals to register
initiative groups to collect signatures). These improvements, however, are rather sporadic,
as they do not affect the nature of the campaign as a whole. Pre8election apathy is also
programmed by the “lethargy” of the opposition, which for a large part plays only a nominal
role in the campaign. The repressions against opposition campaign activists had not been
milder compared to previous local elections. Furthermore, it even intensified to some extent,
and sometimes acquired new forms some (e. g., some opposition members of election
commissions have been threatened with dismissal if they do not abandon their work in
commissions).
The authorities continued to skillfully manipulate the dialogue with the West, aptly
discovering and pressing sensitive points. The made8up and unprovoked escalation of the
conflict around the Union of Poles (the stick) was carried out on the background of the “liberal”
(by Belarusian standards) electoral campaign (the carrot) is intended to shift the attention of
Europe towards an issue that is meaningful for the EU but insignificant for the Belarusian
authorities. Once the EU attention is focused on the Union of Poles, it is not paying attention
to the repression against opposition activists at local elections.
Justification for a new trend (January/March 2010)
The rollback of political liberalization has been monitored in all the areas. In the area of
political democratization, we observe new window dressing for achieving the desired election
# 2 January – March 2010
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result by democratic means: this includes activation of pro8government parties, emergence
of new types of informal repression, intensification of the pressure on the opposition members
of election commissions.
In the area of freedom of association, we noted no movement towards liberalization (the
number of newly registered organizations has not increased, none of the organizations created
by government opponents have been registered, several organizations have been refused
registration). Amendments to the Law on Public Associations and to the Law “On political
parties” that entered into force on February 5, 2010, create conditions for further restrictions
on the freedom of association. The authorities failed to fulfill the promise to abolish Article
19381 of the Penal Code.
Warnings to independent media (including the most widely8read independent
newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii, which was issued a second warning within
a year) and to the Belarusian Association of Journalists, were called upon to restrain the
press and to encourage self8censorship in the run8up to important political events. This has
been achieved to some extent, as the editor of the Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii was
replaced. A decree on regulation of the national segment of the Internet was adopted.
Although most odious and controversial provisions in a draft decree leaked in December
2010 were removed, the degree still means, in the opinion of critics, to stifle dissent in
cyberspace.
The number of administrative prosecutions for political reasons in general, and protesters
in particular, has increased slightly compared to the first quarter of 2009. According to the
database of the Human Rights Center Viasna period, there were 7 cases of administrative
arrest recorded (five in the previous period), 84 cases of administrative fines (73 in the previous
period). Street protests were brutally suppressed with no exceptions (in contrast to the previous
quarter).
At the same time, collection of signatures for candidates for local councils (including in
the form of pickets, which now can be done in any non8prohibited areas) has passed without
incidents.
Description of key events that defined assessment of the trend
Local elections in Belarus are insignificant in terms of altering the distribution of power.
This y to campaign, however, clarifies strategies and approaches developed by the authorities
with respect to political liberalization and democratization. Hence, these local elections will
not be as routine for the authorities as it was in previous local elections in 2007. Rather,
they offer an opportunity to work out some new tactics in the conduct of political campaigns
that can be applied on a full scale in the future. Some of these new approaches were observed
beforehand, and can now be observed in their entirety: a demonstrative but formal
consideration of the recommendations by the West in those areas that do not directly affect
the result of the campaign; extension of the freedom of action for the opposition in
campaigning and information work with the expectation that the internal contradictions and
opposition’s own weakness will not allow it to take advantage of these opportunities; the
application of more subtle forms of repression against opposition activists, especially
concealed harassment in the workplace; the manipulation of Western public opinion by
artificially creating controlled conflict situations in sensitive areas such as the Union of
Poles.
Description of additional events
The conflict around the Union of Poles; Searches in apartments of journalists’ (including
offices of BelSAT, Narodnaja Volja, and Charter97); Denial of registration to the Assembly of
Democratic NGOs.
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Description of events contrary to the trend and rationale for why they do not
change the picture
In January, allegations were made by the administration about the possibility of resuming
the work of the Community Advisory Council at the presidential administration. In February,
the President gave an oral order to develop a draft law on alternative military service, after
which the process was initiated to review criminal cases against persons convicted for evading
military service. The politically motivated criminal case against businessman Autukhovich
was heard in an open trial.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
The opposition will enjoy unparalleled opportunities for campaigning in local elections.
This, however, will be offset by the various “technical” difficulties, such as the refusal by the
printing houses to print leaflets of opposition candidates, seizures (including “erroneous”) of
already printed editions, tacit harassment of the campaigners. The number of deputies elected
from the opposition in local councils will be minimal (up to two dozen councilpersons elected
in the rural, possibly district and small town councils). Informal repression will end one month
after the local elections. But at the same time the pressure on the independent media, political
parties and other associations will go on via warning, suspension, verification, and especially
other forms of harassment (tax penalties, claims for defamation of private individuals, measures
to regulate Internet editions). The Advisory and Monitoring Council will be reactivated, but it
will be busy discussing the nature and objectives of this body, rather than substantive issues.
Brief forecast for the entire year
By the end of the year we can expect that criminal persecution for “nonpolitical” articles
of the Criminal Code against distinct opponents of the authorities will resume. Mass protests
will be repressed unceremoniously, and wide8scale administrative harassment of the opposition
will resume with the beginning of the presidential election campaign by the end of the year.
The number of registered newspapers, political parties and associations will not increase,
while the number of registered NGOs in 2010 will be less than a hundred. However, we expect
immediately before the presidential election a possible goodwill gesture to the West (it could
be done, for example, through some form of legalization of the Union of Poles led by Andzelika
Borys).
TREND 2
Economic liberalization —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
The Belarusian authorities continued in the first quarter of 2010 to pursue a limited
liberalization of the economy as was noted in the first issues of BISS Trends. Such liberalization
does not aspire to change the fundamental rules of the game in the economy, but rather to
create a facade of attractiveness for foreign investors in order to solve the short8term goals of
acquiring foreign loans and investments. In the first quarter of 2010 there is also a sharp
increase in undercover fighting of various power clans, seeking to enhance their influence in
the conditions when the amount of available rents is being reduced. Such infighting makes it
impossible to pursue serious institutional changes in both the economy and the structure of
management, as it merely stimulates the search for new sources of financing loyalty, such as
wide8scale nomenklatura privatization. However, the conclusion of the first privatization deal
with the possibility of dismissal of labor (privatization of the Minsk Watch Factory) was a
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landmark event which indicates that the Belarusian authorities may have abandoned some of
its postulates of the old social contract.
Justification of a new trend (January/March 2010)
The main trend of the first quarter of 2010 consisted of the changes in privatization
policy of the authorities. It should be noted that a pilot privatization program pursued in line
with the agreement with the IMF had failed. According to a letter of intent signed by Prime
Minister Sergey Sidorsky and Head of the National Bank of Belarus Petr Prokopovich on
September 30, 2009, the government promised to sell controlling stakes in 5 major state8
owned enterprises through an open, transparent and competitive international tender before
28 February 2010. At the moment (the end of March 2010), the IMF Executive Board completed
the fourth review of the latest stand8by program, and all that was done by the Belarusian side
was a list of 5 public companies, whose shares will be sold at an auction in 2010 with the
participation of an outside consultant (the list was confirmed by the order of President of
Belarus Alexander Lukashenko on March 1, 2010). The list includes the following joint stock
companies: “Babrujsk Machine8Building Plant” (Mahileu Region), “VolMET” (Vaukavysk,
Hrodna region), “Lida Foundry8Mechanical Plant” (Hrodna region) “Barhim” (PM Baranavichy,
Brest region.) and “Rechitsa textiles” (Homel region). Those are relatively small businesses,
and only “Barhim” may be of any interest to investors.
Description of the key events that defined assessment of the trend
In spite of the fact that the authorities are trying to prove their interest in privatization (in
particular, the head of the State Property Committee of Belarus Georgy Kuznetsov reported at
a press conference on February 17 that the Belarusian side intends to prepare orders for the
privatization of 20 other Belarusian enterprises in accordance with the recommendation of the
IMF), the program had not been implemented both in timing and in substance. The first deputy
chairman of the SPC Sergey Pyatkov stated in January 2010 that the privatization of these
enterprises should be implemented, backed by the IMF Privatization Agency. Creation of a
privatization agency was one of the most important structural criteria set up by the IMF stand8
by program. A new trend in the economic liberalization was revealed when preparing the
program: solutions to fundamental problems of economic policy are being delayed because
of the struggle between various power groups for control of structures and resources. In this
case, the Agency was originally planned to be created on the basis of the SPC, the authorities
decided later, however, to create a structure that combines the agency for privatization and
the investment agency.
The evaluation of three out of five companies from the list is done by the Rothschild
group. Its participation is explained by the hope that the consultant evaluating the assets will
be more acceptable from a fiscal point of view. However, the widespread belief is that the
government delays the privatization process, hoping that the pre8crisis prices is questioned
by two scandalous privatization deals.
According to Presidential Decree № 93 signed on March 1, 2010, the government agreed
to sell a plot of land in the center of Minsk of more than 6 hectares to a foreign legal entity
from Oman. Land ownership is transferred for 10 million USD without holding an auction, for
the purpose of constructing a multi functional complex within 6 years. The sale price is
surprisingly low given that the official assessment of the plot value is three times higher than
the sale price. The Land Code forbids selling the land at a price lower than the register value
“unless otherwise is decided by the President”. The only reasonable explanation for this deal
is the existence of certain important component that had not been made public.
Another rather scandalous deal is the sale of the Minsk Watch Plant to the Swiss company
Franck Muller International BV confirmed by Presidential Decree № 109, also on March 1,
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2010. The price of the transaction was once again rather symbolic, having been about USD
12.4 million for a controlling stake of 52% of the shares. The remaining shares owned by the
Belarusian State will be transferred to Franck Muller in trust management. Two years later, the
investor will be allocated 23 hectares of land near Minsk to build a new plant. Despite the
obvious and understated revenue from this sale, the Belarusian authorities are more transparent
in this deal than in the Oman deal. The most valuable asset of a bankrupt plant (according to
Presidential Decree № 24, signed on January 10, 2009, the company was nationalized for the
debts to the budget and for the failure to sell the stocks of finished products that exceeded the
average monthly production volume by 34 times) is the 128storey building of the engineering
corps of the plant. This is over 50 thousand square meters of office space, which may contribute
around 10 million dollars a month at standard current rates once the office space is leased.
The cost of the building is estimated at USD 150–200 million, and it will most likely become
the property of the Presidential Business Office.
There are questions about the foreign investor involved in the transaction. Franck Muller
is in dire financial straits, the company’s tax arrears are roughly equivalent to its annual income.
All business units are under compulsory audit, but its owner – Armenian businessman and
multimillionaire Vartan Sirmakes – recently replaced all auditors. Thus, the deal looks like an
attempt by Franck Muller to save part of the assets of the company from bankruptcy.
The only large privatization deal planned for the year, the privatization of Belinvestbank (valued
at USD 700 million) to a major Western bank is at risk of collapse. Negotiations with the Unicredit
bank have virtually been frozen. Germany’s Commerzbank opted out of the deal last year.
In sum, the open and competitive privatization process declared by the government has
been put on hold, whereas there is a dramatic acceleration of non8competitive non8transparent
privatization of the non8market prices to murky investors, a process that can not even be
called the “nomenklatura privatization”.
Alexander Borovsky, former head of Belneftekhim who was convicted of abuse of power
in early 2008 and granted a presidential pardon, was appointed on December 7, 2009, as
Director8General of the BelavtoMAZ conglomerate. It was assumed that the valuable experience
of crisis management would help the new director to stabilize the situation in one of the most
important economic enterprises in the country (employing together with subcontractors about
100 thousand people). It was reported that “the President gave Alexander Borovsky carte
blanche to bring order in all spheres of business; however, he was instructed not to lay off
cadres but just to get rid of those with dirty hands”.
In fact, MAZ is a model example, on which the anti8crisis microeconomic policy was
supposed to be tested. It became apparent very soon that layoffs can not be avoided: 27
thousand employees produce about 25 thousand vehicles, and the ratio of engineers per
worker is about 8 (the international ratio is up to 1 to 4). An anti8crisis management plan
leaked to the press on February 21, 2010, which envisioned the lay8off of about five thousand
employees, mostly engineers, reduction of working days at the plant (to 16–17 days per
month), restructuring of the wage policy, and he gradual disposal of social provisions. Next
day, however, the plant management denied the authenticity to the plan.
Thus, the fear of the political and social consequences of the layoffs continue to dominate
the economic authorities in the conduct of anti8crisis policy. The economic logic in this case
contradicts with the logic of politics. It is expected that the political will for decisive restructuring
of enterprises will not appear in 2010.
Description of additional events
The second structural criterion of the IMF stand8by program for Belarus, the creation
of the Agency for financial development, failed to be implemented by the Belarusian
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government. It was assumed that the development agency would replace the banks in the
financing of state programs and to take care of the long8term loans under the implementation
of such programs. The IMF believes that the creation of this department will allow the
National Bank of Belarus to stop refinancing banks at non8market terms. Chairman of the
National Bank of Belarus Petr Prokopovich assured as late as on January 27, 2010, that
such agency would be created within days. No documents have been signed until now,
however. Creation and full functioning of the financial agency is a key element of the structural
transformation of the economy. This is perhaps the only way to untangle the complicated
system of cross8subsidization and budget transfers between sectors and enterprises, on
the one hand; and to relieve the banks from the unusual non8market distributive functions
that only increased troubled assets on their balance sheets, on the other. Strengthening the
market orientation of the banking sector would increase the stability of the banking system
and make credit more accessible to private businesses.
Without these measures, the vicious practice of government subsidies to loss8making
branches will go on uninterrupted. Such practice is fully embedded in the Presidential Decree
№ 92 (dated by March 1, 2010, again) “On some issues of agricultural organizations”. The
decree offers agricultural enterprises a 10 year postponement of payments on debts
accumulated by January 1, 2010. The decree envisages to reduce the amount of financial
obligations of agricultural organizations by about 1.6 trillion Belarusian rubles (about USD
600 million), that are basically donated to state agricultural cooperation.
Nevertheless, the requirement of the IMF to reduce the funding of state programs is
formally executed with a joint decree of the government and National Bank of № 352/3
dated by March 17, 2010. The program caps such financing in 2010 at 7.1 % of the previous
years’ level, including no more than 2.5% in the first quarter. On the basis of the approved
resolution, lending to state programs in 2010 should not increase by more than BYR 2.2
trillion in 2010.
The banking system became a battle field of the power struggle of various interest groups.
While Belarus partially fulfilled it promise of the IMF to provide the National Bank with financial
and operational independence by eliminating the Board of Directors of the National Bank of
Belarus, the National Bank is pressured by the Head of Presidential Administration of Belarus
Vladimir Makey to “rejuvenate” its staff (i. e., fire the “veteran” servicemen and hire younger
officials) by about 30 %. This campaign looks like an attempt to “tame” the most liberal and
market8minded state body.
The program of economic liberalization for 2010 has not yet been adopted. The main
obstacle is a draft decree on the reduction of licensed activities. Plans to abolish the licensing
for 16 kinds of economic activity out of the currently licensed 53 kinds (and for 121 sub8kinds
of activities out of 331) have been announced on February 19, 2010. The decree may be
signed on July 1, 2010, however, there is a high probability that the draft will be sent for
revision again, due to a large remaining number of licensed activities.
A half8hearted and cautious approach to price liberalization is demonstrated by the
Presidential Decree № 127 signed on March 1 2010 (again). The abolished state regulation of
prices in restaurants, cafes and bars price of the “first” and “de luxe” categories, which
accounted for only 13% of the total number of catering establishments, and did not tackle the
second category that accounts for the remainder of the market.
Description of events contrary to the trend
A Presidential Decree № 143 “On Certain Tax Matters” on March 9, 2010 repealed the
limits on the expenditure on advertising, marketing, consulting and information services that
can be attributed to the cost of production.
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The same decree established that local councils of deputies, in order to ensure sufficient
funds in local budgets, have “the right to increase (decrease) the rates of land tax, property
taxes for certain categories of taxpayers by no more than two times” in 2010. The desire to
replenish the budget at all costs obviously contradicts the stated goal of reducing the tax
burden. Interestingly, the working group on simplification of the tax system led by Vice8Premier
Andrei Kobyakov already suggested banning local councils from increasing land tax and
property tax.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
The need for external financing from the IMF, which became particularly evident after
the deterioration of the conditions of supply of Russian oil to Belarus, and the need to improve
indicators of investment climate (such as Doing Business rating) will help to fulfill the
requirements and recommendations of international financial institutions without any significant
changes to existing practice of economic management and decision8making.
Brief forecast for the year
Structural changes in the economy and governance, except for simulative measures,
are unlikely during the election year and under the mounting competition for administrative
rents within the elite. The Belarusian economy is bound to be stuck in a pendulum between
a more a “monetarist” policy and the pressure for the “controlled emission of money”. We
predict that the pressure on the National Bank to reduce interest rates on loans to enterprises
and to increase the financing of the real sector of the banking system will intensify (especially
taking into account the exorbitant GDP growth of 11–13% that is officially projected for
2010).
As the government will fail to meet the main structural requirements of the IMF
standby program, the prospects of a new program of assistance from the IMF seem to
be elusive.
The privatization process will be more “polarized” during the year: a more or less authentic
privatization with the participation of international consultants will be restricted to insignificant
deals with medium8sized enterprises, whereas a “strange” nomenklatura privatization of large
objects of state property will go on.
The liberalization of tax law will proceed depending on the state budget on the one hand,
and the need to improve the position of Belarus in the ranking of Doing Business on the other.
Apparently, these two trends will lead together to a superficial reform driven by the rationale
to achieve a better position in the ranking, with effective preservation of the fiscal character of
the tax system.
TREND 3
The quality of governance and the rule of law —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
Taking into account that there were no major changes in the internal and external economic
situation in the first quarter of 2010, in particular the need for investment, the state continues
to actively develop new elements of the reform package announced in 2009. No new important
documents were signed, however, in the period under review. The only exception is Decree
№ 60 on the regulation of the Internet and Decree № 4, which made some changes to the
current economic decrees. Laws on the support of small and medium enterprises, the reform
of procedural law and others remain in draft form only.
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Justification of a new trend (January/March 2010)
A limited liberalization continued in general in the first quarter of 2010. While centralized
management and decision making continues to persist, proposals from interest groups, such
as the views of business associations, are accommodated, though indirectly, in the decision
making process. The structure of the institutions has not changed; however, the goal that was
publicly announced by the president was to optimize it by the end of the year. The first quarter
was marked by the demonstration of an active pursuit of further liberalization in the sphere of
market regulation, infrastructure investment, and law enforcement. The structure of the judicial
and law enforcement system has remained unchanged.
Description of key events that defined assessment of the trend
An illustrative event, highlighting the trend in the first quarter, was a speech by Deputy
Minister of Economy Andrei Tur at the XI Assembly of business circles of Belarus, where a
high official informed the business community and the media about the finalization of the
draft plan of measures to liberalize the conditions for economic activities in 2010. We observe
that the government listens carefully, actively develops and presents liberalization bills, but
currently only a small number of them came into force.
Description of additional events
Activities of the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic
Court of Belarus, such as the development of projects to improve legislation and joint efforts
to develop measures to improve law enforcement, may be indicative for future changes in the
law enforcement environment. Government efforts to introduce an “electronic government”
also testify about the drive to increase the investment attractiveness of the country. The
electronic government will speed up and simplify the interaction of citizens and organizations
with the State.
Description of events contrary to the trend and rationale for why they do not
change the picture
From the perspective of this trend Decree № 60 on the regulation of the Internet can be
viewed in two ways. On the one hand, it imposes on government agencies an obligation to
publish information about their activities on8line, and seeks to protect the property rights of
authors and holders of the rights on intellectual property, which indicates an improvement in
governance. On the other hand, the decree limits the ability to conduct commerce with foreign
information systems and resources, as well as provides for a compulsory registration of all
on8line systems and resources in Belarus.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
In the second quarter of 2010 the development of liberalization initiatives, some of which
will be implemented, will continue. By the end of the spring session, Parliament is expected to
adopt specific legislation, in particular, the law on supporting small and medium businesses.
The regulation of electronic documents will be improved, and rules for registration of Internet
resources will be introduced.
Brief forecast for the entire year
On the eve of the presidential elections, the power vertical will be strengthened. Assuming
the unchanged internal and external economic situation, the government will implement a
“plan of liberalization”, which stipulates, inter alias, the adoption of a new edition of the
Investment Code and simplification of the tax payment procedures. Electronic documents will
be used more actively alongside with the tightening of state control over means of
communication and its contents.
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TREND 4
Geopolitical orientation —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
The trend of a continuing geopolitical maneuvering between East and West described in
the previous issue of BISS Trends largely continued in the first quarter of 2010, with the
exception that Belarus’ position vis8а8vis both “poles” worsened considerably.
Justification of a new trend (January/March 2010)
The deterioration of relations with the EU is manifested in the condemnation by the EU of
actions of the Belarusian authorities against the unrecognized Union of Poles, as well as in the
adoption of a highly critical resolution on Belarus by the European Parliament. The negative
trend on the “Eastern Front” is reflected in the conflict with Russia concerning the conditions
of supply of oil and petroleum products to Belarus.
Description of key events that defined assessment of the trend
The resumption of pressure on the authorities on the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB)
nearly disrupted the planned visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Martynov to Warsaw
and prompted Poland to seek the support of the European Union. The unprovoked attack on
the unofficial Union of Poles was likely meant to precipitate another split in the European
Union on the Belarusian issue (in particular, by pushing Warsaw to advocate harsh sanctions,
which would not be met with sympathy in the “old Europe”). However, the EU Council has
reminded the official Minsk to adhere to its international obligations and to the resolutions of
the European Parliament. A harsh resolution prompted the Belarusian Foreign Ministry to
make a rather harsh statement in return. At the same time, the restrained reaction by President
Lukashenko and the subsequent agreement to establish a bilateral commission for settling
the situation around the Union of Poles have confirmed that the official Minsk left itself the
possibility of maneuver in this matter. Perhaps the recognition of the independent union will
be used by the end of the year to show further “progress” in meeting EU political conditions.
The Belarus8EU relations were further worsened by fundamental differences over the
representation of Belarus in the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly. The offer by the European
parliament to split the country’s representation between members of the National Assembly
and representatives of democratic forces was sharply rejected by the Belarusian authorities. A
compromise could not be reached during a visit of the delegation of the European Parliament
to Minsk.
Tensions heightened in relations with Russia in spite of the completion of certain
formalities connected with the formation of the Customs Union. Final Belarusian8Russian
agreement on the conditions of supply of oil was clearly in favor of Moscow, which, despite
the stubborn resistance of the Belarusian representatives, got almost everything that was
originally set as its goal. Russia also managed to bring the issue of export duties out of
consideration of the Customs Union, postponing the decision for two years that would
presumably be spent for the creation of a single economic space. Belarus lost 0.3% of revenues
from imports in the process of the allocation of duties as compared to the plans at the beginning
of the year. Alexander Lukashenko failed to meet with Vladimir Putin, when he arrived in
Belarus to attend the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Union State. Finally, Minsk
brought the oil dispute with Moscow to court, having sued Russia, on March 25, 2010, in the
Supreme Economic Court of the CIS. This action by itself is rather a demonstrative step, given
the insignificance of the institution: it is highly unlikely that “the case of the Russian oil” will
be actually heard in the court, or, moreover, that the court would dare to pass a verdict against
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Russia. The action should rather be considered as a demonstration by the Belarusian leadership
of its independent status vis8а8vis Russia, which generally fits into the trend of sovereignization
of the Belarus8Russia relations defined by BISS analysts long ago.
Description of additional events
In spite of the seemingly cordial relationship between Lukashenko and the new Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych, his election may actually complicate the ongoing dialogue with
Kiev. It is hard to imagine that the new Ukrainian president will be as actively promoting the
interests of Belarus in the international arena, as did his predecessor, which earned some
kudos from the Belarusians. Moreover, it is possible that official Kiev will compete, from now
on, with Minsk in the struggle for the favors of Moscow. At the same time, it is quite possible
that the Belarusian authorities together with the Yanukovych administration will be able to
solve some of the “long8lasting” issues hindering bilateral cooperation, in particular, the issue
of delimitation of the border.
Travels by Lukashenko to Venezuela and Brazil, by Martynov to Iran, and a visit of the
Vice8President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping to Minsk confirm the commitment
of the Belarusian authorities to increase the number of solid economic partners and to find
alternative sources of energy and credit. These politics are reasonable in principle, but can
hardly make a big difference in the foreseeable future. In particular, it is unlikely that multi8
billion investments promised by China to Belarus will materialize any time soon, as even the
credit lines that are already open have not yet been exploited due to the banal lack of promising
projects in which China would be interested to invest their money (for example, a three billion
swap between Belarus and China endorsed more than two years ago, remains frozen). The
agreement for the supply of Venezuelan oil to Belarus largely belongs to the category of PR.
However, its implementation deserves serious attention. The purpose of Venezuelan oil supplies
to Belarus is to “hack” a transit corridor for non8Russian crude oil to Belarusian refineries. If
this happens, one can seriously talk about other than Russian investors for the privatization of
these refineries. This, in turn, changes the picture in the whole region: in particular, completely
new perspectives emerge from the pipeline Odessa–Brody.
Description of events that ran contrary to the trend but failed to affect the
overall assessment
Martynov visited Poland after all and signed a long8awaited agreement on cross8border
traffic. Another hint at detente of Belarusian8Polish relations was made at the meeting of
Alexander Lukashenko with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski in Kiev,
where an agreement was reached to establish a joint expert group on the Polish minority. But
the Belarusian side has delayed its implementation, so that by the end of the period under
review, the situation remained in limbo. The Belarusian side agreed to interrogate General of
the Belarusian army Valery Ushopchik over his role in the January 1991 massacre as a
commander of the Soviet garrison in Vilnius. This marked a positive shift in relations with
Vilnius. Alexander Lukashenko was invited to take part in celebrating the 20th anniversary of
Lithuanian independence, but abstained from visiting and sent an invitation to President Dalia
Grybauskaite to visit Belarus instead.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
Local elections will not be recognized as free and fair in the West. The National Assembly
will not be present at the EURONEST. This will not lead, however, to a break with the EU,
although the Belarusian side will engage in tough talk over the unfriendly acts by the Union.
So, there is no reason to talk about a radical turn for the worse in the relation with the EU, or,
for that reason, of any change in the current relations.
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As Russia abstained from any exuberant reaction to the demarches of the Belarusian
government, it is likely that the status quo in relations with the Eastern neighbor will be preserved
as well. Minsk will apparently have to settle with the new customs duties on oil, but will use
every opportunity to recover some of the lost cash: either by trying to export duty8free gasoline
from Russia in order to re8sell it abroad, or exclude from the customs union certain categories
of goods (or example, foreign cars), where hikes in customs duties are extremely unpopular
in Belarus.
Brief forecast for the entire year
The vast majority of foreign policy problems that exist between Belarus and the West are
a consequence of the internal policies of the Belarusian leadership. If the Belarusian leadership
perceives a threat to its power position before and especially during the presidential campaign,
it will do everything to keep the situation under control, regardless of the consequences. If
this is not the case, it will try not to exacerbate the problems for no reason. Brussels, on its
side, does not consider radically changing its policy towards Belarus either. In our view, the
stock of “trump cards” that was accumulated in the hands of the Belarusian authorities (new
political prisoners, the Union of Poles, the question of the death penalty), will be gradually
disposed of by the end of the year in an apparent show of continuing liberalization and in
attempt to avoid new sanctions in the aftermath of the elections.
The relationship is with Russia is being increasingly defined by the economic antagonism
between Minsk and Moscow. However, there remains an enormous dependence of Belarus
on Russia, due to which Minsk is unable to take any drastic steps. Therefore, maneuvering
between Russia and Europe, with periodic but not irreversible deterioration of relations with
both partners will remain the core of the foreign policy of the Belarusian authorities throughout
the electoral period. New markets and credit lines will be actively sought in Third World
countries, but Belarusian products exported to third countries. However, new foreign policy
vectors will rather be complementary, and will not alter the overall geopolitical trend.
TREND 5
Cultural Policy: the ambivalence of trends in Belarusization
and Europeanization 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
The first quarter of 2010 largely confirms the prediction in the previous issue of the BISS
Trends, except for the assumption of a possible intensification of anti8Western and anti8
European motifs in the cultural politics of official discourse, which, of course, does not negate
the possibility of reverting to these motifs in the second and third quarters of 2010. The
period under review is characterized in the field of cultural policy by the continuation of the
trend of “relative” Belarusization and enhancing cultural contacts with the European states,
which are dictated by the desire to minimize the potential social and cultural tensions in the
Belarusian society as well as by the need to find a new cultural recipe to legitimize the expanding
contacts with Western states and cultures, which were considered alien to the values of the
local cultural space in the pre8crisis period.
Justification of a new trend (January/March 2010)
The period of January – March 2010 has witnessed intensification of cultural relations
with European countries, which contribute to a rather distinct strengthening of the trend of
Europeanization in the cultural policy. During this period, the Minister of culture Pavel Latushko
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hat a number of meetings with the Ministers of Culture of Lithuania, Poland, representatives
of diplomatic services of France, Italy, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In January, he signed an
intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in culture, science and education between Belarus
and France. It is expected that in the coming weeks a cooperation program will be signed
between the Ministries of Culture of Belarus and Ukraine. Soon an intergovernmental agreement
in the field of culture will be signed between Belarus and Italy. The Belarusian government
started negotiations on signing an agreement in the cultural sphere with Greece. The program
of cultural cooperation between the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Belarus and the
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Lithuania was approved for 2010–2011. It foresees
translation of modern Belarusian literature to the Lithuanian language and the organization of
culture days of Belarus in Lithuania.
Belarus also intends to participate in the “Kiev Initiative” program, organized by the
Council of Europe. All this indicates an increase in pro8European tendencies in the formal
cultural discourse, but it seems premature to conclude that a radical reassessment of values
is taking place. It should be rather be considered as a compensation for the stalled political
liberalization: shifts in the cultural policy do not cause serious perturbations that could pose a
threat to the power balance in the country, yet they allow to launch speculations about
liberalization, democratization and the European orientation of Belarus. This tactics also helps,
to a certain extent, to eliminate the growing social tensions and potential conflicts between
the government and civil society.
Thus, the first quarter of 2010 is characterized by positive dynamics in the two major
trends of “partial” Belarusization and “cautious” Europeanization, which are at the forefront of
the cultural policy of the Belarusian authorities seeking to obtain new political mileage by
exploiting the incorporation of national and European elements in the cultural space of Belarus.
Meanwhile, both of the trends are far from being commanding and irreversible, as there is no
talk about the complete rejection of traditional myths about the Soviet past imbuing social
consciousness through the media and other channels of communication. It should be noted
as well that civil society had a rather weak response to these trends.
Description of the key events that defined assessment of the trend
The trend of a relative rehabilitation of the Belarusian language was best illustrated by
the celebration of International Mother Language Day initiated by the first national television
channel. The Belarusian Language Society also conducts events for the Mother Language Day
in a concerted action for civil society and the officialdom (BISS trends, actually observed such
actions already happening in the previous period). Recognizing the positive fact of the
popularization of the Belarusian language in this campaign, one should not overlook that it
was carried out at a very limited extent: the campaign in the state media was rather sporadic
and inconsequential. In a similar fashion, the initiative of the Mahileu Regional Executive
Committee to declare 2010 as year of the native language was not supported, and forfeited for
a largely empty concept of “the year of quality”.
Description of additional events
The campaign “Belarus R’US” launched by the Ministry of Culture should be seen in the
context of restrained Belarusization. This campaign implies a degree of correction of the cultural
image of Belarus by incorporating elements of national culture, with the target audience defined
as widely as possible, and the activities planned in and outside Belarus. Moreover, the campaign
will strive to increase loyalty to the official discourse among immigrants through the opportunity
to take part in various events. However, there is reason to believe that this campaign will
effectively be a “shadow” campaign to support an official candidate in the upcoming presidential
elections.
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The trend of “rooting” the national identity in the remote historical past continued in the
first quarter of 2010 and was expressed, for example, by official preparations for a joint
celebration with Lithuania and Poland of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald. This
trend is also complemented by the efforts to legitimize poets and writers who were previous
undesirable for the regime, as was the case with the exhibition that is organized by the Ministry
of Culture to honor Vasil Bykov. However, the name and the work of the writer were to some
extent devalued as the exhibition was only limited to the “Soviet” period of the writer’s work.
The exhibition itself is part of the large array of activities to commemorate the 65th anniversary
of the victory in World War II, as the government constantly updates traditional mythology of
the Great Victory and the liberation.
The appeal to the legacy of Vladimir Karatkevich, whose works return from oblivion in
the year of the 808year anniversary of the birth of the classic of Belarusian literature, also
demonstrates an increasingly complex official discourse on culture and identity. The Ministry
of Culture is planning various activities to commemorate the writer.
A trend of partial liberalization and the cultural “truce” between the government and civil
society is demonstrated by the adequate reaction of the Ministry of Culture, to the complaints
from the Belarusian Public Council on Morality and its head Mikalai Charhinets who wanted to
ban the concert of the German rock band Rammstein in Minsk. The Ministry of Culture declined
to honor the request even though the Council is widely seen as a mouthpiece of the official
propaganda.
Description of events that ran contrary to the trend but failed to affect the
overall assessment
Cultural products and strategies emphasizing the “Soviet” origins of the cultural space
of Belarus have been largely latent in the reporting period; however, one can not talk about
their extinction, as the official ideology still postulates the paramount importance of civil
patriotic education of the Belarusian youth. This education results in a sacralization of the
military liberation themes through a series of different campaigns titled like “A sacred fire of
the great victory unites young people of Belarus”. In another development, Andrew
Gerashchenko (Head of the Department of Youth Authority of the October district of Vitebsk)
made a public statement about the artificial nature of the Belarusian language and its redundancy
for the Belarusian society, and even about the “harassment” of the Russians in Belarus, thereby
implicitly criticizing the new trends in the official discourse. The Gerashchenko affair exposes
a certain degree of overlap and distance in the field of cultural policy center (Minsk) and
periphery (in this case, Vitebsk), and also suggests that Russia may enhance its pressure on
Belarus through various channels if Belarusization continues to progress.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
We expect in the short run that the current trend of cautious Belarusization and
Europeanization will be maintained by the Belarusian authorities, though two official holidays
(May 9 and July 3) will definitely enhance the “Soviet” tunes in the public discourse for the
season.
Brief forecast for the entire year
Exploitation of the national symbols may have a distinctly instrumentalist character
afterwards, as it may be used to acquire political dividends by opposition actors who traditionally
defined their political stances according to national value schemes. This tactics will once
again weaken the opposition in the elections. At the same time, we expect in the long8run the
same degree of initiative for the official discourse in the local space of the Belarusian culture,
as it will be directed to maintain the loyalty of civil society under conditions of increased
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censorship and the roll8back of liberalization in the political sphere. We also predict new
instances of Russian “cultural resistance” to the changing identity politics in Belarus, especially
in the context of the presidential elections.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The second quarter of 2010 stands out as a highly interesting episode in Belarusian
history.
The political sphere saw simultaneous de8liberalization and de8democratization. The de8
liberalization was made manifest in restrictions on the freedom of expression and sanctions
against the Tell the Truth civil initiative. Although it had more possibilities for campaigning
and nominating its representatives to election commissions, the opposition did not get any
chance to influence the election process. In most cases vote count was just as non8transparent
as it had been before and the election was in general totally controlled by executive authorities.
The amendments to the election legislation did not result in democratization of political life.
In the field of economic policy, the government continued taking nominal steps to reform
the economic environment towards its liberalization, at the same time reserving possibilities
of keeping the economy under state control, especially in the sphere of privatization and
investment. However, in the second quarter the President publicly announced his intention to
issue a special directive on liberalization, which should facilitate systematization of the reforms.
Since such directives form the main state discourse for an annual period, next year may be
marked by the sign of liberalization, which could contribute to changing thinking patterns of
officials and state figures on all levels, as well as moving on to more significant and profound
liberal reforms.
The trend of the second quarter of 2010 in the field of the rule of law can be described as
‘minimal regression’. There were no significant events, as the public statements of the country’s
leadership do not qualify as such. Against this background the Council of Ministers passed its
resolutions on regulating the Belarusian segment of the Internet. At the same time, it should
be noted that state institutions continue taking into consideration proposals of different
stakeholders in lawmaking, for example, opinions of business associations on legislation related
to the economy. On the whole, like the first quarter, the second one was marked by imitating
active development of further steps towards liberalization, exemplified by the resounding title
of Directive № 4.
In the geopolitical sphere, in the second quarter of 2010 Russia dramatically increased
its pressure on Belarus in order to make it join the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan,
as well as consolidate Russian political and economic hegemony over Belarus in the longer
term. Although Belarus took a hard line on the Customs Union, standing up for its interests at
the negotiations, and openly clashed with Russia in the new gas war in June, clandestine
ratification of the Customs Union Code on June 30, 2010 clearly shaped a pro8Russian trend
in the trajectory of foreign politics. The second quarter also made it evident that the Kremlin
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has its own political plans for the 2010 or 2011 presidential election, which is targeted against
Alexander Lukashenko personally.
TREND 1
Political Liberalization and Democratization 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
The forecast given in the previous issues of monitoring concerning political
democratization has generally proved to be correct. During local elections, the number of
opposition party members elected to local councils decreased, making now fewer than 10
opposition deputies around the whole country, i. e. the opposition was able to get less than
0.1% of 21,293 seats. Although it had more possibilities for campaigning and nominating its
representatives to election commissions, the opposition did not get any chance to influence
the election process. In most cases vote count was just as non8transparent as it had been
before and the election was in general totally controlled by executive authorities. The
amendments to the election legislation did not result in democratization of political life.
In the area of political liberalization the trends outlined in the previous period have also
proved correct. During the election campaign, instances of opposition candidates and opposition
election board members being pressurized were steadily growing, the pressure taking in most
cases an unofficial form of threats at work or educational institutions. When the election was
over, some of the threats were actually carried out, but further on instances of pressure
decreased. So did the basic figures of politically motivated administrative persecution. According
to the “Viasna” Human Rights Center database, April and May saw two administrative arrests,
whereas in the preceding two8month period of February and March they were five. There were
98 cases of other forms of administrative persecution, while in February and March they made
129. There were no instances of mass protests being forcefully put down, with the exception
of a bicycle race banned in Minsk on May 27. However, the law enforcement bodies have
reintroduced the practice of deliberately false charges of petty hooliganism brought against
opposition activists and corroborated by policemen’s statements only. At the same time the
regime has evidently started preparing the legal ground for the upcoming presidential election,
drawing up and adopting presidential directions to regulate the use of the Internet. The
repression apparatus is also getting ready for the forthcoming presidential election, courts
having given verdicts on all8important ‘symbolic’ cases the opposition perceives as politically
motivated, such as Autochovic’s group and Kavalenka’s cases. Secret services have carried
out a large8scale operation to destroy the infrastructure of the Tell the Truth public initiative.
By the way, by certain signs the Tell the Truth campaign could be identified as Russia’s scenario
at the forthcoming presidential election.
Justification of a new trend (April/June 2010)
On the whole considering the situation described above, which further develops the
outlined trends, it can be argued that at the present moment political life in Belarus is marked
by preparation for the upcoming presidential election. Since the definite voting date has not
yet been made public, the authorities are preparing for it in fact latently, without openly declaring
the start of the campaign. The Head of State is probably the only official to have publicly state
that preparation for the presidential election is underway. The forthcoming event determines
all the other office holders’ actions ‘by default’, for example, the target figure of USD 500
average wages and salaries nationwide to be met by the end of the year, or the next All8
Belarusian National Assembly is not formally linked to any election date. This, however, does
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not make it less obvious that the state propaganda machine is working towards providing
ideological coverage of the approaching election. Meanwhile, repressive institutions are not
yet functioning as actively as they are likely to during the campaign proper. What we see now
is rather haphazard preventive measures, as was the case with trampling on the Tell the Truth
initiative. It should be mentioned that the scale of repression against it could not match the
level of “bloodthirstiness” demonstrated by the authorities when the Partnership initiative
was being crushed before the 2006 presidential election. By putting three activists of Tell the
Truth campaign behind bars and quickly releasing them, the regime showed that it was not
going to burn its bridges by restricting itself exclusively to a violent scenario during the
forthcoming election. The tendency is also borne out by the authorities’ attempts to apply
‘soft’ political technologies in combating their opponents.
For example, the government is trying to cut the ground from under the feet of the Tell
the Truth campaign by offering solutions to some issues it raised. Thus, the Council of Ministers
adopted a resolution on checking the mechanism of working on popular feedback, and Harodnia
city council decided to name one of the streets after Vasil Bykau. However, for all its ‘softness’,
the regime has initiated liquidation of the Movement Forward, under whose auspices the Tell
the Truth campaign is being held.
In the big political season the end of spring and summer of 2010 is virtually an interval
between two major domestic campaigns, when main events are taking place on the international
frontline, while inner political events are characterized by the system being prepared for the
presidential election. In the areas of political democratization and political liberalization we
can witness trends that could be described as minimal regression. Yet, the trends differ in
their nature. The regression in the area of democratization is connected with failed optimistic
expectations that were attached to the amendments to the Election Code, whereas in the
sphere of liberalization we are facing a predictable preventive “freezing” of the situation before
the forthcoming presidential election.
Description the key events that defined the assessment of the trend
The local elections of April 26 gave the government a good chance to demonstrate positive
change in election processes. However, the target was not actually met, the opposition
representation in local councils remaining meager and the record numbers of voting before
the voting day, which made up 29.3% of the total vote, causing serious doubts about the
fairness of the elections. Thus, we cannot attach any hopes on the amended election legislation
to have a positive impact on the forthcoming presidential election. Moreover, increased control
of the Internet threatens to restrict freedom of expression in this sphere during the election
campaign.
Other Events
• The infrastructure of the Tell the Truth initiative was destroyed, its three frontmen
were detained and criminal proceedings were initiated against them. (In three days’ time
the detainees were released.) The authorities initiated court proceedings to annul
registration of the Movement Forward, which was the legal operator of the Tell the Truth
campaign.
• The President set tasks to form an organizational committee to hold the 4th All8
Belarusian National Assembly. Head of the Presidential Administration Vladimir Makey and
Prime Minister Sergey Sidorski were appointed its co8chairmen. The organizational committee
is to draft its proposals on the date of the Assembly, the number of its participants, as well as
a project of the guidelines of the country’s social and economic development for 2011–2015
by July 1.
• Registration of new NGOs has in fact been suspended.
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Events Contradicting the Trend and Why They Do Not Change the General
Picture
The Public Consulting Council with the Presidential Administration held its meeting after
a long break, which, however, did not become a significant event in the country’s social and
political life. Now that Belarus is approaching another presidential election, all political events
are being assessed from this perspective, those having no immediate connection to the election
losing their significance in the eyes of society and often becoming unjustly marginalized.
Brief Forecast for the Coming Quarter
A certain calm in the country’s social and political life is seasonal. The slack political
season of July – August 2010 will turn out to be the lull before the storm of an active phase of
the presidential campaign. An extraordinary session of the Chamber of Representatives of the
National Assembly has been scheduled for September 7, 2010. In all probability, the date of
the presidential election will be announced there. The election is most likely to take place on
December 12 or 19, 2010. This will signify a starting point for all political activities related to
the election.
Brief Forecast for the Year
Based on the events and trends of the first six months of 2010, it can be predicted that
the forthcoming presidential election in Belarus will be held in line with the general practices
tried out during the previous elections. There may be occasional diversions from the typical
scenario towards avoiding the hardest and most flagrant forms of political repression, though
in general the repressive and restrictive nature of the election will remain unchanged. We
expect the government to try and justify repressive actions partially by “struggling for
independence” in the light of the recent clashes between the Belarusian leadership and the
Kremlin. Although the task of guaranteeing international recognition of the election result has
become more complicated, it has not changed the conventional approach towards holding
elections at the domestic level.
TREND 2
Economic Liberalization —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
In the second quarter of 2010 the government adhered to the same economic policies as
they had been implementing in the first quarter. Just as we had predicted, the government
went on taking nominal steps to reform the economic environment towards liberalization, at
the same time reserving possibilities of keeping the economy under state control, especially
in the sphere of privatization and investment. However, in the second quarter the President
publicly announced his intention to issue a special directive on liberalization, which should
facilitate systematization of the reforms. Since such directives form the main state discourse
for an annual period, next year may be marked by the sign of liberalization, which could
contribute to changing thinking patterns of officials and state figures on all levels, as well as
moving on to more significant and profound liberal reforms.
Justification of a New Trend (April/June 2010)
The last quarter was marked by a rather rapid change of events related to the economy in
the political sphere. Belarus was solving some fundamental problems, which are of vital
importance for the country, such as oil and natural gas supplies and their prices, the terms of
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creating the Customs Union, privatization of state property and economic liberalization.
Solutions to the problems lay at the junction of politics and economy, stirring active debate on
the international level. Belarus attempted to defend its positions in international economic
issues, using a wide range of corresponding tools. It succeeded at least in bringing its interests
in the focus of attention and reserving a chance to pursue them in the future. In the area of
economic liberalization, privatization and investment Belarus was still trying to find an
equilibrium between national interests (or those of certain groups, for that matter) and short8
term solutions to macroeconomic problems.
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
Privatization and Investment
In June, Parliament passed the second drafts of two pieces of legislation on privatization
in Belarus, namely On Projects Constituting Exclusive State Property and Activities That Can
Be Exercised by the State Exclusively and On Privatization of State Property and Reorganizing
Unitary State Enterprises into Joint8Stock Companies. The former is unprecedented insofar
as it allows selling enterprises of strategic importance. According to the draft law, enterprises
mining and processing potash (i. e. Belaruskali State Unitary Enterprise) and oil mains are to
be excluded from the list of enterprises constituting state property only. Concerning privatization
of the oil mains, Alexander Lukashenko declared in the past that Belarus was potentially prepared
to increase the share of Russian Gazprom in Beltransgaz joint8stock company, so that Gazprom
would have a controlling stake. But only recently officials have begun discussing the possibility
of selling a share in Belaruskali. At present they are talking of a possible sale of a 20 per cent
minority share to a Chinese investor. Even though privatization policies have been considerably
loosened, the lawmakers have reserved mechanisms to control the industry. According to the
draft law, in privatization of potash extracting assets the state maintains its exclusive right to
sell potash on the international market. For the piece of legislation to be brought into action, it
has to be signed by the President, which may happen in the nearest future.
The law On Privatization of State Property and Reorganizing Unitary State Enterprises
into Joint8Stock Companies, in its turn, should substitute for the Law № 21038XII on Privatization
of State Property of January 19, 1993. The new law makes compensatory basis the guiding
principle of privatization. Selling shares of joint8stock companies reorganized from state unitary
enterprises to their employees at 20 per cent below the nominal price is to be over by January
1, 2014.
According to the new piece of legislation, privatization will mainly be carried out through
selling shares or enterprises as property complexes at auctions (by bidding), as well as through
selling shares of unprofitable enterprises on the basis of trust management. Other methods of
privatization, its procedures, terms and conditions can be established by the President. He
enjoys virtually unlimited authority in managing state property. This reservation may make
potential investors more cautious, resulting in a negative impact in the country’s investment
climate. The attempts to liberalize the investment climate could be caused by the need to
cover the current payment deficit, ensure long8term loans or enter foreign markets (for potash,
for example) or their underlying reason could be a desire to have an opportunity to buy natural
resources at bargain prices, as is the case with selling oil pipelines. Still, the adopted measures
once again turn out to be partial only, providing for state control over privatized industries.
Such limited steps may not be enough to solve the problem of structural imbalances in the
Belarusian economy, offering a short8term solution to certain macroeconomic problems, which
is not a long8term strategy.
Late in May the Council of Ministers passed its resolution № 749, which extended
circulation of the ‘Property’ vouchers from July 1 till 30 June 2013. (Their expiry date had
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been set for June 30, 2010.) It is the seventh time their circulation has been extended since
the late 1990s. The government cited exceedingly high costs of compensation for unused
vouchers, making up about BYR 80bn (USD 27 m), as the reason for such a step. “At present,
considering a number of international and domestic factors”, said Director of the State Property
Fund of the State Property Committee Zhernosek, “the state cannot accept liabilities for unused
vouchers, though there is a provision for such a procedure in the current legislation”. In 2007
some state institutions, such as the State Property Committee, the Ministry of Economy, etc.
came up with a proposal to stop voucher privatization on a non8compensatory basis by annulling
unused vouchers. A draft law with the proposal was even submitted to Parliament, but in the
end the government decided against such a step. There are an estimated 2 m voucher holders
in Belarus.
Another privatization and investment related event in the country was the establishment
of the National Agency for Investment and Privatization on Presidential Decree № 273 of May
25. The decree determines the mechanism of setting up the National Agency for Investment
and Privatization through reorganizing the National Investment Agency State Unitary Enterprise.
Changes will concern the management structure of the agency, which is to be subordinated to
the Council of Ministers. The agency’s work is to be controlled and coordinated by a supervisory
board with the Prime Minister at its head. The institution’s high status and large numbers of
high8standing officials working for it should indeed have a positive impact on decision8making
in the field of investment. However, experts point out that having no authority to manage state
property, the agency is going to deal with investment rather than privatization. According to
the current legislation, decisions on selling state property worth more than 10,000 basic units
(USD 117,000) can only be taken upon the President’s approval. In many aspects the agency
may have been established in order to meet formally the requirements of international
institutions rather than deal with the actual problems in the field of privatization and investment.
At the same time, the World Bank severely criticized the way privatization in Belarus is
being carried out, stating that the country had no delineated privatization strategy, which did
not lead to any transformation of the economy. Singular cases of selling state property cannot
result in any significant changes in the structure of the economy. The World Bank stressed
that it did not consider massive privatization East European style necessary or right, selective
(or pinpoint) privatization being viewed as more efficient. However, even this process is slack
in Belarus. Moreover, the World Bank representatives stated that being only a tool of economic
transformation, privatization should stimulate reforms in different sectors of the economy.
Meanwhile, Belarusian privatization practices look like nothing more than an attempt to fill the
gaps in the budget. Belarusian privatization policy adheres to its priorities, such as preservation
of strategic assets, minimizing negative social effects and covering the budget deficit. These
are recognized by government officials themselves, whereas efficient management by new
owners is not on the agenda.
IMF Mission
The IMF mission visited Minsk once again from May 12 to May 25, assessing the current
economic situation and prospects for further cooperation. The mission is also planning to
come back early in the autumn to continue their dialog with the government. The objective of
the visits is to present the Government the IMF’s conclusions whether Belarus needs a new
program of cooperation with the IMF. According to the mission representatives, if the
Government and the National Bank are interested in a new cooperation program, the IMF is
ready to develop one, “which will include well thought8out measures in economic policy”. At
the same time, in his interview to the Reuters early in May Alexander Lukashenko said that
with the economy recovering, Belarus was not going to ask the IMF for new loans but would
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rely on IMF experts’ consulting in the field of economic policies. The IMF pointed out that
Belarus needed structural reforms and productivity growth, while economic growth that was
attributed to increased borrowing would only put more pressure on the balance of payments
and reserves. The IMF also emphasized the importance of increasing the contribution of the
private sector to the country’s economic growth. By EBRD estimates, the share of the private
sector in Belarusian GDP does not exceed 30%, while the figure is significantly higher in all
the other countries of the region and a wider group of transitional economies.
Eurobonds
In May the President signed his Decree № 245, which authorized the Government to
issue up to USD 2 bn in Eurobonds in 2010–2011. The decree also appointed institutions to
place the sovereign bonds, namely BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank AG, the Royal Bank of Scotland
plc. and the Savings Bank of Russia. The fact that the Government is prepared to enter the
European market for the purpose of foreign borrowing might improve the country’s image and
have a positive impact on Belarusian corporate borrowers’ opportunities to enter this market.
This could create a precedent for future borrowers, potentially stimulate market share and
raise companies’ competence in dealing with stocks and bonds. In terms of the price of
borrowing on the European market, it could turn out quite expensive as compared to the IMF
loans, particularly if we remember that the latter declared it was prepared for a new cooperation
program on condition that Belarus indulged in structural reforms. Still, now is quite a favorable
time for the Belarusian Government to enter the Eurobond market, as the basic interest rates
on such bonds remain quite low on the world market. Lack of credit history on the Eurobond
market could drive up the price of such borrowings for Belarus. The projected emission of
Belarusian Eurobonds makes up about USD 1 bn for this year, which is quite a lot for the first
step.
In all probability, the Government is forced to take these measures in order to fill the
gaps in the balance of payments, balance the budget and ensure the growth of investment in
2010. Another motive may be the Government’s reluctance to depend totally on the requirements
of institutional lenders like the IMF and its willingness to maintain room for maneuver in its
policies. It could be a matter of priority for the Government to ensure economic growth at the
present moment rather than take on any obligations concerning long8term structural reforms.
Customs Union and Gas and Oil Clash
Although the date at which the agreement on the customs union between Russia,
Kazakhstan and Belarus comes into force is drawing near, the parties still have not settled
their differences. The crucial one is the fact that duties on oil and petrochemicals are not
going to be cancelled. By conventional definition, a customs union is an agreement between
two or more states on canceling customs duties in their mutual trade. For this reason, Belarus
was not happy with Russia introducing customs duties on oil and petrochemicals for an
indefinite period even according to the new Customs Code within the customs union framework.
The conflict between Belarus and Russia is unprecedented in the history of the two
countries’ mutual relations. It is the first time that one of the parties has resorted to judicial
methods. On March 25 the Belarusian Ministry for Justice filed a lawsuit with the CIS Economic
Court questioning the legitimacy of export duties on petrochemicals and petrochemical raw
materials supplied to Belarus from Russia. The Ministry for Justice emphasized in its press
release that international agreements within the framework of the CIS and EurAsEC, as well as
bilateral agreements between Belarus and Russia “provide for duty8free trade within the free
trade regime”. “The only exception from the duty8free regime is crude oil, which is liable to
export duty according to a special bilateral agreement”, said the Belarusian Ministry for Justice.
“All other products should be traded on a duty8free basis”. So far, the court has not given its
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ruling and there is a possibility that the hearings may be so long8drawn8out that any decision
will have become pointless by the time they are finished. According to Russian Prime Minister
Putin, Russia takes into consideration the remaining differences concerning export duties on
crude oil and petrochemicals. Yet, in his opinion, the issue lies within the competence of the
Unified Economic Space, which is supposed to have been established by 2012. Consequently,
the issue of duties on oil and petrochemicals is not related to the Customs Union. According
to Putin, oil and petrochemicals will not be dutiable for the countries belonging to the Customs
Union when the agreement on the Unified Economic Space is ratified.
Another difference on the threshold of signing the agreement on the Customs Union
concerns import duties on automobiles from countries that do not belong to the customs
union. Although the problem was raised as early as last year, there is still no clarity about its
solution. In April Vice Chairman of the Belarusian State Customs Committee (SCC) S. Borisyuk
announced that Belarus intended to uphold the existing import duties on automobiles, which
are lower than in the other countries of the Customs Union. This does not make Russia happy,
since the lower duties in Belarus within the joint customs territory could entail an inflow of
cheaper used cars, whereas Russia has to support its automobile industry. On the other hand,
if foreign autos fill the Belarusian market, Russia will also suffer losses due to a fall in sales of
Russian automobiles in Belarus.
On the threshold of signing the Customs Union documents, Belarus and Russia had
another clash, this time about natural gas prices and its transit via Belarus. In June Russia
announced that Belarus owed it about USD 200 m for natural gas that had been supplied since
the beginning of 2010. Receiving no payment, Russia threatened to cut its natural gas supplies
to Belarus. Yet, an unexpected castling followed soon enough, Belarus claiming that Russia
owed it a commensurate amount of about $260m for the transit of natural gas to Europe. After
Russian Gazprom cut natural gas supplies to Belarus to 60% of the planned amount, on June
23 Belarus paid back its USD 187 m debt to Gazprom, at the same time giving Russia an
ultimatum that it should pay for the transit the next day. Russia, in its turn, paid back its debt,
thus putting an end to the conflict. However, there is no clarity about the situation, as the
counter claims could have been settled quietly behind the scenes, without drawing public
attention to the conflict or getting engaged in a political battle. Many analysts believe that
Russia began waging the gas war as an instrument of pressure on Belarus in order to force it
to sign the Customs Union documents. It should be mentioned that the new customs code for
the most part is based on the existing Customs Code of Russia.
Although Belarus had its objections to a number of issues in the new Customs Code,
Russia and Kazakhstan decided to sign all the Customs Union documents between themselves
instead of waiting for Belarus. So on July 1 the unified Customs Code was brought into action
just as planned in Russia and Kazakhstan. However, the two countries kept the door open for
Belarus, giving it time to “think it over” and join them. The Customs Union presupposes the
existing import duties on automobiles for Belarus, though it has been emphasized that these
are only to be applicable during a transition period, with further unification of the duties. On
this issue Belarus has succeeded in bargaining for the terms it finds acceptable, even though
for a limited period. The duties on oil and petrochemicals have been preserved. As a result,
Belarus signed the Customs Union documents and joined the Customs Union on July 6.
The parties have reached an agreement on the terms of importing products for individual
use to the territory of the Customs Union. They have become more liberal for Belarusian
citizens on some items and less liberal on others. In addition, the moment the Customs Union
was came into force, so was an agreement on introducing unified rules on technical regulation,
sanitary, veterinary and phytosanitary control, which should facilitate trade between the
countries that belong to the Customs Union.
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Thus, it was mainly political pressure rather than economic reasoning that determined
decision8making on the Customs Union. In many aspects the procedure of signing the
documents remained covert, so at present it is difficult to assess its implications for the
Belarusian economy.
Directive № 4 on Liberalization
The country continued discussing the need for liberalization of the economy. Since
economic liberalization in the country is also a product of top8down movement, the President’s
statements in his traditional state of the nation address to the people and the parliament on
April 20 mattered a lot for the liberalization process. The main economy8related subjects of
his speech were about:
• the need to further liberalize the economy;
• dramatically simplifying taxation;
• ensuring stable rules for doing business.
According to Alexander Lukashenko, the national economy needs a ‘breakthrough’, which
could be provided by a new technological strategy. Its components include:
1) structural transformation of the economy, which presuppose domination of industries
that make products with high surplus value;
2) setting up high8tech industries that can offer the world essentially new goods and
services;
3) creating market8based incentives in order to increase innovative activity of all
businesses;
4) working out a strategy of business activity that promotes competition instead of
monopolies. It should be mentioned that the government has already aired its intention to
liberalize the economy for several years without making any real progress in improving the
business climate or de8monopolizing the economy.
In his address the President announced his intention to sign Directive № 4 on Further
Liberalization, aimed at giving more freedom to economic activity. Thus, the last two months
have been marked by government officials’ increased activity towards working out this
document or creating the false impression that its preparation has been underway. According
to Deputy Minister of Economy A. Tur, a draft directive on liberalization has already been
drawn up and is currently undergoing an approval procedure at state institutions. Yet, there
has been no information so far either on its form or contents. Early June saw the first meeting
of the Public Consulting Council with the Presidential Administration after a long break. Its
agenda included discussing the project of Directive No. 4, but its text was not submitted to the
members. However, there is still hope that the fact that liberalization was initiated by the
President will give state officials an incentive to work more actively towards improving the
business environment. At the same time, there are reservations that steps towards liberalization
may once again be only nominal and partial, aimed at raising the country’s Doing Business
rating rather than implementing real reforms.
Draft Law on Supporting SMEs
In May the Chamber of Representatives of the National Assembly passed a draft law On
Supporting Small and Medium Enterprises, which, however, has not yet been signed by the
President. The draft law has at last given definitions to such notions as small and medium
enterprises, as well as infrastructure to support small and medium enterprises. Small businesses
are defined as individual entrepreneurs, micro8organizations with average staff numbers of up to
15 and small organizations with average staff numbers of 16 to 100. Medium enterprises are
defined as commercial organizations with average annual staff numbers of 101 to 250. This will
help bring order into the policy of supporting SMEs, adjusting it to international practices.
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The draft law also covers such issues as respect to rights and interests of SMEs and
infrastructure supporting SMEs. It prohibits interference in their work. One of the major
achievements of this piece of legislation is that it provides for a possibility of a simplified
procedure of transferring state property to SMEs and selling state property on a three years’
installment basis. In addition, the draft law establishes the details of SMEs participating in
state purchase procedures, reserving at least 10% of overall state purchases for SMEs. These
steps might raise the significance of private businesses for the Belarusian economy.
Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses
In June the Chamber of Representatives of the National Assembly adopted the second
draft of the Law on Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Republic of
Belarus and Procedural Code of Administrative Offenses of the Republic of Belarus. The draft
law is aimed at bringing down certain barriers to improving the country’s business climate. A
number of its provisions adjust the Administrative Code to presidential decrees and other
pieces of legislation. The draft law is meant to ease the pressure of possible administrative
punishment, making it commensurate with the offense, to issue warnings on a larger scale
rather than impose more severe punishments, and to reduce fines for economic offenses for
such categories as individual entrepreneurs and private individuals.
Thus, the second quarter saw quite a lot of events related to the fundamentals of the
country’s economy. Belarus signed the Agreement of the Customs Union with Kazakhstan
and Russia, but it is difficult to estimate its implications for lack of information. The country
leadership also announced its intentions to liberalize the economy and adopted documents
aimed at creating more opportunities for investment and privatization. Nevertheless, the
economic reforms in the country are as pinpointed and cautious as they have been before,
always leaving the government a right to veto in case it loses control over the economy.
Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses
In June the Chamber of Representatives of the National Assembly adopted the second
draft of the Law on Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Republic of
Belarus and Procedural Code of Administrative Offenses of the Republic of Belarus. The draft
law is aimed at bringing down certain barriers to improving the country’s business climate. A
number of its provisions adjust the Administrative Code to presidential decrees and other
pieces of legislation. The draft law is meant to ease the pressure of possible administrative
punishment, making it commensurate with the offense, to issue warnings on a larger scale
rather than impose more severe punishments, and to reduce fines for economic offenses for
such categories as individual entrepreneurs and private individuals.
Thus, the second quarter saw quite a lot of events related to the fundamentals of the
country’s economy. Belarus signed the Agreement of the Customs Union with Kazakhstan
and Russia, but it is difficult to estimate its implications for lack of information. The
country leadership also announced its intentions to liberalize the economy and adopted
documents aimed at creating more opportunities for investment and privatization.
Nevertheless, the economic reforms in the country are as pinpointed and cautious as
they have been before, always leaving the government a right to veto in case it loses
control over the economy.
Brief Forecast for Next Quarter
The next quarter is likely to be characterized by ‘adjustment’ of the Customs Union
mechanisms. Perhaps we will see the first assessments whether its terms and conditions are
beneficial for the Belarusian economy. There may be a number of documents adopted that are
supposed to give structure to the government’s intentions to liberalize the economy. These
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might inspire some interest among potential foreign investors, at least encouraging them to
get a better idea of the Belarusian business environment.
Brief Forecast for2010
Any significant structural transformations in the economy are unlikely to happen. The
government will go on trying to strike a balance between preserving the existing structure of
the economy and solving the most pressing macroeconomic problems, among other things
by creating a false impression of liberalization or carrying out haphazard reforms in this direction.
Considering the high target figures for GDP growth (11–13%), it is expected that banking will
come under pressure to reduce interest on loans and increase financing of the real economy.
Cooperation with the IMF could be possible if the Belarusian government demonstrates its
political will to engage in such cooperation. In the short term the government will seek alternative
sources of subsidizing the economy.
We do not expect any significant breakthrough in the privatization processes. It will go
on according to two established patterns, namely open privatization of minor and strategically
unimportant enterprises with the assistance of international consultants on the one hand, and
nomenclature privatization of big state enterprises under control of the government or particular
groups.
In the light of the President’s intention to issue a directive on liberalization, perhaps
some further steps will be made towards liberalizing the economy. At least we should expect
some additional measures aimed at simplifying taxation, licensing and the system of wages
and salaries in order to raise the country’s Doing Business rating.
TREND 3
Government Quality and Rule of Law —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
‘Working out liberalization initiatives’ predicted in the last BISS Trends continued in the
second quarter, however, no legislation in this field was passed. The law on support for SMEs
has not been signed by the President yet and work on a decree on licensing is ‘virtually
finished’. Just as we expected, the government approved tough regulation of the Internet.
Justification of a new trend (April/June 2010)
The trend of the second quarter of 2010 can be described as ‘minimal regression’.
There were no significant events, as the country leadership’s public declarations do not
qualify as such. Against this background the Council of Ministers passed its resolutions on
regulating the Belarusian segment of the Internet. At the same time, it should be noted that
state institutions continue taking into consideration proposals of different stakeholders in
lawmaking, for example, opinions of business associations on economy8related legislation.
On the whole, like the first quarter, the second one was marked by imitating active
development of further steps towards liberalization, exemplified by the resounding title of
Directive № 4.
Description the key events that defined the assessment of the trend
The President’s annual speech in parliament was a significant event illustrating the trend
of the quarter. In his speech he announced his plans of strategic liberalization, particularly his
intention to issue a key document in this area, namely Directive № 4. When the President
pronounces a certain initiative or strategy in person, it can be viewed as an important signal
and a strong impetus for the vertical of power to begin working actively in this direction. The
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directive is already being drawn up and can be expected to be issued before the end of the
year. At the same time, until the document has been issued, the President’s statement belongs
to the same category as those of other high8ranking officials, who heralded “a lot of activity
towards preparing’ documents.
Other Events
Although Resolutions of the Council of Ministers № 644 and 649 came as no surprise, it
does not change their anti8liberal nature. Resolution № 644 On Certain Issues of Enhancing
the Use of the National Segment of the Internet in particular introduces strict rules of registering
Internet resources, identifying Internet users and storing data on their online activities. New
legislative initiatives in the fields of regulating insurance practices, out of court mediation,
bankruptcy, etc. confirm that the Government has a tendency to consider different reform
options. Work being done by the Supreme Economic Court towards optimizing the functioning
of the judicial system, in particular an experiment on using e8documents in the judicial process
bring further the trend towards a wider use of IT in social relations.
Events Contradicting the Trend and Why They Do Not Change the General
Picture
No events contradicting the abovementioned trend towards the government’s declarative
active lawmaking and stricter rules of using the Internet were recorded in the given period. If
the Law on Support to SMEs had been approved by the end of June, it could have become an
event going against the overall trend.
Brief Forecast for Next Quarter
In the third quarter of 2010 state institutions will continue their exaggerated activity
towards developing liberalization initiatives, so that the promised Directive No.4, decree on
licensing and law on support to SMEs will be adopted. The government will go on further
implementing IT in the country, at the same time strictly regulating the Internet.
Brief Forecast for the Year
The situation on international markets and rising energy prices will force the country’s
leadership to go on with limited liberalization. In 2010, on the threshold of the presidential
election, the government is expected to pass resolutions that presuppose extra budget
expenditures and improve the position of different social groups, including businessmen. We
can expect the vertical of power to be strengthened and the system of state government to be
reorganized. Electronic documentation is going to be more widely used, and at the same time
state institutions are going to exercise stricter control over information transmission and its
contents.
TREND 4
Geopolitical Orientation —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
In the second quarter of 2010 Russia dramatically increased its pressure on Belarus in
order to make it join the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as consolidate
Russian political and economic hegemony over Belarus in the longer term. Although Belarus
took a hard line on the Customs Union, standing up for its interests at the negotiations, and
openly clashed with Russia in the new gas war in June, clandestine ratification of the Customs
Union Code on June 30, 2010 clearly shaped a pro8Russian trend in the trajectory of foreign
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politics. The second quarter also made it evident that the Kremlin has its own political plans
for the 2010 or 2011 presidential election, which is targeted against Alexander Lukashenko
personally.
Belarus – US and Belarus – EU relations did not change for the worse drastically or
irreversibly. Despite recognizing some improvement in the electoral procedures, EU and
US observers pointed out that amendments to the election legislation had not actually had
any impact on the election campaign and some objectives related to the improvement of
the election legislation had not been achieved. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe are
preparing their assessment of the new Election Code of Belarus. The EU is going to assess
amendments to the Belarusian Election Code based on the conclusion to be made by the
OSCE.
Despite all its efforts, the National Assembly has failed so far to ensure its exclusive
representation in the EURONEST, its parallel participation alongside the opposition still
pending.
Justification of a new trend (April/June 2010)
On the initiative of the Kremlin, Belarus – Russia relations are now determined by
Moscow’s unilateral political and economic dictatorial practices. The new rules of the game
have deprived Belarus of the remaining economic preferences it enjoyed for two decades.
They can be restored only on condition that Belarus is totally and irrevocably incorporated
into the Russian sphere of influence. Such a change in the Kremlin’s approach to the Belarus –
Russia relations has nothing to do with putting them on the lines of pragmatism. Rather, it
demonstrates that Moscow has only changed its attitude to the Belarusian President, while
putting up with billions’ worth of losses caused by more loyal clients and satellites, such as
the regimes of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine and Vladimir Smirnov in the Trans8Dniester
region.
In the wake of the world financial and economic crisis Belarus has not yet recovered
from this entails growing economic hardships Minsk has to face, causing it to seek new
lenders, investors, suppliers of natural resources, trading partners and markets even more
actively than before. Belarus is entering a long period of indefiniteness and risks both in the
economic and (geo)political spheres.
Description the key events that defined the assessment of the trend
The operation to force Belarus to join the Customs Union on the Kremlin’s conditions
became an event with far8reaching consequences, which determined the Belarusian geopolitical
trajectory in the second quarter of 2010. The operation came to be a leitmotif with serious
implications for Belarus, determining the country’s both short8 and long8term prospects and
its position in Europe and the whole world. All other events in the Belarus – Russia relations,
including yet another unprecedentedly ruthless gas war between Moscow and Minsk, were
only part of the general trend. Firstly, the developments on the Belarus – Russia front revealed
that Belarus was financially vulnerable and had to urgently ask the Azerbaijani President for a
modest loan of USD 200 m. Secondly, they were an ultimate proof that the ‘Union State’
project was an illusion, which already belongs to the past. These developments demonstrated
a real conflict of interest between Belarus and Russia, not only short8term but also, much
more importantly, long8term, with economic competition becoming more and more fierce. It
was a clash of opposed political ambitions and lines of conduct, with accumulation of Minsk’s
symbolic gestures, actions and decisions, which offended the Kremlin’s sensitivities and
contradicted the Russian elites’ idea of the appropriate place for Belarus in the geopolitical
space. On the other hand, these events revealed deceitful practices of the Russian leadership,
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who unilaterally de facto broke Belarus – Russia agreements. Thirdly, the room for maneuver
between the East and the West, which has determined Lukashenko’s foreign politics in recent
years, has now been minimized, just as we predicted at the 3d annual BISS Conference
Belarusian Path in Europe in February 2010. Lukashenko did not demonstrate the political will
to renew the Belarus – EU dialog with a view to bringing the relations back to normal and
opening new windows of opportunity for economic cooperation, which to some extent
predetermined his silent surrender to Russia’s demands late in June.
Cuts in natural gas supplies marked the limits of the Belarus – Russia alliance on a
metaphorical level, making Minsk look for alternatives, which e are highly unlikely to materialize
in the next few years, even if the Belarusian leadership has an absolute political will to diversify
energy supplies.
Events Contradicting the Trend and Why They Do Not Change the General
Picture
Demonstration of healthy Belarus – Russia cooperation in foreign politics, defense and
security was in discord with the two countries’ economic disagreements. With the “gas war”
at its very peak, on June 21 Alexander Lukashenko had a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev. However, this time the
Belarusian President did not succeed in “elegantly” linking his role as Russia’s defense force
with economic preferences, the way he used to until recently. In reality major threats to
Belarusian security come from economic factors, willingly or not generated by the Russian
ally, rather than from international or military causes.
Brief Forecast for the Next Quarter
Ratification of the Customs Union Code means that the Belarusian leadership does not
stand a chance of refusing to join the Customs Union. The country’s domestic and foreign
economic strategies will be undergoing further reassessment and adjustment. The
government will be working out practical plans on how to achieve fast tangible results in
the energy field, saving natural resources, carrying out infrastructural projects, raising export
potential, etc. Considering the approaching holiday time, in July and August there will be
minimal contacts with the EU, though issues of energy security will be a top priority on the
agenda. The need to ‘buy off’ voters through a political and business cycle implies that the
Belarusian government is going to stick to the idea of raising average wages and salaries as
the election is drawing near. The harsh political confrontation with the Kremlin may cause
the Belarusian leadership to seek keenly for prospective lenders that could grant Belarus a
loan of about USD 1 bn.
Brief Forecast for the Year
It can be expected that:
• Russia will increase its economic pressure on Belarus at the latter’s slightest attempts
to breach Russian rules. Among other things, the two countries may sign a document that
ensures establishing a unified economic space by 2011.
• Belarus will take vigorous steps (however, with minimal outcome) towards large8
scale economic and industrial cooperation with China with a view to relying on its resources
as an alternative for economic recovery in the wake of the crisis, stabilizing and further
modernizing the Belarusian economy.
• Belarus will increase cooperation and do marketing research with prospective
international business partners, interested in the Belarusian market, worldwide.
• Any significant improvement in the Belarus – US and Belarus – EU relations before
the presidential election is unlikely.
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TREND 5
Cultural Policy: Marginalization of Trends Towards Belarusization and
Europeanization —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
In general the second quarter of 2010 showed that the discourse of power was cautious
in its cultural policy within the trends of Belarusization and Europeanization, just as it had
been predicted. The government legitimized Belarusian8language culture and its representatives
quite inconsistently and only to a limited extent. It should be noted that in the second quarter
the limits of the cultural “truce” with civil society, called by the Belarusian regime, were clearly
outlined. This refers to a flagrantly repressive reaction to the Tell the Truth campaign, initiated
by civil society. Suppositions that the official discourse was going to show a good deal of
initiative in the field of Belarusian culture, trying to establish communication with the Belarusian
Diaspora, turned out well8grounded. So did the prediction that the government would stick to
its tendency to control and maintain monopoly over this sphere by using a traditional arsenal
of Soviet myths in order to sustain the established system of cultural values.
Justification of a new trend (April/June 2010)
In April8June 2010 there was noticeable regression in such trends as liberalization,
Belarusization and Europeanization in cultural policy. Initiatives of the Ministry for Culture and
its Minister Pavel Latushko are becoming more and more lacking in their European dimension.
This trend is corroborated by the meetings held by Mr. Latushko, who the general public used
to view as a pro8Belarusian and to a certain degree pro8Western figure. Unlike the first quarter
of 2010, the second one saw the vector of cultural cooperation move noticeably eastwards,
the Belarusian minister having had meetings with the Georgian and Ukrainian ambassadors,
as well as the Executive Director of the CIS Intergovernmental Cooperation Fund. In addition,
the ministry organized a Year of Belarusian Culture in Russia. Moreover, the policy of the
Ministry for culture, intended to diversify the cultural identity of Belarusian society, is becoming
marginalized as other institutions of power take more dynamic actions strengthening the
traditional definition of Belarusian culture as closely related to the Russian one. In this context
the event most representative of the trend was the ten8day Victory Day celebration, which
brought back Soviet liberation mythology as a decisive one for Belarusian national identity.
The power discourse continues its effort to make the subject of World War II absolutely sacred.
The scale of celebrations, which included a military parade and fireworks, in the year when
economic problems are aggravating, merely brings into focus the government’s attempts to
ease growing social tensions by constructing myths of national unity. On top of that, a similar
vocabulary is being used to describe the international economic crisis as a foreign threat,
which is interpreted as a challenge for the nation. The underlying importance of Soviet
ideological constructions for the regime’s cultural policy was also manifested in the efforts to
reconstruct the wartime atmosphere. The fact that the Stalin line memorial was constructed
and Minsk’s main thoroughfare was decorated for Victory Day in the style of the late 1940s
underline that the government is not prepared to give up manipulating the Soviet past and its
myths. The regime is not going to renounce its monopoly on the public space and is trying to
eradicate all possibility of unpredictable dialog with civil society in the sphere of culture,
which might question values the government is transmitting.
Thus, the second quarter of 2010 was characterized by weakening trends to Belarusization
and Europeanization. The regime is trying to confine Belarusian cultural identity to the Soviet
period only. The government’s strategies in cultural policy are in many aspects repressive,
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confirming a strengthening trend towards de8liberalization and showing that the government’s
intentions in the European dimension were just talk.
Description the key events that defined the assessment of the trend
The celebration of the 65th anniversary of victory in the Second World War can be singled
out as a key event of the quarter. It quintessentially signaled strengthening pro8Soviet and
Russifying trends, which undermined attempts to diversify the Belarusian cultural space through
Belarusization and Europeanization, made in the first quarter and associated with Minster for
Culture Paviel Latuska. Falling back on the old Soviet cultural capital was in sync with the
renewed culture war between the government and civil society.
The unexpectedly large8scale repression against the Tell the Truth initiative also reveals
the true value of European cultural symbols in the eyes of official ideology. Any steps civil
society takes towards building up a kind of communication that would presuppose a critical
approach towards the actions of the government or enable the civil society to formulate
problems on its own cause the regime to use its repressive tools more aggressively. In this
way the government is trying to eliminate a chance of civil society raising its activity levels, as
well as keep it and the ‘dialog’ rules under control.
Other Events
The negative dynamics of the Europeanization trend in cultural policy was complemented
by the dispersal of a gay and lesbian rally, which was going to be held on May 15 in Minsk.
Exclusion of minor social groups and all types of minorities (religious, ethnic, etc.) that do not
match the government’s system of values reflects complexes typical of the regime with its
ideology. It is unable to accept individual freedoms characteristic of the European cultural
space as something fundamental and indispensable. On the contrary, the government goes
on unifying Belarusian society by defining heterosexuality as a dominant norm, which is further
reflected in the ideology of traditional family values.
The trend towards Russification is marked by the Year of Belarusian Culture in Russia,
which officially is called to emphasize the close cultural kinship with Russia. In this way the
Government recognizes the secondary nature of the local cultural discourse as compared to
the cultural metropolis, proclaiming a rather controversial concept of the two nations’ common
history. In the context of a pragmatic approach to culture it is necessary to mention President
Lukashenko’s critical remarks about the official writers’ organization being unprofitable and
film industry undergoing a crisis. The proposed strategy of making cinematography profitable
is notable for its all too familiar regulatory and repressive methods, which would oblige
Belarusian TV to show a preset percentage of Belarusian movies. When similar restrictions
were imposed on the radio, it led to a fall in ratings, so we can predict with absolute certainty
a similar fall in ratings and consequently profits of local TV stations.
Liquidation of the Zniata photo gallery in Minsk fitted into the outlined trend. For quite a
time it was a center of independent and uncensored art in Belarus. It is notable that the gallery
was closed not in a “pinpoint attack” but “by default”, when the ideological department of
Kinavideaprakat unitary enterprise received a recommendation from the Minsk executive
committee, which prescribed stopping cultural events that included private initiative.
Among other events a special place belongs to the Eurovision contest, particularly a
symptomatic reaction of the Belarusian official discourse to it. Too much importance given to
the Eurovision reflects a certain inferiority complex and lack of confidence in Belarusian cultural
identity. A desire to prove to other nations that Belarus belongs to Europe, whether as its
geographical center or by ranking high at Eurovision, turns a commercial show in the Belarusian
cultural discourse into a contest, which in the final analysis fits well into the Soviet logic of
competition.
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Events Contradicting the Trend and Why They Do Not Change the General
Picture
The main event that went against the trend towards Russification and de8liberalization of
the Belarusian cultural space was undoubtedly the Tell the Truth campaign, initiated by civil
society activists and intended to engage different institutions of government in an equal dialog
in order to reveal some pressing issues. It was an attempt to establish direct communication
between civil society and the Government, which is characteristic of today’s European space.
Actions within the Tell the Truth campaign articulate a number of important problems, at the
same time indirectly drawing off a veil of sacredness from the Government, localizing its
monopoly on violence and facilitating increasing awareness in civil society. The campaign’s
short duration has not yet given a chance to record any real change in the government’s
cultural policy. However, the campaign has not only brought together renowned writers, poets,
cultural figures and intelligentsia but is also building up a volunteer network. This fact combined
with the regime’s negative reaction to the campaign gives some reason to hope for a new
stage in the relations of the Government and civil society.
Among other events contradicting the general trend was the decision of the Belarusian
authorities to show the film Khatyn by Andrzej Wajda on April 18 2010, during the funeral of
the late Polish President Lech Kaczynski, who had died in an air crash near Smolensk. Before
that, the film had been banned for ideological reasons, mainly for its anti8Stalin and anti8
Soviet message. Two months later, ONT national TV station showed a documentary Khatyn:
Belarusian List. It was probably the first time since Lukashenko rose to power that state television
had spoken about the “anti8Soviet” version of the Khatyn massacre, admitting that Belarusians
had made up a large proportion of its victims. The Belarusian authorities, unwilling to declare
national mourning on the day of Kaczynski’s funeral, showed Khatyn as a minor concession to
Poland. In spite of such political considerations, these events are worth mentioning as the
first small steps towards de8Stalinization of the Belarusian regime’s political discourse.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the 600th anniversary of the victory of Polish,
Belarusian and Lithuanian forces in the battle of Grьnwald on July 15, 2010 was celebrated on
a rather high official level. The government officially sponsored the main part of the celebration
in Belarus, namely a knight festival called The Castle of Navahradak. Unfortunately, they
managed to turn it into a replica of their favorite kolkhoz style festival called Dazynki.
Brief Forecast for the Next Quarter
In the short term it has to be expected that in the sphere of culture the authorities are
going to make an active use of Soviet symbols and liberation rhetoric in connection with the
upcoming celebration of Independence Day. In addition, it would be logical to expect the
regime to appropriate selectively some national symbols and historic events. In doing so, it
may be pursuing two aims, appropriating the traditional cultural capital of oppositional actors
and creating an illusion of liberalization in the field of culture.
Brief Forecast for the Year
The government seems to be guided by a wait8and8see policy in choosing a further
direction in the cultural dimension. The Europeanization trend will not be completely abandoned,
nor will it have a decisive role. The trend towards Russification will not be completely dominant,
either, due to the political and economic clashes between Belarus and Russia. It looks more
probable that the government will claim to be making its own way in cultural policy. Soviet
rhetoric will continue to play an important role in it, as it enjoys stable popularity in the Belarusian
society. Besides, it can be expected that civil society will be acting more energetically in some
areas, including culture, and that the discourse of power will react negatively to civil initiatives.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the first time since the BISS8trends monitoring began, we are seeing the trend towards
liberalization in all areas of life. However, in general, in the past year, the most stable and
consistent has been the trend of economic liberalization, which allows us to speculate about
deliberate awareness of the Belarusian authorities in regard to the development of market
relations in Belarus.
In the field of democratization and political liberalization, we observed no visible obstacles
to self8organization of alternative political forces. At the same time, visible improvements in
the functioning of civil society and independent press were not marked.
In the area of economic liberalization, the last quarter was characterized, on the one
hand, by the adoption of important and long8awaited decisions on pricing, labor, and licensing;
on the other hand, by predicted failures in privatization and reforming the existing system of
financing public programs.
In the area of good governance and the rule of law, a number of regulations aimed at
liberalizing economic activities were adopted. Among them, in particular, the Law on Support
of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Amendments to the Law on Business Associations, the
decree on licensing certain types of activities and others.
In the geopolitical orientation there was observed an increase in the apparent conflict
with Russia, while strengthening cooperation with the Baltic countries and Ukraine. The crisis
in the Belarusian8Russian relations, however, caused only minimal progress in relations with
the EU. Belarusian authorities continue to insist that the EU should abandon its policy of
making terms in relations with Belarus.
Finally, in the field of cultural policy the trend of Europeanization and Belarusization was
restored, most strikingly it was manifested in the official celebration of the 600th anniversary
of the Battle of Grünwald.
TREND 1
Political Liberalization and Democratization —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
Contrary to predictions, the beginning of the campaign (on 14 September, the parliament
of Belarus scheduled the presidential election for December 19, 2010) is not accompanied by
increased repressions against political activists, including members of the opposition politicians’
campaign teams.
The situation with the freedom of expression in the country remains stable, although it is
still alarming: newspapers receive official warnings, documented cases of “disappearances”
of independent newspapers circulations occur.
The number of newly registered public associations is not decreasing compared to non8
electoral years. However, some administrative obstacles to institutions – a legal form of non8
# 4 July – September 2010
# 4 July – September 2010
310 	



profit organizations – began to be applied. So far, the elimination of institutions is neither
massive, nor persistent: court cases to liquidate institutions with political backgrounds (like
“Right Alliance”, or “Moving Forward”, which is affiliated with the political campaign “Tell the
truth”) have been postponed, contrary to many forecasts that court decisions on liquidation
would follow, and this practice would be further applied to other NGOs registered as institutions.
Opportunities for communication with voters increased at the stage of collecting
signatures, denying exclusively repressive scenario for the future campaign.
Justification for the new trend (July/September 2010)
In terms of political liberalization and democratization, minimal progress was recorded.
At the same time, some changes that occurred are rather significant. For example, one should
note some progress in the field of freedom of the signature collection, and expanding
opportunities for communicating with voters. However, the final evaluation of their significance
will only be up to the election campaign as a whole.
Nota Bene: this estimate is displayed not only in comparison with the previous quarter
monitoring, but also in comparison with the corresponding period of preparation and holding
of the presidential campaign in 2005–2006.
So far, the election campaign in 2010 is held in a relatively liberal atmosphere. The
Central Commission on Carrying out Elections and Referenda was rather positive about the
registration of initiative groups of presidential candidates. 17 out of the 19 applications were
approved and only two rejected, following and were obvious failure to meet the requirement
on the size of the action teams. None of the oppositionists were denied registration. On the
contrary, they were even met halfway, like e. g. a group of candidates from the Belarusian
Christian Democracy: having mistakenly provided a wrong file with a list of the initiative group,
they were given a chance to replace an e8list. Many potential candidates were allowed to add
new people to their teams, even after submitting applications to the Central Commission.
The territorial election commissions include more representatives from opposition parties.
Rejection rate for opposition representatives remain substantial, but it is smaller than during
the previous presidential elections (in 2006, according to the old version of the Electoral
Code) and during the local elections (in 2010, already on the new edition of the Electoral
Code).
Description of key events that defined the assessment of the trend
Announcement of the presidential elections had an impact on all components of the
trend (democratization and liberalization in the sphere of freedom of speech, of association
and non8profit organizations, opportunities for political opposition).
However, the major opposition actors had been approaching the pre8election mode since
as early as April8June 2010. As a result, the active opposition had switched to the pre8election
mode in August, i.e. before the announcement of the election campaign. By that time, authorities
had also entered the electoral phase of the political business cycle (i. e., they resumed
administrative increases in wages). It is worth noting some intrigue with the election date: the
decision was passed by the Parliament not on the first day of the extraordinary session, as
had been predicted. Yet, no one can claim that the elections are held ahead of schedule: the
deviation from the latest date possible is just six weeks.
Other events
Freedom of expression. The government once again issued official warnings to
independent newspapers during the covered period, and the web freedom was limited de
facto (e. g. the Decree № 60 stipulating identification of users came into foce from July 1,
2010).
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Particular attention should be paid to the adoption of the Decree № 515 “On Some
Measures for the Development of Data Transfer Network in the Republic of Belarus” on
September 30, 2010, providing the Operations and Analysis Center (OAC) under the auspices
of the President with functions of a new IT regulator. As a regulator, the OAC is supposed to
administer licensing, strategic development, fair competition and the direct management of
the telecommunications industry. These measures could mean both further liberalization and
increasingly restrictive regulation in this area.
Last but not least, the death of Aleh Biabenin, a journalist of the pro8opposition
website Charter 97, caused many questions. On the one hand, Biabenin’s colleagues
doubted the official suicide version, and put forward various suggestions, in which the
performers are either Belarusian or Russian security services. However, convincing
evidence has not yet been provided. Neither have the opponents explained credible motives
for the authorities to murder Biabenin. On the other hand, the Belarusian government
does not oppose the objective investigation of the case and even invited OSCE experts to
participate in the investigation.
Freedom of association and NGO activities. Statistics suggest there was no deviation
from the usual dynamics, which is surprising in view of the election period., The Ministry of
Justice and the chief justice departments of regional executive committees reported in the
first half of 2010 that 68 new associations (3 international, 9 national and 56 local ones) and
10(sic!) new foundations (1 international and 9 domestic ones) were registered. These figures
compare with figures “non8electoral” periods or surpass them.
At the same time, many NGOs and parties still face difficulties with registration. For
example, the registration of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party was again delayed
in September 2010. Litigation has been launched to eliminate politically engaged
institutions; matching names of new institutions is de facto unofficial banned. The
Association of Civic Education has been denied registration unlawfully and with gross
procedural violations.
Introduced in September, changes in the Regulations on Registration of NGOs slightly
complicate the procedure for registration of new organizations. As far as NGOs audits by tax
authorities and state control bodies are concerned, they were more multiple in the third quarter
of 2010 than in the previous period.
Opposition activities. The Ministry of Justice is conducting audits of the BPF party, two
written warnings were issued to the NGO “BPF Revival” and the BPF party. The BPF Congress
where the party candidate for the presidency was nominated was declared illegitimate by the
Ministry decision. With regard to repressions against opposition activists and some street
protest participants, positive changes are visible.
Political democratization. The beginning of the campaign and registration of initiative
groups were liberal in manner. But the adoption of certain regulatory and procedural acts by
the Central Commission as well as the failure to comply with Alexander Milinkevich’s proposal
for including candidates’ trustees to electoral commissions suggest that the government intends
to retain control over the vote count.
Still, there are positive trends in terms of the nomination of candidates, the possibility
of collecting signatures and campaigning. For example, more opposition members have
been let into regional commissions (e. g. two BPF members and one Social Democrat in
the Minsk City Commissions). Reasonable locations were provided for signature8collecting
teams, enabling them to interact with people and to present their aspiring candidate. In
some cases, the Central Commission intervened to provide local authorities with
recommendations to revise some heavily restrictive decisions against the candidates’
teams.
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Events contradicting to the trend and why they do not change the general
picture
The criminal case against leaders of a political campaign “Tell the Truth” Niakliayeu,
Vazniak and Dzmitryieu is going on, with interviews of witnesses being conducted. Mikita
Matusevich, a campaign activist, has been convicted. Another campaigner Mikhail Bashura is
still under investigation, held in custody.1
The political emigration of a number of prominent opposition figures: Ales Zarembiuk,
Siarhei Panamarou and Colonel Vladimir Baradach, a former brigade commander of Special
Forces (all applied for political asylum) – is undoubtedly a negative trend which indicates a
latent pressure on the opposition.
According to the Human Rights Centre “Viasna”:
Brief forecast for the next quarter and next year
The number of newly registered NGOs is not declining, and one can expect it to be
similar in 2010 to the rates of “non8electoral” years.
We can also assume that the year will be marked by reduction of repression (arrests,
detentions etc.) against opposition members. However, one cannot be sure about it because,
as practice shows, the final stage of campaigns and the first two weeks after elections usually
witness the biggest crackdown measures.
TREND 2
Economic liberalization 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
Predictions about the continuation of the cautious liberalization have in general come
true. The government has taken a number of documents that structure their intention to liberalize
the economy in order to encourage potential investors. However, the Belarusian authorities
still have to balance between addressing macroeconomic problems, preserving the overall
framework of the Belarusian economy and creating visibility of significant liberalization.
Justification for the new trend (July/September 2010)
The past quarter has been characterized, on the one hand, by the adoption of vital decisions
on economic liberalization (in pricing, labor market and licensing), on the other side – by
predictable failures in privatization and reform of fundraising for state programs.
Description of key events that defined the assessment of the trend
Third quarter of 2010 began with a landmark event: the European Commission delegation
headed by Stefan Depieper, the director of the Department of anti8dumping measures of the
1 Last8minute news: Bashura was found guilty, fined with 500 “basic amounts” and released from custody
immediately in the courtroom.
 I quarter 2010 II quarter 2010 III quarter 2010 
All cases of administrative 
prosecutions 
183 131 75 
Including – the use of arrest as an 
administrative penalty by the court  
7 2 1 
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Directorate General of Foreign Trade paid a visit to Belarus on 30 June to 2 July. Launching the
procedure of the EU’s recognition of market status of Belarus’ economy was the main goal of
the visit, which is of great importance during the EU anti8dumping investigations against
Belarusian products. It is obvious that the recognition of market economy status of the
Belarusian economy will take years, but now we can say that Belarusian officials have another
objective landmark in the further liberalization of the economy. We can recall another landmark:
that is, reaching the Top30 States of Doing Business rating.
Undoubtedly, signing the presidential decree № 450 on September 1, 2010 “On Licensing
of Certain Activities” was the most awaited event in terms of the economic liberalization of
Belarus in the third quarter. The Decree provides for the abolition of licensing of 16 activities,
of which 7 include the 59 components (operations or services). Regulations on licensing of
certain activities were approved by the Decree, with an attached list of activities that are
subject to special permission (license), and also a list of state bodies authorized to issue
licenses (the list of licensable activities is exhaustive). The Decree comes into force on January
1, 2011.
It is particularly important that the most dominant businesses – trade and catering, which
used to amount for over 50 per cent of issued licenses, were excluded from the list of licensable
activities. However, the licensing of publishing and printing activities retained. Obviously, the
granting of licenses for them has purely ideological foundation. Advocacy and legal services
have also remained subject to licensing.
Approved by the Council of Ministers on 9 August by the Decision № 1180, the Strategy
for Development of the Energy Potential of the Republic of Belarus has made a real sensation.
One of the most radical reform programs for electric8power industry, housing and public
utilities is stated on 18th page of this document.
The goal of the national strategy in this area is the phased creation of a full8fledged
wholesale electricity market by 2014–2015. Creating an electricity market operator is planned
for this purpose, called “The Market Operator”, to coordinate all purchases and sales of energy
and power in accordance with market rules. Strategy calls for the corporatization (privatization)
of the entire sector of the energy production, transportation and sales, prioritizing renewable
sources producers, including individuals. It also assumes the establishment of independent
electricity suppliers.
The strategy also involves the stage8by8stage elimination of cross subsidies in the prices
of gas and electricity tariffs by 2014. In particular, preferential prices for gas and electricity
tariffs for certain legal entities and entrepreneurs are supposed to be abolished by 2012.
Complete elimination of cross subsidies in gas prices is expected in 2013, and tariffs on heat
and electricity – in 2014. Practically, this is an ambitious program of comprehensive reform of
the country’s energy vaguely similar to the RAO UES strategy of energy reforms.
The declared goal to achieve a “cost transparency at all stages of production, transmission,
distribution and sale of electricity and heat” should be mentioned as a possible pitfall on the
way of implementing this reform. It is doubtful whether the public is going to have access to
all information about costs and, consequently, tariff8making. This means that citizens will
have no choice but again to trust the government’s word that all tariffs will be justified and
fair.
Other events
Several regulations were passed in the 3rd quarter of 2010 to facilitate the privatization
of state property and the implementation of investment projects in the country. Presidential
decree dated 19 July 2010 № 367 “On some Amendments and Additions to Some Decrees of
the President of the Republic of Belarus on the Disposal of State Assets”, among other things,
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establishes the procedure for payment by installments upon transfer of some public real estate
that is directly assigned to the republican bodies of state administration and other state
organizations subordinated to the Government, public bodies and organizations subordinate
to the President of Belarus, and the administrations of free economic zones.
The Decree stipulates the provision of installment payments for a period not exceeding
one year in the sale of buildings, premises, unfinished buildings, or equipment, valued at
more than 10,000 basic amounts. In addition, the State Property Committee is empowered to
make decisions on the orders of state property, whose value does not exceed 5,000 basic
amounts. Delegating this power to this authority will allow more rapid decisions on the disposal
of unused state property.
A presidential decree dated August 4, 2009 № 410 “On Amendments to the Presidential
Decree of February 25, 2008 № 113” makes it easier to attract investment to loss8making
state organizations. A criterion of “stable insolvency” has been excluded from the document.
As a result, the number of organizations covered by the Decree № 113 will increase. In general,
the implementation of the Decree № 410 will expand the scope of the decree № 113 to reduce
the number of unprofitable state8run enterprises, attract investment and secure additional
revenue to the national and local budgets.
On 26 July, Belarus completed placement of Eurobonds in the amount of USD 600 million
with a warrant of 8.75 per cent, expanding in 2015. According to the Ministry of Finances of
Belarus, their issue has attracted the attention of a wide range of investors from different
regions of the world and was oversubscribed three times. Applications for participation in the
placement were obtained from 145 investors for a total of USD 1.5 billion. Belarus additionally
placed USD 400 million Eurobonds on 10 August, with profitability of 8.25 per cent for additional
placement by the repayment.
Obviously, the decision by the government on its first Eurobond issue was caused by the
need to supplement the budget and finance the current account deficit of the balance of
payments, while unwilling to undertake conditions as for stand8by programs. However, entering
the market of foreign loans has important positive value, as from now investors will have an
impartial market8based mechanism for evaluating the credit capacity of Belarus as a sovereign
borrower, other than rating agencies’ judgments.
On September 24, 2010 Belarus finally got its first bank8managed fund (BMF, an instrument
of collective investments which is an analogue of mutual funds, yet regulated by the National
Bank, not the Securities Committee), namely, the BMF Capital Trust Fund Belinvestbank. The
basis for the functioning of the BMF was provided by the e presidential decree dated March 3,
2010 № 131 “About Carrying out an Experiment to Generate Bank8Managed Funds”. The need
for the development of FBU in Belarus is due to the emergence of new and effective mechanisms
for banks to expand their ability to attract and allocate funds, and for individuals and legal entities
to obtain financial market instruments alternative to traditional.
Presidential decree dated September 23, 2010 № 484 “On Repeal of the Decree of the
President of the Republic of Belarus of February 5, 1997 № 132” abolished the government’s
right to determine expenditures composing the net cost of goods (works, services). Previously
approved by the joint decision of the relevant ministries, from now on the basic provisions on
the composition of expenses included into the cost of products (works, services) will be only
advisory in nature. It will be up to organizations to determine for themselves how they shape
the net cost of production. In fact, one can talk about removing the last of the three mechanisms
of state intervention in pricing. The so8called “price increase limits” and “rate of return limits”
lost their mandatory status earlier. We can also assume that the decree would contribute to
liberalization of economic activities, simplify accounting, as well as promote the convergence
of national legislation with international financial reporting standards.
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An important event was also the Council of Ministers’ Decision on 6 September 2010
№ 1285 “On Amendments to Some Decisions of the Council of Ministers and Repeal of Certain
Provisions of the Government of the Republic of Belarus or their Parts”. According to the
regulation, property owners and employers have obtained more rights to shape conditions of
remuneration of managers and employees. Administrative control over wages was reduced.
The procedure for calculating and paying bonuses to officials in commercial organizations
became simpler.
Events contradicting to the trend and why they do not change the general
picture
In March 2010, President Lukashenko approved a list of 5 public companies, whose
shares will be sold at the competitions with the participation of external consultants. This
decision was one of the two key conditions for receiving IMF stand8by loan. The list included:
“Babrujsk Machine Plant”, “VolMet”, “Lida Foundry8Mechanical Plant”, “Barkhim” and “Reиyca
Textiles”. August 18 was scheduled to conduct competitions for the sale of state8owned shares
of the first three (“Babrujsk Machine Plant”, “VolMet” and “Lida Foundry8Mechanical Plant”).
However, investor interest was minimal, with just one offer submitted and, yet, shelved. An
attempt to sell two other companies (“Barkhim” and “Reиyca”) on 23 September also returned
zero results.
Obviously, the pilot privatization of the five enterprises failed because of dissatisfaction
by the economic authorities of Belarus with the IMF8e proposed mechanism of an open tender.
Authorities prefer to negotiate with investors individually, not least because of the possibility
of making secret terms. In addition, the privatization is considered by the economic authorities
of Belarus solely from the fiscal perspective, i. e. as a means to supplement the budget rather
than to reshape the structure of the economy.
Creation of a specialized financial development agency was the second key requirement
on the side of the IMF for a stand8by loan. Creating such an agency within the described
quarter did not happen for reasons that are rooted in the conflicts within the power apparatus.
On August 3, at the working meeting of President Alexander Lukashenko and Prime
Minister Sergei Sidorski, the chairman of the National Bank Petr Prokopovich, as well as the
heads of two major banks in the country, the chairman of Belagroprombank Sergei Rumas
and chairman of the board of Belarusbank Nadezhda Yermakova, President questioned the
necessity of creating such an agency, seeing it as the desire of banks to withdraw from the
service of state programs in full. Quote: “The banks simply want to make their life easier and
get away from government programs, and you know they are huge – the revival of the village,
and the “Milk” program, and the “Meat” program. It does not befit banks to seek to an easy life
and get away from it, because basically these programs are supported by state8owned banks”.
On the other hand, the Finance Ministry opposes the creation of a specialized agency,
insisting on establishing some kind of “development bank” instead. It is obvious that both
sides present a misunderstanding of the true mission of a financial agency (as a tool of economic
restructuring), because the National Bank is inclined to see in it only as a “bad bank” (see
function 1), while the Finance Ministry is opposed to budgetary constraints (see the function
2). Another explanation could be a conscious desire to dilute the essence of the IMF demands,
meeting them only formally.
That is what happened with the requirement of creating a specialized privatization agency
(which ultimately was established on the basis of impotent Agency for Foreign Investments).
Nevertheless, the National Bank of Belarus believes that a specialized financial agency will be
created in Belarus by the end of the year; it will be able to start actually working not earlier
than 3 or 4 months after signing a decree establishing it.
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Through the mouth of the Prime Minister Earlier some time ago, the government promised
to increase salaries for low8paid categories of employees from 1 September by increasing the
rate of the first discharge from 90 thousand to 180 thousand rubles. Clearly, its doubling
would have led to serious inflationary pressures. However, even an increase by one third (to
install the wage rate at 1188120 thousand rubles, as planned from 1 November 2010) causes
a concern about the Belarusian economy. What is particularly disturbing, the pre8election
wage growth is taking place against a background of lower budget revenues. The forecast by
the Finance Ministry on budget deficit grew by 44 per cent (from 2,7 to 3,9 per cent) between
January and August; the emerging trend will be for sure reinforced by spending for the upcoming
salary increase.
Brief forecast for the next quarter and next year
The economic policy in the country will be determined by the political requirement to
achieve the average wage of USD 500 by the end of the year.
There is just one more thing in terms of further liberalization scheduled for the rest of
this year: the Directive № 4 on Liberalization, promised by the President, but still under
construction since as long ago as April 2010.
It is most likely to be also presented as a part of the election program of the incumbent.
This gives grounds for hope that the document is not a mere formality. However, serious
structural changes, obviously, are set aside for post8election period.
Administrative pressures to meet overstated wage and GDP targets will undoubtedly
create macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, we can expect the resumption of cooperation
with the IMF to develop and implement another anti8crisis program.
TREND 3
Good governance and the rule of law 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
As predicted in the last issue of BISS Trends, liberalization initiatives were continued to be
generated, and those finally bore fruit in the form of regulations. New steps were made towards
informatization, resulting in the adoption of Information Society Development Strategy in the
Republic of Belarus for the period until 2015. Finally, as expected, strict rules to regulate the
Internet were put in place, under the Decree #60. However, the expected reform of the power
hierarchy and reorganization of the government ahead of presidential elections did not happen.
Justification for the new trend (July/September 2010)
The trend in the third quarter of 2010 can be labeled as “minimal progress”. A number of
regulations aimed at liberalizing economic activities were passed in July8September. We believe
that this happened in the process of achieving the government’s goal – achieving the Top830
of countries with the best business environment according to the World Bank. Among the
documents adopted, in particular, there are the Law on Support of Small and Medium
Enterprises, the Law “On Amendments to the Law “On Business Associations», the Decree
“On Licensing Certain Activities” and others.
In addition, in the third quarter of 2010, government strategists reached an important
stage in the process of laying the foundations for an information society and e8government in
Belarus. This will certainly help to optimize the economic processes and to improve governance
in the future, as well as increase the competitiveness of Belarus as a state attractive for doing
business.
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Against this backdrop, stringent measures to regulate the Belarusian segment of the
WWW and to meet the deadline set for 1 December 2010 by the Decree № 60 “On Measures
to Improve the Use of the National Segment of the Internet” were introduced in place during
the quarter. In general, the third quarter of 2010 was characterized by the appearance of
specific regulations and simultaneous declarations on the active pursuit of further liberalization
measures, in particular the Directive № 4 which, if judged according to the responsible officials,
is getting outlined.
Description of key events that defined the assessment of the trend
The main event, illustrating the trend in the quarter, in our opinion, was the approval of
the Information Society Development Strategy till 2015by the Council of Ministers. This strategy
includes, inter alias, the establishment of industries of public electronic services in the e8
government, e8learning development, health, employment and the economy as a whole, i. e.
all the attributes of a contemporary post8industrial society. Analysis of the document shows
that the government strategists recognize the need to follow the world trends of economic
and social models.
Other events
Enacted on July 1, the Law on Support of Small and Medium Enterprises defined the
legal and institutional frameworks for that support; in particular, it has established clear criteria
for the classification of business entities to categories of small and medium8sized businesses.
The criteria enable them to qualify for special benefits provided for in other regulations. However,
representatives of business community expressed a well8grounded critical opinion about the
fact that the law constitutes a framework declaration, while a range of extra regulations is
needed for real improvement in conditions of small and medium businesses in Belarus. Thus,
the long8awaited law has not changed the situation radically; one should wait for the publication
of changes in taxation and accounting legislation and, most importantly, the Directive № 4.
Enacted on 15 July 2010, a new piece of legislation “On Amendments and Supplements
to the Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Business Associations» simplified the procedure for
the establishment of companies and decision8making competence of general meetings of
members, as well as enhanced the protection of minority shareholders.
On 1 September, Decree № 450 “On Licensing of Certain Activities” nominally reduced
the number of licensed activities by 16 positions. At the same time, experts claim that only 6
activities were actually released from licensing, while the remaining ones merged with others
under a common name. For example, it remains unclear before a relevant decision by the
Council of Ministers what will be categorized as “legal services”, since this term might also
include those excluded from licensable activities, e.g. auditing services or dissemination of
legal information. The principal innovation is the abolition of licensing in the retail sector, as
well as design engineering and construction.
Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Economic Court continued efforts on optimizing the
judiciary. A pilot trial with a remote video conferencing was conducted for the first time in the
third quarter. According to the work evaluation of common courts, a number of civil cases in
the courts significantly increased in the first half of 2010 over the same period last year (14,5
per cent). This indicates an increase in public confidence in the judicial system as a tool of
settling disputes and protecting legitimate rights.
Events contradicting to the trend and why they do not change the general
picture
The presidential decree № 60 “On Measures to Improve the Use of the National Segment
of the Internet” was enacted at the beginning of the s of quarter. Since then, Internet service
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providers must carry out the identification of devices of users of Internet services, to record
and store information on such devices and web services provided. Internet service providers
are obliged to have a technological base for user data storage and identification. Despite the
fact that from now on, anonymous browsing is legally impossible in Belarus, such a development
was pre8determined earlier, therefore, this fact does not change the picture of the trend against
the background of the liberalization measures described above.
Brief forecast for the next quarter and next year
The quarter IV of 2010 will be marked by the presidential elections scheduled for the end
of the year. This fact will leave its mark on all spheres of public life, including the quality of
governance and the rule of law. Any event like the adoption of a piece of legislation or an
official statement will reach out to society. It seems possible to expect “revolutionary” Directive
№ 4 on the economic liberalization in the coming months for tactical reasons, as well as the
amendments to the Taxation Code, aimed at its further deregulation, etc. The development of
informatization of the country will be held in combination with rigid regulation and control of
activity of individuals and organizations on the Internet.
In the balance of payments deficit, the growth of credit debt of the state and lack of
resources to maintain the financial stability of the country’s leadership will be forced to
accelerate liberalization, expand space for private initiative and establishing fair rules in the
Belarusian market for (foreign) private capital. Most likely, this will happen after the presidential
elections in early 2011. At the same time, elements of the information society are likely to be
promoted – yet, with increasing state control over the communication channels and its contents.
TREND 4
Geopolitical orientation: Relations with Russia 
The relations with the Baltic States and Ukraine —
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
In general, the previous prediction was correct: as expected, in conditions of acute political
confrontation with the Kremlin Belarusian leadership looked for other potential investors and
donors that could contribute to the re8election of Lukashenko. However, nothing indicated
that the Kremlin would get so rigid in its reactions.
Justification for the new trend (July/September 2010)
The entire third quarter of 2010 was marked by a sharp aggravation of relations between
Belarus and Russia. The minor “gas war” in June, however, left Russia without any achievements
in terms of goals pursued by this “war”: to convince the countries of Western Europe that the
major problems with energy supplies arise through the fault of the transit countries, to push
Belarus and Ukraine against each other; and to harm the financial stability in Belarus.
At the same time, Belarus has made progress in cooperation with the Baltic States and
Ukraine. And finally, the July visit of Љtefan Fьle, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and
Neighbourhood Policy, clarified the position of the European Union: free and fair elections in
exchange for EU assistance in the modernization and creation of a new “action plan” in autumn
2010.
Description of key events that defined the assessment of the trend
Russian NTV aired a “documentary” on the Belarusian President “Godfather” on July 4,
2010, presenting the economic achievements of Belarus as a result of Russian “subsidies”
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amounting to the overall USD 52 billion. Lukashenko was accused of insincerity and failure to
live up to commitments towards Russia, as well as organizing kidnappings and killings of
several political figures. Characterized by the haste and apparent laxity, the film was immediately
followed by an English8language version “Hard Luka” on the state8funded Russia Today TV,
broadcasting in English and intended for foreign audiences (Lukashenko was called “Europe’s
last dictator”), thus leaving no doubt that this was done on Russian leadership’s order.
A sociological study conducted in Belarus after the screening of the first two parts of the
film showed that it watched by about 40 per cent of respondents. Assessments differed from
the “absolute truth” to “absolute slander”. The most logical assumption is that these films
were made for in8house “consumption”. This was largely due to the fact that at the time
referred to the June gas dispute Russian public opinion was clearly on the side of Belarus, and
the Russian government is trying to justify its policy towards Belarus as a country by forming
a negative image of the leader of Belarus. A new wave of confrontation in August fully confirmed
this version.
The first channel of the Belarusian TV showed an interview with Mikheil Saakashvili, the
Georgian President, on July 15. He thanked Minsk for a balanced policy towards Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and criticized Moscow for its strange demands on him. On 16 July, during a trip
to Homiel region, the President of Belarus told about his previous informal weekend with the
Georgian leader in the Crimea to celebrate the anniversary of Viktor Yanukovych.
On the same day, on July 16, the NTV channel demonstrated the “Godfather82”. Basically,
the story repeated the first part of the film. However, the film8makers added extra accusations
against Lukashenko: the co8operation with Saakashvili, the ousted Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev and an internationally wanted businessman Boris Berezovsky.
At a news conference in Sochi on 3 August, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
announced that the President Aliaksandr Lukashenko had demonstrated intention to recognize
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, showing no regard to its own parliament. The
reaction to the revelation of the Russian president came soon. Lukashenko accused Medvedev
of dishonesty and bad faith on August 13. According to him, Medvedev misrepresented the
contents of a conversation about the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The third part of the “Godfather” was screened on August 15, accusing Lukashenko of
creating a system of money laundering under the guidance and supervision of the president’s
family. The authors of the movie reminded that 10 years ago Lukashenko was presumed to
have a mosaic psychopathy diagnosis by Dzmitry Shchyhelski, a Belarusian psychiatrist.
In addition to this, the Russian side has conducted unilateral actions against their
commitments under integration agreements, in particular the Customs Union. For example,
based on a report by the Ministry of Economic Development on August 10, the Russian
Government attempted to justify their claims to a share of Belarusian export duties on oil
products produced from Russian raw materials, in addition to the existing export duties on oil
and oil products in trade among the member states of the Customs Union. Thus, one could
argue that Russia does not see the Customs Union and the ES agreements as an obstacle to
create new artificial stages on the way to meeting Belarus’ claims to duty8free deliveries of
Russian energy resources.
The visit to Minsk by Љtefan Fьle, the European Commissioner, in July 2010 confirmed
the interest of the EU to normalize relations with Belarus. The EU’s intention to develop a
detailed “action plan” for Belarus was announced during his visit – a document which would
help to improve relations between the two sides and would aim at promoting reforms in
Belarus. The Commissioner made it clear that progress in relations with the EU will be
subject to democracy and openness of the upcoming presidential election. According to
Fьle, the EU stands ready to help Belarus with economic modernization, diversification of
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oil and gas industry market reforms, in the case if Belarus demonstrates real progress in
democratization.
An assumption that the cooling relations with Russia would be accompanied by a
corresponding improvement in relations with Europe seems logical and consistent with the
logic of the geopolitical “pendulum”. However, this time the tradition was broken. For the first
time the weakening of ties with the East has not strengthened ties with the West, but rather
with North and South. The need for Belarus to find ways to diversify energy supplies is the
reason.
Other events
This summer, the prime ministers of Belarus and Lithuania Sergei Sidorski and Andrius
Kubilius agreed on the possibility for Belarus to participate in the LNG terminal construction in
Klaipeda (decision on its construction was taken by the Lithuanian Government on 22 June).
The Belarusian side hopes to ship up to 10 billion cubic meters of liquefied gas through the
terminal, while Lithuania is expecting 3 billion or so. The government reports that Belarus,
along with Lithuania, is studying the possibility of such a project also in Poland and Ukraine.
According to the decision of the Government of Belarus, the Republic should decide on the
project until November this year.
However, the greatest regional cooperation progress was made during the implementation
of joint Belarusian8Venezuelan project on delivery and processing of Venezuelan oil to Belarusian
refineries. As just three tankers with Venezuelan oil had arrived to Odessa by 1 July, the
project was perceived by Russia as a “demonstrational” movement by Belarus to have a bluff
factor in talks on energy. However, the project rapidly turned into an important factor for
regional integration in the third quarter of 2010.
An agreement by the governmental officials of Ukraine and Belarus on oil transportation
via Ukraine to Mazyr refinery in the Homiel region of Belarus on 13 July 2010 came as the first
breakthrough in this direction, though after a series of delays. Along with the southern transit
route, Belarus examined the northern one: a tanker with Venezuelan oil arrived in the Estonian
port of Muuga on 23 July, and then the oil was transferred to Naftan refinery in Navapolack by
rail.
The search for alternative routes for Venezuelan oil proceeded by a contract signed on
19 August by the Lithuanian Klaipedos Nafta to supply a test batch of Venezuelan oil to
Transchema company, the one responsible for promoting production of the Belneftekhim
concern enterprises to the markets of Lithuania and other European countries. A tanker with a
pilot lot of Venezuelan oil arrived at the port of Klaipeda on August 29.
During a visit by Sergei Martynov, the Belarusian Foreign Minister, to Riga on 23 August
the possibility of transporting the Venezuelan oil to Belarus via Latvia was also mentioned.
Such a policy is beginning to resemble a Belarus8organized competition among the Baltic
countries not only in the best economic conditions for the transfer of Venezuelan oil, but in
better terms of foreign policy cooperation (based on intergovernmental treaties) with Belarus.
Thus, Belarus demonstrates to Russia it is not irreplaceable both in terms of raw material
supplies for the Belarusian oil refineries and in terms of political support for Lukashenko.
Sharing similar international recognition problems, the Belarusian leader and the Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez now help each other and make other states take Venezuela and Belarus
into account, as together they manage a significant amount of energy.
Events contradicting to the trend and why they do not change the general
picture
Contrary to predictions of many analysts, the Belarusian parliament ratified the Customs
Code at an emergency session of both chambers (on July 3, said the President of Belarus to
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media). Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed a declaration of enacting the Customs Code at
the EurAsEC summit on July 5 in Astana. It is thus applied from 6 July in all three countries.
As is known, the issue of customs duty on Russian oil and petroleum products to Belarus
was the stumbling block in negotiations on the Customs Union. The Belarusian side insisted
that the very existence of export duties on trade between the member states of the Customs
Union is in odds with the logic of this economic block. The Russian side argued that the
removal of export duties in mutual trade was an issue of establishing the Single Economic
Space (SES), expected to be created by 2012. Finally, a compromise solution was agreed on:
the customs duty on crude oil and petroleum products will be lifted for Belarus after the
signing and ratification by our country of an entire package of documents to establish the
Single Economic Space of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. The vice8premier of Belarus Andrei
Kabiakou announced it to media on July 5 in Astana. The appropriate decision was documented
in the Protocol on certain interim exceptions from the Customs Union regulations, which was
signed simultaneously with the decision to enact the Customs Code. Thus, the customs duty
on crude oil and petroleum products to Belarus are supposed to be lifted automatically, without
waiting for the documents on the SES to be signed and ratified by Russia and Kazakhstan.
Regarding the use of Venezuelan oil, rail is still the only realistic way to deliver it both
from Odessa kand from Baltic harbours. However, it is obvious now that this method is
unsuitable for the transport of the planned 10 million tons a year, because of restrictions on
the number of tankers the port is able to serve and the capacity of loading racks. It suggests
the urgent issue of how to use existing pipelines, namely – Odessa–Brody and Polack–Ventspils.
The first of these is now being used in reverse mode to pump 9 million tons of Russian
oil to Odessa. Switching it to the direct mode is a matter of the ability of Belarus to guarantee
the pumping of large volumes of Venezuelan oil. The second of these is currently idle; making
it work in reverse mode requires a construction of an extra pumping station. A Russian
shareholder in the joint venture LatRosTrans, the operator of the Ventspils port, might oppose
it. 66 per cent of the equity joint venture company is owned by Ventspils Nafta and 34 per cent
by Russian Transnefteproduct.
Brief forecast for the next quarter and next year
Fundamental step8by8step restructuring of existing models of cooperation is the most
likely in relations with Russia. None of the parties is benefiting from the existing integration
structures (including the recently established Customs Union) the way they had expected. So
far, Belarus is gradually losing preferential terms of energy supplies, and is unlikely to regain
them; Russia’s position is clearly to use all possible tools to postpone such arrangements.
Russia is coming to perceive the phantom of the Union State and even the Customs Union as
a burden on its way to the WTO and the ambition of the Russian economy modernization. As
soon as now the idea of the CU is suffering from numerous exceptions and exemptions from
free trade regime, something that happened to all previous inter8state projects. Thus, it is
logical to assume the continuation of a trend of further erosion of the CU and simultaneous
attempts to put blame on a “partner” for hampering the project.
On the other hand, the regional collaboration with Ukraine and the Baltic countries, in
contrast, begins to show a clear tendency to converge on infrastructure cooperation. Belarus
will certainly make every effort to use Odessa–Brody and Polack–Ventspils pipelines for the
transit of Venezuelan oil.
In fact, the current geopolitical trends (gradual disengagement with Russia and regional
meridional integration based on infrastructure projects) are suspiciously reminiscent of
geopolitical dreams of the ideologues of “the Belarusian Renaissance” of the 908ies and outline
the looming pipeline system, the notorious “Baltic8Black Sea8collector”. If this is the geopolitical
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result of the rule by the originally pro8Russian President of Belarus, one cannot help recalling
Hegelian “irony of history” concept.
TREND 5
Cultural Policy: the Europeanization and Belarusization 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
The forecast given in the previous issue of BISS Trends proved to be quite accurate. First
of all, the Soviet8liberation mythology and themes were used during such an important event
as the Independence Day in Belarus. The further internalization of national symbols and historical
events (transferring them from “outside” into the public consciousness) also proved to meet
the expectations, leading to a more complicated cultural landscape of Belarus and the wider
promotion of ideas about the European origins of the Belarusian culture.
Nevertheless, the specified strategy of Belarusization and the further Europeanization of
the Belarusian culture is not playing a decisive role in the field of cultural policy at the moment.
This is confirmed not only by the relevance of the above8mentioned Soviet8liberation rhetoric,
but also constantly emerging evidence by various civic initiatives of irregularities in the process
of restoration of historical and cultural heritage, when an apparent conflict appears between
the interests lobbied by officials and the declared principles of historic preservation. The
declarative nature of measures to liberalize the sphere of culture becomes visible, a good
example being served by a failure to attract much8needed culture market investors.
Justification for the new trend (July/September 2010)
July8September 2010 is characterized by minor positive dynamics and trends of
Europeanization and Belarusization. This is confirmed by the active performance of the
Belarusian Ministry of Culture in the international arena, the organization of Days of Belarusian
culture in Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the UAE. The Belarusian Ministry of
Culture shares a series of events with counterparts from Poland and Lithuania dedicated to
600 anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald, indicating a great importance and symbolism of the
event. In addition, the festival “Augustow Canal in the culture of the three nations” took place,
the Minister of Culture Pavel Latushka met members of the genus Radzivil, the Polish director
Krzysztof Zanussi, and the ministers of culture of neighbouring countries.
A number of governmental statements and initiatives can be considered as an extension
of pragmatism in strategies of cultural policy, caused primarily by a pressing need to fundraise.
This emphasis on pragmatism intersects with the trend of liberalization, but only to the extent
acceptable to the official authorities.
The above trends are generally positive. Still, they are largely in odds with two major
events that downgrade the symbolic value of attempts to find a self8identification in the context
of European culture. These are the main events of the period under review: the Independence
Day of Belarus and Dazhynki82010. They continue the tradition of recourse to the Soviet myth
supported by myths of “hostility” of the world (perhaps you can add a new moment, “malicious
grin”, the Russian leadership) and the chilling “instability” of the global and chaotic world. In
this context, the special role of the paternalistic state is stressed, as well as the concern for
maintaining a local “greenhouse” stability which is constantly exposed to threats from the
outside world.
Thus, in the third quarter of 2010, the state cultural policy is characterized by contradictions.
The production of cultural meanings and values that are new for the Belarusian reality, as well as
comebacks of the forgotten events, dates and names, are downplayed by the constant exploitation
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of Soviet mythology. This complicates the possible identification of the Belarusian culture as an
exclusively European one. It is also clear that this duality represents the boundaries of
“Europeanization” of the Belarusian culture and history with the current government.
Description of key events that defined the assessment of the trend
A series of developments aimed at reactivation of cultural programs and the meanings,
which make cultural origins of Belarus older, is a characteristic feature of the third quarter of
2010. It promotes inclusion and acceptance of the Belarusian culture in the framework of the
European cultural tradition.
In this context a series of events dedicated to 600 anniversary of the Battle of Grьnwald
should be noted, which complicates the picture of the cultural past of Belarus and bring it
closer to the Polish and Lithuanian cultural traditions. A kind of “Renaissance” in Belarus’
relations with its western neighbors is also confirmed by the organization of the festival entitled
“Augustow Canal in the culture of the three nations” and the official intention to present the
achievements of contemporary Belarusian art at the prestigious European competition and
exhibition, 54th Venice Biennale in 2011.
Other events
In a series of events that complement the positive dynamics of the processes of
Europeanization and Belarusization, one must mention a meeting of the Minister of Culture
Pavel Latushka with representatives of the Radziwill family as one of the most famous names
and characters of the pre8Soviet Belarus. Earlier perceived as “aliens”, Radziwills now are
discharged into the category of foreign guests, giving an example of a remarkable transformation
which, however, explicitly captures the limits of the claimed liberalization and policy of re8
actualization of national cultural values and symbols of an alternative cultural landscape.
Summing up the granting of a “guest” status to the Radziwill descendents: firstly, the
government is not ready to restore property rights of Radziwills and, more broadly, the rights
of other landowners, expropriated by the “red” power in the early twentieth century. Secondly,
this lack of readiness of today’s government emphasizes the faзade nature of the re8
Europeanization of the Belarusian culture’s face.
An interview shared by the Deputy Minister of Culture Tadeush Struzhetski with the
newspaper “Belarusians and Market” can also be noted in the context of liberalization. He
voiced the interest of the state to increase private investment in culture. Liberalization trend is
continued by the cancellation of certificates for touring concerts by Belarusian artists (it used
to be mandatory to register and to pay a state fee).
Other signs of the search for a cultural identity are presented by the appearance of
previously forgotten names on the cultural horizon: the decision to establish a monument in
Minsk to the hetman of Ukraine, a native of Belarus Pilyp Orlyk, the opening of the monuments
to Leo Sapieha in Lepel and the Grand Duke Vitaut in Hrodna region.
Events contradicting to the trend and why they do not change the general
picture
Obviously, the use of Soviet mythology during the Independence Day celebration and
the event “Dazhynki82010” devalues the symbolic key trends of this period – Europeanization
and Belarusization. The rhetorical Victory exaltation of the anonymous Belarusian people’s
heroism and the propaganda of domestic agriculture achievements contrast sharply with
attempts to “re8demonization” of the European culture, the rehabilitation of the Belarusian
national symbols and the resuscitation of the Belarusian language. These contrasts within the
official cultural policy make the degree of freedom and the mandate of the Ministry of Culture
and its leadership more explicit. In addition, attention the gap is opening between ‘being’ and
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‘consciousness’ in authorities’ attitudes towards the restoration and preservation of historical
and cultural heritage. Despite claims about special control by the Ministry of Culture, the
historical appearance of Minsk and other cities does not change as much quality as quantity
and rather for the sake of narrow clan interests.
Brief forecast for the next quarter and next year
Despite the deterioration in relations with the Russian leadership, the power discourse is
not going to exacerbate the anti8Russian rhetoric by appropriate cultural and historical support
measures. However, we can expect a kind of prolongation of the armistice between the
authorities and civil society in the cultural sphere, which will set off the political wars in order
to maintain the stability (of government, primarily) and the exclusion of the image of the
Square from the public consciousness.
There is a reason to believe that the emphasis on selective and partial liberalization and
westernization in the sphere of culture and the search for a different configuration of cultural
codes is likely to persist in the long term and serve a logical reflection of the political games.
However, one should not expect a radical revitalization of the European vector in cultural
policy, since it involves more than declaratory commitment to democratic principles. They are
incompatible with the current nature and values of the government, and therefore will continue
to be substituted by manipulations of the historical memory of the Belarusian’s.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On December 19, 2010, Belarus witnessed events that radically modified each of the
trends that we monitor.
Firstly, in politics, we came across total de8liberalization and mopping up of the political
landscape. Political prisoners reappeared in the country, and searches, interrogations and
arrests became mass phenomena. The original objective of the repressions was to procure
exhaustive information about the plans and sources of financing of the opposition, however,
the repression machine never stopped there, but gained momentum.
In the economic liberalization sector, we observe either the lack of progress or minimum
progress connected with emergency attempts to deal with macroeconomic misbalances.
Economic reforms are dissociated from politics to the maximum in the Belarusian model:
the authorities are only ready to make moves that do not threaten the stability of the existing
socioeconomic pattern.
In the quality of governance and supremacy of law section, we observe the absence of
any progress and blanket application of selective “justice” on a case8by8case basis.
Geopolitically, the pendulum of Belarusian foreign policy temporarily stalled in the extreme
eastern position, and Belarus temporarily got into the Russian gravitational field.
Finally, the last vector we monitor, cultural policy, has started performing a compensatory
function: it aims at neutralizing and to some extent compensating for the clearly unpopular
measures in other sectors of public administration.
# 5 December – February 2011
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TREND 1
Political Liberalization and Democratization 
Assessment of the forecast given in the last issue of BISS Trends
Our forecast about the growing de8liberalization and repressions against the opposition
during the final phase of the election campaign, as the election day approached, proved to be
accurate. There were arrests, documented threats, warnings issued for media and NGOs,
furthermore, the practice of issuing warnings under article 19381 was resumed. Predictably,
December 19–20 saw the peak of the repressions. However, it was the intensity and massive
nature of the repressions against political opponents that were totally unexpected, and so was
the shocking avalanching escalation of de8liberalization. Some politicians had predicted that
the post8election repressions would be even more notorious than the events of the year 2006,
however, what happened in reality was clearly beyond all worst8case scenarios. The long8
term phase of intensive repressions was another unexpected trend: it took six to eight weeks
for the first wave of repressions to subside, much longer that the projected two weeks.
Compared to the intensity of repressions against participants in street protests, the political
opposition and citizens engaged in civil society structures, the situation with the freedom of
speech and freedom of association deteriorated to a lesser degree, which is in line with the
forecast. Compared to previous quarters, the deterioration was very serious, though.
The main difference of the current situation from the one described in the previous
survey is that the previous trend towards a limited liberalization suspended after December
19. At the same time, the political regime in the country remained unchanged; there was a
marked tightening of the policy in the framework of the existing regime, probably accompanied
by a redistribution of power of various groupings within the ruling elite.
The election campaign therefore finished not only with vote count manipulations with a
view to giving the victory to the incumbent head of state (which was predicted in the pessimistic
forecast of the democratization indicator), but also with a spike in repressions, which exceeded
expectations (which was not foreseen in our forecast).
Justification for the new trend towards radical de8liberalization in the period in question
is a simple task: manifestations of this trend are familiar to most Belarusians and are
unprecedented in Belarusian political history. Repressions against political opponents reached
an unprecedented scale, the most significant events being the arrest of seven presidential
candidates on the night after the election day, criminal cases instituted against fifty people,
mass arrests and beatings of participants in rallies, searches at NGOs and confiscations of
equipment, and pressure on attorneys.
The lack of progress in democratization was manifested in the unpromising assessment
of the election by OSCE ODIHR observers, as well as domestic monitors. OSCE mission
observers said vote count conditions were bad or very bad at 75% of polling stations. Even
the CIS mission, which never published its report, criticized some aspects of the election.
Description of the key event that defined the trend and explanation why it is
important and defines the trend
Paradoxically, the main event of the trend in question was not the election itself, which
finished quite predictably, but the post8election repressions. This is largely due to the strategy
of the opposition candidates, who had banked on mass protests about a rigged vote count
after the election rather than on getting a majority vote. We assume that this shift in emphases
became a welcome strategy for the authorities, and the range of repressions obscured the
claims against the quality of the election process and conditions of the vote count.
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On the one hand, the range of repressive measures against the opposition was broad; on
the other hand, the chief instruments of repressions had already been tested by the authorities:
the arrest of over 700 protesters is commensurable with the events that followed the 2006
presidential election, when former presidential candidate Alexander Kozulin was imprisoned.
The wave of searches and pressure on attorneys and human rights activists are quite habitual
in Belarus. The new factors were the brutality of each measure and simultaneous application
of many repressive measures, which resulted in an atmosphere of blanket repression against
the opposition and civil society. Another factor enhancing the shocking effect of the repressions
was that force was used immediately after polling stations closed and even prior to that
(candidate Neklyaev had been beaten before the voting process was completed).
Although the mechanism of repression showed many of its sides during and after the
election, public attention was focused on the criminal case on “mass disorders of December
19” – seven presidential candidates, some of their authorized representatives and members
of their election headquarters, as well as regular protesters were charged with staging mass
riots. Especially alarming is the fact that the events of December 19, which were essentially a
peaceful protest action that was dispersed by the authorities with the use of force, is now
reduced exclusively to the incident near the doors of the House of Government. During that
episode, some doors and windows were shattered in the building, which is interpreted by the
authorities as “mass disorders” (the president and the government media mention attempts
of a “coup” masterminded from abroad). At the same time, most of the presidential candidates
were not only staying far from that site, but were also trying to pacify those who were breaking
windows. Finally, some of those accused of taking part in mass disorders were not even
present at the square at that time. These facts, alongside the lack of action from the police,
who were just watching the crowd for quite a long time before there came a command to
disperse the rally, suggest that the incident was an act of provocation paving the way for the
authorities to exercise repressions against the opponents of the regime.
According to the Human Rights Center “Viasna”, as of March 2, 2011, 38 people still had
a status of charged offenders in the mass disorders case, of them 26 were in custody awaiting
trial, including two former presidential candidates; two were under house arrest, including
one former presidential candidate; nine were released into their own recognizance, including
two former presidential candidates. Twelve people are still “suspects”, of them two are now
abroad, most of those 12 are on their own recognizance, including two former presidential
candidates. Four people had already been sentenced to three to four years in prison for
participating in mass disorders; the international human rights community has recognized
them as political prisoners. According to “Viasna” and Belarusian Helsinki Committee, over
200 people were summoned to the police for interrogation in the framework of the same
criminal case, to say nothing of thousands of
Description of additional events
The mass disorders case is submitted to the court piecemeal, as components pertaining
to separate accused persons are severed from the rest of charges. Besides that, there are
other criminal cases underpinned by purely political reasons, for instance, charging of the
leader of Malady Front (Youth Front) Dmitry Dashkevich and his associate Eduard Lobov with
disorderly conduct. The circumstances of their arrest suggest that the oppositionists were
simply framed: the scheme that had been used so many times to isolate opponents of the
regime based on hooliganism and disorderly conduct charges is working again.
The arrests of over 700 participants in protest actions of December 19820 took place not
only during the dispersal of the rallies, but also within two weeks of the election day. The scale
of repressions corresponds to the events of 2006, however, human rights activists report that
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recent arrests were more brutal and involved beating (during the dispersal of the rally,
presidential candidates Vitaly Rimashevski, Andrei Sannikov and Grigory Kostusev were beaten).
Candidate Mikhalevich on February 28 reported tortures and brutal treatment of the offenders
staying in the KGB investigatory isolation facility. Among those faced with administrative charges
there were many journalists, and some of them (representatives of Belsat television channel,
Radio Racyja) were warned that professional activity of foreign media without accreditation
was inadmissible.
On February 16, 2011, Alexander Belyatski, the vice8president of the International human
rights federation and head of Human Rights Center “Viasna”, received a warning from the
prosecutor’s office on account of his activity in the framework of an unregistered organization
with a threat of prosecution under article 19381 of the Criminal Offences Code. The warrants
authorizing searches in unregistered public organizations (for example, Human Rights Center
“Viasna”, “Legal Assistance to Population”, Student Rada) contained notes that it was the fact
that the NGOs were unregistered that stood behind the searches, which is an alarming signal.
A matter of special concern is the practice of pressurizing attorneys that was employed
by the Justice Ministry. Attorneys do not have a chance to communicate with political prisoners
(many of the attorneys saw their clients only once when accusations were officially presented),
which deprives many of the accused persons of their right of defense. At least six attorneys
either had their licenses revoked or were expelled from the bar association; the leadership of
Minsk board of lawyers was condemned by the authorities, whereas the Justice Ministry
started developing new rules of legal ethics.
The arrests and searches in apartments of human rights activists and human rights
NGOs, as well as the interference of the authorities in the activity of bar associations are
serious infringements on the freedom of association. Furthermore, the Justice Ministry
addressed warnings to a number of NGOs (including the Belarusian Helsinki Committee),
whereas the Public Association Zabota (Care), in which former candidate Neklyaev was
engaged, now undergoes judicial liquidation procedures. Two significant organizations – Party
BNF and Union of Artists – have faced threats of being kicked out of their premises in downtown
Minsk. As for the Belarusian Social8Democratic Party Hramada, the Justice.
Ministry has introduced what can be considered external management, since the ministry
does not recognize the authority of the governing agencies of the party elected at a congress
in 2010, but recognizes the powers of the previous chairman. With regard to repressions
against opposition activists and some street protest participants, positive changes are visible.
Description of events contradicting the trend and why they do not change the
trend
In January 2011, Chairman of the Constitutional Court Miklashevich came out for the
introduction of the post of an ombudsman in Belarus, which means the country essentially
recognizes the recommendation of the global community as valid. However, statements of
this kind used to be made in the past, whereas the influence of the chairman of the Constitutional
Court in the Belarusian system is not sufficient to start developing the framework for a new
institution.
In 2010, the Justice Ministry and central justice departments of region administrations
and Minsk city administration registered 134 new public associations (five international, 15
republican (national) and 114 local organizations), 14 new funds (one international and 13
local funds). The year 2010 thus set a new record since 2005 in terms of the number of newly
registered organizations, although the list includes some of the associations that were previously
denied registration (for instance, Youth public association Falanster (Phalanstиre). The
economic court of the city of Minsk created a precedent by nullifying the denial of registration
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of the Association of extended training and education. At the same time, the government is
working on a new law on non8profit organizations, which will apply severe requirements to
their creation and operation, the same that public organizations and political parties have to
meet now. The current version of this bill is still being revised, as there have been remarks
from both some ministries and civil society.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
It looks like de8liberalization reached its peak in early 2011 and will inevitably be replaced
by gradual liberalization in the form of less intense repressions (but not systemic, long8term
institutional improvements). Repressions will stop their growth, mass disorder cases will be
heard during the first half of the year; dozens of participants in “mass disorders” will hear
verdicts of guilty and sentenced to three to five years in prison. Criminal cases against at least
two of the former presidential candidates will end in verdicts of guilty of arranging those
“mass disorders”. The severity of sentences will depend on political circumstances and the
degree of international pressure on the Belarusian regime. Repressions against the mass
media are unlikely. Forced liquidation of objectionable NGOs and political parties is more
probable, as well as new barriers to their activity. Another registration bid of the Party Belarusian
Christian Democracy will likely fail, whereas the deprivation of the Party BNF of its office in
downtown Minsk will become a painful blow on the party and may entail warnings for violations
in the registration of the legal address. The adoption of the Law on commercial organizations
will be postponed until the second half of the year or even later.
Brief forecast for the year
The likeliest scenario for the year is the gradual transition of the Belarusian regime into
the “stand by for dialogue with the West” phase (until autumn 2011). Since the dialogue will
very likely be centered on the fates of political prisoners, large8scale repressions should not
be expected in that period, however, the same applies to liberalization. The second half of
2011 will see a stagnation of liberalization processes. The state may resume its rhetoric on
possible changes in the election regulations on the eve of the parliamentary elections of 2012
and may announce certain indulgencies for NGOs (introduction of social mandate norms,
abolition of the moratorium on registration of organizations in Minsk). The public advisory
council at the Presidential Administration may resume its work.
TREND 2
Economic liberalization —
Assessment of the forecast given in the previous issue of BISS/Trends
The forecast regarding Belarus’ economic policy that we provided in the previous issue
was only partially correct. On the one hand, the long8term administrative pressure on the
country’s economy with a view to achieving the exorbitant wage and GDP targets definitely
resulted in macroeconomic misbalances. However, the search for the best solution to the
problems took the form of not only an expanded cooperation with the IMF mission for joint
elaboration of a turnaround program, but also the policy of macroeconomic populism: Belarus
placed Eurobonds, took out loans and conducted a corny search for new rents to shore up
what is clearly an inefficient economic structure.
Justification for the new trend
The previous period was characterized by the adoption and implementation of crucial
decisions in the field of investment attraction, labor market liberalization, borrowing and price
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liberalization, and, on the other hand, a natural failure of denationalization efforts, privatization
and public sector management reform. It seems the government has opted for the manual
control mode in modernizing the economic management system, which may often have
conflicting results. We can thus speak about case8by8case liberalization (primarily price and
tariff liberalization), however, these measures are definitely not sufficient to resolve the
economic problems Belarus is faced with now and may be cancelled any time.
Description of key and additional events that defined the trend
The entire month of January was marked by uncertainty because of the quarrel over the
terms of oil supplies and indefiniteness about the prospects of the construction of the Belarusian
nuclear power plant. After shutting the European vector of external policy and having major
concerns about possible economic sanctions of the European Union (we will not argue here
whether the application of these sanctions has been and remains realistic), the Belarusian
regime shifted its reliance to projects with Russia and, to a lesser degree, with China. Placing
its bet on the Russian square in the geoeconomic casino, Belarus was anxiously watching the
roulette wheel spin for what seemed a very long time.
Since there were no contracts for oil supplies to Belarus covering the year 2011, Russian
companies suspended deliveries to Belarus on January 1. The dispute over the terms of trade
unfolded amid Moscow’s decision to abolish export duties on oil for the members of the
Customs Union. However, in return, Russia insisted on a USD 458per8tonne premium. The
conflict was resolved as late as January 25, when Belarusian and Russian companies reached
an agreement on resumption of supplies. The specific conditions of supplies remain
undisclosed, however, there are good reasons to believe that Belarus agreed to buy crude oil
at a price including a USD 468per8tonne premium.
At the same time, the project to build Belarus’ first nuclear power plant was given a
major impetus on January 25, when Rosatom corporation head Sergei Kiriyenko and First
Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko said that the agreement on the construction of the
nuclear power plant would be signed in the first quarter of 2011. The Belarusian nuclear
power plant will cost an estimated USD 6 billion. The first power unit is expected to be launched
in 2016, and the plant is projected to reach its design capacity in 2018. There are still some
points at issue that will have to be tackled later, though.
The crusade against macroeconomic misbalances mostly employed instruments of
external borrowing. Despite the verbal ban of President Lukashenko to borrow and his directive
to “keep within means”, Belarus placed a seven8year USD 800 million Eurobond issue at a
coupon rate of 8.95%. Foreign borrowing through Eurobond offering thus appeared to be
pretty costly. Furthermore, on February 25, Lukashenko inked ordinance № 75 to allow local
authorities (regional executive committees and Minsk city executive committee) to issue
Eurobonds to provide liquidity for their investment projects. Interestingly, these liabilities will
be considered a debt of local authorities and will not be included in the country’s foreign debt.
In fact, Belarus continues using the rent of foreign loans to preserve its socioeconomic model.
Let us get back to the events that define the “liberalization” trend. Firstly, Prime Minister
Mikhail Myasnikovich in January instructed the government to eliminate obstacles to the
development of the logistical sector. The initiative envisages simpler taxation procedures and
document flows for logistical services. This measure seems quite logical, because Belarus is
willing to use new possibilities offered by logistical business and freight transport within the
framework of the Customs Union.
Secondly, Belarus reduced the number of mandatory primary accounting documents in
pursuance of decisions of the president and the government to change to International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Thirdly, some new investment projects were outlined: Lukashenko
# 5 December – February 2011
330 	



decided to allow foreign investors to finance the development of a potash salt field in the
vicinity of Soligorsk, Belarus announced plans to sell a 25% stake in Belaruskali and set in
motion the Technopark project.
Description of events contradicting the trend
In January, Belarus de facto imposed a ban on using bank loans to make advance payments
for import: from now on, to extend loans to corporate entities engaged in importing
commodities, banks are supposed to demand documents confirming receipt of goods. This
measure is an instrument to tighten money market policies, which is capable of encouraging
the shadow market of financial services in Belarus.
At the same time, the ban on lending can hardly be called a de8liberalization feature; it is
rather a forced macroeconomic measure.
Forecast for the second quarter of 2011 and entire year
On the one hand, the government led by Myasnikovich will be lobbying for improvement
of the business environment for small and medium8sized business, hence selective
liberalization. On the other hand, the government will have to address the problem of the
balance of payments by way of case8by8case privatization and additional external borrowing.
Finally, we do not rule out devaluation of the Belarusian national currency in the next six
months.
Based on the framework hypothesis, we forecast that the year 2011 will see efforts to
normalize relations with the West, Belarus will make up its mind to cooperate with the IMF and
will do its best to restore economic ties with Europe. Then again, this forecast is built on the
assumption that the EU will decide against slapping sanctions on the Belarusian potash and
petrochemical sectors.
TREND 3
Good governance and the rule of law 
Assessment of the forecast given in the previous issue of BISS/Trends
The mass protests that took place on December 19 and repressions that followed naturally
left a mark on all areas of public life, including the quality of governance and rule of law. The
arrests of civil society activists, investigatory actions, enforcement efforts of KGB and trials of
those accused provided a clear picture of what was going on in the law enforcement sector,
namely that provisions of the law and other regulatory acts are interpreted exclusively to the
benefit of the authorities and law8enforcement agencies. These unfortunate events somewhat
overshadow the few positive changes in such components of the trend as protection of property
rights and quality of corporate governance. However, we have to admit that against all odds
the authorities continued promoting the package of “liberalization” reforms. As we had expected,
the long8awaited Directive № 4 on promotion of enterprise was adopted late in 2010 (on
December 31). In February 2011, a new version of the Law on Economic Entities came into
effect, and a presidential ordinance on price regulation was approved. The tendency towards
the gradual introduction of some new elements of information society continued, this time as
a new initiative – the application of electronic auctions in state procurement contracts.
Justification for the trend in the period in question
All of the preceding characterizes the Trend in the analyzed period as “absence of
progress”, because the new legal acts and initiatives passed in the period at least do not
deteriorate the status quo. The few months following the presidential election were marked by
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the adoption of specific regulatory acts with simultaneous declarations of the active elaboration
of additional liberalization arrangements, specifically Directive № 4, which, quoting Belarusian
officials, is already “palpable”. Also indicative are apparent attempts of the authorities to
“flirt” with the Belarusian business community: all concerned individuals and associations are
invited to make proposals regarding the documents implementing the key provisions of the
Directive by the end of March, and the authorities will take time to decide which of the proposals
should be included in the new framework to regulate entrepreneurial activities and in what
form. It is also important to bear in mind that most of the amendments are introduced by
presidential regulatory acts, which do not require lengthy reviews and coordination procedures,
hence a chance to respond to changes in the current situation fast enough; however, the risk
of inconsistency is quite high, for any ordinance or decree can be altered as easily and fast as
it was adopted.
Description of key event that defined the trend and explanation why it is
important and defines the trend
Amid the indicatively selective law enforcement practices, the key event of the period in
question was the adoption of Directive № 4 “On the Promotion of Entrepreneurial Initiative
and Encouragement of Business Activity in the Republic of Belarus”, which is so innovative
and progressive in its essence that if all planned arrangements were implemented, the
liberalization trend curve would spike. The directive declares the principle “competition wherever
possible, state regulation wherever indispensable”. The document envisages measures to
protect and develop private property (including irreversibility of privatization of state property
on condition the new owner complies with laws), further improvement of controlling and
supervisory activities with emphasis shifted to prevention of offenses, encouragement of public
private partnership and efforts to ensure the stability of regulations and sustainable quality of
regulatory acts.
Description of additional events
Additional events corroborating the trend in the period in question include the coming
into effect of the Law “On amendments to the Law of the Republic of Belarus “On economic
entities», which simplified the procedure of establishing economic entities and decision8
making regarding the terms of reference of the general meeting of shareholders, and
increased the degree of protection of minority shareholders. Also noteworthy is ordinance
№ 708 “On holding electronic auctions”, which became another move towards information
society.
The concept of criminal liability, which is to be implemented by 2015, envisages
arrangements to decriminalize certain crimes against property, economic procedures and
some other offenses, and introduction of bail as a measure of restraint. Finally, ordinance
№ 72 “On certain issues of price/tariff regulation in the Republic of Belarus” stipulates free
price formation as a general rule and contains a definitive list of exclusions and powers of
state authorities in regulation of prices and tariffs.
Description of events contradicting the trend and why they do not change the
trend
In early February, Chief of the State Control Committee A. Yakobson remarked upon the
failure of Russian Unimilk to meet its investment commitments. The statement may be
interpreted as the willingness of the state to exercise close control of the activity of private
investors and interfere in corporate governance schemes at private companies. However, no
unambiguous conclusions may be drawn based on this information, therefore this fact was
not taken into account when the trend was assessed.
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Brief forecast for the next quarter
In the second quarter of 2011 (April), the government, National Bank of Belarus and
other state authorities are expected to come up with specific draft regulatory acts to implement
the key provisions of Directive № 4. In this regard, the few months to come will be intriguing
in the context of the further development of the trend. The new law on regulatory acts is likely
to improve the law enforcement system, although the key obstacle to the stability and impartiality
of law enforcement practices is the virtually unlimited regulatory and administrative powers of
the president and his team.
Brief forecast for the year
The year 2011 has been declared the year of enterprise/initiative and will be marked by
efforts to implement Directive № 4. The fact is the document includes progressive and
reasonable rules, however, there are good reasons to have doubts that all of its provisions will
be implemented soon enough. From the look of it, the trend of “controlled liberalization”,
observed throughout last year, will continue in 2011, with carefully measured portions of
liberalization laws and presidential rulings. Naturally, an essential prerequisite for the trend to
continue is the absence of drastic changes in the internal and external economic and political
environments. The issues of law enforcement in general and consistency of the legal system
are still unresolved.
TREND 4
Geopolitical orientation: Relations with Russia 
Relations with the EU 
Assessment of the forecast given in the previous issue of BISS/Trends
Despite the forecast we made in the previous BISS8Trends issue, the outcomes of the
presidential campaign82010 compromised all the achievements in the relations with the
European Union and resulted in a sharp strengthening of the eastern vector of the Belarusian
external policy and general dependence of Belarus on Russia. The dissociation with Russia
did not increase; on the contrary, both countries managed to reach agreements on most
crucial issues prior to the presidential election in Belarus.
Justification for the new trend
The new geopolitical trend features a sharp deterioration of relations with the EU and the
United States and reapplication of the policy of partial isolation of the Belarusian regime by
the West. In the first quarter of 2011, the “geopolitical pendulum” reached its most eastern
position. Back in December 2010, immediately after the election, the Belarusian parliament
ratified a package of documents to establish the Common Economic Area with Russia and
Kazakhstan. On January 1, 2011, new terms of oil supplies to Belarus within the Customs
Union came into effect.
In response to mass beatings and arrests of participants of protest actions, the European
Union on December 19 reinstated the original visa ban for Belarusian officials and extended
the list of officials that are denied entry in the EU. The United States joined that move and
discontinued the suspension of the economic sanctions against a few Belarusian enterprises.
Although officially the Council of the European Union did not issue any specific instructions,
Brussels de facto froze its top level contacts with Minsk (except for Foreign Minister Sergei
Martynov), suspended assistance programs and made it clear that Belarus would not be eligible
to receive macrofinancial assistance from the EU.
BISS  Trends
333
Description of key events that defined the trend
On December 21, 2010, the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, the
lower chamber of the Belarusian parliament, adopted a package of 18 international agreements
to establish the Common Economic Area of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (just like President
Lukashenko promised during his press availability on December 20), which became a crucial
move towards further deepening of the integration in the post8Soviet space.
Furthermore, according to the agreements inked in Moscow on December 9, Belarus
was enabled to buy Russian crude oil and oil products without paying duties on condition it
transferred the entire volume of export duties on oil products to the Russian budget (except
for those refined from its own crude and imports from Venezuela). In January, the volume of
oil subsidies to Belarus was announced at a meeting of the two premiers – Russia offered
Belarus a subsidy of USD 4.1 billion. This afforded official Minsk additional room for maneuver
in the western direction and enabled the country to postpone liberal reforms.
The brutal dispersal of the rally in Independence Square on December 19, 2010 and
arrests of opposition leaders and activists that followed became a turning point in the Belarusian
relationship with the West. In mid8January, representatives of the opposition, human rights
organizations and relatives of arrested activists visited European capital cities to meet with
European politicians and officials. Those meetings, alongside hearings of the Belarus issue
arranged in party groups and extraordinary session in the European Parliament on January 12
predetermined the unprecedented severity of political groups’ proposals regarding the resolution
of the European Parliament on Belarus. However, the final resolution and decisions of the
Council of the European Union with respect to Belarusian officials were quite gentle: the EU
imposed visa sanctions and pledged to revise its policy on Belarus. Nevertheless, the process
of normalization of Belarusian8European relations was severed, and the EU de facto limited
contacts with the Belarusian authorities and suspended assistance programs.
Description of additional events
Amid the general deterioration of the relations with the European Union and the USA,
Minsk saw its relations with Poland and Germany become strained like never before – the two
western countries were accused of financing the Belarusian opposition with a view to staging
a coup in Belarus. This happened despite the fact that it was mainly German and Polish diplomats
that made the most effort in cooperating with the existing regime and dragging Belarus into
European processes.
At the same time, a number of statements made both by Belarusian and European officials,
as well as the wording of the resolution issued by the European Parliament and decisions of
the Council of the European Union suggest that neither side appreciates the current state of
things and both would like to get back to normal relations as soon as possible.
Although Belarus is formally a member of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, it was decided
that the EURONEST parliamentary dimension of the Eastern Partnership would be launched
without Belarusian MPs, which makes it clear that the Belarusian authorities should not rely
on the Eastern Partnership as a platform to improve Belarus’ relations with the EU.
Description of events contradicting the trend
In late February, the Council of the European Union approved the mandate of the European
Commission for holding negotiations between Brussels and Minsk over simplifying the visa
regime. The relevant document was submitted to the Council of the European Union back in
November 2010, but its approval took place after the presidential election in Belarus and
introduction of visa sanctions against some Belarusian officials. The European Union used to
impose democratization and liberalization conditionality upon the possible simplification of
the visa regime, however, after the events of December 19, a decision was made to not only
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put additional pressure on the Belarusian government, but also facilitate contacts between
Belarusians and EU citizens by way of simplifying visa procedures and reducing Schengen
visa fees.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
In the next quarter, the situation that was observed at the start of the year will very likely
stay the same. The relations with the European Union will be overclouded by politically8
motivated trials of the opponents of the existing regime, therefore the possibility of the beginning
of a new dialogue between Minsk and Brussels is doubtful. Belarus will be focused on resolving
its internal problems rather than restoring its relations with the West.
Brief forecast for the year
Since official Minsk cannot benefit much from the current level of relations with the
European Union, which substantially weakens its bargaining position in any sort of negotiations
with Moscow, the Belarusian authorities will try their best to get back to normal relations with
the EU. This can happen only after trials of opposition activists and mopping up of the political
field inside Belarus. The commencement of a new electoral cycle (Belarus is scheduled to
hold a parliamentary election in 2012) will also encourage the authorities to tackle foreign
political problems and address the issue of legitimacy of the Belarusian parliament. Based on
this, we can expect a resumption of the dialogue between Minsk and Brussels on the restoration
and deepening of relations this autumn or winder.
TREND 5
Cultural policy: stagnating liberalization and Belarusization on leftovers —
Assessment of the forecast given in the previous issue of BISS/Trends
The forecast provided in the previous issue of BISS8trends was accurate. For one thing,
this pertains to the indication of the special status of culture policy in the near term, aiming at
neutralizing and to some extent compensating for the clearly unpopular measures in other
areas of public administration. As was forecast in the previous issue, the authorities failed to
make up an integral long8term strategy for Europeanization of Belarusian cultural space and
instead came up with a case8by8case redecoration of culture Olympus, which cannot efficiently
perform its functions of a symbolic counterweight to balance the total deconstruction of the
dialogue with civil society. In the quarter under analysis, the policy of relative liberalization of
the cultural space was neutralized by the events that started on December 19, 2010.
The end of the armistice between the authorities and civil society that was marked in
Minsk’s Independence Square on December 19, reverberated through the culture space, when
privately8owned AVTORADIO station was shut down, despite its fitting perfectly into the policy
of Belarusization that is actively promoted by the state. Nevertheless, a few measures taken
during the period in question may be interpreted as an attempt to prolong the life of the
rapidly fading liberalization of Belarus’ cultural space, therefore, it would be proper to tag this
phase as stagnation.
Justification for the new trend
The arrests, searches at alternative private media, closure of AVTORADIO, concealed
efforts to separate poet Neklyaev from politician Neklyaev and sever the author from his work
(examples include A. Yarmolenko’s and N. Cherginets’ contemplations about Vladimir Neklyaev,
similar in their logic) – these are attempts to depoliticize the cultural field of the country and
keep the appearance of the autonomous development of the cultural landscape of the country.
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What we observe here is a tendency towards elimination of all repressive actions of the
authorities in the culture sphere, as well as their consequences, as if they were a matter of
some other reality – the reality of the case of mass disorders. This strategy accentuates the
real degree of (in)dependence and servility of the Culture Ministry and its head. An analysis of
the state culture policy of that period demonstrates this strategy: the Culture Ministry is trying
to prolong the image of the protector of the Belarusian cultural heritage and European roots of
Belarusian culture (for example, P. Latushko’s speech at a board meeting in Mir) by manipulating
secondary events. Nevertheless, the methods of such struggle are not quite innovative, whereas
the notion of Europeanization has its peculiar substance, in which the central aspect is not
democratic values and freedom of self8fulfillment, but the work to “create a positive profile” of
the country abroad.
After the events of December 19, all international contacts and meetings of the culture
minister have been minimized. The few events that promote Belarus’ connections with other
countries are the XVIII Minsk international book fair, attended by representatives of foreign
and private Belarusian publishing houses. This period is also characterized by the general
reduction in activity in the cultural sphere, however, reasons are not purely seasonal. To sum
it up: in the period December 19 through March 1, in the context of uncontrolled flows of
aggression coming from the authorities, which filled even the cultural space of Belarus, the
attempts of the Culture Ministry to keep working on the exportable image of Belarus and its
culture and foster further Belarusization of the cultural landscape acquire a totally grotesque
interpretation.
Description of the key event that defined the trend and explanation why it is
important and defines the trend
The key event marking the end of the cultural armistice between the authorities and civil
society, the quintessence of the continuing repressions that hit, among others, the culture
sector of the country, was the shutdown of the private FM radio station AVTORADIO, a move
that is not legally justified and that does not suit the declared priority of Europeanization of the
Belarusian cultural field. On the other hand, this event emphasizes the instrumental nature of
the European vector in the development of Belarusian culture in the official discourse, where
Europeanization is reduced to a growth in interdepartmental contacts that are measured
quantitatively rather than qualitatively. Moreover, just like in the political sector, the culture
field was a complete failure in all its attempts to improve the cultural image of the country
abroad: the resurrection of pre8Soviet cultural values and historical figures that complicate
the cultural identity of Belarus cannot substitute for the basic principles of today’s European
cultural discourse – the freedom of self8expression, open dialogue and pluralism.
Description of additional events
The contradictory nature of liberalization and Belarusization in the cultural sector also
manifests itself in the adoption of the State program “Culture of Belarus” for 2011–2015,
which continues the tradition of five8year scheduling born back in the Soviet times and
expressing the criteria of cultural development in figures, percentages and other quantitative
indicators. This event to a great extent complements the specific character of cultural policy
since mid8December 2010 through March 2011, namely, its ambiguity and instrumental nature.
Cultural policy of the Belarusian state in that period is quite ambiguous: on the one hand,
there are many projects aimed at developing Belarusian culture; on the other hand, Belarusian
culture is regarded not as a value in itself, but as an ideological instrument to control society.
Economic performance of the culture sector is given a priority status: the program for cultural
development does not rule out a transfer to public private management structure and reiterates
plans for Belarusfilm studio to break even and support itself. S. Klimov, the director of the
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cultural8historical complex Nesvizh Castle, in a recent interview emphasizes the need to reap
economic benefits from cultural and historical entities, whereas preservation of the authenticity
and integrity of cultural monuments pales into insignificance. In this respect, the discussions
around the project to revive Lida Castle are quite indicative: the restoration of the castle followed
the traditional pattern, when only the interference of the media helped influence the process
of restoration, which neglected the authenticity principle.
The selectiveness of the Belarusization policy, or rather the lack of consistency, is
manifested in the authorities’ neglecting the “Day of Native Language” event arranged by the
Fellowship of the Belarusian Language. The replacement of the head of the Belarusian Television
and Radio Company (G. Davydko has been appointed new director) has not resulted in major
changes in the policy of the major media resource: television largely remains Russian8speaking,
the hopes of liberalization of television and radio never came true, Belarusian state television
performs the same ideological functions as before.
Description of events contradicting the trend and why they do not change the
general trend
One of the events that fail to fit in the logical framework of the resumed war against civil
society and increase in repressions is the creation of the advisory council on cultural issues,
which includes, among others, representatives of “unofficial” culture. As of today, the precise
terms of reference of the Council are unknown, and so is the real degree of the involvement of
representatives of unofficial culture. There is reason to believe that the Council, just like the
Council with the Presidential Administration, is just a nominal platform for the authorities to
communicate with independent experts and actors, who will be used to demonstrate the
eagerness of Belarusian officials to engage in open constructive dialogue.
The coming into effect of the presidential ordinance on the liberalization of concert
business can also be interpreted as a positive move: it promotes concert business in Belarus
and is a result of joint efforts of legislators, musicians and businessmen.
Brief forecast for the next quarter
One can be fairly sure that repressions will continue in the near future: the war against
civil, society will continue in all areas of public life, including culture. At the same time, the
authorities can be expected to attempt to use the Culture Ministry to camouflage the critical
contradictions with the declared work aimed at Europeanizing the Belarusian cultural tradition
and sophisticating its cultural horizon, and continue the defined strategy of depoliticization of
the local cultural space.
Brief forecast for the year
Making forecasts in the context of the state policy that was retuned on December 19 is a
tough task, nevertheless, we may expect the authorities to continue mopping up the cultural
landscape of the country while denying any potentially meaningful actor any possibility of
defining the profile of contemporary Belarusian culture independently. The authorities will
therefore encourage further marginalization of representatives of “informal” culture. The
authorities will use both liberalization and Belarusization of culture as a bargaining chip and
implement them patchily.
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